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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis considers the military effectiveness of the late seventeenth century militia, 
focusing upon those county forces which took part in the Monmouth Rebellion 
campaign of 1685.  If the militia were effective then there should be evidence of it 
fulfilling a set of specified criteria for effectiveness.  After examining the militia’s 
historical purpose and context, as well as its relationship with society, these criteria 
were defined and then used to test evidence assembled from primary sources. 
Documents containing information and comments upon the nature, operation and 
performance of the militia were consulted, including records of contemporary official 
and personal material held both by local and national record offices.   
The results showed the militia to have been militarily effective, thus lending 
support to the hypothesis that they were more effective than hitherto supposed.  
Further research was conducted using information gathered from personal accounts, 
private papers, letters, financial records, diaries and memoirs held in record offices, 
libraries and muniment rooms.  These also supported the view that the militia was 
actually an efficient military organisation, according to the period expectations and 
demands made of it. The sheer number of references discovered, together with the 
nature and status of their authors, suggests that modern works have presented an 
inaccurate view of the militia and its qualities.  In the light of this new evidence, it 
was concluded that the late seventeenth century militia were effective in 
contemporary terms, and recommends that current literature be revised. 
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PREFACE 
My fascination with the militia of the Monmouth Rebellion began in 1985 during the 
300th Anniversary Celebrations, when the civil war re-enactment regiment which I ran 
was employed by the cider brewer Gaymer’s to promote their wares. My group 
marched through several West Country towns dressed as royal troops of 1685 and 
read James II’s declaration against the Duke of Monmouth at each venue’s central 
location before distributing Gaymer’s samples in pewter pots.  As part of the research 
for the project I read the pro-royalist accounts of the rebellion, especially the writings 
of John Churchill and the Earl of Feversham. 
This had a profound effect upon my approach to studying military history 
because although until then a dedicated West Countryman and latter day Monmouth 
supporter, reading the accounts written by the traditional enemy opened my eyes to 
the folly of only seeing events through the eyes of one side in a military struggle.  It 
caused me to question what I had hitherto accepted and seen repeated in history books 
purporting to be the truth.  As the creator of the Guild of Battlefield Guides’ 
Validation Programme I now find myself frequently asking candidates presenting 
stories of battles to tell their audiences about the enemy perspective and which 
sources of enemy information they have consulted. 
Moreover this questioning of the veracity of what is written in history books 
led to a growing appreciation of how bias and personal agendas play a part in most 
accounts.  From my reading pertaining to the Monmouth Rebellion I began to 
perceive that the militia regiments which took part in the campaign were often 
sweepingly dismissed as ineffective and were proclaimed, in short, useless as military 
bodies.  There seemed to be universal condemnation.  This was therefore either a 
fundamental truth or a repeated myth that had, by repetition been accepted as such.  In 
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all probability for such a generalisation across such a wide number of regiments to 
apply to all of them was unlikely.  This sweeping dismissal of the militia of 1685 was 
seldom substantiated by contemporary evidence beyond the oft-repeated writings of 
John Churchill.  I wanted to know what other contemporaries thought of the 
institution, especially the officers who commanded these county forces and the 
parliament which legislated for their funding.  
The more I looked through the available history books the more aware I 
became that this work had never been seriously undertaken and the same sources of 
criticism were paraded again and again.  This realisation coincided with a chance 
conversation over lunch with Professor Richard Holmes at the Royal United Service 
Institution in Whitehall. He persuaded me that this work would be an original study 
worthy of a PhD investigation.  The results of my work are presented in this thesis. 
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form of ending.  The spelling of names often varied during the seventeenth century 
and many of those mentioned in the text appear in several formats in contemporary 
documents.  The form chosen for each name is that used by a recent published 
authority, e.g. Rogers, M., Montacute House (Swindon: National Trust, 1991, 
reprinted 2004) refers to Colonel Edward Phelipps of the Somerset Militia although 
this surname can be read as Phelips, Pheilips, Pheillipps, Phillips, Philipps or Philips 
in original sources. 
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Terms used throughout the text which may need some explanation. 
 
Ammunition The propellant and projectiles involved in the use of small arms 
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Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION 
‘We find but few historians, of all ages, who have been diligent enough in their 
search for truth; and it is their common method to take on trust what they deliver to 
the public, by which means a falsehood once received from a famed writer becomes 
traditional to posterity.’1 
 
1.1.  THE WORK. 
This work focuses upon the militia during the reign of James II, and investigates the 
question ‘Was the militia in the second half of the seventeenth century an effective 
military body?’  In particular the investigation focuses upon those units which took an 
active part in the Monmouth Rebellion campaign of 1685 - the historical context of which 
event can be seen in chapter two, pages 53-55.  
 Professional and amateur historians alike paint a picture of the late seventeenth 
century militia as unenthusiastic, ill-run, incompetent and non-effective. Chandler 
thought ‘it had little to offer as a serious military force in time of emergency’ whilst 
Manning even more forcefully states ‘It was ... made abundantly clear that the militia was 
tactically useless, undisciplined and lacking in courage’.2  Clifton claims he reiterates 
James II’s view of them that ‘The militia is a broken reed and should be discarded’.3 
Harris dismisses militia units stating ‘they proved woefully inadequate; they were not 
only poorly trained and ill-equipped, but they also show a general reluctance to march 
against their neighbours who had joined the rebel force’, whilst Tincey in describing the 
events of a skirmish at Keynsham says that a troop of militia stationed to secure the royal 
force’s line of retreat were ‘left well out of harm’s way for fear they would not stand in a 
fight’. 4 Chenevix-Trench dubs them ‘reluctant warriors’.5  Anderson goes further and 
ignores the Restoration Militia completely, telling us that ‘The Militia had been founded 
in 1757’.6   However, the recorded experience of officers and militiamen during 1685 and 
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contemporary reports on its general state do not confirm these assessments which are, as 
this thesis will demonstrate, based upon limited evidence and offer insufficient proof for 
such wide-sweeping condemnation.7   
If there is indeed an established perception that the late seventeenth-century 
county militia was unfit for military duties the author believes it is rooted in evaluations 
based upon selective references and not upon properly researched study, and that this 
misperception is generally uncritically repeated by modern writers.  This work seeks to 
examine whether the militia during the Monmouth Rebellion of 1685 was effective or 
not. 
 
1.2 METHODOLOGY.  
In order to gauge if the perception of the late seventeenth-century militia cited above is 
accurate, a basic question must be asked as to whether there is sufficient contemporary 
evidence to confirm or contradict that view.  To this end the majority of the research 
engaged with contemporary sources from a much wider study than hitherto undertaken 
and analysed their content, purpose and implications.  
However it was first necessary to examine if this perception of ineffectiveness is 
widely held and whether the published work of modern historians, including those 
mentioned above, is persuasive.  This was done by interviewing persons concerned with 
communicating history who were either very familiar with or had an interest in the 
seventeenth century.  The sample included professional and amateur historians and other 
professionals with substantial influence in telling the Monmouth Rebellion story.  They 
were all asked the same open-ended question about their views on the effectiveness of the 
militia in 1685 (see page 5).  This element of the research also took cognizance of current 
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museum displays, posters and labels and battlefield trail pamphlets and interpretation 
boards.   
Having established a modern perception of the militia’s effectiveness it was then 
necessary to see from whence this perception stemmed and to determine if the literature 
concerning the militia confirmed or contradicted the view.  This was done by conducting 
a literature review of the work of a range of writers from contemporary to recent 
historians who specialise in the study of the period, the land forces, the militia and the 
1685 campaign.  When the perception was shown to exist and to be the result of the 
literature, the study turned to both the notion behind the perception and the evidence for 
that notion. This involved tracing the origins of the idea of militia ineffectiveness and the 
motivation of the major source for it, King James II.  During the research a study was 
made of the king’s pronouncements concerning the militia, coupled with an analysis of 
his character and the manner in which his personal judgment influenced his policies and 
those of his ministers and agents.  This is not included in the work as it is tangential to the 
question of militia effectiveness, but there is sufficient evidence to support a claim that 
the perception of an ineffective militia was encouraged if not instigated by James II.       
Because the investigation was to focus upon the militia’s effectiveness it was 
necessary to define exactly what that meant.  Based upon the resulting definition a set of 
criteria was devised pertaining to military effectiveness.  These were then filtered by 
consideration of the historical, political, social and economic contexts within which the 
militia operated and the contemporary expectations of it.  Having established criteria for 
military effectiveness evidence was then sought from a wide range of contemporary 
sources to see if these could be claimed for the militia, or not.   
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1.3. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY. 
The study of the Restoration Militia is important to understanding the late seventeenth 
century because its role, administration and operations are central to many of the 
political, social and economic frameworks of the period.  Not only was the militia crucial 
to social control but it was also central to the debate concerning crown or parliament’s 
supremacy.  Its structure was indicative of the close networks of family and factional 
influences on local and national government, and the financial policies and systems 
which enabled government and society to function. Understanding how the militia was 
formed and its historic tradition reveals a particular blend of capitalist and democratic 
ideology, while an investigation of the people who commanded it and those who paid for 
it helps illustrate the values, attitudes and beliefs of the age. 
In addition such a study increases understanding of how contemporaries perceived 
their duty to the society in which they lived, and how they contributed to its defence.  The 
militia was a major element in this relationship and this study also helps understand what 
people, great and small, expected from it.  This study also informs the appreciation of the 
various comments and judgments passed upon the militia by generations of historians and 
other writers including those of the current era.    
For the past 350 years the image of an ineffective militia during the Monmouth 
Rebellion has been uncritically taken on trust.  If this study of the available contemporary 
evidence reveals a substantial number of primary source references which show the 
western militia to have been effective. it will contradict the current orthodoxy expressed 
in the current limited literature and as it is based on new empirical evidence its 
conclusions should be accepted by future historians. 
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1.4. THE PERCEPTION. 
The popular perception of militia ineffectiveness was tested by enquiring among twenty 
published experts of the early modern period how they viewed the late seventeenth 
century militia.  These were persons who specialise in communicating military history to 
the general public and authorities on the Monmouth Rebellion. The sample was chosen 
from among the membership of the British Commission for Military History, the Guild of 
Battlefield Guides and the Battlefields Trust known to be familiar with seventeenth 
century military history, and judged from past experience as likely to reply. Each person 
was asked ‘What is your perception of the military effectiveness of the late seventeenth-
century militia at the time of the Monmouth Rebellion?’ All were asked to commit their 
comments to email.  The simplified results of the survey were as follows: 
Table 1.4.1: Survey responses concerning militia effectiveness. 
 Sample Size   Responses Judged Ineffective   Judged Effective   No Judgment 
  20  17  15   1  1 
Source: Email responses from selected published historians. 
 Although somewhat informally and unscientifically done, the results were relatively 
unanimous and some of the received comments were telling.    
 Dr. Matthew Bennett, a senior lecturer at Sandhurst replied ‘I have always been 
under the impression that the militia was militarily ineffective.   It is hard to shake the 
impression that they were often playing at being soldiers’.8 Dr. Eric Gruber von Arni, an 
authority on military medical services voiced the opinion ‘the militia of the period could 
be likened to the TA in the early nineteen sixties - a gentlemen's club that had received 
little effective training for the job that they were intended for and, as a result, they 
responded badly during the rebellion’.9 Alan Turton, Curator of Basing House and author 
of several research publications on aspects of seventeenth-century armies, encapsulated 
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the perception: ‘The trouble with the militia was that the evidence shows that they were 
pretty useless’.10  He also commented that ‘It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the 
militia in the 1680s since they were not really put to the test until the Monmouth episode 
when the West Country contingents obviously had mixed loyalties’.11  Former Registrar 
of the Royal Armouries and civil wars authority, David Blackmore commented ‘Most 
militias were a bit of a joke with legal requirements complied to with a nod and a wink’.12 
Dr. Lesley Prince of Birmingham University, another expert on the seventeenth century 
and noted military vexillologist wrote: ‘Everything I’ve read about them leads me to 
believe them to have been ineffective, if not a liability’.13 Dr. Manfred Brod of Oxford 
University’s Department of Continuing Education postulated ‘The militia county 
regiments were far inferior to the bodies of military volunteers, such as that raised from 
the dons and students of Oxford University. The fact that this unit had to be raised by the 
University indicates what a sorry and totally incapable lot the county militia was’.14   
 In addition to these remarks comments were sought from various museum and tourist 
services.  The author has seen no museum information pamphlet pertaining to the 
Monmouth Rebellion which mentions the role played by the militia in the campaign or in 
the culminating battle, whilst the Blake Museum in Bridgwater, which houses perhaps the 
most comprehensive display relating to the campaign, has neither artefacts nor any 
explanatory labels concerning the militia. The Bridgwater archivist reported that ‘Nobody 
is interested in people who did nothing’.15 Various public display panels featuring 
information about the Monmouth Rebellion across the West Country fail to mention the 
role of the militia, and the battlefield interpretation boards on Sedgemoor merely record 
the position of the Wiltshire Militia in the rear at Middlezoy.  Although attempts were 
made to generate interest in the role of the militia in the campaign at several meetings of 
the Sedgemoor Re-interpretation Committee they were rebuffed and consequently their 
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story does not feature in the panels erected in 2008.  At one meeting of this body set up 
by Somerset County Council to promote tourist interest in the Battle of Sedgemoor,  
Richard Brunning, Senior Levels and Moors Heritage Officer, voiced the opinion: ‘There 
is no need to waste time on the militia. They contributed nothing to the events of the 
campaign and consequently have nothing to do with our story.’  The local Tourist 
Publicity Officer added: ‘They have no tourist draw, no reference point for the general 
public, not like the Household Cavalry, so why bother?’16 When asked why the militia 
were not included in the historical background issued to the non-historians on the 
committee, David Lane the Curator of the Bridgwater Museum who wrote the briefing 
story for the Committee and the Museum’s Education Services booklet said ‘I know so 
little about them, I just left them out.  I am unaware that they contributed anything of 
significance to the campaign’.17  
 The consensus of opinion indicates a shared perception of an ineffective militia 
but the question arises ‘Where did this opinion come from?’  Those consulted are 
individuals with different backgrounds, areas of expertise, viewpoints and interpretations 
but they share one unifying factor, they have all read the literature. 
 
1.5. LITERATURE REVIEW.   
Despite being focused upon contemporary sources and the evidence they provide 
‘every historical writer owes a debt to his predecessors in the field he is examining’.18  
Historians’ conclusions and opinions form a platform for further development but it must 
be remembered that they have pitfalls, not the least being the quality and quantity of the 
research underpinning it.  There is a danger in giving lasting credence to pronouncements 
which are subsequently disproved by newly discovered evidence.  For example, 
following a lecture in St. Mary’s Church, Bridgwater which repeated the assertion that 
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Monmouth observed the royal camp at Westonzoyland from that church tower, the author 
gained access to the viewing platform and even with powerful modern binoculars could 
not see anything in detail at that distance.19   
Some works contain what can only be termed imaginative myths.  At another 
lecture in the Church of St. Mary the Virgin, Westonzoyland, it was said that the rebel 
army paraded through the village on its march to Keynsham carrying banners bearing the 
names of the towns and villages from which they came.20  This is wholly unsubstantiated 
and is reminiscent of photographs of 1937 Coronation parades. Yet an author engaged to 
write the Council’s visitors’ booklet about the village in the Rebellion exclaimed ‘That is 
excellent local detail’.  This evidence is clearly anecdotal but in such ways myths are 
perpetuated.  
Most historians write for a target audience and are often inclined to render their 
work agreeable to their potential readership.  This may mean consciously slanting 
information to suit them or writing in such a style that will guarantee their continued 
attention.  Most historians also try to make their work exciting, readable and enjoyable.  
Totally objective history remains an ideal but seldom achieved goal as writers are shaped 
by the circumstances of their own lives; their work demonstrates unwitting bias which 
often tells readers about the values and mores of the times in which they were written.  
When approaching the literature concerning the late seventeenth century militia readers 
must ask of each book not only what level of research substantiates its claims but also for 
whom was it written and what were the prevailing beliefs at the time of writing.  
Since 1685 the story of the Monmouth Rebellion has been told and retold many 
times and the role in it played by the militia has been subject to interpretation and 
comment.  The following literature review outlines what has been written by those 
historians who had been alive during the events they describe, those who followed the 
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antiquarian vogue in the early 1800s or the profession of historical author in Victorian 
England, as well as writers of the twentieth century and of more recent times. 
1.5.1. Contemporary Historians.   
There are few accounts of the Monmouth Rebellion which can be described as the 
work of contemporary historians rather than as firsthand accounts or memoirs.  The four 
major works are those of Andrew Paschall, Gilbert Burnet, John Oldmixon, and King 
James II.   
Paschall was the Vicar of Chedzoy - a village on Sedgemoor - and although he 
recounted events outside his parish he focused his study on the battle itself and paid scant 
regard to the militia who were not actually involved in the fighting. He merely states 
‘1,500 militiamen quarter in Middlezoy and Othery’.21 Yet when he does comment upon 
their campaign performance he makes sweeping judgments: ‘the Militia first in Dorset 
might easily have crushed that Serpent in the Egg… Next in Devon which…should have 
done more than run…Lastly in Somerset where the Militia men did leave the country 
open’.22  Regrettably being restricted to a paucity of news Paschall’s view of events is 
somewhat limited.  He does not see the whole picture. Having mustered 4,000 men in 
Exeter the Devon Militia could have crushed the revolt in its infancy in Lyme but its lord 
lieutenant was under orders not to attempt it.  Nor did the Devon Militia run at Axminster 
(pages 273-286) although he is accurate in that the Somerset Militia left the county open.   
The Reverend Gilbert Burnet was a staunch Whig and also pro-Monmouth. He 
attended the leading Whig politician Lord William Russell on the scaffold and lost his 
various offices and appointments in 1684 after preaching an anti-Catholic sermon. When 
James II came to the throne he fled to the Continent to live in Holland where he became a 
friend and chaplain to William of Orange as well as a Dutch citizen to avoid treason 
charges in England.  Burnet came over with William in 1688 and delivered the 
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coronation sermon.  For all of which he was created Bishop of Salisbury and remained an 
influential figure throughout the reigns of William and Mary, and Anne.  His History of 
His Own Time was published in 1724 with a second volume in 1734; it aroused 
accusations of misrepresentation due to his anti-Catholic stance.23  Burnet’s views on the 
Monmouth Rebellion are mixed but he has very little good to say about the conduct of the 
royal forces including the militia, commenting that ‘their ill affection appeared very 
evidently: many deserted, and all were cold in the service’.24 He also states that at 
Bridport, in a fight between the rebels and the militia (see pages 265-273), ‘the militia ran 
from them’.25  
John Oldmixon was a poet and playwright who was born and raised in Bridgwater 
where as a boy he witnessed some of the events of the Rebellion.  His earliest work 
Amores Britannici; Epistles historical and gallant (1703) and the tragedy The Governor 
of Cyprus are poetic, romantic and highly dramatic.  He was employed as a tract writer by 
the Whigs and his Critical History of England shows his bias. Oldmixon’s political 
leanings and fondness for dramatic prose are also evident in his History of England 
during the Reigns of the Royal House of Stuart in which he describes the events of the 
Monmouth Rebellion.26  Writing in the late 1720s his recall of events 40 years previously 
when he was 12 years old is unlikely to be perfect, as too must be the speeches he 
attributes to various people for which there are no other references, including ‘ “I know 
those men,” said Monmouth [upon seeing Dumbarton’s Regiment] “they will fight. If I 
had but them, all would go well” ’.27    
Oldmixon’s pro-Monmouth stance leads him to denigrate almost everything pro-
James II.  He makes much of a possible incident of the militiamen being deceived by 
faux-cannon and sweepingly asserts mass desertion and defection which no contemporary 
witness corroborates.     
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They had no sooner entered a narrow lane in their way than, 
observing the mouths of two or three hollow trees unluckily 
pointed to their front, they immediately turned tail and fled, every 
man to his own home, except such as staid for the Duke of  
Monmouth 's coming, and then went in to him.28  
 
Oldmixon’s disposition is revealed in his frequent complaining that his services 
were unappreciated by those in power.  A bitter and frustrated Whig he saw the militia at 
the time of his writing in the 1700s as an inept, Tory-controlled body and most likely 
considered it and its historical counterparts fair game for jibes and criticism.29 
Oldmixon’s work is unsubstantiated by reference and arguably the product of 
circumstantial reasoning; he reported on the militia in a manner likely to confirm his 
readers’ opinions.    
King James II was a keen historian who wrote several histories of his own times 
and his account of the rebellion displays an understandable anti-Monmouth bias.30  Much 
of his information is derived from the plethora of reports and letters sent to the Earl of 
Sunderland, Secretary to the Privy Council, and to himself, including detailed ones from 
his two senior military officers, Lieutenant General Louis Duras, Earl of Feversham the 
Commander in Chief in the West Country and his second in command Major General 
John Churchill.  He was also privy to a lot of rebel information provided by Nathaniel 
Wade the erstwhile Adjutant General of Monmouth’s rebel army, both from his 
confession and his battlefield tour discourse.31  Although James gives a detailed account 
of Sedgemoor he includes no reference to the role of the militia in the campaign.  He 
wrote his history during 1686-7, long after he had embraced the anti-militia stance he 
promulgated in his November 1685 address to Parliament. 32 
The contemporary historians have a personal and political bias. Oldmixon and 
Burnet are pro-Monmouth and have little to say about the militia although when they 
mention it their remarks are condemnatory. Both published in the early eighteenth 
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century their views of the militia of the 1680s are more applicable to the militia of the 
1720s, perhaps confirming their readers’ experience of the current force.  Paschall the 
royalist sympathiser, ignores the militia, as does King James whose political anti-militia 
stance over-ruled his impartiality. Paschall’s lack of comment perhaps indicates he had 
no understanding of the importance of the militia’s role in the campaign.  These writers, 
for reasons of partisanship, self-interest or indeed simple ignorance, set in train the 
fashion for denigrating or ignoring the militia and its part in defeating the Monmouth 
Rebellion.   
Historians of subsequent centuries are no different in having personal agendas, 
unwitting bias and the desire to please their readership.  It is perhaps most useful to 
examine them by genre rather than by age. 
1.5.2. Political Histories. 
Thomas Babington Macaulay was a dominant figure of the mid-Victorian era and 
typical of the historians of his times.  His History of England appeared in 1849 and his 
own Liberal political leanings are easily discernable.  He is clearly anti-Jacobite with 
strong Whig sympathies.  His historical work is not always accurate and he is prone to 
picturesque descriptions that are dependant more upon imagination and dramatic 
potential than primary sources.  For instance he repeats a tale of the Monmouth Rebellion 
that he says came from Bishop Kennet, who had it from an officer of the Royal Regiment 
of Horse (Oxford’s) in 1718.  It is third hand.  He could be accused of including it for 
emotional effect for it strikes a chord with stories of indignities wrought by infidels in 
foreign lands upon demure heroines of Empire. 
The report of the intended attack came to the ears of a young girl, 
who was zealous for the King.  Though of modest character, she 
had the courage to resolve that she would herself bear the 
intelligence to Feversham.  She stole out of Bridgwater, and made 
her way to the royal camp.  But that camp was not a place where 
female innocence could be safe. Even the officers…and the 
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negligent general who commanded them, had indulged largely in 
wine, and were ready for nay excess of licentiousness and cruelty.  
One of them seized the unhappy maiden, refused to listen to her 
errand, and brutally outraged her.  She fled in agonies of rage and 
shame, leaving the wicked army to its doom.33 
 
Macaulay is also guilty of claiming to know the thoughts and motives of the 
players in his historical dramas, even claiming to be able to unmask their pretending.  
Thus he describes the relationship between the commander of the royal army and his 
second in command:  
The lieutenant [Churchill] conscious of superior abilities and 
science, impatient of the control of a chief whom he despised 
[Feversham], and trembling for the fate of the army, nevertheless 
preserved his characteristic self-command, and dissembled his 
feelings so well that Feversham praised his submissive 
alacrity…34   
 
Macaulay also makes generalised, unsupported statements about disloyalty of 
whole sections of the community and the Devon Militia.  He writes of the Duke of 
Albemarle, lord lieutenant of Devon, being fearful that 
Such was Monmouth’s popularity among the common people of 
Devonshire that, if once the train[ed] bands had caught sight of 
his well known face and figure, they would have probably gone 
over to him in a body.35   
 
It is necessary to question how Macaulay knows what Albemarle was thinking 
and upon what grounds he predicts not sporadic but complete desertion.  It is also hard to 
believe that in an age of restricted visual imagery the average militia soldier would 
recognise Monmouth’s face – at the most seen only once before during Monmouth’s so-
called royal progress through the West in August 1680.   
Macaulay can also confuse his primary sources. He asserts that at Axminster 
‘Albemarle ... thought it advisable to retreat. The retreat soon became a rout’ and he adds 
that: ‘The whole country was strewn with the arms and uniforms which the fugitives had 
thrown away; and, had Monmouth urged the pursuit with vigour, he would probably have 
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taken Exeter without a blow’.36  The Axminster incident will be discussed at length in 
chapter seven, but suffice it to state here that no evidence has been found for anything 
other than an orderly withdrawal of the Devon Militia.  The original reference to 
discarded guns and coats was actually made by Wade in his Narrative and refers to the 
Somersetshire not the Devonshire Militia. 37  As we shall see there is no evidence of the 
retreat of the Somerset Militia degenerating into a country-wide rout; in fact Wade 
initially reported ‘nothing very remarkable in this days march…’ 38   As to the rebels 
taking Exeter, even if Macaulay erroneously believed that Albemarle’s men were indeed 
dispersed he ignores the fact that the Earl of Bath, lord lieutenant of Cornwall held the 
city with the Cornish Militia and that Churchill and his royal cavalry were nearby.  
Moreover the Exeter civil authorities were capable of robust action as they proved by 
slamming their gates in the face of William of Orange’s army three years later.  To 
suggest Exeter could have been easily captured displays a lack of understanding of the 
military situation.  Overall it is tempting to agree with the 1930s historian John Paget 
who said ‘Lord Macaulay is not to be trusted to narrate facts accurately, to state facts 
truly or to answer the judgment of history with impartiality’.39    
Until he was challenged by more reliable historians Macaulay’s influence spread 
and many of his false statements moved from myth to fact in popular perception, being 
frequently quoted as evidence by modern authors of works on the Rebellion.  For all his 
lofty reputation Macaulay can display a tendency towards unfounded statements, 
prejudice and overuse of dramatic license. 
Ogg is one of the leading protagonists of the argument that the continuity of 
family influence was ‘one of the fundamental things in English political life’.40  To 
illustrate this strong relationship between family and politics in the West Country he cites 
‘the Seymours in Devon, the Godolphins in Cornwall, … the Churchills in Dorset’.41  
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These are families whose influence was felt near the top of the political and social ladder.  
He could have added that an even more pervasive feature of county politics was the 
families which held local offices and sat as justices.  Families like the Drakes, the 
Lutterells, the Strangways, the Portmans and the Wyndhams are important to this study 
because they provided both the deputy lieutenants who administered the county militias 
and the officers who commanded them. 
In his recording of the Monmouth Rebellion, Ogg bows to others, saying the story 
‘has been told by Macaulay with a dramatic intensity unmatched in historical literature, 
and with an accuracy of detail which has withstood the scrutiny, often niggling, 
sometimes vituperative, of more than a century’.42  For the campaign and battle he 
recommends Sir Winston Churchill, Marlborough his Life and Times, which is today 
regarded as somewhat biased not least because Churchill was a descendant of the man he 
liked to call Duke John. For a biography of Monmouth he recommends W.R. Emerson, 
who is rarely cited by other modern historians having been long superseded by more 
authoritative biographers.43  Ogg might not be so damning in his evaluation of the militia 
but he uncritically reiterates the judgments of Macaulay and the anti-militia opinions held 
by John Churchill restated by his descendant.  Concerning encounters where the militia 
actually fought Ogg states ‘in skirmishes with the militia the rebels usually had the best 
of it.’44  In fact the fights of Lyme Road and Ashill were inconclusive and at Bridport the 
rebels were actually beaten off by the militia.  Ogg appears to take on trust that written by 
other writers and thus perpetuates misperceptions. 
In 1985 Hutton identified a changing role of the militia during the Restoration 
period from that of national defence against external and internal threat, to that of 
cavalier crusading against the forces of republicanism and dissent.45  Whether it was 
perceived that way at the time is not proven but it substantiates the frequent government-
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initiated moves to suppress political and religious dissent.  Hutton motivates the whole 
militia movement with the desire to avenge the ills suffered by the royalist factions in 
their communities.  Given the often pro-cavalier stance of many of the families which 
officered the militia and some commanders such as Sir Edward Phelipps harsh 
persecution of conventicles, it is a plausible theory.    
Fletcher more recently challenged the simplistic view of the militia as military 
bumblers.46  However although he makes the point that it limited Monmouth’s Rebellion 
to the West Country by its very numbers and presence even he states that it disgraced 
itself in the face of the enemy.47  Fletcher concentrates upon the evolution of the militia’s 
role in local government but his suggestion that the militia actually might not have been 
as ineffective as was hitherto believed aroused the condemnation of Norrey, who did his 
best to refute this divergence from the accepted belief.48  Yet Norrey too is prone to 
creating arguments based upon slender evidence such as his avowal that ‘Epidemics of 
gout often accompanied notification of a deputies’ meeting,’ for which he cites only one 
incident from a single source.49  Norrey’s work focuses upon local government and as the 
militia is its prime instrument of power he spends six pages ridiculing its organisation and 
performance.  Many of his examples derive from incidents in the very early years of the 
Restoration Militia while others are blatantly erroneous and lead him to make the 
unproven assertion that ‘it is difficult to escape the conclusion they [the militia] were at 
best paper tigers; unreliable, inefficient and certainly not a serious military force’.50  
In his work concerning war, money and the English State, Brewer agrees with 
Namier that ‘a great deal of what is peculiar in English History is due to the obvious fact 
that Great Britain is an island’.51  His argument reflects upon the question of a reduced 
need for a military force due to the country not being an easy prey to invasion and that 
under Cromwell and Charles II the navy become more important, and ‘it was the 
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combination of the militia with the major branch of the nation’s military might, the royal 
navy’ which prevented foreign invasion.52  Concerning the militia’s effectiveness, Brewer 
appreciates the militia was adequate for its role but militiamen ‘were hardly the stuff of 
which great armies are made’.  He also accuses the militia of being ‘a largely ineffectual 
force which was rarely embodied and which therefore lacked military experience and 
expertise’.53   
1.5.3. Histories of the British Army.   
Sir John Fortescue’s ground-breaking work A History of the British Army condenses 
the early centuries into a single volume covering military history from Hastings in 1066 
to the end of the Seven Years War in 1763.54  Writing during the 1880s at a time when 
the structure and function of auxiliary forces was the subject of fierce debate, Fortescue 
makes just two references to the militia of the mid 1680s.  The first concerns the 
continuance of the standing army in lieu of the militia: ‘The courtiers had received their 
cue, and pointed to the flight of the western militia before Monmouth’s raw levies as 
proof sufficient of its untrustworthiness.  The fact indeed was self evident’.55  The second 
undermines the militia’s worth: ‘The old howl of “No Standing Army” had been raised, 
and reams of puerile and pedantic nonsense had been written to prove that the militia was 
amply sufficient for England’s needs’.56 Why Fortescue adopted this view as fact is 
evident in his reference to the events of the Monmouth Rebellion.  He writes, ‘No reader, 
I am confidant, will blame me for leaving him with his Macaulay for the account of this 
insurrection’.57  The power of such a statement to transform myth into truth in public 
perception is revealed in the Sandhurst doggerel, ‘It must be true, it’s in Oman and 
Fortescue’; this was irony by the 1980s, but perhaps not so for preceding generations.58 
Rather than dismissing the militia in a few sentences several histories of the British 
Army have tackled the subject. However, most have done so as part of telling the story of 
18 
 
the regular army in which the militia plays an integrated if minor role. Barnett’s Britain 
and Her Army is typical of these works and although he makes frequent reference to the 
militia in general throughout the book, he confines his comments upon the late 
seventeenth-century militia to three pages.59  He makes a passing remark as to the quality 
of the militia under Charles II saying that ‘the only function it carried out effectively’ was 
‘that of an amateur political police and riot force’.60   
Barnett draws heavily upon Western, citing the action at Landguard Fort in June 1667 
and the lack of musters in certain counties during the 1670s.  He does not make reference 
to the political arguments used to lobby for the raising of a Select Militia (see pages 66-
67) or how they differed from the militia already established.  He only champions the 
cause with the comment: ‘A select force could be better trained in formed bodies and it 
could be kept in being during an emergency, whereas men of the ordinary militia were 
urgently needed at home’.61  Barnett offers neither explanation for these assumptions nor 
any reasons as to why the ordinary militia which existed in formed bodies could not be 
trained, nor any reason why they should be tethered to their home counties in times of 
emergency.  He settles instead for yet another attack on the militia by referring to the 
Select Militia as: ‘The only effective element of the constitutional force’.62 He does 
however, make a telling comment that ‘The militia ceased to be politically acceptable the 
moment it became militarily effective’.63  He leaves readers to assume that by ‘effective’ 
he means the converse of what he earlier lists as the disadvantages of the militia of the 
period, that is: ‘lack of mobility, difficulty of keeping forces in the field, the widening 
gap between trained and troops and civilian levies, and amateur officers’.64  Barnett thus 
appears to rely uncritically upon Western and deploys the same examples of inadequate 
performance to show the militia in a poor light.  
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It is this aspect which arouses suspicion.  Authors in the current literature tend to 
repeat the same examples and the same quotations from the same sources without much 
apparent consideration of the context in which these original comments were made or the 
motives their authors might have had in writing as they did. This is also evident in works 
which seek to develop lines of applied thought or even sometimes to impose a 
sequentially logical framework upon events.  Manning’s An Apprenticeship in Arms sees 
the development of the military as a series of peaks and troughs and, evidently seeing the 
New Model Army as a peak, entitles the next chapter for 1660 to 1688 ‘The Decay of 
Military Tradition’ thus setting a contextual trough for almost everything of that period. 65 
 As the study of military history developed army historians sought to concentrate 
upon more focused subjects or time periods for investigation. For the past thirty years 
Childs’ The Army of Charles II has been regarded as the definitive published study of the 
Restoration Army.66  However, although Childs includes the militia the focus of his work 
is upon the royal army created by Charles, improved under the direction his natural son 
Monmouth and inherited by his brother James.  It is a meticulous and wide-ranging study 
justifiably praised for its depth of research and both level and amount of detail included. 
References to the militia are an integral part of Childs’ story of the development of the 
royal force and serve to show how it survived the political struggle between those who 
worked for the establishment of a standing royal army and those who opposed it, 
preferring in its stead to rely for defence of king and country upon the traditional 
militia.67 Childs also refers to the militia as a political pawn in the contest between king 
and parliament for what he sees as the battle for direct control of it.68   
 Regarding the militia’s effectiveness as a military tool and its proficiency, Childs 
is somewhat uncommitted.  At one point he says  
 These part-time soldiers of the Trained Bands were used to 
handling arms and knew something of the workings of martial 
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discipline. They were in fact ideal for the short term levies of 
1666-7, 1672-4 and 1678-9, as they required little or no training.69 
 
   At another point however, he cites events at Landguard Fort: ‘The militia stood 
 around and looked, having much to do to keep themselves from disorder… and …such  
fighting was left to the regulars’.70   
His suggestion that the militia was a useful source for the royal army to draw 
upon for recruits may hint at disparagement but it could be argued that if they did not 
need much training to reach a par with the royal troops they must have been reasonably 
proficient according to the standards of the age. Childs remains ambivalent as to the 
militia’s general military value throughout, until his final words on the subject pronounce 
that: ‘Parliament knew that the militia was useless, riddled with inefficiency through 
negligence, and scarcely knew how to march let alone fight…’ He does not explore the 
idea further nor support the statement with evidence.71  
In his second book, The Army, James II and The Revolution Childs joins in the 
general castigation of the militia.72  He does so again whilst discussing the argument 
between James II and parliament over the establishment and enlargement of a standing 
army but this time lists the ills of the Wiltshire Militia recorded by John Martin and cites 
a satirical poem by John Dryden.73  However, he presents a confusing assessment of the 
Wiltshire Militia’s lack of tents.  He fails to mention this was standard practice among all 
militia units and even the royal army was well into the campaign before their tents 
arrived.  He implies this was a fault of the militia’s own making, and that they were 
consequently obliged to be stationed behind the lines at Middlezoy rather than to camp 
with the main army at Westonzoyland.  Yet he does not take the line of other historians 
such as Clifton by saying that this was due to Feversham not trusting them to be 
alongside the regulars.74  Childs cites instances of what was wrong with the militia at the 
time of the Monmouth Rebellion but tempers his criticism with caveats concerning James 
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II using selected material for propaganda purposes and his lack of encouragement of the 
militia.  Indeed he goes on to quote the Earl of Ailesbury who ‘thought that the militia’s 
“hearts and inclinations were certainly good” ’.75 
 In his later work The British Army of William III, Childs makes only passing 
reference to the militia and its part in the standing army argument.76 Although no great 
supporter of the militia, Childs does not condemn it at every opportunity; however, a 
measured assessment of its worth was not part of his remit.   
Other studies of the Armies of Charles II and James II have appeared in various 
journals, in particular those by Davies printed in the Journal of the Society for Army 
Historical Research, or Langeladdecke in the English Historical Review.77  In these too 
the militia often remains outside the sphere of interest of the authors and receives only 
the briefest of mentions.  Atkinson says, ‘…the King urging that, after the recent proof of 
the untrustworthiness of the Militia, he must increase the standing force,’ and gives a 
further paragraph expanding this debate with example.  He also later reiterates that it was 
the peers and the country gentry who commanded them; beyond that he is silent.78 
1.5.4. Histories of the Militia. 
More specific books taking the militia as their subject tend to devote very few 
paragraphs to the century between 1650 and 1750. Hay reviewed their history as part of 
an analysis of the militia and yeomanry units serving in the Boer War but limits his 
remarks concerning the Restoration Militia to what acts, ordnances and reforms were 
implemented during the period.79  Cousins allocates two pages to the militia of the 1685 
Rebellion in his The Defenders, A History of the British Volunteer but says little beyond 
commenting upon the comparative trustworthiness of various county forces and James II 
using the crisis as a reason to increase the royal army.80 Stern in The Citizen Army 
devotes a paragraph to the political implications of supporting the royal army versus 
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militia argument, although he does make the point that James II was politically motivated 
in his denigration of the militia.  He wrote: ‘Every one of the British kings who strove to 
abolish the liberties of his people tried first to suppress the militia’.81  Neither Haswell 
nor Zurcher refer to the Restoration militia in their respective studies of citizen armies 
and supplementary forces.82 With such little published interest shown in the period it 
comes as no surprise that few mention the Monmouth Rebellion, except perhaps to cite 
James II’s speech to Parliament made afterwards as part of his political manoeuvrings to 
enlarge the royal army.  Indeed this speech appears to be the salient feature of much 
discussion concerning the militia of that period and will be examined later.83  Other 
sources cite the Axminster incident as evidence of militia incompetence but although they 
might describe events, scant regard is paid to their explanation.84 Where there is 
explanation for the failings of the militia it appears to be made in order to pre-empt an 
obvious rebuttal. Clifton makes the point that three companies of the Devon Militia ran 
away from the rebels when they reoccupied Bridgwater, and then, apparently somewhat 
grudgingly, adds that the force they faced was the whole rebel army.85  
 Chiefly concerned with the militia of the eighteenth century Western sums up several 
of the purposes for which the seventeenth-century militia was maintained encapsulated in 
the phrase: ‘an amateur gendarmerie to counterbalance the malcontents,’ saying they had 
to deal with local risings, anticipate trouble, confiscate arms and generally show the flag 
for the authorities. 86  He also maintains that the militia had a contrasting purpose, ‘to 
supplant the army or to assist it’.87  Although attempts were made to employ the militia 
against the royal army during the civil wars and Interregnum, universal supplanting 
would be very difficult to prove in post-Restoration times.  Despite the control of the 
militia being a point of contention between crown and parliament after 1660, there does 
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not appear to be any evidence of a substantial effort to suborn it or direct its activities 
against the army.   
 Western’s chapter ‘Triumphs and Reverses’, covering 1660 to 1670, has useful 
information about militia activities but it draws somewhat selectively from The Calendar 
of State Papers Domestic and the Historic Manuscripts Commission, and is full of 
financial and political considerations rather than evidence of military operations or 
pronouncements on effectiveness.  His chapter ‘Eighty Years of Decay’ notes several 
deeds of the militia, such as the Wiltshire Militia’s quelling of rebellion in Frome prior to 
Monmouth’s arrival, but his appreciation of events is influenced by his dependence upon 
the reports in the Stopford-Sackville Papers.88  Overall Western is a sound starting block 
as his methodology is thorough and his notes and referencing extensive, although he does 
not provide a bibliography. 
1.5.5. Campaign Histories. 
Works that tell the tales of the Monmouth Rebellion Campaign of 1685 or focus upon 
the Battle of Sedgemoor are common, but few surpass Little’s The Monmouth Episode 
for frequent references to the various militias involved in the campaign.89 However, the 
central topic of the book is the story of the Duke of Monmouth and the rebel army.  The 
operations of the militia serve only as a backdrop or as external constraining elements 
which sometimes come to the foreground when paths cross.  Little does however cite 
several instances which show the militia in a good light, such as the suppression of ‘the 
riot of clubmen’ in Frome, and he makes a case for their more than competent 
occupation, defence and control of Bristol.90  Yet when the opportunity to comment on 
their effectiveness arises Little cannot resist falling back upon the generally accepted 
view.  Despite praising their precautions in Bristol he says Monmouth ‘had, against the 
Militia who actually formed most of Bristol’s garrison, a good chance of taking the 
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city…’ and he pokes Shakespeare-based fun at their local constables’ ‘Dogberry 
dithering’.91   
 Little is useful in three major respects.  Firstly he gives an overall view of what 
several county militias did during that summer of 1685 and how their ranks were 
augmented by volunteer units. He supplies the general framework of the campaign and 
also provides simple time and location references for the movement of each of the 
composite militia units and several of their smaller bodies.  Secondly he provides 
instances in which the militia were useful in performing military tasks during the 
campaign despite his general assessment.  Thirdly he is meticulous in his referencing and 
thus provides pointers for further research or for checking the interpretation of evidence.  
A lot of his evidence comes from the Calendar State Papers and often-quoted texts such 
as Wade’s Narrative, the Axe papers and James II’s account, but he also refers to the rare 
1874 transcript of the Axminster Ecclesiastica and the Churchwardens’ Accounts of 
Frome, Bridgwater and Westonzoyland.  Little tells a stirring tale about the events of the 
Monmouth Rebellion and makes good use of primary sources but he accepts on trust the 
work of his predecessors and their bias against the militia.  
Books which mention the late seventeenth-century militia as part of the story of the 
Monmouth Rebellion tend to fall into two categories: those which are aimed at the 
historical interest market, such as Chenevix-Trench’s The Western Rising – An Account 
of the Monmouth Rebellion or Wigfield’s The Monmouth Rebellion A Social History, and 
those designed for the more general reader including the lucrative markets of tourism and 
hobbies, such as Dunning’s The Monmouth Rebellion – A Guide to the Rebellion and the 
Bloody Assizes and Whiles’ Sedgemoor 1685.  There are also information and story 
booklets such as Clarke’s Monmouth’s West Country Rebellion of 1685 and Scott’s Out 
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for Monmouth. These two areas overlap in such works as David Chandler’s and John 
Tincey’s identically titled books Sedgemoor 1685.92   
These authors all tend to use the same easily accessible primary and secondary 
material and reiterate the same criticism of the militia without delving too much beyond 
the statements made or opinions proffered by their sources.  Although Chandler warns his 
readers against accepting biased primary or uncritical secondary sources, he sometimes 
gives credence to both. 
1.5.6. Unpublished Theses. 
A search of the centralised database of library-held unpublished theses revealed no 
works on the militia of the late seventeenth century.  There are currently only two listed 
theses on the seventeenth-century militia and they deal with the early and mid 1600s.  
Both were useful for their citing of sources, as although they did not reference material 
directly relevant to this study they did supply starting points for document searches.  Ive 
was useful for his recording of held accounts, rolls, pells, registers, order books and 
reports, and their locations, while Nagel provided a framework of understanding for the 
militia before and during the civil wars. 93  Ive also showed how a study of county 
militias could be undertaken and then organised for presentation. There were several 
theses on the militia of the eighteenth century but the descriptions examined said they 
focussed upon the late 1700s and most began with the disputes concerning the Militia 
Bills of the 1750s.  The nearest one to the late seventeenth century began with Queen 
Anne’s refusal of Royal Assent to the Scottish Militia Bill of 1707. 
1.5.7. Summary of the Literature.  
 The late seventeenth-century militia’s military ineffectiveness is a central theme 
running through the literature and this has changed little since the contemporary 
controlling authorities published their version of events.  There appears to be no serious 
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discussion of the Restoration Militia and although mentioned frequently the comments 
are mostly disparaging dismissals.  Generations of historians have rethought and 
reappraised the social, political and economic contexts of various related institutions, 
such as Earle’s work on the social class and occupations of the rebels, Aylmer’s analysis 
of the institutions of government, Ogg’s stress upon family influence in national politics, 
or Butterfield’s political faction-based approach.94 They have examined the personalities 
involved, as in Namier’s prosopography or collective biography approach, and also the 
events of the period, such as in Harris’ appreciation of the tri-nation kingdom’s response 
to aspects of seventeenth-century British political history. 95  Yet all seem to maintain, 
even in passing that the militia were of little military value.  
 When seeking the evidence upon which this general view is based the conclusion 
must be drawn that most of it derives from primary sources tainted by personal, social or 
political agendas.  Both Charles II and James II used the argument of an ineffective 
militia to strengthen their cases for an enlarged royal army; it was perhaps the period 
equivalent of political spin.  In addition it could be argued that all men who wrote of the 
inadequacies of the militia had their own interest at heart; a man whose personal 
advancement was dependant upon the monarch was highly unlikely to offer proof that 
what the king said was untrue.  Similarly military officers such as John Churchill were 
unlikely to contradict their royal patron and praise the militia whose very existence would 
likely mean a reduced royal army and hence less promotion and restricted career 
prospects.  Moreover, royal officers were not disposed to laud their counterparts in the 
militia whom they saw as amateurs in their trade.  It is not surprising that evidence 
gathered from those who moved in court and royal army circles was critical of the militia. 
 Overall both primary and secondary published references to the militia of the late 
seventeenth century tend to be minimal, general and anecdotal in style.  Collected 
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material relating to the militia of the period is sparse in published works, especially that 
which is useful in determining its role or nature.  Equally sparse are collated sources of 
information regarding the technological and administrative aspects of militia system and 
operations.96 Yet across books, journals, magazines, unpublished manuscripts and the 
worldwide web, there was a body of hitherto uncollected and uncollated information, 
which had to be sought out and appraised. 
There was a considerable body of literature concerning the militia of the 
eighteenth century much of which is corroborated by visual records by contemporary 
artists; some laudatory and others derisory.97  The Volunteer Force and Yeomanry of the 
nineteenth century too have a wealth of literature, paintings and engravings devoted to 
them, whilst the Territorial Army of the twentieth century surpasses even that in numbers 
of histories and other accounts, often supported by photographs.  Although many of these 
books devote their early pages to the antecedents of their subject and spend several pages 
on the general history of the militia, there is a distinct paucity of references to units raised 
and operating between the absorption of many of the trained bands into the 
parliamentarian army during the civil wars and the raising of the militia to protect 
England from Jacobite incursions in 1715 and 1745.  They tend to gloss over the militia 
which served Cromwell, Charles II, James II and even William III. 
Compendiums covering the history of warfare are by their very nature, selective 
and generalist.  Few provide evidence of primary research and rely upon information 
already gathered, which by repetition becomes accepted.  For instance the wooden bottles 
containing a measured charge of gunpowder suspended from a seventeenth-century 
musketeer’s bandolier are often referred to as ‘the twelve apostles’.98 This term has 
passed into common parlance and although there is no cited contemporary reference the 
term has by repetition become an accepted truth.   
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General histories also tend to repeat what has been written before. Clark in his 
volume of The Oxford History of England sweepingly asserts: ‘the militia was almost 
entirely untrained.’99 Some writers ignore the militia completely, such as Morley’s A 
Thousand Lives – An Account of the English Revolutionary Movement, which is 
surprising as the militia was the state’s main counter-revolutionary weapon.100   In 
contrast the biographies of the great men of the Restoration and Revolution are rewarding 
for placing events and comments in period, political and personality context.  Ward’s 
story of the life of the Duke of Albemarle contains several sections concerning 
Christopher Monck’s efforts to ensure his militia regiments were well supplied and 
trained properly.101 Sir Edward Phelipps’ biographical commentator draws attention to 
the accepted code of behaviour among officers in dealing with their militiamen, and 
papers given at an Oxford University Continuing Education Conference discussed how 
the personality of James II interacted with prevailing period social, political and religious 
practices and beliefs.102  Yet these speakers too avoided mention of the militia, and 
dismissed it as irrelevant in questions.103     
Much of the modern perception of the 1680s militia is founded upon the 
judgments and bias of historians of the period.  It was developed by Victorian authors 
who read the letters and accounts of witnesses without considering either their 
partisanship or personal agendas and, as with Macaulay, without being too exact in their 
reading of primary sources.  The desire to write for a wider audience led some to over-
dramatise and pass sweeping judgments.  With such a wealth of published material 
seeming to confirm the judgment scholars have found little to excite their interest and 
have taken what was previously written on trust.  Attitudes to the Restoration Militia 
have changed little, the major shift being an increase in a benign tolerance of a second 
rate force of part-timers incapable of matching the performance of regulars.  Apart from 
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this posterity has adopted the traditional view that at the time of the Monmouth Rebellion 
the militia was not an effective body.  No real change in thinking has occurred for nearly 
330 years and crucial questions concerning effectiveness and peer expectation have never 
been addressed.  If this work is to confirm or challenge the established perception those 
questions must be answered. 
 
1.6. THE QUESTION. 
This thesis therefore examines the qualities and operational effectiveness of the late 
seventeenth-century militia in general and during the 1685 Rebellion campaign in 
particular.  After Monmouth’s rebellion James II harshly criticised the militias of the 
south western counties.  He did so in the House of Commons in November 1685:  
 ‘...when I reflect what an inconsiderable number of Men begun it 
and how long they carried it on without any Opposition, I hope 
everybody will be convinced that the Militia … is not sufficient 
upon such Occasions and that there is nothing but a good Force of 
well-disciplined Troops in constant pay that can defend us’.104   
 
He emphasised his dissatisfaction by decreeing that because of its poor quality 
and disloyalty the militia was not to be mustered again until he gave such instruction.105  
Further condemnation followed, such as that voiced by Lord Preston: ‘We have lately had 
an unfortunate Proof how little we are to depend upon the Militia.’ Sir Richard Temple 
took the same view: ‘I must concur with the King that the Militia is not sufficient.’106  
However, as many critics were of the pro-court faction there is room for speculation that 
they followed the king’s lead rather than their own consciences. 
 To provide an answer to the question: ‘Was the militia in the second half of the 
seventeenth century an effective military body?’ the work first needs to establish and 
define the term ‘effective’ and then examine if the West Country militia met the criteria 
of the definition.   
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1.6.1.  Definition of effectiveness. 
John Hughes-Wilson said: 
The effectiveness of military units, regular or militia, is 
intrinsically linked to the idea of being able to contribute 
positively to the defence of the nation, which in turn means the 
role of home security forces is identifying threats, reacting 
quickly and efficiently, and neutralising danger.107  
 
This is not a modern idea. It has been present throughout the history of those 
concerned with national security and the creation and maintenance of a force which is 
capable of undertaking this challenge and responsibility. It was for these purposes that the 
Liedang, Fyrd, Posse Comitatus and the English Militia were conceived and constituted 
to augment and compliment the royal army.108 So as to be judged as effective the militias 
of each successive age had to fulfill these duties and it is interesting to note that part-time 
forces remained a substantial element in England’s defence for centuries.   
Passing judgment upon the Restoration Militia is made difficult by the lack of any 
contemporary list of criteria which those in authority at the time thought of as necessary 
for a unit or institution to be judged as effective.  To many of its contemporaries if the 
militia performed the aspects of their duties valued by the commentator then the 
institution was effective.  To staunch Tory Anglicans units such as Phelipp’s Regiment in 
the Somerset Militia which ruthlessly suppressed and harassed dissenters and their 
conventicles were very effective.  Yet there remains a need to measure the militia in 
terms which embrace far more than the prejudices of certain elements of society. 
In the search for a wider definition it is tempting to turn to the writings of men 
who have served in the military, especially if they are also historians. These writers have 
an idea of what constitutes military effectiveness but they imbue their writings with 
value-judgments of their own age.  Field Marshal Wolseley outlines what he thought 
effectiveness might have meant in the 1680s in his description of the Duke of Monmouth 
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as ‘one of that sort of cut-and-dried, old fashioned officers, who could not believe it 
possible that badly armed, slovenly looking regiments, untrained in the formal evolutions 
of a regular army, could be of any real military value’.109  His comments however say at 
least as much about his own era as the seventeenth century and although another later 
commentator Fortescue stated that mobility and the ability to keep in the field were 
desirable attributes of an effective militia it is better to restrict further investigation to 
contemporary writers.110   
 In 1671 George Monck, Captain General of the Army and Master of the Horse 
under Charles II published his Observations upon Military & Political Affairs which 
sought to instruct commanders of armies in the Art of War.111  Although it mostly deals 
with unit and army deployment Monck also outlines the needs of an armed force if it is to 
be effective.  He states that the ‘greatest virtue required of a Souldier is Obedience’ and 
then advocates that an army must be well supplied with money, men, arms, victuals, 
ammunition, artillery and clothes.112   He also stresses the need for training in drill, field 
manoeurvres and marching, adding that a general should ‘never suffer his Souldiers in 
any place to be idle’.113  
Although Monck’s Observations reveal certain criteria by which to judge a 
force’s effectiveness it is not a model, so if no Restoration model of effectiveness 
survives then it is not unreasonable to construct one. Despite wishing to focus upon 
contemporary sources in seeking guidance to construct a model of military effectiveness 
it was useful to initially take cognizance of modern practice.  Regrettably consulting 
current unit reports was not possible due to Ministry of Defence restricted access.  
Professor Richard Holmes assured me that the qualities and attributes used to assess unit 
effectiveness today are similar to those already mentioned.  However, there emerged 
from discussion of modern unit assessments that an emphasis is placed upon both 
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equipment and leadership.  Whereas weaponry and other equipment are mentioned by 
Monck, leadership is not singled out for note apart from stating that officers should be 
‘knowing and valiant.’114  Much has been written on the theory and practice of leadership 
which is beyond the scope of this work.  However, despite not being allocated a specific 
section in the model it was decided to examine command and control, both in relation to 
discipline and to the roles played during the 1685 crisis by the senior militia officers, 
namely the colonels where they are known, and their superiors the county force 
commanders, the lord lieutenants.   
Although given a good indication of content the author chose not to draw too 
heavily from the described current unit report model because it is constructed to be 
focused upon the modern regular and territorial armies, and it could perhaps lead to a 
propensity to judge a seventeenth-century entity by twenty first-century standards.  It was 
felt wiser to place more reliance on pronouncements upon the effectiveness of military 
forces by two great Captains whose times in command of armies bracketed the period 
under consideration and Monck’s observations.  The first of these two men was Gustavus 
Adolphus, King of Sweden during the Thirty Years War.   
An exceptional military commander of the Thirty Years War, Gustavus Adolphus 
wrote a memorandum in 1619 defining what he expected of a satisfactory army.  ‘It 
should have a proper recruiting system; its units must be properly organised; it must be 
strictly mustered to prevent frauds; and it must be straitly disciplined’.115   Gustavus 
Adolphus also imposed order in his camps and reformed his army’s logistical systems to 
ensure that pay, food, clothing and training drastically improved.116  The writings of this 
Swedish king may well have impacted upon those British soldiers who served in the 
Thirty Years War and thus brought to English military thinking the desire for good 
turnout, known and applicable organisation, well administered musters with an emphasis 
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upon weapon proficiency, regular pay, and adequate food and clothing to augment what 
Gustavus saw as a dependence upon good discipline.  
During the civil wars in Britain of the 1640s and 50s great attention was paid to 
drill.  It is not unreasonable to suggest that with the plethora of contemporary published 
drill manuals that many military men judged the effectiveness of units by the rank and 
file’s ability to perform according to the drill books. Attention was also paid to the raising 
and maintaining of strengths of regiments.  It was common practice that those regiments 
that could not muster sufficient men were either disbanded or amalgamated.117  It was 
also understood that in order to keep an army in the field it had to be supplied with 
weapons, ammunition, food and clothing; all of which demanded adequate funding and 
the means to raise money. Cicero adroitly summed this up in: “Monies are the sinews of 
war.”118 
Seventeenth-century armies had no rank approximating to that of Inspector 
General but inspections were held at sporadic intervals such as Henry Seymour, Duke of 
Beaufort’s journey through Wales in 1685 to examine and report upon the state of the 
militia in those counties.  His secretary Thomas Dinely recorded the Duke’s opinion of 
each county’s militia and made particular reference to their ability to drill, their bearing 
and their appearance.119  Throughout the English counties such inspections were carried 
out in the Restoration age by muster masters who counted the men, examined their 
weapons, oversaw the practice of drill and wrote reports to the lord lieutenants.  Their 
standards were not prescribed but it is reasonable to suggest that their work approximated 
to a national system as most were ex-officers who had seen service in a royal army and 
were probably familiar with the same drill books and military treatises.    
Although the rutted and often meandering roads of the age did not allow the 
marching feats of twenty five miles per day achieved by the Imperial Roman legions, 
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great store was also placed on the ability of units to march.  As Monck and Gustavus 
Adolphus both mention it, it is an aspect that needs to be included in any model of 
effectiveness.   
The elements cited above are also found in later writings relating to maintaining 
an effective military force, especially those of the second great Captain examined, 
Frederick the Great, King of Prussia during the Austro-Prussian and Seven Years Wars.  
Frederick states the need for disciplined, well-drilled, full strength, well-supplied units 
who were able to march at good speed.120  Noseworthy says Frederick can be relied upon 
because ‘His writings were intended for practical application. Frederick had a lot to lose 
by issuing faulty or inefficient instructions.  What was written was based upon his 
experience...’121 His thoughts may have been aimed at a full-time royal army but 
Frederick’s instructions were also disseminated to the German militias. 
One more criterion of effectiveness emerges from a letter of complaint sent from 
James Wolfe when he was serving as a junior officer to his uncle Edward Wolfe.  Among 
the criticism that the army in which he was serving was lazy and lax in discipline, 
training, marching and fighting, he also states that they were ‘easily put into disorder and 
hard to recover from it’.122 Despite there being no previous evidence for this quality 
discovered it is worthy of inclusion in the model, although under the more modern 
heading of post-action recovery.  
From those concerned with military effectiveness during and both before and after 
the period under discussion it becomes evident that the model should include reference to 
discipline, organisation, numbers, training, drill, funding, pay, weapons and equipment, 
support systems and the ability to march and fight.  However, given the contemporary 
tendency to judge of effectiveness based upon achievement of specific duties it is 
necessary to augment the military requirements for effectiveness by determining if 
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contemporary expectation was met.  Was the militia fit for the purpose for which it was 
intended, which was to be a military body with well defined objectives? 
Although no concise statement of these objectives as perceived by its 
contemporaries has been discovered, it is possible to unravel what they were by 
examining the records of the House of Commons and the instructions issued by the Privy 
Council.  The preservation of state security from internal threat was foremost in the 
minds of the Government which issued an order to the militia in July 1660 that they 
desired, ‘... disaffected persons watched and not allowed to assemble, and their arms 
seized; fortresses to be secured, all risings suppressed; and vagrants apprehended...’123  
Members of Parliament who drew up the Militia Act of 1661 also professed that the 
militia’s first duty involved the preventing disturbances of the peace of the kingdom by 
religious or political dissenters. 
... many evill and rebellious Principles have beene distilled into 
the minds of the People of this Kingdome which unlesse 
p[re]vented may breake forth to the disturbance of the Peace and 
Quiet thereof.124 
 
The first Act also legislated for the safety and preservation of Charles II and his 
government, showing itself to be concerned with both external and internal threats: 
... if any person or persons whatsoever …shall within the Realme 
or without compass imagine invent devise or intend death or 
destrucc[i]on or any bodily harm tending to death or destrucc[i]on 
maim or wounding imprisonment or restraint of the Person of the 
same our Soveraigne Lord the King or to deprive or depose him 
from the Stile Honour or Kingly Name of the Imperiall Crowne of 
this Realme or of any [other] His Ma[jes]tie Dominions or 
Countreys or to levy war against His Majestie within this Realme 
or without or to move or stirr any Foreiner or Strangers with force 
to invade this Realme or any other His Majesties Dominions or 
Countreys being under His Majesties Obeysance.125  
 
A second article of the same Act of Parliament indicated that the militia was also 
used for social control and the officers and men were granted legal indemnity from 
prosecution for things done in the perseverance of their duties.   
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... Bee it therefore further Enacted ... That all and every person 
and persons whoe have or shall have acted or done any thing in 
execution of any Commission or Commissions of Leiutenancy... 
shalbe and are hereby saved harmelesse and undempnified in this 
behalfe ...126 
 
This license was specific in describing what the militia was expected to do in 
order to exert control over their regions:     
...any assaulting arresting detaining or imprisoning any person 
suspected to be Fanatick Sectary or Disturber of the Peace or 
seizing of Armes or searching of Houses for Armes or for 
suspected persons shall be and are hereby saved harmelesse and 
indempnified in that behalfe...127 
  
That the militia was expected to undertake military as well as policing duties is 
evident from a Council order of 28 September 1660: ‘…The army is to be disbanded as 
soon as their arrears are paid, and the militia established, to be ready on occasion.’  That 
the men were to be drilled and kept in obedience is evidenced by almost every militia 
officer’s commission.  For example, that of Sir John Fenwick commissioned to command 
the militia forces of Northumberland states that his duties included ‘causing them [the 
militia units] to be exercised in arms and kept in good order and discipline.’128    
In addition to order and discipline the 1661 Militia Act ordered that the 
militiamen were expected to undergo training and have weapons: 
... the severall Leiutenants of the severall Counties Citties and ... 
their Deputie Leiutenants ... shall have power from time to time to 
lead traine exercise and putt in readinesse ... all or any of the 
persons raised arrayed or weaponed according to the said Act...129 
 
In emergencies a county militia that appeared likely to come into contact with an 
enemy force was to be joined by royal troops and the Duke of Albemarle, commanding 
the Devon Militia, was not slow in requesting them or the Government slow in sending 
them, as the Earl of Sunderland confirms: 
I received this morning your two letters of the 12 inst., in the first 
whereof you give an account of the Duke of Monmouth’s being 
landed, and of the forces with him ...  As to the detachment you 
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desire, his Majsty has commanded four troops of horse, two 
troops of dragoons and five companies of foot to march 
immediately to Salisbury, to assist the Lords Lieutenants of the 
counties thereabouts as his Majesty’s service shall require.  They 
will be there on Monday and Colonel Kirk with them.130  
 
The militia was also under direct instruction not to engage without the support of 
royal troops and even then to be cautious in selecting where and when to fight.   
The King is sending several troops towards you, which will soon 
be with you, and he thinks fit that in the meantime, as long as the 
Duke of Monmouth stays in Lyme, you should forbear to attempt 
anything against him, except upon great advantages.  He would 
also have you endeavour to keep straggling people from going to 
the Duke, and in case he should march out of Lime towards 
Taunton or elsewhere, to attend his motions and to take any fitting 
occasion to attack him.131  
 
The campaign duty of the militia when unsupported by royal units was 
containment in whatsoever manner the lord lieutenant felt appropriate. 
His Majesty is well satisfied with the order you have given to 
prevent any further progress of the rebels, and has no further 
directions to send you At the is time, but leaves it to your 
discretion and conduct to act as you shall think best for his 
service.132  
 
Those militias operating at some distance from any hostile force had other duties 
including ‘stopping and examining all straggling and suspicious persons who shall be 
found travelling up and down, and for securing such of them who cannot give a good 
account of themselves.’133 
To summarise, firstly, the militia was to be a government agent of social control, 
manifesting itself in the suppression of opposition by maintaining an intimidating 
appearance and undertaking policing actions, such as watching or arresting suspicious 
persons, seizing of arms or breaking up undesirable gatherings.  Secondly, the militia was 
to be a deterrent to invasion or armed insurrection and in the event of a landing or rising 
to quickly form a delaying first line of defence by putting a substantial body of men into 
the field.  It was to contain any enemy force by denying strategic places to the enemy and 
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in the last resort to fight as support to the royal army.  If the militia achieved these results 
then it could be deemed effective in contemporary eyes.  How it was to achieve these 
objectives and execute its duties results from a complex amalgam of military and political 
judgments, guidelines on financial administration and the more specific aims of drill 
books, all of which will be examined later.  However, there remains the need to construct 
a working model of effectiveness which can be applied to the late seventeenth-century 
militia.             
    The Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of ‘effective’ lists six qualities: 
one, as having a definite or desired effect; two, as being powerful in visual, emotive, etc. 
effect; three, of actually existing in fact rather than officially or theoretically; four, being 
actually useable, realisable and equivalent in its effect; five, coming in to operation; and 
six, being fit for work or service.  As a noun ‘an effective’ refers to a soldier available for 
service. 134    
To avoid both the simplistic use of a dictionary definition and the judging one age 
by the standards of another it is necessary to combine these points with reported ideas 
from modern unit reports, the cited criteria of military effectiveness of Gustavus 
Adolphus, George Monck, Henry Somerset, Frederick the Great and James Wolfe and the 
contemporary understanding of the purpose of the militia. Employing these sources if the 
militia was effective then there should be evidence of it fulfilling the following criteria: 
1. Having a definite or desired effect.  Did it deter enemy invasion and internal 
risings and could it deliver local policing security? Did it fulfill its contract 
and obey orders? 
2. Being military and powerful in visual appearance. Did it look the part, and 
appear impressive in uniform, with substantial numbers and the trappings of a 
military body? 
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3. Existing in fact rather than officially or theoretically.  Could its administrative 
systems produce adequate turnout in men and equipment so as to achieve its 
purpose? 
4. Being able to perform so as to be useable and valuable in its effect.  Was its 
operational performance acceptable?  Could it march, campaign and fight? 
5. Being successful at coming into service.  Could it be financed and supplied so 
as to be summoned, assembled and put into the field quickly? 
6. Being fit and available for service. Was it able to perform as adequately 
trained and drilled soldiers?  
If the militia can be shown to have met those criteria then it would be deemed effective. 
1.6.2. The Militia’s Limitations.   
Before attempting such an analysis it is important to understand that as a military 
body the militia is necessarily not to be measured in the same terms as the royal army.  Its 
part-time nature makes it fundamentally different; so too do the terms of service of its 
officers and men and the expectations made of them.  In examining evidence of the 
nature, operation and performance of the militia there must also be an understanding of 
what it should not be expected to do.  Robert Devereux, 2nd Earl of Essex’s remarked in 
1588 that he looked for little service from the Elizabethan militia ‘when we shall mete the 
enemy’.135  Admittedly said nearly one hundred years before the Monmouth Rebellion 
this statement expresses the idea that although capable of being of limited use on 
campaign, the militia was not expected to fight pitched battles.  By the 1680s that was the 
role of professional soldiers with their strong unit identity and loyalties engendered by 
being permanently constituted.  The militia was not expected to perform as first line 
troops. 
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1.7. ORGANISATION. 
1.7.1. The overall organisation of the work 
As the majority of the criticisms of the militia are directed against their military rather 
than their policing roles, the criteria of effectiveness are primarily reduced to a series of 
more succinct and military-related subject areas. The organisation is based upon setting 
the militia in context and the thesis’s rationale for ‘effective’. 
Table 1.7.1: The organisation of the work by chapter. 
Chapter 2:  Background:  origins, history and relationship with the royal army. 
Chapter 3:  Organisation and Strength: structures, numbers and recruitment.  
Chapter 4:  Coming into Service: funding, pay and supply, summoning and readiness  
        and speed of reaction. 
Chapter 5:   Fit for Service: training, drill and discipline. 
Chapter 6:   Appearance & Bearing: uniform, equipment and weapons 
Chapter 7:   Performance:  marching, taking part in a campaign, fighting and post-action  
        recovery. 
Chapter 8:   Expectations and Loyalty:  purpose and expectations, and loyalty 
Chapter 9:   Conclusion: conclusions and recommendations for further study 
 
As the information was collected it was categorised into topic-related groupings.   
It was then analysed to determine its relevance to prove or refute the perception, and if 
deemed useful was incorporated into a chapter where its place in the argument was 
explained. At the end of each chapter a brief summary developed the overall argument.  
These thoughts are drawn together in the conclusion to put forward an answer to the core 
question of the thesis.      
Whereas most of the chapters are based upon findings from original research 
chapter two is a necessary discussions of the contextual background and nature of the 
militia prior and during 1685.  Each subsequent chapter examines how the militia 
satisfied or did not satisfy a particular criterion of effectiveness, as if each were a 
building block in the construction of a judgment to determine the militia’s success or 
failure as an effective home defence force.  
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Particularly relevant to the work was an awareness of the militia as a pawn in the 
battles of political will between crown and commons, and court and country factions, and 
indeed the role played during these struggles by the monarch himself.  Each faction had 
an opinion, attitude or policy towards the militia and they praised or condemned the 
institution in accordance with their own agendas.  
There also runs throughout the thesis an appreciation drawn from Harris that 
events in the south west of England must be seen as part of what was happening in the 
rest of England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland.  This includes evidence pertaining to the 
militia drawn from the Duke of Beaufort’s inspection tour of Wales in 1684, and the 
defeats of the Covenanters’ in Scotland in 1679 and Argyle’s Rebellion in 1685.136       
Whether or not one subscribes to the romantic notion that each age has its soul - 
an intangible essence or zeitgeist - care must be taken to assess evidence in terms of the 
period’s wider context. During both research and writing consideration was given to the 
social, political, religious and indeed economic aspects and influences exerted upon the 
militia as no institution can be seen in isolation.   
In an attempt to nullify the effects of deliberate or unwitting bias, the research 
was eclectic rather than selective, in both sources examined and material collected and 
included records and writings which presented evidence that both supported and ran 
counter to the generally held view of the militia. This all-embracing approach may risk 
seeing meaningful significance in every document examined but in practice uses the 
diversity of the voices consulted to draw conclusions without sheltering behind the 
inappropriateness of a central controlling thought process.  Throughout the process the 
author remained focused upon the question of whether the militia was effective in the role 
it was expected to perform.   
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The likelihood of deliberate partisanship or unconscious bias wherein values 
influence content was taken into consideration; including any the author may harbour.  
Before stating something as fact evidence was cited and analysed, and its source 
examined to ascertain as far as possible what interpretation was being offered or 
reflected, rather than simply making a judgment upon the degree of credit they deserve.  
Finally when challenging an accepted truth it is alluring to argue that previous 
writers have apparently dispensed with evidence which contradicted or challenged their 
accepted preconception, or indeed not even looked for it.  It is necessary to be aware that 
this accusation could also be levelled at any challenge to accepted truth where researchers 
who set out to find evidence that supports their theory often duly discover it.  The test 
comes in the level and frequency of evidence and the credibility of its interpretation.    
1.7.2. Limitations of the Work. 
The decision to focus upon the militias of South West England was based upon 
the idea that it was these units which played an active role in the containment and 
suppression of the Monmouth Rebellion, because this was an occasion when the militia 
was called upon to perform its combined purpose of campaigning and policing in local 
defence.  It was also one of the rare occasions when the militia was tested in the field - 
called upon to undertake a military campaign and indeed to fight. 
Although nationwide many militias were called out or placed upon alert during 
1685 it was the militias of Cornwall, Devon, Dorset, Gloucestershire, Hampshire, 
Somerset, and Wiltshire that played significant roles in the military campaign.    It was 
felt more relevant to investigate those units rather than those county militias for which the 
response was only theoretical. Although the Monmouth Rebellion and William of 
Orange’s invasion were both of great significance the events of 1685 rather than those of 
1688 are the focus of the work because it was in them and their reporting that the 
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perception of an ineffective militia began.  Use of material from the whole decade has 
been made due the general paucity of surviving militia records.  The work also draws 
upon evidence gathered from reign of Charles II and the early years of William III 
because the militia of the 1680s was still governed by the Militia Acts of the early 
Restoration and early Williamite sources tell of what existed before his militia reforms 
took effect. 
 
1.8.   SOURCES. 
This investigation involved research amongst collections of papers, letters and 
accounts held in national and regional libraries, such as the National Archives at Kew, the 
Bodleian Library at Oxford and the British Library in London where a significant find 
was A Method for Executing the Powers relating to the Militia dated 1684.137  The 
collections of county record offices have been consulted and proved most informative.  
At the Wiltshire and Swindon History Centre at Chippenham a very useful muster list for 
the Salisbury Regiment of the Wiltshire Militia was found, which specified each man’s 
name, company affiliation and parish of origin.138 Also useful was a warrant giving 
instruction for training of the militia troop of Marlborough Horse.139 In addition personal 
papers in both public and private hands have been consulted, but regrettably with little 
result.  Other research has been carried out in repositories such as the War Office 
Collection and Library and The Prince Consort’s Library, Aldershot and The National 
Army Museum.  As well as document collections at other national institutions, local 
museums and libraries, particular attention was paid to local manuscripts, books, booklets 
and pamphlets in towns directly affected by the rising, such as those belonging to the 
Wiltshire Archaeological Society.140  The paper trail has also included libraries, and 
muniment rooms of descendants of various ministers of state, such as William Blathwayt, 
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and of various county lord lieutenants, such as the Earl of Pembroke, and their militia 
officers, such as Major Thomas Erle.141  In the case of searching collections of papers 
where the number of documents was numerous, advice was sought from supervising 
archivists and both their written and computerised catalogues especially those listed by 
the Historic Manuscripts Commission.  They were searched by use of keywords and key 
names derived from the Literature Review.  
Articles and academic papers published in institution and society journals have been 
consulted including the Journals of the House of Commons and House of Lords, and the 
Journals of the Society for Historical Army Research.142  Lack of background concerning 
the foreign policy, religious and social systems of the Stuart Age was addressed by a 
programme of supervisor-recommended reading as well as attendance at courses, 
including one held by the Oxford University Continuing Education Department on James 
II.143   
There are surprisingly quite a number of primary sources which refer to the militia 
during the 1685 crisis, although never as many as one would like.  Over the last thirty 
years many have appeared as appendices in several Monmouth Rebellion-related books, 
and are noted in the Bibliography. Those which afford more pertinent insights into the 
effectiveness of the militia are: Feversham’s Despatches to James II (in French) and The 
Movements of the Royal Army, both in the Stopville-Sackville manuscripts.144  The 
rebel’s story is told in Wade’s Narrative and John Coad’s account of his part in events, 
whilst the Wiltshire Militia’s own tale is told by Adam Wheeler.145 
Many militia-based internet sites discovered are American and are overtly political 
arguments for and against gun control, citing as evidence that the English state initially 
expected members of the militia not only to possess but to keep their weapons in their 
homes.146  Somehow, what happened in seventeenth-century England is interpreted as a 
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basis for what authors think should happen in twenty-first century America. These sites 
do however make reference to various legal conditions which governed the English 
militia but they often conflate notions of home and national defence.  However, they are 
interesting because they quote English material to indicate that the Restoration militia 
was a political as well as a military body, ‘Sometimes the people thought of militia 
service as a right, but more often as a duty’ wrote Wagner, who continued as follows: 
Then, during the political and religious strife of the 17th century, 
governments began using the militia more as a political police 
force…When the monarchy was restored under Charles II, he 
continued the trend of dominating the militia and building a 
professional army. He also began to systematically disarm those 
who were deemed politically unreliable. James II continued and 
expanded these policies and ended up being overthrown.  All of 
this left the English people with a great dislike for standing 
armies, and a sense that their militia duties, while not always 
welcome, were nonetheless an important safeguard of their 
freedom. It also left them firmly convinced that government must 
not be allowed to disarm its citizens. The Declaration of Right, 
produced by the Parliament in 1689, included protection of 
citizen’s gun rights. In fact, it made possession of guns an 
independent right, not at all dependent upon membership of a 
militia. 147 
 
Comments such as this do show that the militia should not be simply seen and 
consequently judged as an extension of the royal army and contribute to an appreciation 
of it as a critical and independent body.   
Moreover there also exists a body of largely unexamined and unpublished 
material.  Into this category in the Wiltshire and Swindon History Centre come 20 
collected pieces of paper, written in secretary script, frequently in a bad hand, in which 
the words ‘militia’, ‘powder’ or another word or name associated with them has been 
spotted by an archivist and the papers put together into an unsorted bundle.148  
Memoirs and letters are personal but they have their target audiences and often 
have their own agendas. Memoirs tend to be written with intentions beyond the mere 
recording of facts and events and sometimes justify actions, often promote causes and 
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have hidden subtexts or constraints.  Many seventeenth-century memoirs are subtitled ‘A 
Vindication of...’ whilst Wade’s Narrative is known for not including names or deeds of 
rebels who were still alive at his time of writing.149  Paschall’s suppression of the incident 
in which the royal foot and the royal horse exchanged volleys in his account of the battle 
of Sedgemoor is a good example of judicious editing.150  Most notable are the plethora of 
reports and letters critical of the militia which have been penned by royal officers such as 
Feversham and Churchill who had careers both in the army and at court to protect and 
enhance, which they could do by espousing views concurrent with James II’s known 
aversion to the militia.151   
More dispassionate are the Calendar of State Papers (Domestic). The CSPD 
contain a series of letters from the Earl of Sunderland, Secretary of the Council, to the 
lord lieutenants with their orders concerning the Monmouth Rebellion, which throw new 
light on why Albemarle’s militia did not attack the rebels.152  Also dispassionate but full 
of financial detail concerning the cost of the military are the Exchequer files for the 
period, including those of the years that Fox was Paymaster General.153 
Financial accounts may have their pre-designated audience but unless there is 
some hidden agenda or deliberate falsification, they are often enlightening.  The annual 
accounts of Thomas Naish, gunpowder supplier to the Mayor of Salisbury gives reliable 
information as to its consumption rate by the city’s militia company, whilst the itemised 
tailor’s bill presented to Francis Luttrell on his appointment as a colonel of the Somerset 
Militia, detailed on page 220, lists items of an officer’s dress and shows the need for a 
private income to uphold the dignity of the position.154  Unlike the mid-eighteenth 
century legal property qualifications for militia officers, the reliance upon wealthy and 
social elite families to provide sufficient men willing to serve in the militia was a more 
informal arrangement embracing a degree of noblesse oblige.  However, it did ensure that 
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such men both had a vested interest or stake in the country and then preservation of the 
status quo, and could stand the expense of purchasing their uniforms and equipment.  
Both primary and secondary published references to the militia of the late 
seventeenth century tend to be minimal, general and anecdotal in style. Collected material 
which directly relates to the militia of the period is hard to find in published works, 
especially that which is useful in determining its doctrine or nature.  Equally sparse are 
collated sources of information regarding the technological and administrative aspects of 
the militia’s development.  
 
1.9. CONCLUSION. 
Until this thesis the subject of militia effectiveness does not appear to have been widely 
examined and what appraisal has been undertaken has generally begun from the 
assumption that the militia was inadequate and performed poorly.155  This perception 
appears to be derived from the literature which at times is insecurely founded in limited 
contemporary writings, and yet is frequently repeated uncritically by historians of this 
and earlier ages.   
This work starts from a neutral standpoint and provides an analysis of available 
primary source material in both national and local repositories relating to the nature, 
operation and performance of the late seventeenth-century militia.   It evaluates this new 
evidence within the framework of a constructed model of effectiveness drawn from the 
writings of military commanders and the expectations made of the militia by those who 
created and commanded it.  The work examines each element in the model in turn so as 
to judge whether the militia met these criteria and by weight and value of this evidence 
makes a judgement to determine the military effectiveness of the West Country militia in 
1685. 
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However, before examining these criteria it is necessary to investigate the 
militia’s background so as to understand where and how it originated, why it was created 
and indeed continued to be funded.  Coupled with this is its complicated relationship with 
the royal army with which it was intended to co-operate, and the question of how it fitted 
in with the society from which it was drawn and which it served.  
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Chapter Two 
BACKGROUND 
 
 ‘They combine the character of defenders, contribute to the prosperity of the country, 
are connected with their fellow subjects, and interested in the support of the laws and 
good government of the Kingdom’1 
 
        
  
To judge the effectiveness of the late seventeenth-century militia it is necessary to 
understand its background. This chapter initially places the year of the rebellion in 
terms of the Restoration period and then presents a chronology of the events of the 
crisis.  After that it deals with what the militia was, why it existed and how it evolved. 
The later part of the chapter concerns who controlled the militia and how the 
institution engaged with the society it served, the relationships between it and the 
royal army and then between it and James II, and lastly its policing role in state 
control of both political and religious dissent.2   
 
2.1. HISTORICAL CONTEXT. 
Charles II was restored to the throne in 1660, yet throughout his exile he was regarded 
by many royalist sympathisers at home and abroad as having inherited the crown in 
1649.  Despite his long marriage to Catherine of Braganza he did not have any legal 
issue and upon his death in 1685 Charles’ younger brother James, Duke of York 
became king.  Although his succession was welcomed by the majority of the 
population there was an attempt by Charles II’s eldest bastard, and James’ nephew, 
James Scott, Duke of Monmouth to claim the throne.  The historical context of this 
rebellion and the events of 1685 are encapsulated in the following two tables:  
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Table 2.1.1: The Monmouth Rebellion within its historical context. 
 
1649          King Charles I beheaded and Parliament became the supreme power . 
1650          Prince Charles Stuart arrived in Scotland and signed the Act of Covenant. 
1651          Charles crowned King of Scotland and invaded England. Oliver Cromwell  
                  and the English army defeated him and his Scottish army at Worcester. 
1652          Trading disputes with the Netherlands escalated into the First Dutch War 
1653          Cromwell became Lord Protector.  
1654          Peace negotiated with the Netherlands. 
1658          Cromwell died. His son Richard took office but resigned a year later.  
1660          Charles proclaimed King of England and returned from exile to be restored  
      to the throne.  Many republicans fled to Holland. 
1661          The first parliament of King Charles II met at Westminster.  The Militia  
      Act passed which vested control of the armed forces in the Crown. 
1665          The Second Dutch War began and the Great Plague struck London. 
1666          The Great Fire destroyed much of London. 
1667          The Dutch destroyed much of the English fleet at anchor off Rochester, 
                  although a month later the War ended with favourable terms for England. 
1670          Charles II’s eldest bastard James, Duke of Monmouth signed the Treaty of  
                  Dover with agents of Louis XIV which created an Anglo-French alliance. 
1671         Charles’ younger brother James, Duke of York declared his Catholicism  
      followed by an attempt to exclude him from the succession. 
1672          England entered into a Third Dutch War which lasted two years. 
1673          The Test Act passed which excluded Catholics from public office.  
1678          Titus Oates made false accusations of a ‘Papist Plot’ to murder the king  
       followed by a swathe of Catholic persecution. 
1679           A second attempt made to pass an Exclusion Bill to bar James, Duke of  
       York from the throne.  The Duke of Monmouth became the Protestant  
                   hope and darling of the newly named Whig Party. 
1681           A third attempt to pass an Exclusion bill resulted in Charles imprisoning  
                   its champion the Earl of Shaftesbury who later fled to Holland. 
1683           The Rye House Plot, an attempt to assassinate the king was discovered.   
                   Implicated, Monmouth too fled to Holland.  
1685           Charles II died and the Catholic James, Duke of York became king.   
Encouraged by exiles in Holland James, Duke of Monmouth led a           
small invasion force intent upon raising the West Country into  
                   rebellion in the name of Protestant reform and then to make him  
                   king.  The rebellion failed and Monmouth was executed.  
1686           James II took measures to restore Catholicism in England, and set up an  
                   army camp of 13,000 troops at Hounslow to overawe nearby London.  
1688           James issued the Declaration of Indulgence to suspend all laws against  
                   Catholics and Non-Conformists and to repeal the Test Act. His wife   
                   produced a son to guarantee the Catholic succession and the king sought  
                   to promote his Catholic supporters in Parliament, the Army and Clergy. 
                   Discontent with the attempts at personal control seven leading statesmen  
                   invited his daughter Mary and her husband, the Dutch Stadtholder,        
                   William of Orange to England to restore English liberties.  This they did  
                   in what is now called the Glorious Revolution.  James II fled to France.   
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Because of Monmouth’s rebellion 1685 was a period when the militia was 
tested on a regional scale over a sustained period of several weeks, rather than on a 
small local scale over a couple of days.     
Table 2.1.2: Movement of the major forces during the Monmouth Rebellion  
 Event   Monmouth Churchill        Feversham  
1685 
11th June Landing at Lyme  Lyme 
12th  Rebels muster  Lyme 
13th  Monmouth declared traitor 
Militia summoned  Lyme  Royal interview 
14th  Skirmish at Bridport 
  Dorset Militia defend town   Lyme  Assembles troops     
  Devon Militia march 
15th  Axminster Incident Axminster Leaves London 
  Somerset Militia retreats 
16th  Rebels advance  Chard 
17th  Continues advance Ilminster Reaches Bridport 
  Wiltshire Militia muster 
18th  Enters Taunton  Taunton  Occupies Axminster 
  Dorset Militia advance 
19th  Skirmish at Ashill Taunton  Chard         Appointed CinC 
20th  Monmouth declared king Taunton  Chard 
21st  Continues advance Bridgwater Chard (Kirke Arrives)  Leaves London 
22nd  Continues advance Glastonbury 
 23rd  Continues advance Shepton Mallet            Bath & Bristol 
24th  Conitnues advance Pensford Rendezvous of the royal army near Bath 
25th  Skirmish at Keynsham Keynsham  Bath 
26th  Attempt on Bath then            
Begin the retreat   Norton St Phillip               Bradford-on-Avon 
27th  Battle at Norton St. Phillip Norton St Phillip                Bradford-on-Avon/Norton St.  
Phillip/then back to Bradford 
28th  Continues retreat  Frome 
29th  Rests   Frome   Westbury (Trayne Arrives) 
30th  Continues retreat  Shepton Mallet   Frome 
1st July  Sacks Wells  Wells    Frome 
2nd  Continues retreat  Nr Axbridge   Shepton Mallet 
3rd  Re –enters Bridgwater Bridgwater   Glastonbury/Somerton 
4th  Fortifies town  Bridgwater   Somerton 
5th  Battle of Sedgemoor Sedgemoor  Weston Zoyland/Sedgemoor 
  Wiltshire Militia reserve 
6th  Militia hunt fugitives Gillingham  Orders mopping up operations 
7th  Sussex Militia capture      Bridgwater 
Monmouth     Cranborne 
 
2.1.1. Origins and Development. 
The beginnings of the English militia system are found long before the Restoration in 
the authority given by British kings to wealthy and powerful subjects to swell the 
ranks of their oath-sworn warrior bands with local, able-bodied men when situations 
required it.  The first general to command a combined force of warriors and ordinary 
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British people was Cassivelaunus, chosen by the British tribal chiefs about the year 54 
BC to oppose Caesar’s second invasion.3  The practice was continued under Romano-
British rule which encouraged a warrior culture in which all men were expected to 
bear arms to maintain their community’s safety and security.  Norse settlers from 
Scandinavia created the Leidang with notable leaders summoning a proportion of 
freemen from the households in their tribes to render temporary military service.4 
Saxon England followed the custom but imposed a nationwide system enforcing 
conscription of men chosen by a local leader to be weaponmen of the shire, and ‘It 
seems universally agreed by historians, that King Alfred first settled a national militia 
in this kingdom...’5  Saxon warrior elites under oath to serve warlords still existed, but 
this ability to summon men between sixteen and sixty for military service in national 
defence alongside the small units of household warriors was a levy, known as the 
fyrd.6  Saxon kings vested authority in their appointed local governors, the sheriffs of 
the county and enjoined them to record the names of those upon whom the duty to 
muster was levied. Sheriffs allocated the fyrd to fighting bands and exercised them to 
prepare for war, ‘Trayned men having abiliments of war to serve the Lord their 
King’.7  
There was mutual understanding of roles between the two elements.  The fyrd 
was not expected to stand in the front ranks of the shieldwall which was the 
prerogative of full-time warriors, but to add depth to it or to protect its flanks with 
missile weapons.  They were not professional soldiers, but tradesmen, farmers and 
labourers, servants and household slaves whose military duties were part-time.  They 
were called for short periods of service to the shire and a sheriff, no matter how 
politically or militarily powerful, could only require them to leave their county in 
times of emergency when the security of the homeland was threatened.8  In an island 
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kingdom, this was usually interpreted as incursions by seaborne raiders or invasions 
by foreign powers or races intent upon seizing land upon which to settle.  The fyrd 
performed well.  It fought admirably against Danish incursions in Mercia in 796 and 
Wessex in 855, and it was the mainstay of Alfred’s armies and indeed of Harold’s 
success in 1066 at Stamford Bridge although its lack of battlefield experience cost 
him dearly at Hastings.9 
The Normans did not replace the Saxon fyrd but adopted the levy as a means 
of increasing their feudal host with men not beholden to a feudal lord.  Warren-
Hollister argues that they took over the Saxon system of requiring each hundred to 
furnish twenty men - one for every five hides.10  Unlike those who served in the 
king’s army they were still summoned and commanded by the sheriff in whom 
Norman law reaffirmed the right to muster every male able to use a weapon in their 
county, excluding nobility and clergy. Not all able men served as there was still a 
selection process but the duty to muster was firmly established.  Sheriffs chose whom 
they wanted in the force.  The Normans called this body the posse comitatus, literally 
translated as the power of the county, an expression that lives on in so many 
American Westerns.  Its civil rather than solely military role can be traced back to the 
1181 Assize of Arms and the creation of jurata ad arma, an armed body of men at the 
disposal of the king for the purposes of keeping the peace.  Mustered at times of 
threat, the posse was primarily intended as a peace-keeping organisation.   
The difference between warrior and fyrd was perpetuated in the difference 
between those who served in the royal armies and those who served in the posse, 
whose role also included the control of civil disturbance and local policing duties.11  
Yet together they continued to perform well in meeting foreign threats, turning out 
and defeating the Danes in 1069, the Scots in 1072 and the Welsh in 1098; some even 
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went abroad and fought in Maine in 1073.12  A further development saw an additional 
creation called the select fyrd which was answerable to the local lord rather than the 
sheriff.  However, by 1100 the select fyrd was almost absorbed into the feudal 
contingents of the royal armies, ‘merely serving cum militas’ at the wish of their 
Norman overlords.13 The posse was more representative of ordinary people with two 
commentators arguing that ‘The English militia concept was unique because of its 
plebeian character’.14  
In 1181 Henry II’s Assize of Arms required that every levied freeman was to 
produce weapons according to the worth of his possessions thus introducing 
proportional cost-bearing.15 This levy was divided into three categories: those under 
knights fee, the select fyrd and the grand fyrd or posse; the latter had to muster with an 
iron cap, a gambeson - a padded jerkin - and a lance or spear.  Musters were held for 
annual inspection to confirm the men had acquired this equipment.  In 1253 the levy 
was extended to include villeins and serfs meaning that those rich enough could send 
their human property to serve instead of appearing themselves, and again those raised 
were promised that they did not have to leave their home shire except in 
circumstances such as ‘the coming of strange enemies into the realm’.16  They served 
quite adequately during the de Montfort Rebellion of 1265 and in 1277 they were out 
again, but ‘few appeared to have served longer than one month although a picked 
body of 100 archers from Macclesfield was paid special rates to remain out longer 
than customary’.17   Edward I’s Statute of Winchester, 1285 prescribed the weapons 
and equipment each man in the posse should bring, dependent upon the size of his 
property holding.18  This was made easier by the listing of the most common and least 
inexpensive of weapons; ‘anyone else... shall keep bows and arrows’.19 The 
popularity of the longbow and the laws to encourage its practice made the posse a 
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formidable and inclusive body, and although payment in lieu of service, called 
scutage, was acceptable large numbers of men took their obligation personally and 
seriously. The posse comitatus began to evolve into a more select body of property-
owners with legislation for periodic inspection of men and weaponry to ensure they 
met their obligations to the state. 
The various plagues which swept late medieval Europe and the ensuing social 
revolutions fuelled by shortages of manpower changed the nature of the posse.  In an 
era when manpower was scarce freed serfs and peasants sought paid employment 
rather than fulfilling unpaid duties, and similar values spilled over into the military 
with men of the levy asking for pay.  Instead there was renewed legislation under 
Henry IV reaffirming that service was without pay.  However, the Commission of 
Array in 1402 restated their right not to be required to leave their home counties 
except in dire emergencies.20  Another edict decreed that general musters were to be 
held in every county every three years to ensure there was always a force ready to 
resist invaders or suppress rebellions.21 These obligations were established by law in 
1411 with the addition of a riot act which gave the posse policing powers under the 
direction of sheriffs - the poair de counte – the right to arrest rioters.22  They were 
called out to suppress Jack Cade’s Rebellion in 1450. 
But as the king’s armies also needed to be constantly maintained an active and 
listed posse was a fertile recruiting ground for soldiers to fight the king’s wars.  Many 
of these free and often skilful men were lured away by a system of indenture; military 
service governed by contract and rewarded with money. It reaffirmed the warrior 
class as professionals yet transfers from the posse widened its social profile.  The 
renowned English and Welsh archers that served in England’s foreign wars were often 
drawn from the posse, whilst the defence of the kingdom in their absence was 
 60 
 
entrusted to several great lords and their retainers and the county sheriffs with the 
depleted posse.  Never the first choice for fighting units but often the home of useful 
skilled men the home defence force had by Henry V’s time firmly become, in general 
perception if not in comparative practice, a second class army of amateurs albeit an 
effective one. The difference between the two types of force had become set: the 
king’s or royal army, those in paid, full-time service, and the posse, those in unpaid, 
part-time service.  
The so-called Wars of the Roses saw a proliferation of expanded professional 
retinues paid and maintained by over-mighty subjects whilst the effectiveness and 
standards of the posse went into decline along with its name - the term ‘militia’ began 
to appear.  Henry VII successfully limited these extended retinues but although he 
inherited his father’s distrust of private armies he did little to encourage the militia.  
As there was no standing royal army Henry VIII sought to create a national militia 
during his reign and regular musters of county forces were called.  Militia 
organisation was codified according to population, each county being divided into 
divisions. Wiltshire was divided into four divisions each comprising a number of 
hundreds capable of supplying a specified number of men appropriate to their size.  
The men appearing were carefully listed on a muster certificate and categorised 
according to the arms they brought.  A typical ‘Certyfycatt of the vewe of abull men’ 
for one of the two divisions of North Wiltshire lists 311 Archers, 505 Billmen, 329 
Harnesses and 70 Horses; across the county this would translate into a force four 
times those numbers – perhaps 4,500 Foot and 280 Horse.23 However some muster 
rolls record low numbers of men appearing when summoned not only in times of 
peace, but even when invasions or Scots incursions threatened, and when numbers 
rose, many of those mustering were woefully short of the weapons and the 
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accoutrements they were supposed to bring.24  Market End parish of Bicester 
furnished 1 armoured and mounted billman but ‘there be 10 archers more in that town 
and 21 billmen able to serve the Kinge lackynge harnes and weapon’, and there were 
another seven weaponless men in Kynges End parish.25  
Measures were needed to stem the decline and under Mary I all previous 
militia legislation was repealed and a more cohesive set of laws introduced. These 
required property owners to be responsible for finding, keeping and maintaining such 
horses and armour for the defence of the realm as their wealth permitted.  The 
legislation included penalties for absenteeism or equipment shortages and it made 
corporations responsible for the supply and storage of weapons in gatehouses or 
churches.  It instructed local authorities to devise the means by which their forces 
could assemble at one hour’s notice.26  It also heralded the move towards a centrally 
controlled militia, which may have been the result of a Catholic government being 
apprehensive of the largely Protestant militia.   
Elizabeth’s government enacted a militia statute in 1558.27  As there was still 
no standing royal army she employed a levy for raising royal troops for her Irish Wars 
and the prospect of pay, loot and free-billeting again encouraged the stripping of the 
militia of many of its best men. From the 1560s onwards the provision of soldiers in 
times of war was primarily the responsibility of the lord lieutenants of the counties 
(see below) and late Tudor government enforced its militia regulations.  It ordered a 
nationwide inspection of all males of sixteen years and upwards from which each 
region was to draw ‘a convenient and sufficient number of the most able, by the 
reasonable charge of the inhabitants of every shire, to be armed and weaponed and so 
consequently taught and trained.’28  This marked the introduction of training 
requirements and consequently the origin of the trained bands which, through their 
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exemption from being forced into service overseas, were safe from absorption into the 
royal armies.  This condition encouraged another important change in the nature of 
militia service in that it encouraged men to volunteer for service rather than being 
pressed.   The Elizabethan Militia was England’s army although the expectation of its 
ability to fight against well-trained professional solders or mercenaries was uncertain.  
However, despite the Earl of Leicester’s disparaging comment ‘I [know] what burgers 
be well enough,’ the militia put down the rebellion of the Earl of Essex in 1601 both 
in the street fighting and the rounding up of conspirators.29  Moreover, throughout 
Elizabeth’s reign the independent nature of the trained bands was being fostered.  
They were each essentially de jure, local in command and not under central 
government control, and they were also de facto, voluntary in recruitment and not 
bound in service.   
 Successive English governments tried to balance local and national priorities 
and to mollify a seemingly innate distrust of a centralised military answerable only to 
a socially elite minority.  None of the Tudors, and neither James I nor Charles I before 
the civil wars had a standing royal army.  They had a small core of royal guards and 
maintained garrisons in various parts of the country, relying upon short-term mass 
recruitment in emergencies.  The trained bands satisfied the need in times of peace for 
a home defence force without raising and paying for a large body of professional, full-
time soldiers.  Although some aspects of compulsory service and obligation to supply 
equipment were present in the militia regulations, the traditions of localism and 
voluntarism held sway.     
Being his national defence force, James I tried to improve the trained bands 
and inject a spirit of revival and renewal.  Inspections were ordered and plans for 
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making good deficiencies in numbers and equipment set in motion, particularly in 
London,  
…supplying the roomes of Captains, souldiers and other 
persons as are either dead, insufficient or removed out of the 
City since the mustering of former times, with sufficient and 
at men… also causing the defects of Armours, weapons and 
other Furniture to be sufficiently repaired, armoured and 
provided.  And that the said Bandes may be trained and 
exercised from tyme to tyme.30   
 
This included holidays such as Shrove Tuesday and May Day when the towns 
looked to their trained bands not their watch to police any unruly behaviour by 
apprentices or other young men.    
When Charles I came to the throne in 1625 he expressed a desire to create an 
exact or perfect militia; dutiful to the monarch, well equipped, up to strength, properly 
disciplined and regularly trained.  Issues of muskets and pikes replaced bows and bills 
and the Privy Council issued edicts about absenteeism and the borrowing by one unit 
of another unit’s weapons for different inspection days.31 The new measures met with 
some success.  Throughout the 1630s interest in the trained bands grew and in the 
shires interest was taken in the achievements of those in the capital as Letters from 
Mercurius Civicus to Mercurius Rusticus testifies.32 However, tension between the 
king and his parliament grew into a struggle for constitutional control of the trained 
bands.  Relations between monarch and civil authorities worsened as Charles tried to 
enforce a levy for the First Bishops’ War and reneged upon the ‘no foreign service’ 
agreement with the militia.33 By 1641 the London Militia, the most numerous in the 
country, had become disaffected and skeptics thought it could no longer be relied 
upon to enact the king’s will and perform the duty of the former posse comitatus to 
maintain the peace and keep order in times of civil unrest.   
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As the trained bands showed signs of increased military effectiveness whoever 
controlled them held the potential power of government.  The spiral into civil war is 
not within the scope of this work but it is interesting to note that the first open 
disputes between king and parliament were over the control of the London Trained 
Bands and then the county militias.  These arguments are detailed by Nagel and 
Wedgewood, and Charles I’s attempts to seize control of them in the three kingdoms 
are outlined in Kenyon & Ohlmeyer.34   
With the raising of the royal standard at Nottingham in 1642 commissions of 
array and militia ordinances were issued and passed by both king and parliament 
respectively, instructing powerful and influential men to raise regiments of foot and 
troops of horse.  The trained bands were the natural focus for early recruitment.  
Although ranks were swollen later by impressments, numbers were initially gathered 
through volunteers, and the militia system disintegrated as units were converted to full 
time troops. They often performed well in battle, a fact commented upon by several 
contemporaries even their surprised foes.35   
Militia regiments were again raised during the Interregnum and operated 
alongside the New Model Army. Under Cromwell this united force won itself a 
formidable reputation and proved to be as good as any in Europe, and it more than 
competently policed the rule of the Major Generals, 1655-57.  The militia and the 
standing army numbered around 80,000 men across England, Scotland and Ireland, 
and the distinction between the two forces became blurred.  
 
2.2. THE ROYAL ARMY AND THE RESTORATION MILITIA. 
Disbanding parliament’s standing army and retaining only a small part of it as royal 
troops was one of the most popular steps taken by Charles II at the Restoration, as it 
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both removed the financial burden it imposed and ended its ability to interfere in 
politics.  Childs states that the disbanding of the Interregnum’s standing army 
returned 40,000 men to civilian life.36  
On 6 November fifteen regiments of foot, four of horse and 
twenty-two garrison companies had been dissolved, leaving 
three of foot, nine of horse and eleven garrison units.  By 
Christmas 1660 the New Model Army had ceased to exist 
except for Albemarle’s foot... and his own regiment of horse.’ 
 
The much reduced military, mainly drawn from royalist troops returning from 
exile or from units loyal to Monck was returned to the pre-war state of guards and 
garrisons. This was a relatively small, permanent force paid for out of the royal purse 
from monies allocated to the king by his royalist parliament for his personal 
protection and the better governance of the country. Yet, it was still an unpopular 
entity and any attempt to increase its size or vote it additional funding was strenuously 
resisted. 
The size of the royal army fluctuated due to wars with the Dutch, intervening 
periods of peace and the need to hold first Dunkirk and then Tangiers.  However, the 
force grew steadily in numbers.  In 1685 James II’s army to suppress the Monmouth 
Rebellion consisted of: The Royal Regiment of Horse Guards, The Royal Regiment of 
Horse, The Royal Regiment of Dragoons, The First Royal Regiment of Foot Guards, 
The Second Royal Regiment of Foot Guards, The Royal Regiment of Foot, The 
Queen Dowager's Regiment of Foot and The Queen Consort's Regiment of Foot, 
together with the Train of Artillery which was not part of the army establishment. In 
addition there were 22 specified garrisons including those posted on offshore islands 
such as Jersey.  Although the army was controlled by the king it was administered 
centrally by a triumvirate of officials: the Secretary-at-War, the Muster-Master-
General and the Paymaster.37   
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The royal army during the Monmouth Rebellion campaigned with 
approximately 3,000 all arms and could have produced another 4,000 if the regiments 
mustered all their companies and troops and the garrisons had been called in.38 
Additional to this home defence force there were other contingents on the Irish and 
the Scottish establishments and three regiments in service with the Dutch. The Irish 
establishment was smaller than the English establishment and the Scottish 
establishment smaller still but the overall total number of regular royal soldiers in 
1685 amounted to approximately 17,000 spread across four countries.  The royal army 
was considerably bigger than envisaged in the early 1660s but the militia could draw 
upon a much larger number of men. Hume maintains that by 1672 there were 130,000 
militiamen in England, 22,000 in Scotland and 24,000 in Ireland.39  The militia 
regiments may not have matched the royal army in royal-affiliation titles and indeed 
professionalism, but they did number somewhere in the region of 176,000 men in the 
three kingdoms, with 30,000 in London alone.40      
 An entrenched antithesis to a standing army coupled with a need for some 
form of large-scale, home defence force saw the rebirth and growth of the Restoration 
Militia. However, the Militia Bills of 1661 and 1663 met with opposition in 
parliament and were only passed by securing the support of former cavalier officers 
and exaggerating reports of plots and possible rebellions. Charles II then followed 
Cromwell’s example by creating a Select Militia. Barnett states that it was the 
ineffectiveness of the militia during the Second Dutch War that was responsible for 
the revival of the Select Mobile Militia in 1667, under which initiative a regiment of 
foot was raised plus three regiments of horse and seventeen independent troops.41  
The regulations for the Select Militia insisted that both those responsible for providing 
men and the men themselves swore ‘that it is not lawful upon any pretense 
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whatsoever to take arms against the king.’42  Apart from these few units, this Select 
Militia never materialised, but the militia acts of the early Restoration abolished 
tenure in chivalry (or shield service), established legislation for the governance of the 
militia and created a national militia estimated at 160,000 locally-raised men funded 
by local contribution.43  Although the militia legislation of the 1660s had been fraught 
with argument the late-seventeenth-century militia had come into being.44  
With two military bodies in the country it was not surprising that rivalries 
existed and there were several areas of tension.  Militia officers tended to be those 
who extolled loyalty to the Church of England, parliament and the local community, 
whilst royal army officers’ first allegiance was to the king upon whom they were 
dependent for pay, promotion and social advancement.   
The militia and the royal army were also rivals for recruitment. Militiamen were 
frequently volunteers rather than men who had been pressed or forced by their 
wretched circumstances to enlist.  They were usually of higher social standing than 
those in the royal army who were often the dregs of society. Western’s subtitle The 
Story of a Political Issue encourages readers to see the militia as a military body 
nominally assigned to parliament, with its ranks filled by small holders, craftsmen and 
men with a little social standing and some vested interest in the country; and the royal 
army as intrinsically bound to the court, full of men of lesser degree, usually landless 
and perhaps petty criminals, who had no say in the affairs of local government, and 
consequently could not be expected to care overmuch for the cause for which they 
were expected to fight.45 Being civilians the men in the militia often shared the 
general populace’s view of regulars as expressed by the Restoration playwright 
Thomas Otway in his play The Soldier’s Fortune.  He calls them lousy redcoat-
rakehells, dogs, enslavers, plunderers, ravishers and scoundrels.46   Although it cannot 
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be proved it is likely royal soldiers also looked down upon their part-time 
counterparts. 
The two forces were thus separate bodies but they were expected to co-operate 
to achieve the goals of a campaign.  To do so, senior officers had to understand the 
differences between them and their relative strengths and weaknesses.  Problems 
arose because this was not understood or became confused. There appears to have 
been not only a degree of confusion over relative qualities in the eyes of those who 
exercised political control over the two institutions, but also in the relationship 
between the two officer cadres and the social groups from which they came.  King’s 
work on the population of late seventeenth-century Britain describes the emergence of 
a discreet group of men who had bought commissions in the regular army or actively 
sought them through patronage, in order to achieve the political and social status 
enjoyed by militia officers, which would have ordinarily been denied them by the 
natural order of county social structures.47 King advances a view of society based 
upon a fixed social hierarchy and the importance of the household, and he suggests 
that these men were its enemies, holding transient appointments and being dependant 
more upon court and state patronage rather than established country and local power.  
If King is correct it is not surprising that the two bodies did not work together easily 
and seldom had a good word for each other.  
Contemporary comparisons with the royal army were inevitable as they were 
the only model against which the militia could be measured as soldiers. But they were 
comparisons made on unsound ground.  For example, the military experience of those 
in the royal army was far greater. Although some men would have retired upon their 
return from Tangiers in February 1684, Trelawney’s Regiments was destined for 
Ireland as a ready and available serving unit.  There must have been a degree of 
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turnover of men in the royal ranks but it is reasonable to suggest that those serving in 
the mid 1670s constituted a significant core to each regiment in the mid 1680s.  Most 
of the royal units that fought at Sedgemoor were experienced and had seen action. 
Table 2.2.1: Experience of the Sedgemoor regiments. 
His Majesty’s Regiment of Horse Guards - Some sea service then with Turenne in 
Flanders campaign 1672-78.  Fought at Maastricht in 1673. 
 
The Royal Regiment of Horse (Oxford’s) - Active in the policing of Oxford in 1681.  
One troop had served in the Tangier Garrison. 
 
The Royal Regiment of Dragoons - Active in Tangiers, and recently helped suppress 
Argyle’s rebellion in Scotland. 
 
His Majesty’s First Regiment of Foot Guards  - Extensive sea service during Dutch 
Wars and with the English force on the Continent, both with Turenne then the Dutch 
in Flanders, plus home policing of the Oates Riots. 
 
His Majesty’s Second Regiment of Foot Guards - Sea service and land campaign in 
Flanders, first against the Dutch then against the French. Some served in Tangiers. 
 
The Royal Regiment of Foot (Dumbarton’s)  - Served on the Irish establishment and 
recently returned from four years in Tangiers fighting Berbers.       
 
The Queen Dowager's Regiment (Kirke’s) - Recently returned long term garrison of 
Tangiers, having been in many engagements with the Berbers. 
 
The Queen Consort's Regiment (Trelawney’s) - Part of the garrison of Tangiers, 
having been raised in 1680 and in frequent action against the Berber tribes. 
Source:          Hamilton, Lt. Gen. Sir F.W., The Origin and History of the First or Grenadier Guards, 
(London, John Murray, 1874), vol 1., pp. 79-88.  McKinnon, Col., Origin and Services of the 
Coldstream Guards (London, Richard Bentley, 1833), vol 1.  Packe, E., An Historical Record of the 
Royal Regiment of Horse Guards or Oxford Blues (London, William Clowes, 1834), pp. 31-40.  White-
Spunner, B., Horse Guards (London, MacMillan, 2006), p. 87 
 
Many of these regiments were campaign-hardened and no battalion of militia 
could match this experience: nor could its men be adjudged more capable soldiers.  
Despite his proficiency in drill and his personal courage, a Devon militiaman with 
eight days formal training per annum was never going to equal a veteran who had 
spent years in Tangiers in a state of endemic war.  It is tempting to believe that the 
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militia’s politically motivated detractors knew exactly what they were doing when 
they held up the two forces for simplistic comparison.   
By 1685 the competing existence of royal army and militia had changed the 
nature of reciprocal respect and expectation of co-operation between the warriors of 
the king and the weaponmen of the county.  Adding fuel to this division was the 
king’s preference and public support for the royal army.    
The royal army was subject to the orders of the king and that the militia was 
also under his control was enshrined in law by act of parliament:  
Foresmuch as within all His Majesties Realmes and 
Dominions the sole Supreme Government Command and 
Disposition of the Militia and of all Forces by Sea and Land 
and of all Forts and Places of strength is and by the Lawes of 
England ever was the undoubted Right of His Majesty’.48 
 
The number of royal regiments and their small establishment meant that the 
army could be tightly and centrally controlled.  However, to be practical the 
administration and control of the militia had to be delegated.   
Whereas the king could draw upon a cadre of professional military officers to 
command the royal army, the civilian nature of the militia required a different 
approach and different men.  To control and command the militia Charles II 
reinstituted the pre-civil war system of lord lieutenants of the counties, men who were 
the monarch’s representatives in their shires. The office had been abolished under the 
Commonwealth but An Act for ordering the Forces in the several Counties of this 
Kingdom of 1662 declared that 
...the King's most Excellent Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, 
shall and may from Time to Time, as Occasion shall require, 
issue forth several Commissions of Lieutenancy to such 
Persons as his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, shall think 
fit to be his Majesty's Lieutenants for the several and 
respective Counties, Cities and Places of England and 
Dominion of Wales, and Town of Berwick upon Tweed. 
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 Charles II issued instructions for these men to ensure they had ‘volunteers 
who offer assistance formed in troops apart and trained; the officers to be numerous; 
disaffected persons watched and not allowed to assemble, and their arms seized’.49 
The reinstated lord lieutenants were still primarily the king’s military representative in 
the county but their wide-reaching local influence took on greater significance.  By 
the 1680s they and their deputy lord lieutenants were key figures in the intricately 
constructed military, judicial, economic, social and political framework of the 
counties, and each man was carefully selected from a close-knit circle of men loyal to 
the monarch.  All were peers of the realm except the lord lieutenant of County 
Durham, Dr. Nathaniel Crew who was the Bishop of Durham (locum).  All were also 
Tories. Some Whig families achieved high office under the Stuarts post 1681 but they 
were consistently excluded from that of lord lieutenant.  The continued wealth and 
status of these men depended greatly upon the king’s goodwill.  
Table 2.2.2:  The lord lieutenants of the south western counties 1680 – 1690. 
 
COUNY 1680 1681 1682 1683 1684 1685 1686   1687 1688 1689 1690 
Cornwall 
 
John Granville, Earl of Bath Not known or Vacant   John Granville, Earl 
of Bath 
Devon 
 
Christopher Monck, Duke of Albemarle Not known or Vacant   John Granville, Earl 
of Bath 
Dorset 
 
                                                                 John Digby, Earl of Bristol 
Hampshire Robert 
Bruce, 
Earl of 
Elgin 
Not known or Vacant  followed by  
                        Edward Noel, Earl of Gainsborough  
James 
FitzJames,
Duke of 
Berwick 
Charles Paulet,  Duke of Bolton                                   
Gloucester
shire 
                                          Henry Somerset, Duke of Beaufort Charles Gerard, 
Earl of 
Macclesfield 
Somerset Heneage Finch, 
Earl of 
Winchelsea 
         Charles Seymour, Duke of Somerset Henry, 
Baron 
Waldegrave 
Maurice Berkeley, 
Viscount 
Fitzhardinge 
Thomas 
Osborne 
Earl of 
Danby * 
Wiltshire Philip Herbert,                
Earl of Pembroke 
                    Thomas Herbert, Earl of Pembroke Not 
known / 
Vacant   
Thomas Herbert, 
Earl of Pembroke 
* Shared with both William Cavendish, Duke of Devonshire and Charles Sackville, Earl of Dorset. 
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The lord lieutenants had deputies to assist them in their duties.  The office of 
deputy lord lieutenant, between three and six per county, was in the gift of the lord 
lieutenant.50  Each was usually assigned a division of the county, often unrelated to 
their residence, and they were supposed to meet with their fellow deputies or under 
officers regularly in designated market towns.51  These men’s duties involved holding 
musters, supervising the efforts of the muster master and the militia officers, and 
applying the statutory rules for the assessments of property holders and the collecting 
of all militia-related monies.  They often held other offices, many having served as 
sheriff of the county, others were justices of peace while some were Members of 
Parliament.  Such was the influence of deputy lieutenant and militia colonel Sir 
William Portman that there is a note appended to the list of rebels condemned to 
transportation by Judge Jefferies in 1685 that one man was pardoned at his request.52  
Most deputies were mature men of over 35 years of age who recognised the 
advantages the position offered and valued the appointment.   
The deputy lord lieutenants were drawn from the ranks of the leading county 
gentry whose local knowledge, experience and standing served them and their office 
well.  They were known local figures and whilst not members of the aristocracy, 
many were baronets and knights.  Others were major landowners and merchants 
whose wealth, property, status and influence had been achieved through trade, civil 
war service, marriage and patronage.  They had sometimes risen from quite humble 
beginnings in a relatively short time: ‘appointments were all de novo’ but they all had 
to be men known to be loyal to the Crown because they held local power when their 
superior was at court or immersed in national affairs.53  In Nottinghamshire Gilbert, 
Lord Haughton, a cavalier who had returned from exile, was created a deputy but his 
father the Earl of Clare, who had been an Interregnum Member of Parliament, was 
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not.  For young men it was often a career move to higher things and sometimes quite a 
family monopoly.  In Somerset the Portman family provided several deputies during 
the seventeenth century, the first being Sir John Portman whose position secured him 
a baronetcy in 1612.54   
One of the duties of a lord lieutenant which he usually delegated to his 
deputies was to ensure that the required militia levies were raised and trained.  They 
in turn often passed this responsibility to an array of militia officers and sub-officers 
of the civil administration, going as far down the scale as the parish constable who 
was responsible for its implementation at the lowest local level.  To aid these men in 
performing this duty the lord lieutenant also appointed a county muster master to 
actually oversee musters and training and a secretary to arrange for the billeting of 
any troops sent into his county from elsewhere.55   
After the lessons of the civil wars the king knew he needed lord lieutenants, 
deputy lieutenants and militia colonels who shared his political values and derived 
some interest, influence or gain by upholding them.  The lord lieutenants sat in the 
House of Lords and the deputies often had seats in the House of Commons, as did 
many of the colonels.  The colonel of the Red Regiment of the Wiltshire Militia was 
John Wyndham who was also Member of Parliament for Sarum.  Similarly in 
Cornwall Colonel Charles Godolphin was the member for Helston, and in Somerset at 
least four militia colonels held seats: Sir William Portman for Taunton; Sir Edward 
Phelipps for Ilchester; Edward Berkeley, Viscount Fitzharding for Bath and Francis 
Lutterell for Minehead.   
The lord lieutenants were not instructed by Charles II ‘to require persons as 
have a certificate of their constant loyalty and fidelity’ before being appointed as 
militia officers, but he encouraged the appointment of those with a family history of 
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service to the crown.56  Members of families in the South West who had remained 
loyal throughout the civil wars and who had soldiered for his father’s cause or 
accompanied his exile were the obvious choices for appointments.  Those of high 
social rank such as Francis Lutterell whose family had held Dunster Castle for 
Charles I and Sir Edmund Andros whose father had held Jersey, were appointed to the 
senior ranks of the militia whilst those of lesser social status or younger siblings 
became the inferior officers, such as lieutenants and ensigns.57  Proven family loyalty 
to the Crown was seen as an important criterion of loyalty and thus a factor in 
appointments. 
Table 2.2.3:  Those controlling the western militia in 1685 and their family 
association with the royal cause. 
 
Lord Lieutenants and Commanders of County Militias: 
Cornwall John Granville, Earl of Bath – Father was Sir Bevil Grenville, hero of 
the Royalist Western Army killed at Lansdown. 
Devon  Christopher Monck, Duke of Albemarle - Father engineered The 
Restoration and had served as Captain General of the Army. 
Dorset John Digby, Earl of Bristol - Father was Royalist cavalry general and 
Charles’ friend in exile. 
Gloucestershire Henry Somerset, Duke of Beaufort – Father had been created Earl of  
Worcester in 1642 and had held Raglan for Charles I. 
Somerset Charles Seymour, Duke of Somerset - Uncle was Charles I’s General  
in the West.  Grandfather had been enobled during the civil war.  
Wiltshire Thomas Herbert, Earl of Pembroke – Grandfather had been a royal 
favourite before becoming a staunch supporter of parliament. The 
family home at Wilton had been the Royalist civil war Artillery Park, 
Militia Officers: 
Cornwall Colonel Charles Godolphin – Father had been a Royalist colonel in the  
Cornish Foot, known as one of ‘the four wheels of Charles’ wain…’ 
Devon  Captain Robert Hawley – Father & uncle had been Royalist officers. 
Dorset Colonel Thomas Strangways– Father & uncle had been royalist 
colonels of horse and were captured at the storm of Sherborne Castle.. 
Gloucestershire No officers’ names discovered 
Somerset Colonel Edward Phelipps – Father had been a royalist captain of horse  
under Charles I and sat in his Oxford Parliament in 1644.  He was also 
jailed for his attempted rebellion for Charles II in 1655. 
Colonel Sir William Portman – Father had fought for Charles I. House 
had been a royalist HQ. Imprisoned and died in the Tower.  
  Colonel Ralph, Lord Stawell, – Father had been a colonel of horse in  
General Hopton’s Royal Western Army. Defied Parliament’s authority 
in 1650 and imprisoned in the Tower until released at the Restoration. 
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Wiltshire Colonel John Wyndham – Uncle had been royalist Governor of  
Bridgwater whose wife had nursed Charles II when he was a baby.  
Captain Sherrington Talbot – Father raised a regiment for Charles I 
  Captain Ashby – Father had been a colonel of horse in the civil wars  
and was created a baron in 1660, after which he led an investigation  
into the activities of Cromwell’s treasurers in Devon.   
 
Source: Newman, P.R., Royalist Officers in England & Wales 1642 – 1660 (New York, Garland, 
1981).  
 
The spread of the influence of such men can be seen in the fact that ‘In the 
species of interregnum which prevailed in Poole from the issue of the Quo Warranto 
under the Grant of Charter of 8 December 1688 the duties of the Mayoralty were 
performed by Colonel John Wyndham of Salisbury, who was appointed to the Office 
by commission…’58  The family of John Young, Wyndham’s lieutenant colonel, is 
not listed among the wealthy of the county but it was already producing militia 
officers.59   The chart below shows that across the southwest these militia officers also 
held important civilian offices as members of parliament, sheriffs, justices of the 
peace, and high ranking controllers of local business. Holding both a militia 
commission and a civil office could cause conflict of interests.  As lord lieutenants 
were peers with seats in the House of Lords and their deputies were often MPs in the 
House of Commons many were frequently absent from their counties for part of their 
time.   In 1661 the Wiltshire deputies urged to organise the militia quickly, petitioned 
the Council to increase their numbers as ‘none of the deputies are likely to be resident 
in the county and the militia by [is] no means settled.’60   
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Table 2.2.4: A Selection of militia officers and their civil offices. 
 
Cornwall Colonel Charles Godolphin, justice of the peace and Assayer of Tin & Coinage. 
Dorset Colonel Thomas Strangways, MP for the county and deputy lord lieutenant.   
Major Thomas Erle, MP for Wareham and deputy lord lieutenant.   
Captain of Horse, Richard Fowns, MP for Corfe Castle and deputy lord  
lieutenant of Dorset.   
Hampshire Colonel Sir Robert Holmes, MP for Newport. 
Somerset Colonel William Portman, MP for Taunton and deputy lord lieutenant of both 
Somerset and Dorset.   
Colonel Edward Phelipps, foreman of the grand jury, MP for Ilchester. 
Captain of Horse, Sir Maurice Berkeley Viscount Fitzharding, MP for Bath, 
became lord lieutenant in 1688. 
Colonel Francis Luttrell, MP for Minehead, and deputy lord lieutenant of  
Dorset.   
Wiltshire Colonel John Wyndham, MP for Sarum, high sheriff, mayor of Poole.   
Colonel Henry Chivers, high sheriff.  
Colonel Edward Baynton, justice of the peace. 
Captain John Davenant, high sheriff. 
Colonel of Horse Thomas Penruddock, former MP for Wilton and deputy lord 
lieutenant of Wiltshire. 
Captain of Horse, Sherrington Talbot, MP for Chippenham. 
 
Militia officers were not only themselves well placed in local affairs but also 
had family connections in positions of power. Colonel Charles Godolphin’s uncle 
William had inherited his grandfather’s colonelcy of the local trained band and 
converted it into a field regiment fighting for Charles I.  Charles’ cousin Colonel 
Sidney Godolphin was Governor of the Isles of Scilly.  Another cousin and another 
Sidney Godolphin had been Monmouth’s Secretary, was MP for Helston and held 
several offices under Charles II including Gentleman of the Bedchamber.  He became 
a baron in 1684.  Under James II Sidney Godolphin became First Lord of the Treasury 
and Chamberlain to Queen Mary of Modena.   Those who controlled and commanded 
the militia were well placed in both the political and social structures of the country 
and exerted influence.   
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2.3. JAMES II AND THE MILITIA.  
The king’s role in the creation of the perception of an ineffective militia has already 
been mentioned but it is worth developing this point as part of the militia’s 
background.  James II tended towards the view that both the state’s and his own 
personal security could only be ensured by a fully dependant and therefore loyal, 
royal army.   The militia being controlled by the county lord lieutenants meant that the 
monarch was to a degree, dependent upon their goodwill.  By careful placing of his 
own men and issuing frequent instructions Charles II had lessened their independence, 
so James II continued this policy.  He kept the same beholden men in power and later 
appointed his illegitimate son James Fitzjames, Earl of Berwick to the lord 
lieutenancy of Hampshire in 1687 at the age of 17.   
This desire for personal control was fuelled by his and his Tory government’s 
wariness of a militia influenced by the Whig Party, coupled with a memory that his 
father had lost his crown through having too small a military force to crush his 
parliamentarian opponents in early 1642.   These fears manifested themselves in a 
desire to diminish the status and role of the militia, parliament’s potential military 
instrument, and to replace it with an enlarged royal army loyal to his person.  This 
was a bold and controversial move as no previous monarch had sought to dispense 
with the local defence force.   
James’ preference for the royal army was marked and his antipathy towards 
the militia hardened between May and June 1685.  In May 1685 the right of a subject 
to refuse an appointment to a militia command was withdrawn and service was 
enforced by fine, but in June 1685 James suspended all militia training in Scotland 
and absolved people of the responsibility of paying to maintain the militia under the 
proclaimed intention of easing the burden imposed upon the people.61  He then 
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managed to persuade the Scottish Parliament to disband the militia entirely despite 
their very good showing in suppressing Argyle’s Rebellion.  
Our sovereign lord, with consent of his estates of parliament, 
considering that it may contribute for the ease of the people to 
have the ordinary rendezvouses of militia discharged, unless 
extraordinary occasions should otherwise require; therefore 
they discharge all rendezvouses of the militia in time coming 
during his majesty's royal pleasure and, until his pleasure be 
so declared, that no leaders nor assisters shall be liable for 
furnishing and contributing to buy or maintain horse or foot 
on that account, and they recommend to the secret council to 
take such courses for disposing of the militia arms in the 
respective shires as shall seem most expedient for his 
majesty's service, without prejudice always of the continuance 
of the former and present constitution of the militia during the 
present rebellion. 62  
It is worth considering if he saw this as a rehearsal for his plans for England.  
Although it is not possible to prove that James II actually conceived a political 
strategy to increase the royal army at the expense of the militia the picture of the 
Restoration militia passed down to modern readers is at least part framed by the 
political intentions of James II.  He may have harboured notions of ruling by Divine 
Right but in 1685, early in his reign, he needed to tread warily and take parliament 
and popular opinion with him.  It was in his interest to encourage the image of militia 
incompetence fuelled by Feversham’s and Churchill’s biased reporting of events.  He 
chose to interpret campaign reverses as the fault of the militia rather than recognise 
his nephew Monmouth’s military abilities. ‘Through the fault of the militia bands of 
Devon or Somerset the Rebels have opened their way toward Taunton’.63  The idea of 
using the situation to raise public awareness of the argument for a larger royal army 
also seems to have been formulated at this time and he took opportunities to 
promulgate this view: ‘I hope everybody will be convinced, that the Militia, which 
have hitherto been so much depended on, is not sufficient for such Occasions’.64 
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Militia officers may not have been aware that James was masterminding a campaign 
of denigration but they were well aware that one existed. One complained that: ‘…we 
are not beholding to the Gazet that trumpets the small acts of others and wholly omits 
what was of more consequence’.65   
Monmouth’s Rebellion had served James’ purpose in that in response to the 
threat he raised several new regiments of horse and foot, some under the command of 
leading Catholics and issued instruction to increase the strength of every troop and 
company in the existing royal army.  Although an enlarged royal army had been 
achieved there remained a need to discredit the view that the militia was the nation’s 
defender, and a need to find the funding to pay for the new regiments.  If the militia 
could be denigrated and then abolished, the royal army was ready to replace it.  
Moreover the tax raised to pay for the militia could fund the new units.   With an 
enlarged royal army and a redundant militia James could have absolute personal 
control.   
James II’s personal correspondence reveals that he was playing political 
games to meet the need for a personally loyal armed force.  He often refers to the 
failure of the militia in letters to royal officers and friends in both the military and 
state service, making them fully aware of his views.  However, he sent praise and 
statements of confidence to the lord lieutenants via Sunderland.  On 13 June he had a 
letter sent to Albemarle, stating that: 
The King commands me to let you know he places an entire 
confidence in your conduct and zeal for his service, and 
therefore leaves it to your discretion to march with the forces 
of the county, and to proceed in all things as you shall see 
cause and judge best for his service, and his Majesty having 
authorised several Lords Lieutenants to march with the militia 
out of the counties I send enclosed a letter giving you the same 
authority.66 
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He repeats this confidence on 16 June: 
His Majesty is well satisfied with the orders you have given to 
prevent any further progress of the rebels, and has no further 
directions to send you At this time, but leaves it to your 
discretion and conduct to act as you shall think best for his 
service. 
 
However, the following letter is a carefully crafted political document which 
begins:      
His Matie commands me to acquaint your Grace that He is very 
well satisfied with the good Services you have done, and the 
Orders and Directions you have given for preserving that 
County and the Peace and Quiet thereof, being a matter of the 
Greatest importance at this time…”67   
 
There is no hint of dissatisfaction. But, the same letter imposes the Earl of 
Feversham’s full authority over Albemarle and Bath, the lord lieutenant of Cornwall 
and joint commander of the forces in Exeter: 
… the Duke of Albemarle will receive Directions from My 
Lord Feversham, that the King does expect he should act 
accordingly, which I am sure will bee best done, if so good a 
friend as your Lordpt is, can be near him.’68   
 
Both men were instructed to subordinate themselves to the newly appointed 
royal army commander.  John Granville, Earl of Bath was a king’s man, he had fought 
for Charles I, served on the Privy Council under Charles II, represented James II in 
Cornwall and indeed transferred allegiance to William of Orange once he was 
crowned.  In 1685 James could trust Bath to do exactly as he was told, but it may be 
that James had perceived in Albemarle a desire to ally himself with the militia, and 
being conscious of Albemarle’s power and popular standing, was also beginning to 
undermine him.  By suggesting that Bath joined Albemarle he was perhaps hoping 
that the elder and totally loyal man would be a controlling influence.  As the son of 
the Captain General who had instigated the Restoration and as a Duke, Albemarle’s 
voice carried considerable weight: should he contradict the official line the king 
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intended to take regarding the militia it would be very embarrassing.  It would appear 
that as early as 16 June the king had begun to denigrate the militia and the reduction 
of Albemarle’s influence was wholly consistent with this.  If the king could 
marginalise him and the role of the lord lieutenants he would enhance his own central 
power.   
Just four days after the defeat of Monmouth at Sedgemoor the king instructed 
the militias all over the country be stood down.69  This was normal practice but for 
those militias in the West there was still plenty of work to be done in re-establishing 
royal authority, hunting down rebels and bringing them to what then passed for 
justice.  On 30 July, with Monmouth dead a fortnight, the lord lieutenants received a 
further letter from Sunderland:  
The King commands me to acquaint your Lordships that he 
would have you give an order for an estimate to be forthwith 
made of the expense of keeping up the Militia within your 
Lieutenancies as large as by law they may be kept togeather 
in one yeare and to transmit the same forthwith to me.70 
 
Coleby confirms that Edward Noel, lord lieutenant of Hampshire had a copy, 
and comments ‘with a view to making alternative arrangements.’71 The request was 
for a financial projection based upon the maximum cost likely to be incurred for a full 
year’s spending, not simply the real cost of maintaining the militia during a campaign. 
The government was preparing arguments to bring measures before parliament 
backed by financial statistics which showed the militia to be too expensive.  Coleby 
also states that James intended to dismantle the militia and Miller confirms this with 
the revelation that James had plans to take over their weapons.72  This was coupled 
with several lord lieutenants being expressly forbidden from holding musters, and 
others discouraged from doing so.73    
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A deputy lieutenant of Essex, Sir John Bramston, was with Albemarle when 
he received his copy of the letter ordering that the militia was not to muster and 
remarked that ‘the design is visible’.74  In Bramston’s record of Albemarle’s reply the 
Duke did not try to hide the failure of the Somerset Militia at Axminster nor his 
reluctance to act without orders with his Devon Militia.  He admitted that the militia’s 
performance had not been flawless and added that he was now sure that the king 
‘would make no more use of them, but have the monie that expense came to, and 
mawteine [royal] forces in every countie proportionate.  But that must be by Act of 
Parliament, and we shall heare more of that matter next meeting…’75  Albemarle was 
astute.  Charles II had set the precedent of reallocating parliamentary monies in 1666 
by putting much of the fleet out of commission thus releasing its funding for the royal 
army, and James intended to do something very similar.76  Miller states: ‘...in England 
James let the militia decay and planned to use the militia rates to maintain the 
standing army’.77  If the militia had to undergo decay and decline in order to be 
ineffective it can be argued that hitherto it had indeed been effective. 
Albemarle fell from favour and was either ejected or resigned his various 
military appointments and public offices.  The defence of the militia as an effective 
body was undertaken by Sir Thomas Clarges who insisted that both Albemarle and 
the militia would have achieved much more if they had been better supported.78  'To 
come first to the Militia, who (let me tell you) did considerable Service in the late 
Rebellion, and if a great Nobleman of this Kingdom had been supplied and assisted, it 
had soon been quelled’.79   
In May 1687 James II ordered the militias of Cornwall, Devon and Dorset not 
to muster until further notice: ‘The King would have you take care the militia within 
your Lieutenancies of Devon and Cornwall will not be mustered until you receive his 
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direction’.80 A similar missive went also to the Earl of Bristol concerning the Dorset 
Militia.81  Whether the militia of the southwest would have fought against William of 
Orange must remain a matter of speculation, but had they been in position to do so 
there is nothing to indicate that they would have behaved differently from the soldiers 
of his royal army in the face of a foreign invasion.  It is very unlikely that the type of 
men who made up the militia in 1685 were different from those of 1688 and that the 
regiments ‘composed of honest yeoman and farmers fighting in defense of their lands, 
family and country would be a match for any invader’.82  
 
2.4. THE MILITIA’S ROLE IN POLICING.  
Before leaving the militia’s background it is necessary to briefly examine their role in 
policing the state. The term ‘militia’ has its roots in various Latin expressions: miles 
meaning soldier; -itia indicating a state, activity, quality or condition of being - thus 
militia means soldier in state service.  Although in English parlance earlier the word 
‘militia’ was first recorded in 1590 in a book by Sir John Smythe, Certain Discourses 
Military.  Uncritical observers may believe Charles II merely continued the institution 
of a part-time national defence force but the crown’s and the government’s survival 
depended on the militia. 83 
The first Act of Parliament in 1661 legislated for the safety of Charles II, 
threatening reprisals against any who dared to: 
… intend death or destrucc[i]on or any bodily harm ... or 
restraint of the Person of the same our Soveraigne Lord the 
King or to deprive or depose him from the Stile Honour or 
Kingly Name of the Imperiall Crowne...’84  
 
Charles II’s guards may have been able to protect his person in a reasonably 
small confined location but a later Militia Act of 1661 outlined the necessity for the 
militia’s continuance to respond to the threat that:  
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... since the twenty fourth of June One thousand six hundred 
and sixty there have beene Inserrections by occasion whereof 
diverse of His Majesties good Subjects have beene murdered 
and for the securing the Peace of the Nation and preventing 
further disorders diverse persons suspected to be Fanaticks 
Sectaries or Disturbers of the Peace have beene assaulted 
arrested detained or imprisoned and diverse Armes have been 
seized and Houses searched for Armes or suspected persons 
Bee it therefore further Enacted by the Authority aforesaid. 85 
 
The need for protection was nationwide.  In the early years of the Restoration, 
the state created the militia to guarantee its own security.  Although the government 
paid political lip-service to the idea that the militia was maintained to guard against 
foreign incursions or invasions its main purpose was to defend the state against 
disturbances or insurrections among its own people.86  Beneath the veneer of 
protecting the nation from external threat the militia was the government’s military 
tool for internal social control.  
The use of the militia at times of threats to national security was a laudable 
aim but whereas foreign invasion was easy to define, civil unrest and dissenter 
activities were harder to interpret.  The militia could be useful to the local community 
in the peace-keeping role of the posse comitatus and as a quasi police force could 
suppress public disorder to ensure the safety of ordinary citizens.   However, whether 
an outdoor church-meeting constituted a threat to civil order is a moot point but the 
lord lieutenants usually responded to instructions issued by the king or his Secretary 
of the Council.  Although rhetoric suggested it would be called out to meet foreign 
threats local violence and internal threats to national and government security were 
often its real targets.   
To judge how effective the militia was in policing the country it is necessary 
to examine how well they performed in that role.  Whilst it is tempting to think of the 
militia’s enforcement of the law in the days before the formation of the civil police 
 85 
 
force, as conducting operations against gangs of law-breakers or smugglers, militia 
policing was actually more focused upon maintaining the political status quo than 
rounding up thieves, armed robbers and fraudsters. The focus of their efforts was 
upon conducting searches for arms, dispersing conventicles and harassing dissenters 
in general, be they religious, such as Catholics and non-conformists, or political, such 
as old Cromwellians or republicans. This was specified in the requirement that 
ordered ‘disaffected persons [to be] watched and not allowed to assemble, and their 
arms seized; fortresses to be secured, all risings suppressed’.87 In some areas the 
militia may be accused of over-zealous policing especially where the suppression of 
non-conformists’ outdoor religious meetings or conventicles and the harassment of 
dissenters were concerned. Edward Phelipps, a country gentleman of traditional 
leanings and a senior officer in the Somerset Militia was described as  
… a fierce enemy to his political rivals and an opponent of 
religious dissent. He was foreman of the grand jury (1680) on 
the Taunton radicals, and was described two years later as 
'very successful in bringing nonconformists to Church'. In the 
aftermath of the Rye House Plot (1683) he assisted in the 
search of the houses of 'fanatics' in Bridgwater and burned the 
furnishings of their chapel.88 
 
Searches of dissenters’ properties for weapons were also a great cause for both 
tension and resentment but accusations of uncivil behaviour towards those whose 
houses were searched were investigated.  After such an enquiry into threatening 
behaviour lodged by Mr. William Herbert of Grafton Park, Sir Roger Norwich wrote 
to Secretary Jenkins that the complaint was malicious and a slight on the lieutenancy.  
He enclosed a disposition from Captain Edward Saunders of the Northamptonshire 
militia horse assuring that property was not damaged.  A rebuttal to a similar charge 
was made in evidence given by Lieutenant James Bond of the Northamptonshire 
militia foot.  Describing a search he reported that
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say, If you will not tell us where your master’s arms are, we will quarter with you a 
month’.89 Whether these investigations of hardships suffered by dissenters were 
thorough and unbiased or their findings genuine we cannot tell.  However, it does 
emerge that the militia did as required and were effective in their policing role. 
 
2.5. CONCLUSION. 
The late seventeenth-century militia existed as part of an age-old institution providing 
the nation and the government with sufficient military might to guarantee its own 
safety and that of its subjects.  From Roman times to present day part-time troops 
have been required to leave their civilian occupations and take up arms in order to 
protect the nation from threats, both external and internal, and they have done so with 
varying degrees of success whilst also maintaining a relatively stable relationship with 
the royal army.  
After 1660 control of the militia was still nominally founded in the king but 
was also securely rooted in local authority with a complex interwoven pattern of roles 
and responsibilities and reliance upon an accepted social order. The Restoration 
Militia was active in the execution of its duty regarding both dealing with foreign 
threat and with internal disturbances, again with varying degrees of success.  
However, King James II was a force majeur in creating the image of the militia as 
ineffective in the military role. Yet, although lying outside the remit of this thesis, it 
appears to have performed its policing duties with zealous efficiency and proved itself 
most effective.  It therefore remains to investigate whether this was repeated when it 
came to dealing with invasion and rebellion – whether it was also effective as a 
military force in 1685.   
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The first stage of this investigation is to examine whether this force with its 
traditional background was well-organised and effectively administered.  To 
determine whether effective systems of funding existed and for raising adequate 
numbers of men, and then supplying them with equipment to fulfill their role?  It is to 
these questions that attention now turns.  
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Chapter Three 
ORGANISATION AND STRENGTH 
‘After the Civil War, the militia was in abeyance until 1757’.1 
 
In its Public Service handout, Military Records 2, The National Archives at Kew 
unwisely questions the very existence of a militia in the post-Restoration period.2  So 
this chapter will firstly answer any doubts as to its existence and then investigate its 
structure during the period under consideration.  It will examine its organisation as a 
military body, its systems of command and control, and assess its capacity to turn out 
in effective and creditable numbers.  
In April 1660, the year of the restoration of the monarchy it was recorded that 
the City of London Militia remained very much in evidence: ‘this day was a general 
muster of the city militia in Hyde Park where there were about 30,000 men in arms’.3  
Equally that same year the county militias were also in evidence in the West Country 
where the deputy lieutenants of Wiltshire reported calling out their troops:  
...upon severall informations and allarums … we ordered two 
companies of foot to be garrisoned in Malmesbury and one 
troop of horse in the Devizes to be diligent in these parts for 
the searching and seizing of arms in all suspected places and 
the securing of all justly suspected persons. 4 
 
Three Militia Acts were passed in 1661, 1662 and 1663. Parliamentary records 
make frequent references to the militia, and the Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 
contains frequent letters and references to them.5  County records contain many lists 
of contributors to militia money and corporation books record expenditure on local 
militia, as will be discussed in chapter four.  Moreover, numerous extant copies of 
commissions and orders issued by the lord lieutenants to various militia officers 
across England during the Restoration period will be referred to throughout the work. 
 92 
 
This chapter will demonstrate that, in the face of incontrovertible evidence to the 
contrary, The National Archives’s above-mentioned information sheet is substantially 
incorrect although sadly this error is a fair reflection of the paucity of that institution’s 
holdings of material relevant to the Restoration Militia.  
 
3.1. MILITIA ORGANISATION. 
The organisation of the English Militia was county-based throughout much of its 
existence and by the late seventeenth century each county organised its force in a 
similar manner. The militia had a military structure akin to that of the royal army in 
that soldiers of both foot and horse were grouped into military units called regiments, 
which were subdivided into companies for the foot and troops for the horse.6 As a 
county force each of these regiments was commanded by the lord lieutenant or his 
appointed senior officer.  
Higher costs combined with a limited availability of suitable horses meant that 
there were more regiments of infantry than cavalry.  The usual establishment for a 
county militia included up to six regiments of foot and one regiment of horse.  In 
1638 Somerset produced a local force of some 4,000 infantry arrayed in five 
regiments and 300 troopers in a single regiment of cavalry.7  In 1685 Hampshire 
mustered 2,500 men in five regiments of foot and 120 troopers in one regiment of 
horse.8  However, no contemporary records of all the county forces for the Monmouth 
Rebellion have been discovered but from the work of Cruickshank, Miller and 
Wroughton and the examination of various County Record Offices’ manuscripts, a 
consistent pattern of four or five foot regiments and one horse regiment per county 
emerges. 9 
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Although the military structure of the militia mirrored that of the royal army its 
administration was firmly entrenched in the well-established practices of local 
government.  Each county was subdivided into administrative units.  The basic 
element of the system was the parish overseen by a parish constable.  Parishes were 
grouped together into hundreds, a measurement based upon land area, and overseen 
by a constable of the hundred.10  Hundreds were further grouped together into county 
divisions which were named for their relative location, either East Division or West 
Division as in Cornwall, or for their dominant regional city or town, such as Taunton 
Division, Wells Division and so on in Somerset.  Table 3.1.1.lists the hundreds in two 
county divisions supplying militiamen to two regiments based upon major cities in 
Somerset. 
Table 3.1.1:  Contributing hundreds to the regiments of Bath and Wells  
 
Bath Regiment    Wells Regiment 
Bath     Wells 
Chew     Galstonbury 
Frome     Chewton 
Bedminster    Catsash 
Keynsham    Bruton 
Kilingdon    Hawthorn 
Portbury    Norton Ferris 
Wells     Whitston 
 
Source: SRO; DD/SH/5/402.  A Specimen of the |Proportions of the County of Somerset... 
losted as late seventeenth century 
 
The parish and smaller hundred groupings were the basis for militia 
companies whilst the groupings of the hundreds into divisions formed the framework 
for regiments. The lord lieutenant of Somerset advised:  ‘…the Deputy Lieutenants 
[should] divide themselves so that three at least may Act in each of the five divisions 
that compose the five regiments of the County.’11  The numbers of regiments in the 
South West and their division allocations are listed below. 
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Table 3.1.2:  The county forces of the south west in 1685. 
   Regiments     Mustering Town     Regiments    Mustering Town      
            of Foot for Division        of Horse   for County 
Cornwall        4  Liskeard   1 Bodmin 
Camelford  
South Colombs  
Helston              
Devon         6  Exeter   1 Exeter 
    Plymouth 
                                                    Four others not known             
Dorset         5  Blandford (Erle) 1  Dorchester 
     Bridport (Strangways) 
Dorchester 
Shaftesbury  
Sherborne     
Gloucestershire        4  Gloucester   1 Gloucester 
    St Braivels 
    Cirencester 
    Not known    
Hampshire*        6  Andover & Fawley  1 Winchester 
Alton     
     Basingstoke (Paulet)   
New Forest (Fleming) 
Portsdown 
   Winchester (Bolton) 
Somerset        5  Bath   1 Taunton 
Bridgwater (Stawell/Phellips) 
Yeovil/& Crewkerne (Helyer?) 
Taunton (Lutterell) 
Wells (Berkeley?)    
Wiltshire        4          Devizes (Chivers?) 1 Salisbury 
Marlborough (Baynton) 
Salisbury (Wyndham) 
Warminster (Ducket?)   
 
*In 1685Hampshire Regiments included:  
(Webb?) The Yellow Regiment of Andover 
   Fleming  The Green Regiment of the New Forest 
   (Dean?)  The Blue Regiment 
   (Norton?)  The Grey Regiment 
      The White Regiment 
Allocations to colonels, other than Fleming  are speculative based upon names in Wyndham’s 
Account, Fversham’s account of events at Bath and family home locations.  
 
Source: Murphy.W.P.D. op.cit., pp.6-7; Cornwall – Carew R., op.cit., pp.86-87; Devon; Egerton MSS. 
Eg. BL. 1626. Army. List of the Militia and of Lords Lieutenants in England and Wales 1697, cited in 
Hay, C.B., op.cit., p.270.; Dorset - Squibb, G.D., A Guide to Materials for Local History in the 
Muniment Room of the Dorset County Museum (Dorchester, Longmans,1945), p.65; Gloucestershire - 
Bloomfield.,P. op.cit., Hampshire - HRO: PER98/18   Hampshire Militia Rolls no 1 to 18; Somerset - 
SRO: DD\SH/5/402  A Specimen of The Proportions of the County of Somerset; Wiltshire - Wheeler’s 
in Chandler, D., Sedgemoor, pp.130-137. Wadham Wyndham’s Journal of the movements of the 
Regiment of Wiltshire Militia commanded by Colonel Wyndham during Monmouth's Rebellion. 
Communicated by Wadham Wyndham Esq. to the late Mr. Hatcher the historian of Salisbury, in 
Waylen., J., A History Military and Municipal of the Ancient Borough of The Devizes (London, 
Longman, Brown & Co., 1859), pp.316-320.12  
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Despite the interlude of the civil wars the organisation of the peacetime militia 
appears to have remained relatively stable with successive generations of 
administrators adopting the practices of their predecessors.  For example the muster 
certificates for the Tudor Wiltshire Militia note that ‘the division of the whole shire’ 
contained four main groupings of the hundreds whence four regiments were raised, an 
arrangement retained under the early Stuarts and reconstituted following the 
Restoration.13 In 1662, three deputy lieutenants sitting at Winchester in Hampshire 
ordered the mustering of that county’s militia ‘to be carried out… by the militia 
officers of each division’, thus indicating a post-civil war return to a divisional 
structure for the militia.14 Across the West Country surviving records point to the 
same divisional format being applied in each county. The Egerton Manuscripts, which 
contain the muster returns for 1697 (see Table 3.1.3), indicate that the same traditional 
organisations, unit names and area allocations were retained for the Williamite 
Militia.15 
Regrettably decisions concerning the information recorded were left to the 
various lord lieutenants and muster masters and consequently a collated summary is 
incomplete, lacking as it does some colonels or regimental names or even the named 
division allocation in several counties. 
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Table 3.1.3: The composition of the county forces of the south west in 1697. 
    Colonel  Companies Name             Rendezvous 
     And Men 
Devon          Stamford      7   710   Exeter 
   Drake       6   860 
   Davy                   8   840 
   Yonge       8   850 
   Roll       6   800 
   Arscot       6   860 
Troops of Horse    Ellwill       3   236 
Gloucestershire        Guise                 10   583 White  Gloucester 
   Dutton       8   534 Green 
   Stephens      9   551 Blue 
   Colchester      9   531 Red  St.Briavels 
Troops of Horse    Dursley            3   243 
Hampshire        D. of Bolton          6   366 
   M. of Winchester  6   435 
   Compton      6   399 
                                        vacant       5   371 
   Bridges       6   448 
   Dawley       5   440  
Troops of Horse    D. of Bolton      2   120 
 
Somerset         Trevellian      8   724   Bridgwater 
   Berkeley      8   726   Wells 
   Warr       8   650   Taunton 
   Not Known      8   547 Blue  Bath 
   Henly       8   787    Crewkerne 
Troops of Horse    D. of Ormond      5   269 
Wiltshire         Mompesson      6   543 Red  Salisbury 
   Webb       6   749 Blue  Marlborough 
   Chivers       6   514 Green  Devizes 
   Bainton            4   432 Yellow  Warminster  
Troops of Horse    Penruddock      4   232 
 
Source: Egerton MSS. BL. Eg 1626 Army. List of the Militia and of Lords Lieutenants in England and 
Wales 1697; also listed in Hay, C.B., (Ed.) An Epitomized History of the Militia , the ‘Constitutional 
Force’ (London, United Services Gazette, 1905), pp.114-135. 
 
 Just as the number of regiments varied from county to county so too did the 
number of their constituent sub units, as can be seen in the figurers recorded by 
Thomas Dineley (below) when, in 1684, the militias of the Welsh counties were 
mustered and inspected and the number of their companies and troops counted. 
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Table 3.1.4: The composition of the county militia regiments in Wales in 1684. 
   Foot Regiments  Companies of Foot Troops of Horse 
Montgomeryshire  1   4   1 
Denbighshire   1   2   1 
Flintshire   1   5   1 
Caernarvonshire  1   3   1 
Anglesey   1           not known  1 
Merionethshire  1   4   1 
Radnorshire   1   3   1 
Brecknockshire  1   5   1 
Carmarthenshire  1   not known  1 
Cardiganshire   1   3   1 
Pembrokeshire16  1   8   1 
Glamorganshire  1   not known  1 
Monmouthshire  1   not known  1 
 
Source:  Thomas Dinely, The Account of the Progress of Henry, the First Duke of Beaufort Through  
Wales in 1684 (London, Blades, East & Blades, 1888). 
 
During Elizabethan times the militia in Cornwall is recorded as having a 
highly organised structure with 6,030 men in 58 companies forming 12 variously 
sized regiments, accompanied by a ‘trayne of artillery’ of six small field guns and all 
necessary tools and transports.17 Although no records exist for a change in 
administration a degree of rationalisation must have taken place to create the four 
divisional regiments of the Restoration.   The most detailed records of the individual 
companies of a militia regiment of foot in the 1680s so far discovered are those of 
Colonel John Wyndham’s Regiment of the Wiltshire Militia.  The Wiltshire county 
force under the lord lieutenant, Thomas Herbert, Earl of Pembroke, was typical of the 
forces raised in the West Country during the Rebellion and in 1685 Wyndham’s, or 
the Salisbury Red Regiment, was one of four regiments of foot and one regiment of 
horse which formed the county force.   Table 3.1.5 shows how the force’s constituent 
regiments were based upon the county’s major towns and were also allocated the 
name of a distinguishing colour to identify them individually.  
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Table 3.1.5: The organisation of the militia forces in the county of Wiltshire. 
 
The Salisbury Regiment  The Red Regiment 5 Companies 540 in 1685 
The Marlborough Regiment The Blue Regiment18 not known not known 
The Devizes Regiment  The Green Regiment not known not known 
The Warminster Regiment The Yellow Regiment not known not known 
The New Sarum Company The Mayor’s Men 1 Company 110 in 1685 
The Wiltshire Horse  The Horse  4 Troops 230 in 1685 
 
Source:  Collated from W&SHC: 490/1440 A list of the men who served in the Monmouth Rebellion in 
the Wiltshire Militia...; 1553/22 The Commonplace Book of Sir Edward Bayntun of Bromham; 
1178/450 Warrant to the Constables of Kingsbridge Hundred; 413/11 The Militia in the several 
hundreds 1698… towards this the raising of the Yellow Militia Regiment in this Division of 
Warminster in the County; G23/1/41  A bundle of documents relating to the militia. 
 
In addition to the county division regiments, city corporations, institutions and 
even the clergy raised further companies in times of trouble.19 Although nominally 
under the command of the county lord lieutenant, these units were expected to remain 
as a local defence force within the environs whence they were drawn.20  During the 
events of 1685 the City of Bristol Militia under lord lieutenant Henry Somerset, Earl 
of Beaufort was active in securing its vital seaport for the king.  With the aid of 
several companies of Gloucestershire Militia also under Beaufort, they arrested rebel 
sympathisers and contained dissenters.21  The corporations of other cities and towns in 
the southwest had their own units and several institutions raised companies and 
troops, such as the University of Oxford Volunteers.22  Salisbury answered the 
summons from the Council stating ‘it shall be likewise expedient that such of the 
clergie that as have beene heretofore appoynted to finde armes, and others of them 
that are meete to be charged, may be ordered to cause the same to be shewed at these 
musters.’23  Although such companies were under the command of the lord 
lieutenants they were also answerable to their civic authorities and this tended to 
introduce management difficulties. Amongst the counties of the southwest letters 
reveal that the relationship between the lord lieutenants and the mayors and 
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corporations appear to have been generally cordial, if somewhat reproving.24   Table 
3.1.6 shows how these urban units were deployed across the West Country.  
Table 3.1.6: Additional companies of militia in the south west in 1685. 
  Regiments    Companies      Troops       
            of Foot       of Foot             of Horse      
Bristol    1    
Bath    1   
Salisbury   1   
Winchester   1   
Southampton   1   
Exeter       1    
Plymouth      1    
Penzance   1   
Truro    1   
Gloucester   1  
The Clergy   3  1 
 
There is no conclusive proof that the same number of companies existed in 
1685 as in 1697, although there is an indication that in Salisbury the Mayor’s 
Company of City Militia was absorbed into the Salisbury Regiment.25  There is 
however, no suggestion made that any re-designation of parishes amongst the 
hundreds or changes in local authority organisation occurred; neither were there major 
alterations to the arrangements for the assessment and collection of militia money as 
will be discussed in chapter four.  William III’s reign did however see changes in 
personnel indicating how political militia officer appointments were.  For example Sir 
Thomas Mompesson, a local political rival and staunch Whig replaced John 
Wyndham who was a High Tory, in the colonelcy of the Salisbury Regiment.   
Although somewhat political we have seen that commissions as senior officers 
in the militia were in the gift of the lord lieutenants who were expected to make 
appointments from amongst the lesser nobility and gentry of the county.  These were 
wealthy men, well-established in local society and often already post-holders in local 
civil institutions.26  In practice the colonelcies of the regiments were frequently also 
the prerogative of the more active deputy lieutenants, otherwise they went to 
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representatives of the older families of powerful landowners who could be relied upon 
to encourage their tenants, great and small to pay their militia money or serve in the 
ranks themselves.  On average each company of foot had its commander, usually a 
captain who was assisted by a lieutenant, an ensign and six NCOs.  A troop of horse 
had its captain, a lieutenant, a cornet, a quartermaster and five NCOs. Ideally these 
men had some military experience but it certainly was not essential as the 
responsibility for training and overseeing the efficiency of constituent units was 
delegated to the county’s muster master who was, at least in theory, a professional.27  
Of those who served under these men little detail has been recorded, but they 
were not from the lowest level of society.  Some militiamen were naturally drawn 
from estate workers and there were agricultural labourers in their ranks but the 
majority of the men were tradesmen and manufacturing craftsmen from the towns and 
rural craftsmen, yeomen and smallholders in the country.  Many of those assessed to 
be contributors to Militia Money chose to serve themselves and were obviously men 
of property and some standing.   
Militia service was no task for the feeble-bodied or even the feeble-minded:  
men in the ranks had to be capable of learning and performing complex drill routines, 
especially the musketeers who carried complicated equipment which needed specialist 
skills.  Men chosen to serve by their parishes were styled ‘Able Men’ or ‘Picked Men’ 
in most muster lists from Tudor and earlier Stuart times, and although this criterion 
was certainly relaxed during the Civil Wars it appears to have been reinstated by 
Cromwell during the Interregnum.  There is no contemporary definition of either 
description but it may be assumed it meant fit and healthy and able to bear arms.  
Existing contemporary muster lists and parish constable’s lists do not note men 
excused duty as do some later records.  The men were required to be between 16 and 
 101 
 
60 years old and remained registered as able to serve until age, infirmity or quitting 
the parish intervened.  Childs asserts that the militiamen of the 1690s were ‘honest 
young men’ indicating they were of good character and youthful.28  In one or two 
Elizabethan muster rolls there is a heading suggesting that they were of the ‘second 
sort’, not large land owners nor menial labourers but small-holders, village craftsmen, 
senior servants or tradesmen.29   
Again stemming from Tudor tradition it would appear that single men were 
preferred but all had to be selected or approved by their parish constables, by whom 
they were given parish monies and were entrusted with expensive parish property: 
such men were not rogues or prison sweepings. The frequency of payments made in 
the Restoration period by parish constables under the Elizabethan Poor Laws, to 
unemployed undesirables in order to oust them from the parish indicates that they 
were also unacceptable for service in the militia.30  It can thus be argued that unlike 
the royal army the militia did not recruit among the dregs of society.  Even if the 
accusations of the militia being something of a drinking circle were true, they might 
even reinforce the average militiaman’s standing in local society: vagabonds rarely 
receive invitations to join social clubs.      
Recruitment was not by the ballot system which filled the ranks of the 
eighteenth-century militia.31  The feudal system of lords calling out their retinues had 
been replaced by commissioning the gentry to raise regiments, but this was modified 
by the merging of the Quota and Subsidy systems of taxation in a way which called 
for the assessment of individuals who could afford to pay for the militia, yet permitted 
the method of assessment and contribution to be decided at local level.  The lord 
lieutenants and their deputies employed muster commissioners to rate local people 
and assign to them the provision of men and equipment according to a national scale 
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of contribution.  This and the funding system are discussed in chapter four but the 
result was to make recruitment the responsibility of the individual contributors who 
either had to serve as part of their civic duty or to find a replacement.  The failure to 
either serve personally or to find a substitute soldier was punishable under law by the 
imposition of fines by local justices of the peace.32  
The community-based nature of this system meant that the behaviour of the 
men who served reflected upon the reputations of both their parish and the 
contributors who found them.  Parish constables and contributors thus sought reliable 
men of good reputation; hence the majority probably came from hard-working, 
yeoman stock and counted themselves as loyal subjects of the legal king, whosoever 
he was.  It was to this sentiment that Monmouth appealed after being proclaimed king 
in Taunton.  Adult literacy was rising and many militiamen could read, so 
Monmouth’s published letter to the Duke of Albemarle, contained things designed to 
unsettle them.  He, as king, complained that the militia was:  
... raised in oposicion [sic] to Us and Our Royall Authority… 
proclaimed King to succeed Our Royall Father…charge and 
command you… to cease all Hostilities and force of armes 
against us and all our loveing Subjects,  
 
Moreover:   
 
We shall be obliged to proclaime … All those in Armes… 
Rebells and Traytors and shall proceed against them 
accordingly.33 
 
 From Albemarle’s reply it would seem these words did not unsettle the Duke, 
but their inclusion in this and other documents emanating from Monmouth’s 
propaganda machine were designed to trouble the consciences of the rank and file, 
both the faint-hearted and the ardent dissenters.34 Ordinary militiamen may have 
thought that the popular Protestant Duke’s rebellion might succeed and consequently 
the threat of a traitor’s death by hanging, drawing and quartering would loom over 
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them.  Such an end would until then never have been imagined by the law-abiding, 
West Country citizenry and it would undoubtedly have had an effect.  However, 
James II was de facto the king. Charles II, despite enormous pressure had never once 
deviated from his assertion that his brother was his successor, and that being 
illegitimate the Duke of Monmouth could not legally inherit the crown. To ask the 
population to turn against the legitimate heir to the throne was not only treason but to 
the majority asking them to turn against their fundamental belief in law and order.  
Moreover there remained the fear that to rise against the king was to go into rebellion 
against the Lord’s anointed and in that lay a risk more terrible than mere death of the 
body.  The king was crowned in God’s name and he was God’s chosen ruler; to go 
against the choice of God meant a condemnation of the soul.  ‘There was degree of 
conflation of God’s Will and the King’s will’.35  
Most office holders inherited working systems but their characters dictated 
how well their duties were performed. Whilst Philip Herbert, Earl of Pembroke, was 
lord lieutenant of Wiltshire the militia appears never to have received a high priority 
and so reform was ignored.   However, the militia had been a major concern to his 
predecessor, the Earl of Hertford, and so, when Philip’s son Thomas Herbert assumed 
the Pembroke title and the lieutenancy in 1682 the organisation of the militia and the 
role of the muster-master of Wiltshire were as Hertford had directed during his time.  
Hertford had delegated several key tasks to the muster master. The first was to ensure 
that the maintenance costs of the militia were spread evenly across those who could 
afford them. Secondly, these folk were made responsible for gathering the men 
together for training and also for recording their attendance as well as, thirdly, the 
compilation of detailed accounts recording the state of equipment.  Ideally the man 
employed as muster master would be a professional soldier, although in Hertford’s 
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time the post was held by the Earl’s secretary Josias Kirton, a man of no known 
military experience; an arrangement which caused some controversy (see below).      
Militia colonels and their regimental officers were answerable to the muster-
master for the efficient supervision and instruction of the men.  During the 1680s all 
royal army officers were commissioned by royal appointment but the degree of 
influence or interest exerted by the king varied considerably from rank to rank and 
regiment to regiment.  A similar situation existed in the militia.  Although officer 
appointments were made by the lord lieutenants the documents bestowing them were 
still called commissions.  Some posts, especially the more senior ranks which carried 
with them increased social standing in the county and further potential to ascend the 
social ladder, attracted many aspirants. Others of a more junior rank, such as ensign, 
cornet or quartermaster were often regarded as necessary staging posts to the more 
attractive and lucrative posts as well as stepping stones to social position and local 
office.36  Many royal officers regarded their military duties as part-time commitments 
and a means of acquiring money and status for minimal effort. In October 1688 
‘Ensign Thomas Carew had been absent from the Earl of Bath’s Regiment since 
March,’ and ‘Lieutenant Dering Bradshaw had requested a furlough of three days but 
had still not returned after three weeks.’37 With the militia officer structure being very 
similar to that of royal troops it would not be surprising if similar attitudes were 
present within the militia.  
The county force was an army in miniature, with the lord lieutenant as its 
commander-in-chief and one of his deputies as his major general and second-in-
command.  The day-to-day administration and running of a force according to the 
orders of its commanders was orchestrated in the royal army by a colonel with the 
title of adjutant general.  Another colonel holding the appointment of quartermaster 
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general oversaw communications, marching and encamping. The movement of 
supplies lay in the hands of the carriage master who was usually a well-paid civilian.   
No references to any of these roles appear in any of the militia papers in the southwest 
pertaining to the Restoration.  However, Carew’s survey of Cornwall in Elizabethan 
times states, 
I will now set downe the principall Commaunders & Officers, 
touching these martiall causes, together with the forces of the 
shire,’ and he lists not only the deputies with military 
responsibilities, but notes the men who performed the roles of: 
‘Colonell Generall, Marshall, Treasurer, Master of the 
Ordinance, Colonell of the horse, Sergeant maior, Quarter 
Master, Prouost Marshall, Scowt Master, Corporals of the 
field, Ammunition Master, and Trench Master’.38 
 
  Several of these roles and ranks were in use by both sides in the civil wars 
and were revived at the Restoration in the royal army but whether they were 
reintroduced into the militia remains undiscovered. The militia forces may have 
become dependent upon royal staff officers after uniting with the army in the field, or 
that these duties may have been carried out by officers without holding formal 
appointments.  
The direct control of individual regiments, irrespective of arm, was the 
responsibility of colonels who had a number of inferior and non-commissioned 
officers to assist them to administer, train and operate the regiment. 
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Table 3.1.7: Regimental ranks and appointments with their roles.  
 
Field Officers 
Colonel  Commanded the regiment, commanded a company /troop 
Lieutenant Colonel Assisted/replaced the colonel, commanded a company/troop 
Major   Senior administration officer, commanded a company/troop 
Inferior Officers 
Captain  Commanded a company/troop 
Captain Lieutenant Commanded the colonel’s company 
Lieutenant  Assisted the Captain 
Ensign/Cornet  Carried the troop/company colour 
Non-Commissioned Officers 
Drum/Trumpet Major Senior musician and administration NCO 
Sergeant  Commanded half a company or a discreet arm element within it 
Corporal  Commanded half a troop/assisted the sergeant 
Musician  Trumpeter/drummer/fifer or piper/ - clerk, messenger or orderly 
Other Ranks 
File Leader  Oversaw drill & welfare of his file (Horse 2/3 men, Foot 4/8)  
Trooper  Cavalryman 
Private Sentinel Infantryman - pikeman or musketeer 
Saltpetreman  Made or distributed match (saltpetre-impregnated cord) for the  
                                     muskets if required.  
 
Source: Drawn from Cruso, J., Militarie Instructions for the Cavallrie (1632), pp.3-16. 
 
In writing a lieutenant colonel’s commission in the militia for Jonathan 
Rashleigh, the Earl of Bath quotes his own commission, signed by the king, stating 
that he has the power ‘…to nominate, appoint and give Commissions to such persons 
as you shall think fitt to be Colenell’s, Majors, Captains and Commission Officers of 
Regiments, Troopes and Companyes…’ Bath also adopts the practice of stating not 
only Rashleigh’s assigned rank within the regiment, but also his duties within his own 
company:   
…you are hereby constituted and appointed Lieutenant 
Colonel of that Regiment of Foot whereof Sir John Carew 
Baronet is Colonel, and Captaine of a Company therein, being 
part of the Militia of the said County of Cornwall.  Take into 
your charge And care the said regiment as Lieutenant Colonel, 
and company as Captaine thereof…39   
 
Rashleigh may have been the lieutenant colonel of Carew’s Regiment and 
done duty as second-in-command but similar to traditional practice he was also 
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captain of his own company within that regiment and was expected to do duty as such 
and accordingly drew two amounts of pay. 
A county force was too small to create formal brigades, combining two or 
more regiments which would necessitate the appointment of brigadiers, but 
absenteeism among senior officers or their detachment to perform other duties meant 
that command of the regiment could often devolve upon inferior officers.  Senior field 
officers needed their juniors to be capable of performing higher roles as and when 
required.40  Wyndham’s Muster Roll states that each company had its senior officer, 
either colonel, lieutenant-colonel, major or captain, two inferior officers, a lieutenant 
and an ensign, plus two or three sergeants – a total of five or six ‘commission  
officers’ and ‘non-commission officers’ to each company.41  The pattern seems to 
have varied little over the century as during the 1630s the Bristol Trained Bands were 
known to have had one hundred men per company with six officers.  Gentlemen 
volunteers, reformadoes, drummers, lance pessadas, corporals and file leaders, were 
not counted as officers.42  This mirrored practice among the royal regiments, although 
in their ranks the senior lieutenant who often commanded the colonel’s company 
could still be styled captain-lieutenant; curiously no militia commission for this rank 
has been found.   
Control within the military is a complex amalgam of sworn allegiance, duty, 
imposed discipline and formal regulation, often enhanced by regimental pride and 
comradeship. This control is demonstrated by soldiers performing according to the 
will of those set in authority over them.  Although there is a temptation to become 
distracted by an investigation of leadership, it is the manipulation of followership, 
which in this context is the more useful study.43  In the militia the willingness of the 
men to follow the orders of their officers depended not so much upon a lord 
 108 
 
lieutenant’s commission or one issued by the king but upon the interwoven nature of 
the governance of the local community.  Community was an important factor in the 
command and control of the militia.  Militia officers were often set in authority over 
men from their estates but also, and even more frequently, over those from the 
parishes surrounding their own.  Many of Colonel Francis Luttrell’s Company within 
his Taunton Regiment of the Somerset Militia came from the north of the county in 
and around Dunster, his family home.  Colonel Wyndham not only had a house in The 
Close at Salisbury but held the ancestral home at Norrington in Alvediston which lies 
in one of the hundreds ascribed to his own company within his regiment. 
Table 3.1.8:  Residences of Wyndham’s officers and their areas of command.         
  
Officer    Residence                   Hundreds Commanded 
Col. John Wyndham  Family - Norrington Manor,  Alderbury  
Alvediston in    Chalke 
Chalke Hundred    Swanborrough  
Person - The Close, Salisbury. 
Lt.Col. John Young   Family – Ogbourne St George.        Amesbury,  
Person - Tollard Royal  Part of Elstub 
Major William Hearst  not known               Cadworth 
Cawden 
            Underditch 
Capt. John Davenant   Landford,     Branch 
Frustfield Hundred    Dole 
 
Source: W&SHC: 490/1440 a list of the men who served in the Monmouth Rebellion in the Wiltshire 
Militia…; Murphy, op.cit., p.184. 
 
Officers frequently lived in the regions from which their men were drawn.  
Table 3.1.8 above shows the close proximity of places where the officers in 
Wyndham’s Regiment lived and the homes of the men they commanded, and also 
instances of two designated residences – one of which they currently occupied, and 
the other on the family estates from where they drew their income. 
The military be it royal or militia, interpreted unwillingness amongst the men 
in the ranks to behave according to an officer’s wishes as most undesirable and 
assigned to such incidents during wartime a sliding scale of criminal charges varying 
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from insubordination, punishable by stoppages of privileges, incarceration, or 
flogging, to mutiny, which often carried the death penalty.  However, in peacetime 
militiamen were subject to civil law and answerable to civil authorities, even for 
military infractions.  During musters and undergoing training they were still civilians.  
It was only when militia units were embodied for field service did they come under 
military law and were liable to suffer the same stricter penalties that their royal 
counterparts faced: hence Wyndham’s threat to execute anyone who broke ranks to 
loot on Sedgemoor.44  Being under civil law was not, however, a license to elude 
punishment because as localism prevailed the officers whose authority they flouted in 
committing crimes whilst attending musters, were also often the local justices of the 
peace before whom they appeared for judgment at the petty sessions.  If accused of a 
more serious offence they would have appeared before the king’s justices at the 
quarter sessions. 
Being civilians the basic system of militia recruitment was akin to general 
taxation and tied to the parish system of local government.  The funding of the militia 
is dealt with in the next chapter but to summarise, each parish supplied a quantity of 
men according to the sum that its wealthier inhabitants could fund and the number of 
men who were both suitable and available. The men were usually resident in the 
parish and many of those assessed as contributors actually served themselves whilst 
others were substitutes paid to serve on behalf of those who wished to avoid personal 
service (see pages 110-111 below).45 
There was no universally-applied formal procedure for selecting men for the 
Restoration militia, because as stated before the responsibility for supplying men lay 
initially with those persons assessed to pay for and find them, together with the parish 
constables.  The cheapest option for anyone wishing to avoid answering the summons 
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was to provide a volunteer in his place.  Substitutions were permitted everywhere but 
the most frequent instances of this happening were in urban parishes where money 
was more plentiful, men for hire were more readily available, and the absence of a 
wealthy merchant on militia duties might interfere with business. A list of those 
paying for the Salisbury Militia in 1664 and the soldiers who appeared for them has 
four blocks of names: the first contains 17 names of people paying, with 16 soldiers 
supplied; the second has 41 payers of which 30 appeared in person amongst the 40 
soldiers who attended the muster; and the third has 73 contributors, many paired, who 
returned 50 soldiers - only 1 contributor appeared in person and several soldiers were 
paid for by corporations.   
Other factors encouraged substitutions. There was a lack of officer 
commissions for aspiring men who thought themselves above the common soldiery 
and would far rather find a substitute than serve in the ranks.  Contributors who were 
invalids or ill, widows and wealthy spinsters could not serve.  Religious dissenters 
were reluctant to serve themselves because one of the militia’s duties was the 
harassment of conventicles and their enlistment could result in a call to act against 
their friends or business associates.  Circles of friends were also prone to decide as a 
body to either join or decline to serve and indeed what was locally considered socially 
fashionable could also influence the choice to serve or to find a substitute.  Those 
paying for substitutes were not required to supply their reasons for doing and the 
authorities were more focused upon filling quotas than upon the individuals who 
appeared at musters.   
The combination of conscience, obligation, family tradition, expectation of 
social betters, landlord or even peer pressure, all positively influenced volunteering.  
Added to these factors was the official approval implicit in being chosen by the 
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constable, the satisfaction of doing one’s patriotic duty and the sense of the adventure 
coupled with the change from routine that militia service could bring.  Overlaying 
these considerations was the very masculine temptation of being taught to use 
firearms and handle other weapons, and to wear a uniform that was an attraction for 
members of the opposite sex.  Added to all these benefits came the lure of pay and 
food which proved a powerful enough draw to achieve the enlistment of adequate 
numbers of recruits who would appear when summoned. The ballot was sometimes 
employed but it was used more as a means of reducing the numbers of those who had 
already volunteered rather than as coercion to enlistment.46  Even in the royal army 
coercion was not a popular form of recruitment and it was not until 1708 that those 
with no lawful calling or employment were enlisted compulsorily for service with the 
royal army.   
As the contributors were usually respectable men, property owners, substantial 
tenants or traders, each with a vested interest in preserving the status quo, they would 
be unlikely to supply men whom they thought to be unfit for service or potentially 
disloyal.  Moreover, they were liable if their substitute defaulted.  Local reputations 
were invested in those representing contributors, who consequently sought men who 
would be a credit to them. Contributors and volunteers were sought first, in the belief 
that their willingness to answer the call would render them superior to intimidated or 
coerced or even bribed men.   
However, there were problems.  Joint assessments made upon two or three 
persons or upon corporations meant that no individual had the legal responsibility for 
ensuring turnout.  The legal position was that all were equally responsible and those 
named had to come to an arrangement otherwise a fine would be imposed and a 
further demand made for a nominated militiaman. 
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  At a muster, parish men were probably assigned to files, the basic level of 
organisation, consisting of similarly armed men and led by a file leader. The men 
were trained, accommodated and messed in their file; the number of men allocated to 
each of these files depended upon the muster master’s preference or the drill book he 
was following.  The classic array had been in files of eight, but during the civil wars 
this was reduced to six, copying Livy. When arrayed in line to fight at Sedgemoor, 
Wheeler says the Wiltshire Militia was in three ranks which would mean half-files 
from six. Dinely’s illustrations depict various files going about camp duties. They 
numbered eight in Montgomeryshire, six in Merionethshire, and five in Radnorshire 
although this group of men might be a detached half file of four with a sergeant.47   
Illustration 3.1.1: The Radnorshire Militia at Prestategne Church and the 
Montgomeryshire Militia at Welshpool Church. 
  
Source: Thomas Dinely, The Account of the Progress of Henry, the First Duke of Beaufort 
Through Wales in 1684 (London, Blades, East & Blades, 1888), and Baker,C., Ed., The Beaufort 
Progress 1684 (London 1867), pp.77 and 180. 
 
Parish files were assembled into groups by hundreds to form a number of 
divisions, usually numbering between 16 and 32 men according to the depth of their 
files.48 The men of the hundreds, in their divisions, were then allocated to a 
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company.49 Several divisions formed a company, (perhaps 96 men in 6 divisions of 16 
men, arrayed in 12 files of 8 or 16 files of 6) which could be made up of men from the 
parishes of one, two or even three hundreds which were usually geographical 
neighbours. 50   
Table 3.1.9: Parish contingents of Selkeley Hundred within the colonel’s 
company of the Marlborough Blue Regiment of the Wiltshire Militia 1677. 
 
Alborne   10 East & West Kennet    3 
Mildenhall        6 Bukhampton     3 
Ogborne St. George      8 Winterborne Bassett    2 
Preshutt & Clatford      7 Avebury     4 
Ogborne St. Andrew      8 Catcombe     2 
Winterborne & Montaine    4 Broadhinton     3 
Upper Lockridge      2½ Savernake Park, north side   4 
Lower Lockeridge       1½ Marleburgh Town   22 
West Overton & Shaw    4 
 
Total: 94 men. 
 
 Source  The Commonplace Book of Sir Edward Bayntun of Bromham Freeman, J,. (ed.) (Devizes, 
1988), p36. Note Winterborne & Mountaine is Winterborne Monkton, one mile north of Avebury. 
The spellings of place names are as they appear in the original.  The ½ indicates that the provision of 
one man was shared between two adjacent parishes.  
 
The intention behind this system was to ensure that militiamen served among 
friends and neighbours and were surrounded by people from villages that they knew.  
As Table 3.1.9 shows, the number of men furnished by parishes varied and 
consequently the number of hundreds needed to fill the ranks of one company varied.  
Sometimes a wealthy hundred with well-populated parishes, such as Selkeley with 94 
or Carhampton Hundred in Somerset which furnished 69 soldiers, could produce a 
substantial number of men.51  Other, poorer hundreds could not especially if their 
parishes had few inhabitants wealthy enough to be charged with supplying men. 
Although Lockridge Hundred in Wiltshire covered a substantial area its contribution 
of just four men had to be spread across its two parishes. Variations in the numbers 
supplied meant that sometimes the simple grouping of hundreds did not produce 
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companies of equal numbers whereas a large hundred yielding a good number of men 
might be halved, as in the case of Elstub Hundred, (see Table 3.1.10 below). 
The localised nature of the organisation with adjacent hundreds supplying one 
specified company also made company mustering easier as most men would have had 
relatively short distances to travel to attend.  The parishes mentioned in Table 3.1.9 
are all within ten miles of Marlborough.  A warrant from Sir Edward Baynton ordered 
the ‘stated number of foot soldiers’ to be ‘sent from the places named …with two 
days’ pay and the muster master’s dues to appear at the Angel in Marleburgh at 10.am 
on 26 September [1677] to be sworn and trained’.52 Once a year companies were 
required to form their regiment by mustering at a county rendezvous but these were 
once again reasonably close geographically thereby encouraging attendance.  This not 
only limited the militiamen’s travel but facilitated the speed and ease whereby non-
attendees could be traced or absenteeism due to sickness verified by the constables 
who were required to compile returns.53  Stringent checks were made by the muster 
masters and defaulters listed and reported.54  Localism also meant parish constables 
who drew up the lists were not far away and could be called upon to verify absences 
or shortages.  They might also attend musters and any misdemeanour exposed and 
condemnation be relayed back to the local community.  
The northeast of Wiltshire with its weaving cottage industry was more densely 
populated than the sheep-grazing downlands of the rest of the county, so if Selkeley 
Hundred could produce sufficient men to make up the Colonel’s Company of the Blue 
Regiment, perhaps the other four hundreds of the county division, Highworth, 
Kingsbridge, Kingswardstone and Ramsbury, could furnish discreet companies too; 
especially as Highworth and Ramsbury were large market towns and Kingsbridge 
contained the wool-trading centre of Swindon.  Where areas were sparsely populated 
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several hundreds had to be combined to ensure there were sufficient rich landowners 
as contributors and adequate numbers of the right sort of men as soldiers to fill a 
company.  The number of hundreds needed to complete a company varied. 
Table 3.1.10: The recruitment bases of Colonel Wyndham’s Regiment.   
Constituent Companies   Men Hundreds   Parishes 
 
Colonel John Wyndham’s Co.  148      3      35 
Lieutenant Colonel John Young’s Co. 112      1½  24  
Major William Hearst’s Co.     94      3             20  
Captain Gabriel Ashby’s Co.                          100      2½  21  
Captain John Davenant’s Co.     86           2  19  
 
Source: W&SHC 490/1440 ‘A list of the men who served in the Monmouth Rebellion in the Wiltshire.’  
 
The author of this list (see Appendix 1.) is not named but he recorded the 
numbers, names, hundreds and parishes of the men who formed the regiment’s five 
companies in 1685.  His figures can be contrasted with the practice of seven 
companies per regiment employed in Norfolk and the nine in Surrey and Berkshire in 
1690 (see Table 3.2.4 below).55  It is also worth noting that Table 3.1.10 shows that 
the militia followed the civil war and royal army practice of making the colonel’s 
company and that of the lieutenant colonel stronger than those of the other officers.  A 
name not recorded by this anonymous writer is that of the colonel’s brother, Wadham 
Wyndham who joined the regiment during the campaign and wrote a journal of it.  He 
was a militia officer but his rank is unrecorded.  However, being sent with ‘an express 
sent to Colonel Wyndham from the Earl of Pembroke’ from Bath to Bradford then on 
to Trowbridge, he may have been on the lord lieutenant’s staff.56  
The record of Wyndham’s Regiment contains inscribed lists of names of men 
in each company ordered by hundred and parish.  The penultimate folio provides a 
summary of numbers in the regiment and each of its five listed companies.  As the 
booklet was designed to accommodate the regiment’s information it is improbable 
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that Wyndham’s had any other unrecorded companies.  The list embraces all the 
hundreds and parishes in the county division whence the men were drawn. 
These listed parishes make up a swathe of adjoining hundreds in the south 
eastern part of Wiltshire, and Map 3.1.2 below shows the localised approach to 
organisation. The incongruous allocations of Wroughton parish to Elstubb & Eversley 
Hundred or the parish of Kingston Deverill to the Amesbury Hundred in 1685 were 
organisational, inter-divisional anomalies originating in medieval church politics and 
tithing allocations.57   Ten men from Wroughton were included in Sir Edward 
Baynton’s Regiment of Militia Foot based in Marlborough in 1677, but their names 
are not recorded and therefore cannot be cross-referenced with those on the 
Monmouth Rebellion list.58 However, the Marlborough allocation is more in keeping 
with their geographical location. The reason for the different allocation may have 
been that these ten men were raised by precept to the constables and tithingmen of the 
parish rather than via the standard deputy’s warrant to the constable which, on the 
same day raised men from 17 parishes in the surrounding Selkeley Hundred.59   
From work on the anonymous list the map of Wiltshire below shows the 
parishes of the southeast of the county colour coded to show to which regimental 
company its men were allocated.  Indeed the micro-organisation of militia companies 
was so embedded within the parish system that it embraced not only inter-divisional 
but also inter-county allocations, the most obvious example being the inclusion of 15 
men of Lieutenant Colonel Young’s Company of Wyndham’s Regiment who, 
although allocated to this Salisbury unit, came from the parish of Oakingham, Hurst 
and Swallowfield, near Reading in Berkshire.60    
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Illustration 3.1.2:  Wiltshire parishes furnishing men for Wyndham’s Regiment. 
 
 
 
Source:  Map of Wiltshire issued by Wiltshire C.C. and W&SHC:490/1440 ‘A list of the men who 
served in the Monmouth Rebellion....’ Parish boundaries may have been different  in 1685. 
KEY: Colonel John Wyndham’s Co. Magenta   Salisbury supplied men to 
Lieutenant Colonel John Young’s Co. Deep Yellow   its own City Company 
Major William Hearst’s Co.  Purple   under the Lord Mayor/ 
Captain Gabriel Ashby’s Co.                          Green 
Captain John Davenant’s Co.  Yellow  
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In default of further information it seems reasonable to presume that the other 
Wiltshire regiments were similarly organised with neighbouring hundreds grouping 
their parish contingents together to form companies of roughly similar sizes. In 1698 
the Yellow (Warminster) Regiment numbered 422 soldiers, excluding officers, 
whereas three years earlier Wyndham’s Salisbury Red Regiment fielded 540.  
Compared to many counties Wiltshire, having a thinly populated region of central 
downland, did not have a large population.  It is not surprising that Wyndham’s 
Regiment mustered only five companies compared to regiments in other, more 
densely populated counties such as Somerset.  Interestingly the three royal line 
regiments involved during the Monmouth campaign also fielded just five companies 
each (see Table 3.2.3 below).  Wyndham’s Regiment drew men from 12 adjacent 
hundreds centring on Salisbury whilst the Yellow Regiment was raised from eight 
separate hundreds and part of another, all of which were clustered around 
Warminster.61 This organisation was the same in 1689 as evidenced by a list of 
tythings around Warminster that supplied men to the county force.62  
With the exception of Wiltshire the counties of the southwest are coastal and 
in most maritime counties the militia were often in competition for manpower with 
the navy.  In 1664 the following assessments of men for the navy were made: 
Cornwall 200, Somerset 150 and Devon 700.  These legal quotas were filled by 
attracting volunteers using recruiting posters, ale-house inducements and press gangs, 
the latter being assisted by man-catchers who claimed rewards for delivering men.63  
Impressments for sea service had been used since the time of Edward I but they were 
more frequently employed as a form of recruitment after the passing of the Vagrancy 
Act in 1597 which legalised the drafting of men of disrepute, usually homeless 
vagrants.  These were not the type of men sought by the militia; moreover press gangs 
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seldom took landsmen, a category which embraced the majority of militiamen.64  
However, if being enrolled in the militia gave protection against the press even if the 
country was at war, then militia recruitment in ports may have been easier because 
men usually preferred eight days’ service per year at a nearby town in the militia to 
the prospect of spending the duration of a conflict at sea in the navy.  
The Militia Horse was organised on a similar pattern to the foot but the cost 
and funding implications meant that a county division usually raised a troop of 50 to 
60 men rather than a regiment of 500 to 600.  Only the most wealthy landowners and 
merchants could be assessed singly to provide a trooper and horse whilst those just 
below the stated financial threshold were banded together to do so to ensure turnout 
numbers were maintained.  In Wiltshire the four divisions of Salisbury, Devizes, 
Marlborough and Warminster produced a four-troop regiment consisting in 1685 of 
troops under Colonel Penruddock, Captain Willoughby, Captain Maskelyn and 
Captain Talbot.65 Although their divisional allocations are undiscovered it is likely 
that Penruddock commanded the Warminster Troop as he was from Compton 
Chamberlain which is in Damerham Hundred and part of the Warminster Division, 
and similarly Talbot might have commanded the Devizes Troop as he lived in Lacock.  
Each troop was raised from a swathe of parishes surrounding its divisional 
headquarters, the Marlborough troop originating from the northeast of the county.   
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Illustration 3.1.3:  The parishes known to have provided mounted men in 1679 
for the Kingsbridge Hundred’s contribution to the Marlborough Troop of 
Thomas Thynne’s Regiment of Militia Horse. 
 
Source:  Map of Wiltshire issued by Wiltshire C.C. and W&SHC: 1178/450 Warrant to the Constables 
of Kingsbridge Hundred.  Many of the adjacent hundreds may also have provided men but only those 
mentioned in the warrant are highlighted.  
Although the recruitment of militia horse was also relatively local, the need to 
furnish horses and tack as well as men meant that the cavalry tended to be drawn from 
the horse-owning classes of higher social standing.  A Privy Council instruction to the 
lord lieutenants insisted that persons to be charged with providing a horse were to be 
of sufficient wealth ‘so as to engage persons of quality and interest…’66 Many of 
them owned farms and estates and consequently were fewer in number across the 
hundreds than those of more moderate incomes in the towns and villages.  
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Nevertheless this did not rule out substitutions.  The business of running an estate 
could be demanding and it suited some landowners to send young men as substitutes 
to ride out with the militia horse.  
The horse too had local mustering venues within their hundreds.  The 
Kingsbridge Hundred troopers attended a Marlborough troop muster where they 
assembled before marching to their regimental training rendezvous at New Sarum 
(Salisbury).67  The basic level of organisation in the Horse was again the file but its 
maximum size was 4 troopers.68 In the field a file was more likely to be two or three 
troopers deep.      
Despite its size and wealth Hampshire seems to have only produced two 
troops of Horse in 1685.  One was commanded by Thomas Brocas Esq. and the record 
of his troop provides lists of names of the officers and troopers alongside those of 
their contributors and the number of horses supplied.  Contributors were either named 
individuals or named places such as parish farms or parsonages and the list embraces 
the hundreds and parishes in the Eastern Division of the county, once again reflecting 
the localised approach to organisation.  
Table 3.1.11: Places supplying horses to Captain Brocas’ Troop of the 
Hampshire Militia Regiment of Horse in 1685, plus those who supplied horses 
for the previous expedition.  
 
Riders     Horses   Owners 
John Kinch  }   Mr Young of Exton 
John Stary  }  2 Sam Gawdon of Froyle Esq. 
William Gunner } 
Robert Wake  }  2 Jemy Hunt of Popham Esq., 
Thomas Feilder   1 Mr Marriott of Rapley 
William Cammer   1        {Mr Wakeford of Blarkmore 
Henry Cleare    1 Bramshott and Headly Parsonages 
John Bonnam    1 Farrington farme and parsonage 
Will Kerry    1 Wentworth Parsonage and Colsmor farm 
Nicholas Smith   1  Alfford and Byton Parsonages 
Nicholas Goodyeare   1 West Meon and Hinton Parsonages 
Jos. Browne    1 Cheriton Parsonage and Mr Mathew 
Robert Twyford   1 Mr Cole of Lisse 
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Andrew Pinke  1  Mr Morley and others for Waltham  
Parsonages 
1 Neaton Farme and Newton Valence 
1. Alton and Brimstead  Parsonages 
1 Chalton Parsonages Bouler his estate 
1 Alverstoke and Marblington Parsonages 
1 Droxford Farms and Parsonages 
 
Source: HRO: 39M85/PC/E14. An edited List of the Troop of Horse in the East Division of the County 
of Southton under the command of Thomas Brocas Esqr. 1685.  The full list is Appendix 2.  
 
In a few cases the social position and wealth of a land-owning commanding 
officer meant that troops of horse could have greater local cohesion.  Thomas Thynne 
of Longleat was a colonel of horse in the Wiltshire Militia and although his regiment 
comprised troops drawn from as far apart as Marlborough in the north to Salisbury in 
the south, many of his own troop were from his own estates.  John Kidd, whom 
Monmouth knighted for his services as a rebel cavalry commander, had been the 
gamekeeper on the Thynne’s Longleat Estate and an NCO in the militia. 69 
No matter whether foot or horse when summoned militiamen assembled in 
their parishes and marched to a specified place, probably the central town of one of 
the constituent hundreds for the mustering of their troop or company.  They then 
marched again to either a regimental rendezvous in the nearest major town or city, or 
to a county rendezvous at the county town so as to muster the entire shire force.  In 
1685 the appointed place of muster for Wyndham’s Regiment was Salisbury and the 
call to arms went out on 17 June.  Drummer Adam Wheeler who recorded the 
regiment’s involvement in the campaign presented himself for duty that same day 
suggesting that he lived in or around Salisbury.  Others arrived over the next two 
days, the furthest coming from Wokingham near Reading.  To perform the necessary 
administration, distribute the orders and assemble a regiment from an area with an 
average radius of twenty miles from Salisbury within three days so that it was ready 
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to march out on 20 July, was no mean feat.70  Overall, three days appears to be the 
usual time taken for a full regimental assembly during an emergency. 
Localism, as well as making administration easier and encouraging muster 
attendance, also had another function involving unit trust, with possible links to 
performance. In his paper on Issues in Integrating Territorial Army Soldiers into 
Regular British Units Charles Kirke stresses the need for trust born of familiarity 
between units that are called upon to operate alongside each other.71 Although his 
examination addresses the relationship between members of the modern Territorial 
Army and the Regular Army, his findings indicate a fundamental factor whereby men 
operate together more effectively and perform better in stressful situations when they 
know each other. The localised structure underpinning the organisation of the militia 
system thus ensured that a man knew who he was expected to stand next to in the line,   
…personal relationships…mean far more than political 
abstractions. …When roundshot skipped across furrows and 
blade rasped from scabbard, men strove to seem valiant in 
order to gain or retain respect of their comrades.  I am sure 
that the bonds of mateship and the charisma of a brave leader 
meant more than politics when matters came… to ‘push of 
pike.72  
 
Company and regimental musters amongst the foot were thus gatherings of 
near neighbours and therefore not surprisingly also took on a sense of social occasion.  
A high proportion of contributors to the mounted militia turned out riding their own 
horses and, like their companions in the foot, they too probably turned musters into 
social gatherings among their own class, perhaps including a hunt at some stage.   
Much has been made of the drinking and raucous behaviour at militia musters 
Dryden singled out drink as the sole reason for a muster when he commented that 
having carried out a little training men: ‘then hasten to be drunk, the business of the 
day.’73  However, Kirke makes the point that ‘it is easier to trust someone (or some 
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group) after they have joined in a social occasion, ideally involving alcohol and some 
joint and joyous activity such as a pub crawl or games night.’74  It appears therefore 
that if the militia did indulge in drink at musters they adopted the principles of 
community and socialising – a forerunner of a twenty-first century model of good 
practice.   
Ineptitude caused by drunkenness is a repeated theme of descriptions of the 
militia. However, across centuries gatherings of warriors have entailed the 
consumption of copious amounts of alcohol. John Trussel writing in Winchester 
during the 1640s proclaimed:  
The soldiers love good liquor night and day 
The ale-house keepers labour what they may... 
Now every second house almost is made  
A member of the strong ale-drapers trade 75 
 
Restoration soldiers were no different. Many small alehouse-keepers in the 
West Country were reportedly driven out of business during the 1680s as a result of 
the depredations of troops quartered on them following Monmouth’s rebellion.  After 
1688 the national decline in the number of brewing victuallers was blamed on the 
quartering of soldiers upon trust and for small pay.76 Local tradition may also have 
had a significant part to play in the militia’s drinking fame. Waylen recounts one 
legend concerning the Bell Inn at Seend near Devizes. He tells a story that during 
their march back to Wiltshire after Sedgemoor, ‘the militia drank up an entire cask of 
liquor, which cask ever after bore the name of "Old Monmouth;" and when it was no 
longer serviceable for beer, it was sawn in two and used as a pair of wash-tubs’.77  It 
is a local tale with only coincidental substance.  The militia did indeed pass through 
Seend but there is nothing to suggest they stopped, moreover it is a poor example of a 
drinking feat as one cask would not slake the thirst of a regiment of 550 men let alone 
the county force.     
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However, drinking was not universally condemned and may have been part of 
a tradition of reward for the services of part-time civil authorities:   
… legislation was introduced which required the presence of 
representatives from dead soldiers’ regiments at military 
funerals.  In the military hospitals, alcoholic drinks were 
invariably provided for the deceased’s fellow patients after the 
ceremony.78 
   
The town accounts for Poole list an entry where five shillings was provided 
for ‘beer for the watchmen at the town gate at the Insurrection’.79  
Inevitably soldiers sporadically got drunk but careful assessment must be 
made before labelling them as a permanently inebriate rabble.  Over several chapters 
in The English Alehouse: A Social History Peter Clark develops a convincing 
argument that between 1660 and 1750 there was a gradual evolution of respectability 
in the social world of the alehouse, in conjunction with a rise of regulation and 
improvement of accommodation and facilities.   Such a movement would have had 
greater influence upon the civilian soldiers of the militia than upon those in the royal 
army. Given the social class of the majority of these militiamen, although they were 
doubtless capable of drinking and having a good time it is doubtful they descended 
into the alcoholic mayhem imagined by their critics.80 
 
3.2. STRENGTH. 
Although the numbers of men turning out fluctuated according to national and local 
circumstances and the frequency of musters varied, nevertheless the organisation and 
administration of the militia remained reasonably constant during the later decades of 
the seventeenth century no matter the monarch, so it is reasonable to suggest militia 
turnouts were also similar.  In 1697, twelve years after Monmouth was executed, not 
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content with estimates William III ordered accurate headcounts and full inspections at 
musters. The results for the West Country are listed in the table below.  
Table 3.2.1:  The mustering of the county forces of the south west in 1697. 
   Regiments and         Additional City      Troops         Additional City 
   Men Mustered            Companies     of horse        Troops 
 
Cornwall        Not listed         Penzanace                 not known 
            Truro                 not known             
Devon         6   4,920          Exeter             480      3    236       Dartmouth   60   
        Plymouth        467  
Dorset         Not listed         
Gloucestershire       4    2,199         Bristol             727       6    243 
Hampshire        6   2,659         Southampton   200       2    120 
               Winchester      150  
Somerset        5   3,434                  5    269 
Wiltshire        4   2,238          Salisbury        128       4    232 
 
Source: Egerton MSS in Hay, C.B., (Ed.) An Epitomized History of the Militia (the ‘Constitutional 
Force’) (London, United Services Gazette, 1905). 
 
Although muster masters were required to make returns to the lord lieutenants 
and attempts were made to gather them together there seems to have been no central 
statement of nationwide statistics until 1697.81 The Commons’ Journals have no 
record of any official listing or estimate being put to them before 1697, although in 
1688 an overall total of 150,000 men was mentioned in debate without 
contradiction.82 Authors’ statements concerning the strengths of various militias have 
been based upon estimates and can vary. Chandler states that the Wiltshire Militia at 
Sedgemoor numbered 3,000 men.83  Tincey sets them at 1,500, while Little and 
Clifton ignore their numbers altogether.84   County force strengths could indeed vary 
as they depended upon the number of divisions in a county and their ability through 
the wealth of their inhabitants to furnish men.  Table 3.2.3 below shows the number of 
militia regiments raised across the West Country. 
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Table 3.2.2:  The numbers in the West Country county forces in 1685. 
   Regiments    Companies     Number Regiments    Troops      Number  
            of Foot  of Foot       of infantry    of Horse     of Horse   of cavalry 
Cornwall        4           1       
Devon         6           4,000       1                  3              240 
Dorset         5 
Gloucestershire        4           2,000       1  6    240 
Hampshire        5                                      2,500       1  2    120 
Somerset        5     30         4,000       1              5    300 
Wiltshire        4     16         2,000       1  4    200 
 
Numbers are rounded up or down to the nearest known approximate or quoted strength. 
 
Despite an obvious disparity between the numbers raised, a rough average of 
five hundred men to the regiment and sixty men to the troop emerges.  Comparison 
needs to be made with those regular regiments that undertook the 1685 campaign.  
Table 3.2.3:  Campaign strengths of the royal infantry regiments active in 1685. 
 
                 Companies   Musketeers    Pikemen   Grenadiers  Total 
The Royal Regiment of Foot  5   86             68           50 204 
The Queen Dowager's Regiment        5 136             64           50 250 
The Queen Consort's Regiment          5 136             64           50 250 
 
Source:  Tincey, J., Sedgemoor 1685 - Marlborough’s First Victory (Barnsley, Pen & Sword, 2005), p.  
101; Scott, C.L., The Armies and Uniforms of the Monmouth Rebellion (Leigh-on-Sea,  
Partizan, 2008),  pp.31-34. 
 
With an average 50 men to a royal company none of these units were at full 
strength, yet most authorities accept that a foot company strength for the period to 
have been around 60. The Duchess of York and Albany’s Regiment of Foot 
(Trelawney’s) were noted as having companies of 65 in September 1684 but one 
month later at the Putney Heath Rendezvous they were recorded as having 70 men per 
company present.  On campaign numbers fell due to losses in action, accidental 
injuries, straggling, sickness and detachment to perform other duties so returning to an 
estimated 60 men of all ranks per company would seem a reasonable approximation.85 
The Royal Order of July 1685 reorganising the army decreed 50 per company, except 
for the 60 approved for the Guards. 
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There is further evidence that the simple assumption that the militia followed 
the royal army in size of units is incorrect.  Documents describing the allocation of 
various battalions and companies of the Somerset Militia to their specific locations are 
held at Bath Record Office. Part of these listings includes a statement that the Bath 
Trained Bands numbered around 800 in seven companies.86  The militia company 
strength was thus the pre-civil war target of about 100 men to a company with more 
allocated to the senior officers’ units.  Such a concept of larger sized militia 
companies is corroborated by evidence from the reviews of 1690 when William III’s 
militia reforms were rebuilding units to regain the state they had been in before James 
II neglected them. 
Table 3.2.4:  The militia in three counties under the Duke of Norfolk in 1690.  
 
In The County of Norfolk                                                                                                    
A regiment of Horse, being 6 Troops, besides officers, having buff coats, backs, 
breasts and pots, and most of them carabines, and such as do want, the persons 
charged with finding them agreed to furnish them forthwith.    370 men.                 
A Regiment of Foot consisting of 7 Companies,  
all clothed in blue, under Colonel Sir Jacob Astley.             818 men.  
A Regiment of Foot consisting of 7 Companies,  
all clothed in purple, under Colonel Sir Thom. Knyvett.      847 men.  
A Regiment of Foot consisting of 7 Companies,  
all clothed in white, under Colonel Sir Wm. Cooke.            688 men.  
A Regiment of Foot consisting of 7 Companies,  
all clothed in yellow, under Colonel Sir Robert Walpole.    734 men.  
Four Companies in Yarmouth clothed in red.    526 men.  
Two Companies in Lynne clothed in red.     258 men.  
A Regiment of the City of Norwich,  
consisting of 6 Companies, clothed in red.  
In The County of Surrey                                                                                                                                      
A Regiment of Foot consisting of 9 Companies,  
having good arms and clothed in red coats.                    1,000 men.  
Two Troops of Horse, of 60 each Troop.           120 men.  
A Regiment of Foot in the Borough of Southwark,  
consisting of 6 Companies, whereof the Lord Lieutenant is Colonel.         1,500 men. 
In The County of Berks                                                                                                                                          
The Regiment of Foot consisting of 9 Companies,  
having good arms and clothed in grey.                   900 men.  
Three Troops of Horse of betwixt 50 and 60 each Troop. 
 
Source: The Letter Book of the Duke of Norfolk quoted in Sumner, P.,   JSAHR XXVII 1950, p.186. 
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It is rare to find such information about so many militia regiments in one 
document especially where the units recorded come from more than one county.  The 
militia of the large coastal county of Norfolk consisted of one regiment of horse, five 
regiments of foot (four country and one borough) and two seemingly independent 
borough garrisons.  The regiment of horse has six troops of between 50 and 60 
troopers in each.  The county’s four regiments had seven companies averaging 110 
men whilst each of the three borough units listed had twelve companies between 
them. The outlying garrisons had an average company tally of 130 men.  The only 
other borough regiment was listed under Surrey being that of Southwark with an 
average company strength of 250, which is indicative of the greater population 
density of the London boroughs compared with those in the rest of the country.  
Unfortunately, the Duke of Norfolk failed to list the number of men in the Norwich 
Regiment thereby obviating a more substantially-based comparison.  It is beyond the 
scope of this work to attempt such a comparison but it is interesting to note that the 
Williamite Militia settled upon 110 to 120 men per company and seven companies to 
the regiment.  Holden cites the Worcester Militia in 1697 as consisting of 786 
infantrymen in one regiment of foot spread between seven companies, and 120 
troopers in a regiment of horse divided into two troops.87  
The most detailed information for the militia of the 1680s comes from the 
Wyndham Muster Roll as mentioned before wherein each company was counted and 
its officers’ and men’s names recorded.88  Many of these records were kept so as to 
pay the men for turning out and to enable written reports on ‘The State of the Militia’ 
to be submitted, although this example is unrelated to any specific function and 
appears to have been created solely to record those who took part in the Monmouth 
Rebellion Campaign.89     
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Table 3.2.5: Company xtrengths of Colonel Wyndham’s Regiment.   
 
Companies                Number of men 
Colonel John Wyndham’s Co.  148 
Lieutenant Colonel John Young’s Co. 112 
Major William Hearst’s Co.     94 
Captain Gabriel Ashby’s Co,   100 
Captain John Davenant’s Co.     86 
 
Source: W&SHC: 490/1440, A list of the men who served in the Monmouth Rebellion in the Wiltshire 
Militia. 
 
Table 3.5.2 shows that Wyndham’s regiment returned a campaign regimental 
strength of 540 including all officers, and an average of 108 per company.  This 
composition follows the pattern of pre-civil war militia regiments with an average of 
100 men per company as a numerical target.  If this was the case across all those 
militia units involved in suppressing the Monmouth Rebellion the numbers of men 
mustered appears highly significant.  If the 34 regiments recorded in Table 3.2.2 
above, each turned out between 500 and 600 men then the militia foot alone in the 
southwest could have numbered between 17,000 and 20,000.  This number is 
significant when compared to Monmouth’s supposedly popular rebel army which 
numbered 7,500 at its height and averaged 3,500 all arms for the campaign.     
In the royal horse, contemporary troop size is generally estimated at between 
50 and 60 men.  Roll returns for The Royal Regiment of Horse (Oxford’s) in 1684 
record 50 per troop, including non-commissioned officers and trumpeters whilst the 
1685 warrant for the Royal Dragoons puts the regiment at 60 per troop. A 
contemporary issue list records 360 helmets and 360 carbine belts and swivels 
allocated to a six-troop regiment.90 The Royal Order of July 1685 decreed 50 for a 
troop with the exception of Oxford’s Horse which was set at 80, but the numbers 
taking part in the 1685 campaign are set out below. 
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Table 3.2.6:  Campaign strengths of the royal mounted regiments active in 1685. 
 
Regiment           Troops  Troopers H.Grens  Dragoons   Total 
His Majesty’s Regiment of Horse Guards      3     150            60 0          210  
The Royal Regiment of Horse (Oxford’s)       7     350              0 0 350 
The Royal Regiment of Dragoons (Royals)      3         0              0     150 150  
  
Source:  Tincey, J., Sedgemoor 1685 - Marlborough’s First Victory (Barnsley, Pen & Sword, 2005), p.  
101; Scott, C.L., The Armies and Uniforms of the Monmouth Rebellion (Leigh-on-Sea, Partizan, 2008),  
pp. 31-34.91  
 
The ability to raise regiments of militia cavalry at approximately double the 
numbers of the royal army, as seems to have been the case in the foot, was impeded 
by cost.  Militia horse costs were higher due to the need to provide mounts, saddles, 
tack and forage as well as the services of a blacksmith.  A single hundred did not 
usually have inhabitants of sufficient means to supply a full troop of cavalry but they 
could sometimes supply a significant number.  The source for Table 3.1.3 above, a 
warrant dated 6 September 1679 from Thomas Herbert, Earl of Pembroke, to the 
Constables of Kingsbridge Hundred instructing them to muster the mounted militia of 
their hundred and attend a training rendezvous at New Sarum lists 22 troopers – about 
half the strength of a royal army troop.92  Because Wiltshire was more densely 
populated and had a greater distribution of wealth in the north of the county it is 
reasonable to suggest that the rate of 22 troopers per hundred was probably not 
sustained county-wide. If each hundred had enough persons able to supply about 20 
troopers, then Wiltshire’s 50 hundreds should have raised 1,000 militia horse, whereas 
the total was nearer 200.  The average troop size of horse militia in the south west was 
55, with Devon fielding the greatest number of 80 men per troop and 
Gloucestershire’s 40 the least.  Hampshire appears to have maintained the average 
with its two troops under Thomas Brocas and Thomas Jervoise producing 56 and 62 
men respectively.93 
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Table 3.2.7: Contributors to part of the Marlborough Troop of Horse.  
Mr Goddard of Swindon Mrs Beale of Westbrook and Mr Hains of Alborne   1 
Sir Walter St. John & his son        2 
Mr Hide for the estate late Sir Francis Inglefields     2 
The Lady Bullon and Sir William Holcroft          2 
The Lady Cawley & Oliver Cawley Esq.          1 
Capt. Plodwell         1 
Thomas Bennett of Salthrop Esq.           1 
Mr Oliver Plodwell of Linam and Mr Turks and Mr Romain   1 
Mr John Sadler of Chilton, Mrs Ann Sadler wid. And Mr Charles York  1 
Mr Fisher of Lidon for his mother and the other occupiers  
of the estate late of his father and Mrs Morse of Badam    1 
Mr Roger Ewan of Draycott and Mr Lidyards of Badbury  
Mr John Jacob Junior for his esdtate in Hilmartin and  
Mr Plodwell of Grirklane        1 
Major Wildman for his estate in Wroughton Mr Will Strange  
Will Law and Mr Richard Strange       1 
Mr Arthor Billett of Swindon Mr Edwars Sadler for Mannington  
Mr Giles Alworth and Mr Charles Billatt of Blackgrove    1 
Mr Goddard of Swindon Mrs Beale of Westbrook and Mr Hains of Alborne   1 
Doct Buol of Lidyard Tregoze and Mr Robt Jonnes of Lidyard Milicent  
Mr Shoal of Wootton Basat and Mr Bath of Purton        1 
Sir William Binrock for all his estates in Wilts and  
the Wid Smith of Torkenham and her son         1 
Mr Chamberlayne of Wanboro Mr Stratton of the same  
and Mr Nurse of Mildonhall          1 
Doctor Hodges of Wanborough Mr Goodon of the same       1 
Doctor Morse of Hodson Mrs Morse and Mr Brunsdon of Wootton Bassatt    1 
Mr Norton of Badbury and his mother and Major Noss of Bradley and his son   1 
Total: 22 troopers  
Source: W&SHC: 1178/450. 
 
Based upon Table 3.2.7 above if an estimated 28 troops each turned out 
around 60 men then the militia Horse in the south west would have numbered nearly 
2,000.  Uniting foot and horse figures, those serving in the militias of the south west 
during the Monmouth Rebellion were probably between 19 and 22,000.  
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3.3. CONCLUSION. 
In summary, the post-Restoration Militia had a structured organisation 
securely based upon the civil and ecclesiastic administrative systems of local 
government.  This enabled it to operate smoothly in all the counties of the southwest.  
The gradual evolution from parish files to hundred companies and thence to regional 
troops and division regiments ensured that the men remained in familiar groups and 
simplified administration.  Official control ranged from local constables to county 
deputy lieutenants and was firmly based in localism.  This local nature ensured 
service was undertaken alongside and thus under the eyes of the men’s neighbours 
which encouraged good behaviour and a modicum of unit identity. Moreover 
geographical proximity meant less arduous marches to various rendezvous points and 
enabled scrutiny and checks of systems and personnel to be much easier.       
The men came from a mixture of middle and lower classes but were deemed 
honest working men of some social standing amongst whom excessive drinking does 
not appear to have been a significant problem.  Officers at all ranks were found from 
local worthies, landed gentry and some powerful high-born men.  The system of 
muster masters’ inspections and reports ensured periodic turnout in satisfactory 
numbers.  Misdemenours were effectively investigated and deficiencies actively 
punished at the petty or quarter sessions.  Company strengths among the militia foot 
tended to be double that of royal units and the numbers of cavalry matched that of 
troops of royal horse. Each county could field a significant contingent of thousands of 
men and when seen as a whole the militia of the southwest was a potentially large 
force.   We turn now to seeing if this well organized and effectively mustered force 
was adequately financed and supplied, and whether its summoning systems were such 
that could turn out significant numbers of men in an emergency. 
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Chapter Four 
COMING INTO OPERATION 
‘The Militia…now under the power of Lieutenants or their Deputies shall be 
exercised, ordered and managed…’1  
 
This chapter will examine the extent to which the militia as a functioning body was 
adequately funded and supplied, and whether its financial systems were ordered and 
allowed it to function as required. Moreover it will look at its summoning systems to 
see if they were effectively operated so as to put a substantial body of troops into the 
field.  The chapter investigates the militia’s administration systems to determine if it 
was effective in coming into operation during an emergency.  
 
4.1 FUNDING. 
Until the civil wars, the militia was funded jointly by direct instruction from the 
crown to property owners to find and equip men, with additional expenses covered by 
the crown and paid for out of taxation. Part of the crown’s prerogative was to collect 
general revenues as tax and to distribute such sums as it deemed necessary into 
whatever aspect of the state’s activities it thought fit.  This included funding the 
militia.  
The early Stuart government had discontinued the Elizabethan quota system, 
whereby each county was charged to produce a certain number of armed men leaving 
the means by which this was achieved to local discretion.  Gradually this changed to a 
subsidy system in which the government set criteria for the assessment of local 
landowners’ wealth and approved an annual tax on that wealth. This tax was collected 
in monthly instalments via the justices of the peace acting in the role of 
commissioners for the militia.  Both systems were fraught with difficulty as they were 
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dependent upon men being willing to assess their neighbours and ‘although there was 
statutory backing, the resulting militia rates were contentious.’2  High evaluation of 
property led to reduction in local support for the militia, infrequent musters and poor 
turnouts, whereas low evaluation resulted in limited resources for the militia and 
difficulties over pay for the men. The Restoration solution was a combination of both 
systems and a shift of responsibility from the authorities to the contributors.  Although 
this work uses the word ‘contributor’ for those who contributed to the funding of the 
militia, such people were also known as ‘finders’ as it was their duty both to find the 
men and to assume responsibility for their turning out when summoned.  The rate of 
contribution was fixed nationally according to bands of assessed wealth but collected 
and spent locally.  Contributors could either serve in the militia themselves, bringing 
their own equipment, or find replacements who they had to both equip and pay. 
Equally they might pay the required sums to the Sheriff’s Office who distributed it to 
the Parish Constables to find the necessary men and equipment, and provide their pay. 
Financing the militia had been a simple affair when the major expense was 
that of equipping the men but when paying men a daily rate for their service was 
introduced a new structure was required to collect, control and disburse money on a 
regular basis.  Viroli cites the need to pay militia soldiers as an indication of the 
decline of respublica – the quasi moral concept aimed at the preservation of 
communities of individuals living together in justice. This he coupled with the 
contemporary growth of social and financial systems designed to support the state and 
its government.3   Payment for trained band soldiers was made in 1573 at the advised 
rate of 8d. per day, which was to be found by the relevant contributors.  However, the 
notion that service in the trained bands was seen as an unpaid obligation for all fit 
males between certain ages persisted with payment between provider and server being 
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a personal affair.  As payments did not go by way of a third party certain 
compromises could be made, although pressure could be brought to bear on defaulting 
payees by withholding of service or by complaining to county authorities. 
Enforcement would be applied through the county quarter sessions.  The advised rate 
of 8d a day was increased during the early seventeenth century to 1s per day although, 
conversely, the quarter sessions grew steadily more reluctant to enforce payment.4  In 
1655 Cromwell’s new militia was raised from volunteers who agreed to attend 
quarterly musters and appear at other times when required for £8 per year.  This was a 
formal contract backed by legislation.5   
Payments made directly to militiamen for service were also not regarded as 
part of centralised expenditure.  Cromwell’s government had funded it separately, 
from a specific tax levied upon rich, former supporters of the king who, although at 
liberty, were described as malignants; the men whom the militia were raised to watch 
were obliged to pay for their watchers with their contributions being collected at local 
level.  In this arrangement lay the seeds of the future transfer of full funding of the 
militia, including soldiers’ pay, away from central to local funds.  During the 
Interregnum the simple system of general taxation and payment by the central 
government evolved into a new fiscal structure.  Monies previously collected on 
behalf of the monarch and paid directly to the Exchequer were augmented by a range 
of new demands levied and collected by officials who administered such taxes locally.   
Despite frequent attempts during the Interregnum to give the Exchequer sole 
authority over all revenue, in the event it never regained full control of county 
taxation assessment nor indeed of certain national taxes such as customs and excise. 
The latter set a precedent in being managed locally through a board of commissioners 
composed of aldermen of the corporations and men of good standing.  Possibly 
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through vested interest, each county authority kept a tight rein on country finances. 
The county treasuries became effectively administrative executives beyond 
government control whose prerogative was only challenged at the Restoration in 
1660.  Charles II’s first government mounted this challenge by delegating all county 
affairs to the lord lieutenants.  The militias could only operate if there were sufficient 
funds to pay for them so, rather than fund an increase in the royal army, parliament 
voted to allow the king to raise money to pay for the militia – should he deem it 
necessary for it to be embodied.6  To guarantee this money was collected the Militia 
Acts of 1662 and 1663 empowered the king to raise it through the Militia Money tax, 
based upon an amount equal to the sum of a county monthly quota according to the 
assessment of 1661.  In more simple terms this meant that across the nation £210,000 
was to be raised over a three year period, to be collected in three annual tranches of 
£70,000.  
The Restoration Militia Acts also specified how these sums were to be raised. 
At its operative level funding for the militia primarily consisted of passing on the cost 
of its raising and maintenance to the wealthier people of each county.  The lord 
lieutenants were to make an assessment of the wealth of their counties’ property-
owning inhabitants and to calculate a pro-rata costing before issuing orders listing the 
names of specified contributors who were to provide men, weapons and ammunition, 
horses, transport and supplies. For example, a reasonably wealthy farmer would be 
assessed as possessing sufficient property to warrant him providing a man as a foot 
soldier, equipped with a musket and accoutrements, to whatever rendezvous was 
ordered.  A wealthier property owner might be assessed at a rate warranting he sent a 
man as cavalry trooper, equipped with a sword, pistols and accoutrements, plus a 
horse, saddle and tack to the rendezvous.  Thus the cost of the Restoration Militia was 
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still to be borne by local property owners but rather than being taxed by the office of 
the King’s Revenues, it was imposed by way of the requirement to provide men and 
equipment according to local assessment of wealth.  These nominal assessed sums 
were known as Militia Money and were collected from a contributor if he/she could 
not find a man to serve. Financial contributions could be kept down by contributors if 
they served themselves and/or directly supplied equipment such as weapons, armour 
or horse furniture, otherwise they paid in coin.  All such monies were paid directly to 
the individual parish constables who forwarded them to the Constable of their 
hundred or spent them on local militia requirements, keeping accurate records of 
collections and disbursements.7  Holding cash on behalf of the parish could have its 
dangers, especially in times of unrest. Thomas Smith, Constable of Chardstock, was 
relieved of some militia money by a party of Monmouth’s rebels.8       
With this revenue duly legalised, Charles II called for it to be increased in 
1662, 1663 and 1664 as a result of so-called ‘plots and conspiracies’ that necessitated 
the summoning of the militia.9  The amounts collected are shown in Tables 4.1.2 and 
4.1.3 below.  
The number of men to be raised, equipped and trained fell within whatever 
sum the county could afford and was thus proportionate to the value of property in 
that county.  So as not to lay the financial burden solely upon the landed gentry and 
nobility and to include urban merchants, the lord lieutenants had a provision for the 
assessment of goods and capital as well as land possession.  ‘Property values’ was a 
somewhat ill-defined term, but it had legal basis in the old church and poor rates of 
previous eras and was a familiar and recognised method of taxation. Determining the 
rateable value of goods and money was equally difficult as in both cases assessors had 
no right to demand access to a property in order to conduct a detailed examination of 
 142 
 
a holding, an estate or financial accounts. Consequently allocated assessments were 
sometimes arbitrary, a problem partially solved by banding, that is to say allocating 
valuations either around or in between specified sums.10  The rates applied for the 
assessment of militia money contributions are set out below.  
Table 4.1.1:  Rules for determining liability to provide Horse and Foot in 1663.  
 
                   Basis of the Charge (whichever was larger)  
                   Revenue                      Capital  
Liability 
    Amount      Subject      Amount      Subject 
Above £500 Land in 
Possession 
Above £6,000 Goods or money 
except furniture 
To find more than 
1 horse & trooper 
£500 Land in 
Possession 
£6,000 Goods or money 
except furniture 
To find 1 horse & 
trooper 
£200 - £500 - £2,400 -£6,000 - To contribute to 1 
horse & trooper 
£200 Estate £2,400 Personal estate  
£100 - £200 Estate £1,200 -£2,400 Personal estate To be charged to 
horse or foot 
£100 In possession in 
lands, tenements, 
hereditaments, 
lease & copyholds 
£1,200 -  
£50 - £100 - £600 - £1,200 - To contribute to 
more than 1 foot 
soldier 
£50 In possession £600 Personal estate in 
goods & money 
except stock on 
the ground 
To find 1 foot 
soldier 
Up to £50 In possession Up to £600 - To contribute by 
parish as directed 
 
Source: The Militia Act of 1663.11 
 
Disputes were relatively rare, suggesting that assessments were often well 
below true value with rapid settlement effected in order to avoid a more expensive 
reassessment.  There were of course challenges (see below) but as those responsible 
for assessing the wealth and levying the charges were also responsible for hearing 
appeals, such protests may have been considered somewhat futile.   
Although the process was speedily put into operation there was a degree of 
connivance at rateable values among the nobility where the sums to be paid appear to 
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be based upon gentlemen’s agreements among social equals. Landowners whose 
extensive holdings lay in a variety of counties, such as those of Algernon Percy, Earl 
of Northumberland were often arbitrarily assessed by fellow landowners.  
Northumberland received several letters from Charles Howard, Earl of Carlisle and 
lord lieutenant of Cumberland and Westmorland in 1662 indicating a somewhat 
laissez-faire approach to assessment.  
It being the King’s pleasure that the value of Peers’ estates 
should be returned to the Lieutenants of the counties where 
they lie, to the intent that they be rated towards finding of 
horse for the trained bands by the commissioners appointed by 
the King, I have presumed to trouble you to cause your 
steward or other officer to certify me at what value you would 
have your estate in Cumberland to be returned.12 
 
Northumberland was being permitted to set his own rateable value.  He also 
received similar letters requesting self-evaluation regarding his estates in Yorkshire’s 
East Riding, the West Riding, and also in Dorset.13 Northumberland’s reciprocal 
cooperation was probably most appreciated, as he wrote in his role as lord lieutenant 
of Northumberland to William Cavendish, Earl of Newcastle, ‘…if you will let us 
understand what will be the most agreeable to your Lordship we shall endeavour to 
give you satisfaction.’14  Although their assessments were probably lower than they 
should have been the aristocracy did pay up and there is no evidence of them 
endeavouring to avoid payment completely.  Northumberland paid £2,200 for his 
estates in the East Riding, £700 for the West Riding, £800 for the North Riding and 
£60 for Dorset, whilst William Cavendish, Marquis of Newcastle-upon-Tyne paid 
£1,400 and the Earl of Carlisle £1,600 on their properties in Northumberland.15 
As no statutory requirements for disclosure existed, the lord lieutenants or 
their deputies appointed assessors from among substantial landowners with 
knowledge and experience when valuing the incomes and property of those not of the 
 144 
 
nobility.  They estimated the size and nature of holdings, not just the value of the land 
but buildings, crops and stock too, sometimes so as not to trespass, resorting to 
inspection at a distance from public footpaths or accepting the word of servants 
regarding the contents of barns and storehouses.  Assessments could be complicated 
as large families often had several members holding lands and properties in trust for 
others.  Part-ownership of estates was common as were estates comprising properties 
scattered around the county.   
With perhaps a degree of creative accounting the summary schedules for each 
parish were drawn up to form the quotas for the individual hundreds for collection or 
material provision.  Braddick maintains that recruitment was also part of a moral 
code: ‘Wisps of evidence about the criteria for valuation suggests that social values 
were important – wealth was set against family commitments of the taxpayer, their 
attitude to the poor and whether or not they kept a good home’.16 
The financial duties of the reinstated lord lieutenants and their staffs meant the 
county treasurers had been rendered superfluous.  But these lord lieutenants were 
often creatures of the king and parliament was not anxious to see financial control of 
local government, including the militia, solely in their hands, especially as some were 
erstwhile or potential opponents of parliamentarian rule.  Therefore parliament 
established ad hoc committees to take the place of the Exchequer and administered 
areas such as local sequestrations and accounts, as well as the newly-formed county 
militias, with each national committee retaining its own treasurers and collectors.   
Having its own committees controlling the finances of the militia meant that 
parliament held the means to impose its will over that of the monarch.  The king may 
be invested with absolute authority over the militia and his lord lieutenants may 
control it, but by establishing the various financial management committees at 
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national level, parliament tried to take hold of the purse-strings and attempted to 
dictate what the lord lieutenants could do.  One way of exerting control was to 
establish a fixed national rate of payment levied upon contributors.  The militia rate 
was initially set during the Interregnum with the cost for each assessed individual 
rated to provide or pay for either a fully equipped foot soldier or a trooper and these 
rates had remained reasonably stable during the 1650s.  However, to realise the sum 
allocated by the Restoration Parliament of £70,000 a year the rate rose, and did so 
again when Charles II said that he wanted it increased.   
Table 4.1.2:  The annual charges of the Militia Rate 
  
Year  To Pay for a 
Foot Soldier 
Levied on 
property 
assessed at  
To Pay for a 
Trooper 
Levied on 
property 
assessed at 
1650 £20 £200 £200  £2,000 
1659 £20 £200 £300  £4,000 
1660 £40 £300 £500  £6,000 
1662 £50 £600 £500  £6,000 
 
Source:  Ordinances of 1650- 1660 and the Militia Act of 1662. 
 
It is interesting to note that although the property value band increased by 
about 200%, in real terms contributors individual amounts fell. The Interregnum 
government exacted one pound for every ten pounds of assessed wealth, whereas the 
Restoration government decreased the rate to one for every twelve. Parliament was 
able to afford this reduction in demand upon the wealthy by the widening of the 
assessment band.  During the Interregnum a lower band of annual income was set at 
£200, below which property owners did not have to contribute.  This disappeared at 
the Restoration when less wealthy landowners were obliged to share the costs of 
providing militiamen amongst themselves as several contributors’ payments could 
now be amalgamated to fund an infantryman or trooper.     
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In 1663 parish constables and their assistants were empowered to formulate a 
pro-rata scale of contributions to embrace all landed estates in their parishes. The 
Restoration militia rate fell upon a wider section of property owners encompassing far 
more of those from the lower end of the scale as the cost of maintaining the militia 
spread down the social ladder.  As previously the monies were initially collected by 
the parish constable, who paid them to a receiver in the county treasurer’s office, 
either the county treasurer himself or one of his assistant clerks.  The furnishing of 
men and equipment was recorded by both constables and county clerks who also 
checked who and what appeared at militia musters against the list of what was 
expected by assessment.  To encourage diligence and discourage fraud, treasurers and 
clerks delivered their militia fundraising accounts, muster rolls and reports on oath to 
the lieutenant every six months. 
Table 4.1.3: Militia fundraising account for the parish of Shobrook in Devon.  
 
Shobrook in stBudleigh Hind 
Lists of donors of financial contributions for the establishment of foot souldiers within 
this parish aforsd according to the draft of Parliament in that rate provided by vt his 
Maties Deputie  Lieutnt of the aforsd County that   day of   in the 29th yeare 
of the reigne of our Soveraigne Lorde King Charles the Second of England. Anno 
Dominy 1677 
 
Mr. John Rowe  45.00 ) 
James Dally   05.00 )  50 – 1 
Tho: Dyer   42.00 ) 
The widd. Radmore  08.00 ) 50 – 1 
Mr. Willm Bradford   50.00  50 – 1 
Willm Tomson   18.10 )  
Tho: Hugh   18.10 ) 
The widd. Faddon  13.00 ) 50 – 1 
Laurence Rowe  25.00 ) 
Laurence Browne Junr 25.00 ) 50 – 1 
Mrs Mary Dyer widd  95.00 ) 
Tho: Poyntingdon Esq. 05.00 )           100 – 2 
Willm Rowe   40.17 ) 
Stephen Dauby  09.03 ) 50 – 1 
John Reynols   41.17 ) 
Tho: Holman   09.03 ) 50 – 1 
Laurence Browne Senr 41.17 ) 
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Richard Stirling  08.03 ) 50 – 1 
Jo: Lane   36.00 )  
Roger Pridham  14.00 ) 50 – 1 
Richard Dally   25.00 ) 
Jo: Parker   12.12 ) 
Roger Board   12.12 ) 50 – 1 
James Wescroff  21.16 ) 
The widd. Hollihole  14.17 ) 
Henry Jarobb   13.07 ) 50 – 1 
Mathew Frost   18.10 ) 
Willm Maunder  18.10 ) 
John Shapland   13.00 ) 50 – 1 
Edward Ham   22.10 ) 
Tho: Esworthy  22.10 ) 
Robt Roode   05.00 ) 50 – 1 
Tho: Troffe Gent.  21.10 ) 
John More   13.00 ) 
The widd. Gibb  16.00 ) 50 – 1 
Simon Hull   21.10 ) 
Robert Lane   17.10 ) 
John Hogg   11.00 ) 50 – 1 
Robert Burnbury  18.10 ) 
Willm Lake   18.00 ) 
Willm Asrott   13.10 ) 50 – 1 
 
To the Lord 
The heiress of Jo Turkfield Esq. for ye Barton 123.15 
Moore for Lay tennant    046.00 
Moore for parte of Frilford    015.00 
Sir John Rollo for Faddon Barton   123.15 
More for the late Mrs Lothbridges tennant  046.00 
More for the Birkham downes   007.10 
Henry Frost Esq for Jonward Barton   123.15  
Morr for Lower Jonwartt    020.00 
Jo: Quirk Esq.      015.00 
Doctor George Harris for Sertory [surgery]  200.00 
 
Source: Devon PRO: 1049M/94-5.  The information is duplicated on a second document and the date 
of the collection is left blank on both, which could mean these were copies prepared for use on future 
separate occasions or were retained copies of an original which had been sent to the Lord Lieutenant.   
In addition to the papers made out by those levying the charge it appears to 
have been necessary for them to secure a written statement that notice of the 
requirement had been received and, furthermore, that all stipulated payments were 
agreed by those making the payments.  It does not appear that such documents were 
universally required.  Few are extant whereas assessment accounts are commonplace. 
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Nor were they were signed by everyone who was to be taxed, but they were prepared 
and signed by the richest contributors – those who bore the greatest financial burden, 
as shown below. 
Table 4.1.4:  The Woodrow Agreement. September 21st 1683   
An agreement for sending three souldiers laodd ipon Woodrow Tything 
£.      s.    d. 
Tho: Bearmen for queen field               135   00    0   
John Cook        50   00    0 
John Burkly        10   00    0 
William Norris for Buthery      10   00    0 
This is to finde one souldier     205  00    0 
 
Ms. Jeremy Rough        55  00    0 
Ambrose Audry      100  00    0 
Henry Smith         55  00    0 
This is to finde one souldier     210  00    0 
 
John Paradise         30  00    0 
Widdo Kelson         20  00    0 
Arther Pearce         20  00    0 
Ms. Markes         28  00    0 
Ms. Coxeter         25  00    0 
Samuel Mitchel        34  00    0 
Robert Jennings          7  00    0 
William Pearce and Jo: Briye       40  00    0 
John Beines         10  00    0 
        214  00    0  
  
This was agreed upon by whose names are hear unto subscribed 
Ambrose Audry 
Henry Smith 17 
William Pearce 
John Paradise 
Tho: Bearman 
 
Source: W&SHC:109/548 The Woodrow Agreement. 
 
The Shobrook and Woodrow documents, and also numerous similar extant 
accounts, indicate that property valued at £50 incurred the responsibility of providing 
a footsoldier.  The Shobrook Accounts, as shown in Table 4.1.4 above, show that Sir 
John Rollo was assessed at £123 15s for his home property of Faddon Barton, a 
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further £46 for the land he let via Mrs Lothbridge, and another £7 10s for some 
downland that he owned, making £177 5s his total assessed contribution. Sir John’s 
income may have made him one of the wealthiest men in the parish, although he 
appears to have got off lightly compared to the assessment made upon Dr. Harris for 
his surgery. 
The number of persons contributing within a parish was dependant upon their 
wealth, but it would appear that adjustments would be made at times to ensure the 
figures balanced. The warrant from the lord lieutenant of Wiltshire to the constables 
of Kingsbridge referred to in chapter three lists seven persons associated with the 
parish of Swindon who were deemed wealthy enough to furnish two troopers between 
them.18  
Table 4.1.5:  Contributors to the horse for the parish of Swindon. 
 
Contributors               Number of Troopers 
 
Mr Arthur Billett of Swindon, Mr Edwars Sadler for Manington, 
Mr Giles Alworth and Mr Charles Billatt of Blackgrove   1 
Mr Goddard of Swindon, Mrs Beale of Westbrook  
and Mr Hains of Alborne        1 
 
Surprisingly neither Westbrook nor Aldbourne were part of the parish of Swindon, 
although Billett and Billatt are, presumably, corruptions of the well-established 
Swindon family of Villet. Goddard was lord of the manor.  The payments derived 
from contributors from several parishes have thus been conflated to fund two 
troopers.   The list of Swindon contributors to the foot has not been discovered but it 
would seem that, of the parish’s 580 inhabitants (less those under 16 years old) some 
140 were free-hold tenants, amongst whom only 5 paid for a cavalryman, and nobody 
bore more than a one-third share.19  
Individuals could challenge the assessment, either its amount or their ability to 
pay. A plaintiff could appear before the deputies at a local market town, appeal 
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against their decision, and go before the lord lieutenant and/or the county treasurer to 
argue their case.  During the early 1660s, when the tax was new, there was some 
resistance to paying, and to the very formation of the revived military force.  In 
Wiltshire Sir James Thynne received ‘many complaints of persons refusing to 
contribute and pay the soldiers’ alongside outbursts concerning their behaviour.20    
Complaints were frequently of a minor nature, often revolving around how the 
rules were manipulated and how to deal with low level problems.  In 1661 Colonel 
William Strode of Barrington in Somerset complained of being over-rated, and about 
the treatment that two of his horses received at the hands of their militia riders.  As 
Strode was an ex-Cromwellian officer and influential in the community, the lord 
lieutenant thought he might incite others to withhold payment so had him arrested.  
His refusal to pay was considered a political act and in retribution he was imprisoned, 
harangued and threatened before being sent to London where he was forced to make a 
submission to the king before the Privy Council.21   At other times the authorities 
appeared more lenient.  The Duke of Bolton, lord lieutenant of Hampshire wrote to 
his deputies, ‘Having had severall complaints concerning the unequal levying both of 
Horse and Foot to serve in the Militia; it is my desire that it might be taken in due 
consideration by you and others of the Lieutenancy and that it may be better 
afforded…’22 
Yet there was a tradition of resistance to other militia-related payments, 
especially by the richer men of the county.  Trouble began in Wiltshire as early as 
1602 when the deputy lord lieutenant, Sir Hugh Portman, resented paying ‘for 
entertainment to be given to the muster master’.23 He and others thought that the 
muster levy should be sufficient to bear all the expenses associated with the militia 
without the necessity to impose additional taxes at the apparent whim of the 
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lieutenant. Although lord lieutenant Hertford withdrew Portman’s office as deputy 
from him, others joined in the protest, including many of the justices of the peace.  By 
1606 the quarrel had reached parliament where Sir Henry Poole stated that ‘the 
compulsory tax laid upon subjects in divers counties, by lieutenants and their 
deputies, to maintain muster masters and such like things, at the charge of the subjects 
for non-payment thereof, is grievous and unjust.’  Subsequently, the matter went 
before the Privy Council and, although their ruling was unrecorded, it would appear 
that a compromise was reached.  Hertford’s wish for an additional sum to be extracted 
was upheld, but the justices gained the right for their petty sessions to confirm the 
appointment of the muster master and also determine his rate and method of 
payment.24            
Paying for muster masters aside it might be assumed that generally the people 
resented paying for the militia but there were no widespread or organised protests in 
response to the imposition of militia taxes.  In time people became accustomed to 
paying.  Indeed the militia appears to have been well regarded by contemporary civil 
powers, and it was to the militia that they first turned during crises, including the 
Monmouth Rebellion. At the first opportunity after quitting Lyme just ahead of the 
invaders, customs men Dassall and Thorold sent letters to Albemarle of the Devon 
Militia and to the colonels of the Somerset Militia.  The mayor of Lyme Gregory 
Alford rode directly from Lyme to meet Albemarle, stopping only to alert other 
authorities and to write to London.  These civic leaders had no hesitation in contacting 
the militia, whom they clearly believed capable of decisive action.   
 Possibly the penalties for not paying were a deterrent. Lord and deputy 
lieutenants had authority, by act of distraint, to punish failure to pay or to ensure that 
the demands of providing men or equipment were met, by imposing fines. For such 
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penalties a standardised and nationally applicable system of appropriate amounts was 
applied when punishing defaulters.  In 1672 the fine for not finding a horse soldier 
was £20 and for not providing a foot soldier £5, whilst the original assessment 
remained to be paid.  A threat of a fine brought to a head a simmering fifteen year old 
dispute between two contributors in 1700 when William Gore petitioned the lord 
lieutenant of Monmouthshire.25  He and his father had contributed two fifths of the 
cost of a militia trooper for nearly fifty years but at the time of the Monmouth 
Rebellion the partners in this arrangement changed.  In 1685 the Gores were partnered 
with a Mr Kemys and his mother, and their contribution share increased to one half.  
At the Rebellion the new partnership could not hire Gore’s usual horse and were 
obliged to purchase one with a new saddle, arms and other furniture.  However, 
Kemys also used the horse for private occasions, and in 1690 deeming the beast too 
old for service succeeded in obtaining a county order for Gore to jointly buy another 
which was to be in the care of Kemys with Gore sharing its maintenance costs.  In 
1695 Gore received a county threat of a fine as his partner Kemys had supplied a 
worn out saddle and ill conditioned arms to the general muster.  Kemys demanded 
that Gore should pay half towards new equipment and yet another new horse.  Gore 
sought a compromise over payment and usage, but Kemys refused all negotiations, 
despite Gore continuing to pay his half share of powder, ball, cleaning of arms, saddle 
and furniture repairs, besides the hire of their trooper and other charges.  Finally in 
1700 Gore had grown weary of Kemys and sought redress of his grievances and 
restitution of his expenses, including enough money to purchase all the new militia 
requirements and maintain them.  He further requested the lord lieutenant to order that 
the jointly owned horse and equipment should be kept in readiness only for militia use 
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at The Bull in Carlyon.26  Mediation between ill-disposed conjoined contributors was 
just one of the tribulations of involved in the administration of the funding system.   
 Although a constable’s valuations were made upon residents of his parish, the 
men charged with that office sometimes took their duties beyond what was strictly 
required of them.  In the constable’s evaluation of Cornwall’s Liskeard Parish for 12 
March 1661 the early columns of figures state how much each person paid, and 
towards how many men they contributed. The last column, that of ‘Adjustments of the 
said parish’, provides a list indicating persons who owned land in the parish but were 
non-resident.  Such people were entitled to a seat in church but did not have to meet 
the majority of parish demands, as to do so would mean they would be liable for more 
than one assessment and would, therefore, be contributing twice: this was deemed 
unfair.27  However, by listing the adjustments, the four constables who drew up this 
list thereby ensured that the value of the holdings of the absentees was recorded and 
available for addition to their liability in their parish of domicile.28  There is no record 
of parishes recouping any payment made upon these holdings from the landowners’ 
parishes of residence, although this may have been the intention behind their listing 
by the constables of Liskeard. 
 It has been mentioned that there was a degree of connivance between 
landowning lord lieutenants and it seems likely that this state of affairs percolated 
down the social scale.  There is no proof of malpractice but it would be interesting to 
know why a rich and populated county such as Hampshire only turned out 120 
troopers (see Table 3.2.2, page 127) when most southwest counties fielded 250.     
By the Militia Acts the lord lieutenants were also permitted to exact an 
additional quarter of one month’s assessment to fund ammunition, other military 
necessities and supplies in an additional tax known as Trophy Money.  Trophy Money 
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was so-called because rather than pay for the militiamen and their personal equipment 
it paid for such items of regimental military impedimenta as are usually depicted in 
trophies of arms – flags, drums, extra shot, extra barrels of powder, halberds and so 
forth.29  The encompassing nature of these expenses is shown in a page from the 
accounts pertaining to militia spending in Salisbury, which is illustrated below and 
records items such as a drum strap (hanger) and the redeeming of a pledged halberd. 
Illustration 4.1.1:  Payments made from trophy money 
 
Source: W&SHC: G23/1/41 A bundle of documents: Item 7. A note of disbursements of Trophy  
 Money paid by Mr Mayor of Salisbury bears the date 24 July 1671 but is assigned to 1674. 
 
There is an undated order from the lord lieutenant of Hampshire to his 
deputies and to Richard Cobb, treasurer to the militia to meet at Winchester and there 
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to issue warrants ‘for the lewing of Trophy Money so the Militia may be mustered as 
the earliest opportunity’.30  Once purchased, the major items secured by Trophy 
Money would seldom need to be replaced.  
From his studies of the Herefordshire Militia Assessments and financial 
papers, Faraday asserts ‘the cost of the annual fortnight’s duty was about £55 and 
£120 for commissioned officers of horse respectively, and £23 and £30 for their 
inferior officers. This, together with the cost of drums and ammunition, was charged 
to the special militia tax funds.’31  It would seem officers’ expenses were paid for out 
of the lord lieutenant of Herefordshire’s ‘quarter and trophy’ money and not through 
the base militia rate which provided the troopers’ and foot soldiers’ pay and expenses. 
The Herefordshire Assessment records appear to be the only substantial extant body 
of militia accounts and although being ‘so ravelled and perplexed’ that they cannot be 
taken for a model across all counties, they are a good indication of a nation-wide 
system in all its imperfection.32  
It is also worth noting that stemming from legislation initially passed during 
the Interregnum the lord lieutenant was also empowered in times of crisis to give 
orders, personally or by delegation to his chief officers, for the requisition of wagons, 
carts, and draught animals from private individuals to furnish a transport system for 
the county forces.  Promissory notes would be issued allowing recompense to the 
owners at the rate of sixpence a mile for a cart drawn by six horses or five oxen and 
one penny a mile for a horse – whether this was to supplement the draught horses or 
as additional beasts is not clear.   
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4.2.    PAY AND SUPPLY. 
The annual payment of eight pounds per man for Cromwell’s new militia had re-
introduced the idea of paying militiamen for service. The adoption of the Interregnum 
model, proposed and passed by members of the Restoration government, continued 
this arrangement by agreeing that ‘The Militia…shall be exercised, ordered and 
managed… in the same manner as the same now is actually exercised, ordered and 
managed.’33  A paper, supposedly in Clarendon’s hand, also advocated that the men’s 
pay should remain the same.34  Later, this must have seemed unnecessarily generous 
to the Cavalier Parliament as a rate of two shillings a day for horse and one shilling a 
day for foot was introduced in 1661 and, except for a further rise of sixpence a day for 
the cavalry authorised in 1663, this remuneration remained fixed.  Consequently in 
the 1680s, the minimum requirement of eight days mustering and training per year 
was thus worth two pounds a year to a trooper and eight shillings a year to a foot 
soldier; a far cry from the Cromwellian 1659 eight pounds and a far smaller budget 
for local taxation to provide. 
This basic pay system was complicated by another statute that stated that when 
a man was called out on active service he was to receive one month’s pay in hand 
from his contributor for his immediate campaign expenses.  This sum could be 
recouped from the public treasury upon application and was presumably paid out of 
the collected militia money. The sums involved were far from negligible. In 1685 one 
month’s pay at one shilling per day translated as thirty shillings per man, a sum the 
county would eventually be obliged to find.  The basic cost of paying Wyndham’s 
540 strong regiment for one month’s active service was therefore £810 and, if four 
foot and one horse regiment per county was the pattern, each county would have to 
find some £3,720 for its militia during the crisis. It can be calculated that Cornwall, 
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Devon, Dorset, Somerset, Gloucestershire and Wiltshire spent over £2.5M in modern 
money. 
During any campaign in which their services were retained after the initial 
county-funded month elapsed the responsibility for payment of the militia was 
transferred to the campaign war chest of the royal army’s commander in chief, a 
situation from which the county treasuries benefited. However, in the absence of 
national emergencies the various county and corporation authorities held the 
disbursement of collected monies in their power and, amongst other things, payments 
to the soldiers for attendance at musters were provided from their funds. For example, 
the City of Bath Records for 1670 show ‘£1 15s 0d paid to the trained soldiers at the 
last day’s muster’ and ‘£4 1s 0d for the soldiers’ at a two day muster as well as ‘£8 2s 
0d for the soldiers’ at for a four day muster in 1683.35  However in drawing up rules 
governing such payments, the counties appear to have discontinued the Tudor practice 
of paying ‘Drink Money’ at the rate of one groat for every five miles marched.36 
The issue of pay was important both as a matter of necessity and principle.  
When it was not forthcoming the men felt betrayed and that their contract had been 
broken.  Unlike royal troops civilian soldiers were not dependant upon the authorities 
for their livelihood which made them more prone to taking action when feeling 
aggrieved.  Possibly due to the lax attitude of the Duke of Somerset many of his 
regiments had not been paid at the time of the 1685 Rebellion and the consequences 
are explained in chapter seven, page 285.  
Regarding payment met by  the campaign war-chest for staying out over the 
allocated one month, during the 1665 Dutch invasion threat the Berkshire Militia 
augmented the garrison of the Isle of Wight until with the threat was nullified when 
the lord lieutenant, Lord Lovelace petitioned for them to return home. The king 
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consented and authorised their dismissal, ‘after examining what pay was due to them 
for serving beyond the month, and to answer for their debts or borrow money in the 
island to pay them, which was to be repaid without delay’.37   If the militia was still 
required to continue on active service following completion of its initial month’s of 
service, and this service was not set against a specified campaign war chest, the 
militia would not be paid by the regular military authority, but remained the 
responsibility of the contributors.  Hence a note by John Evelyn in which he 
complains that: ‘the two horse-men which My Son & myself sent into the County 
Troopes were now come home,’ but instead of returning home at the end of one 
month’s service they had remained with their unit for nearly another month: ‘To our 
extraordinary charge’.38   
There were ways in which certain militiamen could earn more pay, especially 
drummers who were called upon to perform at civic occasions.  Jonathon Michell, a 
drummer under Captain Richard Davy in the Salisbury City Trained Band, was paid 
£1 1s 0d for beating his drum on the occasion ‘when the King went to Oxford.’39  
Similarly Jonathon Greene was paid 12s 0d for six days’ drumming in 1671.40  Gifts 
were also forthcoming for those on guard duties.  In Poole the men had beer issued, 
whilst in 1679 the militiamen in Reading were given one bushel of sea-coal every 
night at 8d per bushel.41       
Supplying the militia was a locally managed affair, with clothing and some 
weapons being paid for by contributors and acquired from a variety of sources as will 
be detailed in chapter six.  In addition, the men’s immediate campaign expenses 
including food and any additional comforts were also covered by their contributors.  
However, there was also a co-existing supply system through local centralised depots.  
With the recreation of the county militias it was necessary for several urban centres to 
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restock their armouries, previously stripped during the civil wars.  In 1662 Bath City 
Council purchased 27 swords and scabbards, 27 belts, 12 pikes, 16 muskets, 16 sets of 
bandoleers and 37 pounds of black-powder.  From this it may be deduced that, 
initially, the Bath Company of the newly raised Somerset Militia mustered at least 28 
men.  Additional purchases continued as late as the 1690s when a two-year weapons 
maintenance contract with John Ditchen for the cleaning and repair of eight swords 
was extended.42   
 The billeting of militiamen was yet another logistic and financial problem to 
be solved.  Although the regulars had tents, there was no routine issue of tents or 
hurdles for huts to the militia.  They were usually lodged in inns, farms or private 
residences. Never popular, billeting at least meant the militiamen had shelter for the 
night. Wyndham’s Regiment was posted in Middlezoy on the eve of battle of 
Sedgemoor because the Royal Horse, also without tents, had filled Weston Zoyland.  
However, two of Dinely’s drawings illustrating Beaufort’s tour of Wales, one of 
which is illustrated below, depict a militia camp with a variety of bell and ridge tents. 
spread over a fairly wide area with soldiers among them.  Whether these tents were 
supplied from the militia rate, from trophy money, or paid for by the commanding 
officer is unknown.   
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Illustration 4.2.1:   The camp of the Carmarthen Militia, 8 August 1684. 
Source Dinely, op. cit., p.224. 
Officers, however, could and did have their own more luxurious tentage. An 
entry for Cardiganshire states that: 
… his Grace’s company made a halt to view the Regiment of 
Militia Foot which their Colonel had ordered to be drawn up 
there in his Graces way where Sir Rice Williams in his own 
tents which were very large had prepared an ample 
entertainment: To which after his Grace had seen the 
Regiment exercise, and some close volleys were made, sat 
down.43 
 
To describe Sir Rice Williams’ tents as ‘his own’ would imply that the men 
had tents of their own or were more likely in billets, but the colonel’s accommodation 
was separate and considerably larger and more comfortable.  The colonel’s tent would 
be full of his own furniture including a properly made bed, and carpeting on the floor, 
but comfort was never a high priority for the rank and file, although if encamped for 
some time the men may have constructed timber frame beds with cross-strung match 
and a straw-filled palliasse similar to those used in field hospitals at the time.44  
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4.3. SUMMONING AND READINESS. 
The Government called out the militia by letters to the lord lieutenants.  Written in the 
king’s name they were usually sent by the Secretary of the Council and carried to the 
counties by royal messenger.  There is conflicting evidence as to whether there was an 
exclusive nationwide express system in operation or not, although it is widely held 
that the large stables maintained at Basing House in Elizabethan days were part of 
such an organisation.45 A branch of the Royal Household, known as The Messengers, 
delivered letters on the king’s service, taking precedence over all other 
communications.46  On receipt of such a communication the lord lieutenant would 
send his orders to his deputies and the sheriff by couriers.  The deputies wrote 
summoning orders to the constables of the hundreds who, in their turn, instructed their 
parish constables to turn out their men and send them to the nominated rendezvous. 
Exactly how the men were roused is conjecture, but many systems were tried.  
The mayor of London kept a select band of armed men ready to muster on the tolling 
of St. Paul’s bell whilst in Southampton men were turned out ‘by raising the gare and 
ringing of church bells’.47  The old Tudor system of fire beacons could also have been 
in use but the coastal communications system, which used flags by day and lanterns 
by night, had been discontinued due to interference with the signals used by the 
navy.48  On a local level the traditional ringing of church bells would have signalled 
an alarm but, for a peacetime muster with several days notice, it is not unreasonable to 
imagine that constables ran around their village and sought out the men directly or 
devolved the responsibility by instructing the contributors to find their substitutes.  In 
answer to a French threat in 1690 the authorities at Poole instructed:  ‘Imprimis - An 
extraordinary watch of thirteen every night (every man in his own person if at home 
and of ability of body) do watch at such places as the captain of the watch for every 
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night shall see fit.’49  The Poole Council, however, could also be more specific about 
the location of men keeping watch and how they should signal: 
Item – The four men be appointed as a sea watch or guard, 
two of which to go in the King’s scout and two to be at the 
castle of Brownsea, the former to give notice of any 
approaching danger and the others on such notice or sign, by 
firing a gun, to give notice to the town.50 
 
Once assembled in their parish groups, the men marched to join their 
companies and thence to their regimental rendezvous. The organisation of the militias 
by parishes, hundreds and counties as outlined in the previous chapter, meant that 
upon summoning, a force of some five to six hundred foot plus a troop of fifty to sixty 
horse would assemble in a large town. In Wiltshire in 1685, such musters were held in 
Devizes, Marlborough, Salisbury and Warminster where orders from the Earl of 
Pembroke coordinating their subsequent movements were delivered. In Somerset the 
mustering towns were Bath, Bridgewater, Crewkerne, Taunton and Wells but the 
Duke of Somerset had no coordination system and the battalions once assembled were 
left bereft of orders.   
 At Sarum in 1086 William I’s Council had affirmed that every free man in a 
shire was to be in readiness to take the field anywhere against a national foe.51  
Although in 1685 the summons was not so all-encompassing, yet the intention 
remained that a general rendezvous of the county’s forces would provide a small army 
consisting of both foot and horse at short notice.  Albemarle called such a rendezvous 
for 11 June 1685 and such was the effectiveness of his summoning system that he had 
over 4,000 men at his Exeter muster. Their readiness to march in three days proves 
that little was needed beyond having the men perform regimental exercises efficiently 
whilst awaiting the arrival of those who had furthest to travel. The men may have 
been quite capable of performing company drill but it is likely that it took two or three 
 163 
 
days to familiarise both officers and men with the demands of operating in much 
larger formations.  Regimental deployments and drills were necessary if the county 
force was to operate cohesively and effectively.   
Most militias had identified assembly points and these were firmly ingrained 
in tradition. In Cornwall the county’s nine very large hundreds were divided into four 
administrative divisions upon which the militia regiments were based.  The troops 
from each hundred had their own assembly point which was probably also the 
rendezvous for company drill, whilst regimental drill was conducted at the division 
assembly points.  In order to keep travel to a minimum, two regiments met for 
regional musters, reserving the grand all-county muster for the county capital at 
Bodmin.  Saltash was chosen over Bodmin for the 1685 emergency because it was 
closer to the seat of the rebellion at Lyme Regis.   
Table 4.3.1: Assembly points of the Cornwall Militia.  
Division Hundred 
Assembly 
No. of 
Parishes 
District 
Assembly 
Division 
Assembly 
Regional 
Assembly 
County 
Assembly 
East Westwibilshere   18 Lanreath  
Liskeard 
 
 
Launceston 
 
 
 
 
Bodmin 
 Eastwibilshere    34 Kellington 
North Trigg   12 Bodmin  
Camelford 
 Lesnewth   17 Camelford 
 Stratton   11 Stratton 
West Penwith   25* Penzance Helston  
 
Truro 
 Kerrier    26 Helston 
South Pydar   21 South 
Colombs 
South 
Colombs 
 Powder   38* Grampond 
* Includes the major town parishes of Penzance and Truro, each with a large 
contingent of men, which might have remained behind for home defence. The town 
parish of Liskeard raised 42 men for service.52  It is to be expected both Penzance and 
Truro, being wealthier and larger, raised more. 
 
Source: Richard Carew, The Survey of Cornwall and an Epistle concerning the Excellencies of the English  
         Tongue (Penzance, Hewitt; London , Law, 1769), pp.86-87. 
 
The speed at which the militias mustered and made ready to march is an 
indication of their efficiency and effectiveness.  During emergencies not only was the 
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rate of assembly and numbers of the men appearing tested, but so too were the militia 
administration and supply systems.  Most local constables knew the routine dates of 
the county musters to which they were to marshal the prescribed men, indeed most of 
those involved would be aware of what was expected of them and the deadlines that 
they had to meet.   Responding to an emergency was different: there was no time to 
prepare and everything had to be set in motion in as short as time as possible. 
The coastal counties of the southwest have a reputation for their rapid 
response at times of alarms such as threats of foreign invasion and pirate raids. The 
Cornwall Militia turned out at Falmouth in June 1666 in answer to the Dutch Admiral 
Ruyter’s progress along the south coast of Britain, and then again in August as a show 
of strength in the face of his pretended raid.53  However, not having access to ships or 
boats restricted the militia’s usefulness against seaborne enemies and consequently 
the ports placed greater reliance upon the navy for defence.  The same is true about 
the militia’s role in counter-piracy operations. The Cornwall Militia turned out when 
Padstow was blockaded by pirates in 1692 but, although they responded rapidly the 
pirates did not land and the militia could only watch as the pirates took five coastal 
trading ships in one day.  If pirates managed to land they were often dealt with by the 
militia but though it was more than adequate for that task, as an all-embracing, anti-
pirate force it was out of its depth.  Criticism of the militia’s performance following 
the Dutch raid on Chatham is similarly ill-founded for although it responded and 
assembled quickly, it had neither the ships nor the cannon to strike at the Dutch.  
However, where they did land the militia effectively repulsed them.  The militia’s 
duties were never intended to include sea warfare.     
The same is true of its role in supporting the representatives of His Majesty’s 
Customs.  To investigate any of the western militias’ involvement with smuggling is 
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fraught with the dangers of imaginative storytelling and hearsay. However, smuggling 
was an all-pervasive activity connived at by all strata of society and it is unlikely that 
the officers and men of the militia, being members of local communities, were keen to 
put an end to this lucrative, albeit illicit trade.   
The militia not only responded with alacrity to threats of incursions but was 
also quick at coming to the aid of the civil authorities.  When, in June 1683, following 
the discovery of the Rye House Plot, Secretary Jenkins demanded that a search be 
made of dissenters’ houses, the lord lieutenant of Hampshire, Edward Noel, Earl of 
Gainsborough, sent word to the militia officers in the major towns to execute his 
orders.  John Speed reported back to Jenkins that ‘the magistrates and militia officers 
of Southampton responded very rapidly’. They had searched all suspects, restricted 
movement overseas, disarmed all dissenters and arrested Nathaniel Robinson a non-
conformist minister.54   
The lord lieutenants were also capable of taking the initiative by assembling 
their county forces without specific orders from the king or the council, as Albemarle 
did in June 1685.  Whether this was in response to having gained some prior 
knowledge of the imminent arrival of Monmouth’s invasion fleet or was part of 
Albemarle’s drive to improve his Devon Militia is unknown.  
James II it seems did not take the possibility of a foreign invasion seriously, 
being more concerned with searching households for arms and seeking out and 
harassing dissenters.  Charles II had been different.  In 1679 he put the militias of the 
south coast on standby several times and his Secretary of State, Williamson had 
ordered a report on the current state of the militia together with a report on their 
deployments in 1672, 1673 and 1675.55  However, James’ peaceful accession had 
done much to allay fears.  Although informed by the Dutch almost immediately that 
 166 
 
Monmouth was at sea, it was only two days before the landing at Lyme Regis that an 
order went to Gainsborough, lord lieutenant of Hampshire to arrest Thomas Dore, 
mayor of Lymington, a known activist and Monmouth supporter.56  They missed him.  
It was two days after the landing, 13 June, that the order to raise the militia went out 
and indeed a caveat was added that only such parts of the militia as seen fit should be 
called out.57 Even then the government was slow to co-ordinate militia troop 
movements.  Gainsborough had reported that his militia was ready by 14 June but no 
marching orders were written or dispatched until 17 June.58  Such delays in response 
were not due to the failings of individual militias but to the slowness of the central 
government.  This, however, did not prevent accusations of tardiness being included 
in the criticism leveled against the militia in general.       
 Having landed on 11 June Monmouth’s army was arrayed in regiments, 
armed and perfunctorily drilled, and was ready to march out of Lyme Regis on 15 
June.  Information gathered from the records of the various militias indicates that they 
too were able to muster and march within four days, as shown in Table 4.3.2 below. 59  
The rebels were perhaps quicker to muster as the majority of those who assembled at 
Lyme came from close by and did not have to first attend company or regional 
musters before marching to the army’s assembly point; men simply left their homes 
and walked to Lyme.  In contrast the distances travelled by militiamen going from 
home to muster were sometimes great: organising arms, equipment and provisions 
and then walking, say, the sixty miles from Ilfracombe to Exeter was no easy feat.  
Yet, with the summoning systems in place the men came in.  Even after the Battle of 
Sedgemoor militiamen from distant villages continued to arrive at their muster points.  
A witness in a case before the Devon quarter sessions recounted that ‘the Posse men 
were coming in in swarms, and he [Albemarle] was sending out expresses to stop 
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them, but they were to be ready at an hour’s warning, if occasion.’60  This meant that 
having reached Exeter, they were told to go home, but to hold themselves in readiness 
to return immediately if required.  No accounts of protest have been found. 
 The speed in which the men were assembled may have varied according to 
the distances they had to walk, but the time between them mustering and being ready 
to march appears relatively consistent.  It was usually one day, although the Red 
Regiment of the Dorset Militia assembled and fought at Bridport on 14 June.61     
Table. 4.3.2: The mustering of militias involved in the Monmouth Rebellion. 
County Force  Rendezvous  Summoned Mustered Marched 
Devon   Exeter   13 June 11 June* 14 June 
Dorset   Bridport  13 June 14 June 18 June 
Gloucestershire Gloucester  13 June not known not known 
Hampshire  Southampton  13 June 16 June 17 June 
Somerset  Taunton  13 June 14 June 14 June 
   Bath   13 June 13 June not known 
Wiltshire  Salisbury  13 June 17 June 20 June 
*Albemarle summoned his militia on his own authority, without waiting for the king’s letter. 
 
Source:   CSPD.1685 Earl of Sunderland to the Lords Lieutenant, numbers: 853, 855, 856; Squibb, 
G.D., A Guide to Materials for Local History in the Muniment Room of the Dorset County Museum 
(Dorchester, Longmans,1945), p.65. HRO: PER98/18   Hampshire Militia Rolls no 1 to 18; Adam 
Wheeler’s ‘Iter Bellicosum: or a Perfect Relation of the …march…’ in Chandler, D., ‘Sedgemoor 1685 
- from Monmouth’s Invasion to the Bloody Assizes’, (Staplehurst, Spellmount, 1995),    
 
 Having mustered, the militias were reviewed and allocated their initial 
campaign stations, sometimes after a prolonged wait for instructions from those 
coordinating the national deployment.62  The accusation that the southwest militias 
were unready and not allocated to tasks is refuted by Bishop Trelawney.  James II 
began his political campaign against the militia in the early days following 
Sedgemoor and struck first at its leaders. However, the day before Monmouth’s 
execution Trelawney wrote to Sunderland with the:  
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...true accompt of the demission of Mr Rashleigh, the present 
Sheriff of Cornwall, from the trust of the Lieutenancy… 
according to this just sense of duty he shew himself the whole 
time of this rebellion.  He not only joined me in signing all the 
commissions but accompanied me throughout the whole 
country to review and dispose the regiments… 63 
 
 The bishop thus bears witness that although some deputy lieutenants may 
have been lax in their duties it did not impair the loyal effectiveness of the 
administration and initial operation of the militia in Cornwall.   
 In chapter five it will be established that the militia underwent training, was 
drilled, and performed its military exercises to the satisfaction of its commanders.  To 
judge whether its preparation was sufficient to meet the needs of the civil and military 
command co-ordinating the anti-rebellion operations, it is necessary to summarise 
what each southwest county militia achieved and contributed to the overall campaign.   
 The Somerset Militia assembled at its designated towns within three days 
and the regiments under Phelipps and Lutterel marched smartly to intercept the rebels 
once they had moved out of Lyme, as ordered. Although one part of the force 
panicked and ran, it did not disperse but quickly reassembled and shut down 
Monmouth’s ability to recruit from eastern Somerset.  Another part of the county 
force secured Bath and denied Monmouth access to the city, its bridge over the Avon 
and its control of the Great West Road thereby forcing him to retreat into Somerset 
instead of striking for London. 
 The Gloucestershire Militia responded very quickly and occupied Bristol.  
Together with the Bristol City Militia they arrested known dissenters, eliminated the 
potentially massive support that the city might have offered to the rebels, and 
effectively denied Monmouth access to a major supply port.  It was ineffective when 
failing to completely destroy the medieval stone bridge at Keynsham, but the record 
of the engineers during Moore’s retreat to Corunna over a hundred years later 
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illustrates the difficulty of that type of task.  The Gloucestershire Militia successfully 
kept watch on any rebel activity south of Bristol and hemmed in Monmouth from the 
north by patrolling the north bank of the River Avon. 
 The Dorset Militia assembled a significant portion of its force in Bridport 
within twenty-four hours of being summoned.  There it fought off a raid in strength 
under the rebels’ most experienced and senior officers Venner, Grey and Wade. After 
the rebels marched out of Lyme the militia quickly entered it and then patrolled the 
coast, closing down any move south and possible supply for the rebels from the 
Channel.  It also accompanied Churchill as his only infantry until Kirke’s Regiment of 
royal foot arrived, at which point they handed over the role and moved to secure the 
southeast of the region. Clifton’s map of rebel support on page 321 illustrates their 
effectiveness inasmuch as very few rebels came from east of a line drawn between 
Bridport and Yeovil.64   
 The Wiltshire Militia marched quickly towards Bath, covering 49 miles in 
three days, and mounted a demonstration of force to the populace of their county.  
Despite Wyndham’s Regiment’s flight from Bradford-on-Avon it rallied and fought at 
Frome, dispersing potential recruits and arresting local leaders.  It blocked any 
possible move east by the rebel army and effectively denied Wiltshire as a rebel 
recruiting ground.  One of its cavalry troops rode in Oglethorpe’s pacification of the 
Chew Valley and covered his attack on Keynsham.  It provided the second line at 
Norton St. Philip and Sedgemoor and took an active part in securing and guarding 
prisoners after the battle. It then escorted the artillery until it was safely out of the 
West.  
 The Hampshire Militia assembled within three days and marched on the 
fourth.  It initially secured the south coast and the key towns of Southampton and 
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Portsmouth.  Although its instructions to take Thomas Dore at Lymington were late in 
arriving it prevented any risings that Christopher Battiscome may have instigated in 
their county.65 It was also instrumental in aiding the Wiltshire Militia in preventing 
any rebel move eastwards, south of the Great West Road.  Although two regiments 
were sent back to Hampshire for supposed indiscipline, Feversham kept the Blue 
Regiment to support his numbers and the Green Regiment was at Burrow Bridge 
during the battle at Sedgemoor.  Presumably, the other regiment, out of the county’s 
total of five, held Wiltshire. 
 The Devon Militia under Albemarle had begun mustering two days before the 
king’s letter summoning it to arms actually arrived.  Given that the average strength 
of a militia battalion was 500 men and a militia regiment of horse numbered around 
250, the six foot battalions and one mounted regiment of the Devon Militia mustered 
a surprising 4,000.  A gift of £1,000 from the bishop of Exeter paid for more arms and 
equipment, which were efficiently acquired and issued.66  The letter which summoned 
it arrived on 13 June and it marched the next day 14 June, in response to instructions 
to shadow the rebels whilst forbearing to ‘attempt anything against him, except upon 
great advantages…’67 When Monmouth did leave Lyme, on 15 June, Albemarle, 
wisely, did not attack the rebels’ prepared position in Axminster, but fell back to 
secure the West whilst continuing to press and harass Monmouth’s force from that 
direction – just as Churchill did with the Dorset Militia from the south. The militia 
then re-established royal authority in rebellious Taunton and its presence prevented 
the rebels from slipping westward after their retreat to Bridgwater.  It also severely 
limited Monmouth’s ability to raise recruits.  Only five parishes west of Wellington 
contributed men to the rebel cause.68  After the Battle of Sedgemoor the Devon 
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Militia was active in rounding up and interrogating prisoners, and gathering 
information. On 8 July, by order of the Duke of Albemarle, the sheriff was advised: 
To send out scouts in your northern partes, to apprehend such 
as are scattered there.  Some were examined here yesterday, 
who confess that about two hundred of them went towards 
Ilfracombe and dispersed, some one way some another, neere 
that place, and one of the witneesess saith hee, with Ferguson 
and about thirty others, went off in a boate at sea at 
Ilfracombe, but were driven back, seeing the King’s shipping 
making toward them.69   
 
 Further afield, the Sussex Militia were active in securing the port of Poole in 
Dorset and patrolling Hampshire.  From their base in Ringwood, one of its various 
parties, probing Cranborne Chase towards Shaftesbury, arrested Monmouth’s 
escaping entourage including his second in command Lord Grey of Wark.  Near 
Verwood, a small party of Sussex Militia Horse headed by Trooper Henry Martin 
apprehended the rebel Duke himself, subsequently holding him in custody and 
escorting him to London.  
4.4. CONCLUSION. 
Although few military bodies consider themselves properly resourced the militias of 
the southwest were adequately financed by a local county-based finance system which 
operated well.  The wealth of the county’s land-owning and merchant classes was 
reasonably assessed and adapted every year the militia rate was increased.  Whilst 
there was some dissatisfaction with the application of the rules, several petty 
neighbour disputes and a degree of mutual connivance by the aristocracy over 
amounts levied, overall there was little voiced objection to paying either Militia or 
Trophy Money. The local authorities assessed, collected and spent the money 
effectively, usually making sure that the men were paid via the county or the royal 
campaign chest, and supplied with the necessities of their role.  They also kept 
detailed records of their collections and disbursements as well as keeping track of 
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contributors’ individual payments to balance cash and items supplied.  When the 
system broke down it was a sufficiently rare occasion to cause comment and action.  
The authorities and officers also maintained effective summoning systems 
ensuring that the men assembled promptly and in sufficient numbers to perform their 
duties.  Although procedures were not codified they were effective and forces 
mustered over considerable distances.  The authorities were also effective in 
accounting for defaulters and following up absences or shortages in weapon 
provision.  In the emergency of 1685 some county forces were more successful than 
others in mustering and marching but in general the militias of the southwest 
responded quickly to their summoning and put substantial bodies of troops into the 
field – any delay in marching can often by laid at the feet of central government not 
issuing orders.   
However, they could not have achieved this without being adequately trained 
and drilled, a subject that will be addressed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Five 
FIT FOR SERVICE  
 
‘I account a Rich Publick Treasure… and a people well trained in Martial Affairs 
to be the two pillars (next under God) that will preserve a Kingdom or State from 
ruine and danger.’1 
 
 
The previous chapter examined how the militia was summoned and mustered, so this 
chapter will investigate its capacity to achieve what was asked of it once assembled.  
Military readiness demands that units should be fit for service and available to 
undertake operations whenever called upon to do so.  In order to achieve this, training 
to march, manoeuvre, handle weapons, and to obey orders in a disciplined fashion is 
essential.  
 With the memory of the civil wars being reasonably fresh, one is tempted to 
ask if the ordinary Restoration Englishman still had a taste for militarism.  There is 
evidence to say he did.  In his examination of a serious riot of 1686 in York, 
Withington writes ‘…civic militarism as embodied in the civic militia was an 
entrenched feature of corporate citizenship’ and he convincingly argues that whilst 
historians are fully aware of the religious and politically partisan basis of conflict in 
the later seventeenth century, they are less attuned to its corporate dimensions – in 
particular, the manner in which militarism continued to insinuate itself into the 
everyday lives of citizens.2  Withington contextualises the riot in terms of antagonism 
between the citizens of York and the royal soldiers of its garrison, stating that these 
social identities served as a palimpsest for other tensions, and that the foremost 
agitators on the side of the civic faction were the militia.  Further, he postulates that 
after militarism was given full reign during the civil wars, it was suppressed at the 
Restoration and only allowed public expression in the ranks of the militia, where it 
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flourished. In his unpacking of what he claims to be a hitherto unidentified aspect of 
urban society, Withington maintains that this innate militarism gave rise, within the 
military, to a clearly defined corporate identity and a coagulated focus for communal 
animosities.  Further work is required in this direction, yet Withington’s ideas lend 
weight to a concept that the militia’s ranks contained many men attracted to and 
somewhat naturally disposed to the military.  Men who willingly undertook training 
and obeyed commands. 
 
5.1.   TRAINING. 
Militia training in the earlier part of the century was a matter of government policy.  
A lord lieutenant had the power to muster the king’s subjects and according to his 
commission they were to be made ‘apt for the wars’ and armed and equipped ‘after 
their abilities, degrees and faculties’.3  Although each lord lieutenant usually awaited 
orders from the council prior to arraying his forces in a time of emergency, he was 
also required to ensure that they were in a state of constant preparedness.  Much of 
this preparation was undertaken by the county muster master whose task was, 
initially, to train calivermen (musketeers) in the handling of their specialist equipment 
and weapons, but their role gradually expanded to embrace all arms.  They were to 
undertake inspections of arms and armour, to determine men’s suitability to serve and 
to oversee the compilation and production of the necessary certificates or lists of 
attendees and their arms on behalf of the deputies.  
Muster masters were usually professional military officers with campaign 
experience, ‘familiar with modern techniques in drilling soldiers, [and with] new 
tactics and armaments, which were being introduced on the continent.’4  Their arrival 
in Tudor times had been funded by the crown, but early Stuart transference of 
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responsibility for their maintenance and pay to local government resulted in their 
appointment and tenure becoming dependent upon the lord lieutenants or their 
deputies to whom they were responsible on either a singular or a regional basis.  
Once under county control, local officials exerted their authority, investigating 
both the finances and effectiveness of the muster masters who reported to them. In 
1630, the deputy lieutenants of Hampshire wrote to Lord Conway concerning their 
muster master’s entertainment and expenses, pointing out the necessity to ensure that 
‘the job is done correctly, that the trained bands are of good quality and well trained, 
and that their weapons are of good quality too.’ They did not see that paying for his 
entertainment whilst undertaking these duties was part of the contract.5 
 Such control aside, muster masters were pivotal in establishing a trained 
militia, especially where the gentrified local officers possessed little military 
knowledge or experience.  These experienced military men did so by touring the 
county, making inspections and attending and supervising musters large and small at 
both regional and parish level, where they directed activities and issued instruction.   
Muster masters could not have attended every local muster and there is no 
evidence to identify where these small parish gatherings took place – but perhaps 
some indications, however tenuous, persist.  In the village of Charlton, northwest of 
Malmesbury in Wiltshire, there is a plot of land known as Pikemen’s Field where, 
folklore holds, in past times, local men drilled.  Swindon metal-detectorists have 
recovered considerable numbers of musket balls from the slope south of Akers Way 
in Moredon.6  There is no evidence to suggest that any conflict ever took place within 
miles of Moredon, and the steep slope there may well have been the practice butts of 
the local militia.  Moreover in the local church of St. Mary’s, Moredon, lies a tablet 
dedicated to Wadham Strangways who was killed by rebels at the Bull Inn, Bridport, 
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during the battle fought there early in the Monmouth Rebellion.7  Wadham 
Strangways was a deputy lieutenant of Dorset, and the brother of Thomas Strangways, 
a colonel of the Dorset Militia with overall command of the county forces.8  
Regrettably, nothing has been found to also link Wadham Strangways to the Blue 
Regiment of the Wiltshire Militia, in whose ranks men from the Swindon area served.  
Throughout every county men were to muster within half a day’s march of 
their parish, both for the convenience of the men and to keep the expense of training 
to a minimum.  Horse and foot were to be counted, recorded and their arms inspected; 
any defaulters, both absentees and those with equipment deficiencies, being noted 
with the expectation that deficiencies would be made good by the miscreant prior to 
the next muster on pain of a fine which would be imposed at the next petty or quarter 
sessions.  The men were to be trained to be ‘perfect in the use of their weapons and to 
know their marches’ whilst supplies of ammunition and match were held ready for 
this purpose at appointed places.9  Subsequently, the muster master produced a muster 
certificate which verified all the names, weapons, accoutrements and stocks of 
powder seen.  This he presented to the lord lieutenant.   
The established practice for training was to require the men to appear by 9.00 
am at a place specified by the constables of their hundred, usually central to the group 
of parishes from which they came.  They were to attend fully uniformed and 
accoutred four times a year for one day’s training as a company and then, once a year, 
to muster in the same way prior to marching on to a regimental muster where they 
experienced four days’ joint training as a full regiment – or indeed as a county force.  
In this way, the requisite eight days’ training a year was achieved, although it may be 
that that some groups of men met within their own parishes for additional practice – 
especially before a muster when their skills would be on display and under scrutiny by 
 179 
 
men from other villages. There being little public recognition or status in general 
parish life, it seems unlikely that men with an opportunity to exhibit manly skills 
would willingly court ridicule by not being proficient in weapon handling.   
A summons from the lord lieutenant of Wiltshire to attend training and the 
requirements therein was sent to the constables of the various hundreds as a warrant 
upon which they were instructed to act: 
In [in response to] an order to me directed for the training…. 
and mustring of the horse of the Militia horse … of 
Marlborough in the County aforesaid under my command.  
These are to will and require you immediately on sight hereof 
to give notice to the severall persons hereunder named 
charged to the finding of horse armes and rider within your 
hundred … of whom they shall stand jointly and soundly 
charged …[to move with] their respective horses and riders to 
Wilton in the said county completely armed according to the 
directions of the law … with powder and bullets and four 
dayes pay in order to [join] the March unto the Rendezvous of 
the Regt of the Militia horse raised within the county aforesaid 
Commanded by the honourable Coll. Thinne at the City of 
New Sarum on Wednesday the third day of October next by 
nine of ye clock in the forenoon then and there to be trained 
… As the law directs and to … be with their Colours at 
Amesbury in the said county by two of the clock in the 
afternoon of the same day.   
Dated the sixth day of September Anno Domini 1679.10 
 
According to Childs the military theory of the early Restoration relied upon 
past precedent and experience so training was based on what had gone on during the 
Thirty Years’ War and the civil wars.  The key drill book resulting from that age was 
Richard Elton’s Complete Body of the Art Military (1650) which was reproduced 
unchanged in 1668 and Childs affirms that ‘until the flintlock and bayonet became 
standardised at the end of the century there was no real incentive or requirement to 
adjust drill and minor tactics’.11  Other military theory writers of influence were 
James Turner, George Monck and Robert Boyle, Earl of Orrery.12  However during 
1674 a letter was sent to all royal army senior officers advising them of the 
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forthcoming publication of a new drill manual entitled An Abridgement of the English 
Military Discipline, known colloquially as The Abridgement, or Monmouth’s Drill 
Book, (who was in command of the army when it was published) or Bill’s Drill Book 
(after its printer, John Bill), and 100 copies were duly published and distributed in 
1675.13  This was followed by a further 1,500 copies a year later and by 1679 it was in 
general use by the Scottish Establishment and available for general public purchase.  
It was thought to be somewhat too much in the French manner for some senior 
officers but ‘it pleases so well that the king says he likes it far better than ours.’ This 
was a very successful publication, being reprinted several times for use by the regular 
army.14 As both senior royal officers Monmouth and Feversham were protégés of 
Turenne and the French system its influence spread.  Editions vary slightly.15  The 
1678 edition, which is pocket-book size, condenses five pages of the original onto one 
side and contains only two illustrations.  The 1682 reprint increases the number of 
drawings, especially for the more complex evolutions.  Further editions appeared in 
1685 and 1689, and its content continued to be reproduced in various forms as late as 
1745 such as that in a booklet entitled The Gentleman Volunteer’s Pocket 
Companion.16  It appears that by the mid eighteenth century The Abridgement had 
percolated throughout the military. Although there is no evidence to confirm that The 
Abridgement was the accepted drill book of the late seventeenth century militia, its 
universal popularity, numerous revisions and reprints provide strong evidence in 
support of just such a hypothesis.   
As the militia tended to emulate the practices of the royal army it is likely that 
the training undertaken by many of them was based upon Elton’s Complete Body of 
the Art Military or the The Abridgement.  The latter manual is divided into chapters 
entitled: ‘Of the Exercise of the Foot, Of the Exercise of Horse, Exercise of Dragoons, 
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and Exercise of Grenadeers’, whilst the chapter devoted to the infantry provides 
sections giving comprehensive instructions for the exercise of muskets and pikes both 
individually and together, as well as for closings and openings, doublings, reducing, 
firing, forming, marching, drawing up, saluting, wheeling, encamping, passing defiles 
and for arraying in battle.  Modern-day re-enactors of the period testify that both the 
Complete Body of the Art Military and The Abridgement are based upon common 
sense, are easy to perform, give clear instruction and provide for frequent repetition 
over a short period of time.17    
Re-enactment gives some indication of the time it would take groups of young 
men to learn and adequately perform seventeenth century weapon postures and drill 
using instructions derived from a period drill book.  Table 5.1.1 has been compiled 
from information obtained according to the research methodology advocated by Dr. 
Charles Kirke of Cranfield University, from interviews with a range of re-enactors of 
seventeenth-century drill who are experienced in teaching new recruits and refreshing 
the skills of older members.18 
Table 5.1.1:   Training hours for 17thC infantry re-enactors to become proficient. 
 
Experienced  To learn the      To learn the To learn basic   To perform 
re-enactment  postures of        postures of  marching and           adequately 
officers Pike       Musket  manoeuvring drill 19  
  
  New Refresh     New  Refresh New  Refresh          New Refresh 
Berry    6  4        6       3     3   1  12      1    
Cullen    4  1        4       1     3   1  10      1    
Frame    2  1        3       1     2-5   1  10      1    
Nickson   6  4        7       4     4   4  10      2    
Turton    3  1        4       1     4   2  10      1    
Watson20        15          20          10       30    
 
Average            4         2                5         2     4   2  10 1
  
 
 
 
 
 182 
 
Table 5.1.2:     Training hours for 17thC cavalry re-enactors to become proficient. 
 
Experienced  To learn to      To learn the To learn basic   To perform 
re-enactment  ride in        sword work marching and           adequately 
officers formation        manoeuvring drill21  
 
  New Refresh     New  Refresh New  Refresh          New Refresh 
Blackmore   6 ½        6       ½     6   1  7      ½     
Jennings   3 ½        2       ½     3   1  4      1    
Outhwaite   2  ½        2       ½     8   1  8      1    
 
Average             3         ½                 3       ½      6   1  6      1 
 
Information regarding time taken to accustom horses to mock battles not gathered. 
Certain parallels can be drawn between re-enactors and the Restoration 
militias: both sets of participants train with the same weapons and perform the same 
drills, but for all their serious intent and endeavours, both are not full time soldiers 
and bear a ‘weekend warrior’ soubriquet from their contemporary popular press. 
Frame, possibly the most efficient and experienced re-enactment trainer, believed that 
his shorter hours brought recruits to the point where they could handle their weapons 
adequately without making simple mistakes.  However, he added that it took much 
longer for the men to be accustomed to performing in a fight albeit a mock one, with 
its noise, hectic activity, tiredness, and pressure to keep up with others. It is known 
that the London militias staged mock battles, although whether to merely entertain 
crowds or to accustom the men to an approximation of combat is uncertain.22   
The most complicated and potentially dangerous element of drill for both 
contemporary and re-enactment seventeenth-century soldiers is the loading and firing 
of the musket.  The Abridgement gives thirty separate instructions for this operation 
which through repetition in training would have been committed to memory and 
performed almost subconsciously. It was not only the method of choice in making the 
men more familiar with the task but also a means of ensuring that they loaded safely 
and correctly. The group of re-enactment officers indicated that, on average, it takes a 
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re-enactment recruit some five hours to learn the required postures but, once learnt, 
only two hours following a winter’s layoff to refresh their memories and to return to 
former proficiency.  This would easily be achieved in eight days training. 
The militia sometimes also trained using powder.  The Salisbury City 
Company being drawn from men in a relatively small area possibly trained together 
more frequently than those disbursed across the countryside so their consumption of 
ammunition was likely to be higher than most but they seem to have used an 
enormous amount.  
Table 5.1.3: Powder bill submitted to the Mayor of Salisbury.   
For  John Joyce Mayor of Sarum 
April 20 16 lbs – 15 of powder    01 – 0 – 0 
May  3 30 pounds of powder    02 – 0 – 0 
         4 30 pounds of powder    02 – 0 – 0 
          10 30 pounds of powder    02 – 0 – 0 
          19 15 pounds of powder    01 – 0 – 0 
          26 15 pounds of powder    01 – 0 – 0 
          30 30 pounds of powder    02 – 0 – 0  
June  21 12 pounds of powder and ½ powder                     16 – 8 
         22 30 pounds of powder    02 – 0 – 0 
         23 30 pounds of powder    02 – 0 – 0 
          60 pounds of bullets    01 – 5 – 0 
July     5 32 pounds of powder    02 – 2 – 8 
          29 30 pounds of powder    02 – 0 – 0 
        21 – 0 – 4 
Source: W&SHC: G23/1/41. Item 9. 
 
In 1671 Turner wrote, ‘Fifty years ago the Calibre of the Musket was ordain’d 
by most Princes... to receive a Bullet, whereof ten were to be cast of one pound of 
Lead; that hath not been thought convenient since, and therefore most allow twelve 
balls to one pound of Lead for a Musket’.23   This meant balls weighed 1 ounce, 
losing the ¼ ounce in casting sprue.  Consequently in the 1680s the 60 pounds of 
bullets would realise 720 balls (12 bore), and as the mayor of Salisbury’s company 
had approximately 72 musketeers this probably meant each man was issued with 10 
balls during the month of June.24  Unfortunately the document in Table 5.1.3 is 
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undated but has an unacknowledged annotation stating 1685.  If this bill was written 
during the year of the Monmouth Crisis then it may indicate the men trained with 
powder but not ball, only being issued bullets in an emergency.   
Turner also states that ‘To a Musketeer belongs also a Bandelier of Leather, at 
which he should have hanging eleven or twelve shot of Powder, a bag for his ball, a 
primer, and a cleaner.’25 These wooden powder charge bottles on extant bandoliers 
hold approx three drachms (½oz in apothecary measure).  The men would need six 
ounces of powder per bandolier of twelve bottles.  The Salisbury men could thus fill 
the 72 bandoliers for the company’s musketeers with 27 pounds of powder which 
approximates the units of 15, 30 and 60 lbs bulk purchases as half, full and double 
bandoliers.26 There are no records of the City having cannon for use in celebrations, 
so in May it would seem each man used five bandoliers’ worth of powder which is 
sixty rounds fired in training during the one month.  If this was the training rate then 
the men had more than ample time to become familiar with their weapons even if the 
authorities were vigilant in enforcing the law that they could not take them home. 
 The tradition of gun ownership for self-sufficiency was severely curtailed by 
the introduction of the 1671 Game Act.  Ostensibly passed to limit poaching, the act 
contained several clauses designed to implement gun control and, for the majority of 
the population, made the keeping of weapons illegal.  Article II stated that:  
…every person and persons not having lands and tenements or 
some other estate or inheritance … of the clear yearly value of 
one hundred pounds per annum, or for term of life or having 
leases of ninety nine years…of the clear yearly value of one 
hundred and fifty pounds per annum… stocked with deer or 
conies… are herebye declared to be persons by the laws of this 
realm not allowed to have or keep for themselves or any other 
person or persons any guns, bows, greyhounds, setting dogs, 
ferrets…but shall be and are hereby prohibited to have, keep or 
use the same… 27   
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Only substantial house and landowners, capable of allocating considerable 
tracts of land to stocking private game reserves were thereby permitted to own guns or 
keep them at home, and indeed they were the only persons permitted to use them.  All 
stocks of arms or even a single weapon in a private citizen’s possession were deemed 
illegally held and could be seized. Only those with an income of £100 a year, or 
holding a lease for land which generated £150 a year, were allowed to kill game and 
thus keep small arms in their homes.  Holmes states that ‘those owning property 
worth one hundred pounds a year were perhaps half of one percent of the 
population’28 which would mean ninety nine and half percent of the nation were 
forbidden to hold arms and liable to have any that were in their possession 
confiscated. This meant that having a personal weapon at home was restricted to the 
squirearchy and above, the classes from which militia officers were drawn and to 
whom the men owed allegiance as officers, landlords or employers.  Entries in the 
State Papers Domestic indicate that many searches were executed under the authority 
of either the Militia Acts or the Game Act even after the crushing of Monmouth’s 
Rebellion.29 
The Game Act might also have had an effect upon the militiamen’s 
proficiency as prior to its passing to shoot flying game was considered a valued skill 
and one at which ordinary men might compete with their betters.  After 1671 the 
ability to shoot birds in flight became a social marker.  On the surface the Game Act 
struck a perhaps ineffectual blow against poaching but it would appear to have 
contained within it the more political intention of disarming the general population by 
providing a legal means by which arms control could be enforced.  
Despite the introduction of this law James II’s concern about the number of 
guns in civilian hands persisted, and he wrote to several lord lieutenants informing 
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them that he had heard that ‘a great many persons not qualified by law under pretence 
of shooting matches keep muskets or other guns in their houses.’30  This might have 
been directed at the militia as it is difficult to understand what other sectors of society 
would have had legal access to firearms and the opportunity to occasionally take them 
into their homes.   
Shooting competitions were not the sole province of the militia but they were 
apparently a militia tradition.  In Poole, James Reade, a ‘captain of the Bande trayne 
soldiers [had] sett vp a Maye poole w’th a parret vppon the topp thereof’ with 
instructions to the men ‘to shoote at him there own costes and charges without danger 
to any p’son.’31  It is interesting to note that by engaging in shooting competitions the 
men using the weapons were accustomed to firing ball rather than the powder-only 
discharges used at training musters, displays and reviews.   
It would appear that the Game Act and the endeavours of the authorities to 
disarm the populace met with only partial success and that even early in William III’s 
reign there were weapons remaining in private hands.  The Victorian historian of 
Poole J. Sydenham cites an entry dated 21 June 1690 from an official record book that 
is no longer extant, outlining the defensive actions necessary to put the town in 
readiness to resist a possible French landing:   
Item – That all persons that have muskets, fowling pieces, 
blunderbusses, pistols, powder, bullets or other arms or 
ammunition of defence, do bring them into the town all, and 
there an account is to be taken of them, and care taken for the 
cleansing of them and making them fit for use, and that the 
fixing and cleansing of the arms and the cost of the powder 
and shot shall be made good to the furnishers, at the general 
charge of the whole town, to be levied by an equal rate as the 
law shall allow.32  
 
Despite the efforts of central government to regulate the ownership of arms, 
some militiamen, most of them probably contributors who served and whose wealth 
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qualified them to keep guns, would not only have owned weapons but would also 
have been proficient in their use and care.   
The Duke of Albemarle went to great lengths to make his views clear to his 
deputies that the Devon Militia was to be properly trained, whilst in Somerset Sir 
Edward Phelipps may have been somewhat zealous in its delivery.33 Rogers implies 
that Phelipps was a martinet with a reputation for being a hard taskmaster.  As 
presumably his inferior officers would have followed his lead and the tone he had set, 
it is reasonable to suggest his regiment of the Somerset Militia, although unhappy and 
resentful were drilled to proficiency.  The state of their morale may well have been 
another influential factor in their behaviour at Axminster.  
Although able to drill and fire, militiamen would still need to be honed into a 
fighting unit.  File drill in sixes or eights may have produced a degree of uniformity 
but time was needed for these small units, no matter how proficient in themselves, to 
be welded into a cohesive larger formation capable of acting under discipline.  
Wheeler, of the Wiltshire Militia, omits to say what happened in June 1685 following 
Wyndham’s regimental muster parade in Salisbury. Yet, after three days he declared 
his regiment ‘exactly completed by his Honor and accommodated fitt for Warr 
according Military Discipline.’34  Although Wheeler does not specify the activities 
undertaken during 18 and 19 June whilst waiting those who lived further away to 
arrive it would be strange if those assembled failed to drill.   
On 28 June, after marching to join the royal army at Box near Bathampton, the 
Wiltshire Militia attended a rendezvous of the army and were ‘set in Batalia, as if 
presently to engage the enemy’ by Feversham and Grafton.35  Dressing and 
manoeuvring in battalia would have demanded competency in the handling of arms 
and more than a basic understanding of deployment and drill.  
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Ineffectiveness has frequently been remarked upon by commentators as noted 
earlier but efforts taken to address the situation have been generally ignored. 
Albemarle took great pains to see that the units under his command were competent 
and in a good state of preparedness. He kept strict lists of those who served and 
indeed encouraged his own estates’ staffs to serve, especially in Essex where many 
appeared as militia lieutenants (Albemarle was lord lieutenant of Essex as well as 
Devon).36 He was also a keen participator in the training of his charges. In April 1676, 
the day following the king’s departure after a short stay at Albemarle’s house at 
Newhall rather than go with the king to court in London, “he remained at home to 
exercise his militia on the Ox-eye Green, near Chelmsford.”37 Several lord lieutenants 
commanding elements of the late seventeenth century militia may have been 
disinterested in military affairs, one such in the West being Charles Seymour, Duke of 
Somerset. Under the governance of men like this the efficiency and practice of the 
militia probably deteriorated, but such a charge cannot be made against Albemarle. 
When he became a joint lord lieutenant of Devonshire in 1675, one of the first things 
he did was to instigate a report upon the county militia.  He then undertook a series of 
reforms which apparently did not occasion the improvement he sought. On 23 April 
1681, he circulated a letter to his deputy lieutenants: 
GENTLEMEN – I have received yours of the 15th from Exeter 
at your last meeting there and I am sorry to heare that the 
militia is in noe better posture and that you make noe greater 
appearance at your general meetings, which I desire may be 
amended for the future, as a matter very conducing to his 
Maties Service, especially in these times when loyall men 
ought frequently to meet and joyne together to disappoint the 
wicked designs of rebellious and seditious people for the 
preservation of the peace of the government as it is established 
in Church and State by Law, Whereby and by noe other rule 
his Matie intends to governe according to his late most 
gracious declaration.  I need say noe more to persons so loyall 
and well affected to his Maties service only to desire you 
according to your wonted care & zeale to meet as often as you 
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may till you have settled the militia in such a good posture as 
it ought to be, & therein you shall be sure to have the best 
assistance that I can give you, expecting to heare constantly 
from you of your proceedings therein, So wishin you all good 
success & happiness, I rest, Gentlemen, Your most assured 
and affectionate friend to Serve you.38 
 
The above quotation is useful in providing an insight into Albermarle’s feelings at 
the time and it gives a clear idea of what he was insisting should happen. He leaves 
the recipients, Sir Coplestone Bampfield, Sir Henry Ackland,  Sir Thomas Carew and 
the remaining deputy lieutenants at Exeter in no doubt as to his thoughts regarding 
their current performance and what he wanted done about it. Earlier requests for 
reform via his county office might have not been implemented with alacrity or 
diligence but this letter was directly from the lord lieutenant of the county, a gartered 
Duke and personal friend of the king.  It would have been extremely unlikely that, in 
the strictly structured, hierarchical society of the day, his wishes would have been 
flouted, especially as he said he expected to hear reports of proceedings from his 
deputies frequently.  Given that he was a man who sought to attain standards 
acceptable to his father, there is little to suggest that the state of affairs reported upon 
in 1681 remained unchanged in 1685.    
However, the charge of laxity in the desire to train – and hence lose effectiveness 
– must also be seen in the context of government direction.  Instructions to the lord 
lieutenants were not always precise and were open to interpretation.  They could, 
indeed, be seen to have encouraged them to be less than diligent, especially if such 
diligence brought about increased spending.  When coupled with the very real 
apprehension of an effective, trained militia capable of becoming the cornerstone of 
an armed population with a recent history of rebellion, the unenthusiastic nature of 
government support is understandable.   
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However, evidence exists that many of the militia regiments were both 
proficient in their drill and well turned out. Thomas Dinely, accompanying the Duke 
of Beaufort’s Tour of Wales in 1684, recorded how the various Welsh militias 
paraded before the duke for inspection during his progress. Dinely makes 
complimentary comments on what he saw and, as the duke’s scribe, it is reasonable to 
suggest that he also recorded the duke’s opinion: 
…his Grace was met soon after by those of the county… and 
at a convenient place in the Road was their troop drawn up, 
their officers being in very noble equipage.  Advancing further 
towards Welshpool his Grace found the Foot likewise drawn 
up with all their officers at the head of them.39  
 
He also makes the following comments, county by county, regarding the 
performance of individual militias. 
Table 5.1.4:  The state of the Welsh county militias. 
Anglesea  Militia of Anglesea Horse and Foot well accodated … giving 
severall Vollies of shot. p.127. 
Brecknockshire  …well satisfied with the Good Order he found the Militia in 
both horse and foot. p.221. 
Caernarvonshire  Giving severall volleyes… p.101.  
Caermarthenshire  …some close volleys were made. p.245. 
Flintshire  …exercised in various figures … which they performed with 
great exactitude and their volleyes and fireings were second to 
none …his Grace extreamly well satisfied. p.93 
Montgomeryshire  …exercise and make several good volleys. The Horse in like 
manner performed their duty. p.75. 
Merionmethshire  …made severall good volleys and after his Grace to his 
satisfaction had seen both the horse and foot exercise. p.149  
Radnorshire   …a good volley being given. p.176. 
Pembrokeshire The County Troop also appeared near Pembroke on the shore 
making severall good and close fireings. p.269. 
Monmouthshire  Doublings, Countermarches, Wheelings variety of exercise and 
good and close fireings were made…the militia horse led then 
by Sir Charles Kemis gave severall volleys. p.370. 
 
Source: Thomas Dinely, The Account of the Progress of Henry, the First Duke of Beaufort Through 
Wales in 1684 (London, Blades, East & Blades, 1888), and Baker,C., Ed., The Beaufort 
Progress 1684 (London 1867). 
 
 
 191 
 
From these comments, the type of exercises performed by the militia becomes 
clear. Having the regiments and troops ‘drawn up’ meant that the men were capable 
of arraying in ranks and files, for which they would need to have understood their 
company structures, placings and degrees of dignity, as well as arranging 
organisational and administrative files.40  Being able to give several volleys meant 
that they could both fire their muskets safely and also reload proficiently according to 
their drill books. Moreover, to have fired ‘good’ or ‘close volleys’ meant that they 
were able to fire together, not an easy task with a matchlock weapon.41 Only the 
Pembrokeshire Militia were completely firelock armed.42  
To be able to undertake ‘fireings’ was evidence of the men’s drill and other 
abilities.  Firings were the four methods of shooting in battle: firing by rank 
maintaining, gaining and losing ground and by salvo wherein all the body fired at the 
same time. The first three were complicated drill manoeuvres which entailed 
musketeers stepping up to a stationary or mobile mark, firing, turning to their right 
and then marching to the rear of their block before returning to their respective places 
whilst reloading on the move.  It is a difficult process, prone to induce misfires or 
marching errors.  The fourth requires the body to double its files to the front and its 
ranks to kneel, stoop and harrow.  In order to undertake these firings, they would of 
necessity have been able to successfully perform other manoeuvres such as closings 
and openings, doublings, reducing and firing, all of which were specified in The 
Abridgement.  
Doubling files to the front or rear in order to halve ranks or change a body from 
open to close order were part of standard practice in arraying a body of troops in its 
fighting formation but countermarching and wheeling were refinements to drill and 
demand a lot more practice.  The foot of the Monmouthshire Militia might have been 
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staging a special show, performing their ‘Doublings, Countermarches, Wheelings, 
variety of exercise and good and close fireings’ but, no matter the circumstances, they 
demonstrated good training and even, perhaps, an expert level of effectiveness.  
It is also noticeable that not only the foot but also the horse of Montgomeryshire, 
Pembrokeshire and Monmouthshire are recorded as firing volleys.   The description 
did not mention dismounting, therefore it is reasonable to suggest that the ranks of 
troopers fired mounted using the old fashioned practice of the caracole, a procedure 
whereby, as the horses circled, pistols or carbines were fired from the saddle in 
rotation. All such tasks combined the complications of firing, manoeuvre and drill 
practised by the foot but, additionally, demanded more than competent horsemanship.  
It is small wonder that Beaufort was well satisfied, and Dinely reported that 
everybody was: 
… extreamly satisfied with the good Order in which his Grace 
found the Militia not onely of the Principality of Wales but 
this of the County of Monmouth commanded by Charles, The 
most illustrious and powerful Prince Henry Duke of Beaufort, 
Marquis and Earle of Worcester, Baron Herbert of Ragland, 
Chepstow and Gower, Lord President of Wales, Lord 
Lieutenant of the Counties of Gloucester, Hereford and 
Monmouth, of His Maties most Honble  Privy Council, Knight 
of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, etc…  Earl of 
Worcester etc. … 43 
 
Despite having little personal military experience Beaufort was accustomed to 
inspection parades and was impressed with the proficiency of the militia in Wales.  
The troops seen were in good order and could perform efficiently. The circumstances 
of a visit by a personage such as Beaufort may have meant that a certain degree of 
special effort was spent rehearsing the exercises for this inspection.  However, all the 
lord lieutenants were men of great importance, social standing and power and there is 
little to suggest that any inspection by any lord lieutenant would not have prompted a 
similar response.  If Beaufort conducted inspections in Gloucestershire and other 
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diligent lord lieutenants like Albemarle in Devon, and Pembroke in Wiltshire did the 
same, the overall picture of good standards of militia performance in those counties 
was most likely to be similar. Moreover Dinely’s noting of the weapon-handling skills 
of the various Welsh militias indicated that the militia met the contemporary 
requirement of skill level.44 It is also most unlikely that the Duke of Beaufort would 
have accepted lower standards and been satisfied with poor drill performances when 
he inspected the militia of any of his three English counties wherein he was lord 
lieutenant.  Although drill parades cannot approximate actual combat and nobody was 
under fire, it may be that the militia in general was better able to function in action 
than has hitherto been believed.   
 
5.2. OBEDIENCE. 
Militiamen might have had the discipline to execute orders required for proficiently 
performing in training and drills, but they also needed to obey their officers under the 
more stressful and distracting conditions of action. Examples of disciplined response 
in action will be discussed in chapter seven, however the memoirs of Adam Wheeler 
illustrate that military discipline could be strictly enforced by militia officers. When 
asked permission by members of his regiment to pillage the field after the rebels had 
run at Sedgemoor Wyndham’s command was ‘upon Paine of Death not a man of his 
Regimt should move from his post.’45  He refused to allow his men to join in the 
general looting, despite the example of the royal troops.   
Wyndham, with his threat of applying the death penalty, obviously regarded 
his powers of command as being regulated by military law as the unit was attached to 
a royal force. Despite punishment for military infringements being normally meted 
out by justices of the peace under civil law as mentioned earlier, officers could 
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impose fines, which included terms of imprisonment for non-payment.46  Clode 
describe this as ‘feeble punishment for the crime of desertion or neglect to attend 
military duty.’47  However, not all militia officers were slack when it came to 
discipline.  In his role as a colonel of the Somerset Militia, Colonel Sir Edward 
Phelips imposed strict and perhaps questionable discipline as ‘the severities used by 
him towards them, which were different from the carriage of all other who are in 
command’. 48  
 Although the most serious collapse of militia discipline occurred at Axminster 
amongst the Somerset Militia a separate, incident involving the Wiltshire Militia 
occurred in Bradford-on-Avon.  On 24 June, according to Adam Wheeler, the Red 
Regiment took fright during the night and appears to have bolted. It fled to 
Trowbridge where it rallied during the following morning.49  It was obviously a 
serious incident as Wadham Wyndham mentions that it occasioned his marching in 
the company of Colonel John Dean’s Regiment of Hampshire Militia from Bradford 
to Trowbridge.50  Wheeler makes no reference to the Wiltshire Militia Horse being 
with the Red Regiment but he does state that a few days later they were joined by the 
Blue Regiment as Pembroke gathered his forces.  It is likely that being a lone 
regiment of foot they were alarmed by tales that Monmouth’s whole army was nearby 
and ran.  This is not surprising if the men believed that they had been surprised at 
night by a force reputedly outnumbering them ten to one.51   
However, even this discreditable incident was not quite the blind panic 
identified by some critics.  The militiamen appear to have taken Colonel Wyndham’s 
carriage with them, which would have required its team of horses to be brought from 
their stables and harnessed – a somewhat time-consuming process.  Later, at 
Trowbridge, Wheeler took it upon himself to guard this carriage and, in a somewhat 
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theatrical gesture, ‘resolved to hazard my life by Ball or Sword, rather than loose any 
part thereof.’52 Equally, the flight did not preclude the officers’ night-necessaries from 
being packed and loaded intact – a most unlikely event during an undisciplined rout.  
The speed of flight must also have allowed for a wheeled vehicle to keep pace with 
the troops over rutted country roads in the dark.  This would have taken time and 
although there is little question that the Red Regiment took off in unseemly haste, 
there is no evidence to indicate a rout and wide dispersal.  Indeed, the regiment was 
sufficiently well-ordered to march out from Trowbridge to Frome on 26 June where, 
according to Wadham Wyndham it fought with 1,500 rebels, then arrested the 
constable and forced the locals to lay down their arms.53 Even those who fled at 
Bradford were not cowards. On 27 June the united county force returned to the Bath 
area for a rendezvous of the army and on 28 June, having once more left the company 
of the royal army, when it received an alarm that the enemy was near, it stood at 
Bratton Lane and prepared to face the foe. 54  
The discipline of the militia’s senior commanders should also be examined to 
see whether their ability to perform as expected or ordered encouraged or impeded the 
effectiveness of operations.  Clifton makes a general criticism of the militia’s actions 
and the associated deficiencies in the command abilities of the lord lieutenants during 
the 1685 campaign thus: ‘militia commanders displayed incompetence of nearly equal 
proportions’ and goes on to say, ‘with their commanders displaying incompetence… 
the low morale of the militia rank and file is not surprising’.55  He attacks Albemarle 
for lacking the genius of his father, but most of the evidence he cites relates to the 
Duke of Somerset whose poor decisions and repeated failures to act did display a 
lamentable lack of military understanding and which encouraged, on the wider scene, 
contemporary criticism of the militia. The Duke of Beaufort tried to undertake some 
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of the work for Somerset via the messenger communication system that the militia 
had established, but the latter displayed gross inefficiency in its use, as Beaufort 
complained: 
I had sooner sent back your messenger but I expected the 
return of mine, which I thought would have enabled me to be 
positive when I could march towards you, by acquainting me 
by what time the militia from the remote part of 
Gloucestershire could be up with me; but he not being come, I 
can only tell your Grace that so soon as they are come up, 
there being here at present only a few companies of the hither 
part of the country, I will march towards you; but I think in the 
meantime you would do well to send to Lord Churchill, who 
is on this side of Salisbury, to march towards you with the 
King’s forces he has with him; all yours as you tell me fled.  I 
shall expect to hear further from you as the enemy advances.56 
   
Although addressing a fellow lord lieutenant and not having the authority to 
do so, Beaufort is politely but firmly telling Somerset to remain where he is and 
advising him that he, Beaufort, would arrive at his location as soon as possible. He 
also implies criticism not only of Somerset’s silence but also his exaggeration on 
claiming all his forces had fled. 
Beaufort eventually gave up trying to oversee Somerset and refused either to 
send him men from the Gloucestershire Militia or to abandon Bristol in order to join 
him behind the walls of Bath.  He added: ‘I have to defend this place where you 
should be very welcome, if you think fit to come…’57 Churchill also refused to aid 
Somerset, suggesting he asked Albemarle.58 The eventual solution was for Feversham 
to instruct Somerset to march with all the men that he had under his command, except 
those garrisoning Bath, to join him at Bristol and in the meantime to destroy the 
bridge at Keynsham, where another sorry tale of Somerset’s inefficiency unfolded. 59  
Although breaking a medieval stone bridge would have been very difficult, it stood no 
chance of being done if no orders to do so were issued. The Earl of Pembroke seems 
to have been better disposed towards aiding Somerset and promised to send him men 
 197 
 
from the Wiltshire Militia – even going so far as to offer to go himself if 
circumstances permitted.60   
Apparently the king also lost faith in Somerset as, on 21 June, he ordered him 
to take all of his remaining militiamen to Bristol having left four companies in Bath, 
and repeated the order to destroy the both bridge at Keynsham and another at Bath.61  
Not only did Somerset leave the destruction of the Keynsham Bridge to Beaufort’s 
militia but that at Bath remained intact when Monmouth’s army arrived on 26 June.   
    Somerset appears to have been both ineffective and inefficient no matter the 
area of his responsibility and he needed frequent reminding by letter of things he was 
supposedly undertaking.  In September 1682 Sir Thomas Thynne had to remind him 
that he required documents to affirm the reinstatement of his dukedom and that he had 
not yet sent word as to where and how he wanted these delivered to him.62  Following 
the Rye House Plot, Sir Leoline Jenkins wrote to require him to instruct his militia 
officers to be alert to suspicious persons, and that he had been instructed by the king 
to convey to him the need to disarm dangerous persons – presumably setting out the 
expected action to be taken simply and clearly.63  Somerset seems to have passed the 
responsibility to his deputies, for it was they who replied.64  On another occasion the 
Treasury wrote to him about the need to collect large outstanding tax arrears in 
Yorkshire where he was also lord lieutenant: apparently he had not been diligent in 
implementing or overseeing tax collection.65  To cap it all, on 3 April 1684, he had 
had to be reminded by the king himself to attend court to receive his Garter, which 
had been awarded to him the previous January: he was given the deadline of 7 April 
to collect it.66  
Perhaps the Privy Council too was wary of Somerset. In February 1685, 
Sunderland wrote informing him that Charles II had suffered a fit and warning him to 
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issue the necessary orders to his deputy lieutenants and justices of the peace to 
prevent any possible disorders in the event of false reports of his death.67 Whether 
they did not trust him to do so without further prompting is not certain but in May 
1685 they wrote expressing concern that he not acted upon earlier instructions to 
account for seized arms:  
The Earl of Dartmouth, Master-General of the Ordnance, 
having by letter of 16 June last [1684] acquainted you with the 
King’s pleasure touching the arms seized and taken from 
dangerous and disaffected persons…and forasmuch as it does 
not appear to this office how those arms (mentioned in the 
enclosed list) seized in co. Somerset, under your grace’s 
command, were lodged and disposed of; we desire you will 
please that we may receive an account where and to whom the 
said arms were delivered, that care may be taken for bringing 
the same into his Majesty’s stores.68 
 
The officers of the Ordnance tried to prevent Somerset from obfuscating by 
supplying him with a full list of the arms sent in by his deputies, for which he was 
accountable.  It may be deduced that although the Somerset Militia was not in itself 
ineffective, its commander certainly was, despite having able men to assist him.  This 
is further corroborated by Sunderland’s practice of sending orders directly to Sir 
Edward Phelipps, thereby by-passing Somerset and the chain of command: 
The King…directs me to tell you he doubts you not but you 
and the rest of the deputy lieutenants and justices of the peace 
will take all possible care to preserve matters quiet in co. 
Somerset; in order to which he thinks it requisite that you 
should continue your meetings and secure such persons as you 
shall think dangerous. 
 
Remarkably, Sunderland makes no reference to Phelipps having to refer to his 
superior.  On 18 June, nine days later, Sunderland wrote to Somerset stating the king 
was sending Colonel Canon to assist him.  The next day, after receiving from Kirke a 
copy of a letter Somerset had written to Churchill bewailing the loss of his force and 
calling for Churchill to march to his aid with his royal troops, Sunderland again wrote 
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to inform Somerset that Feversham had been placed in overall command of all troops 
including the militia, thereby effectively relieving him of independent command.69  
This communication also placed the rest of the lord lieutenants and the senior 
royal officers in the region under Feversham’s command.  It was not accepted without 
comment.  Churchill complained to Clarendon of being superseded, ‘I see plainly that 
I am to have the trouble, and that the honour will be another’s’.70  Albemarle also 
became petulant in his wording of official reports: 
My Lord Churchill has not yet joyned me, and having noe 
order to attack the enemy without him would not attempt it;  
if it had been done when I first desired it, I believe the Rebels 
would have mett with some defeat before this time. 
  
Somerset did not protest.   
 It is likely that Lord Fitzharding welcomed this move.  He implied that the 
lack of Somerset’s leadership and presence was limiting the Somerset Militia’s will to 
fight: ‘If you were amongst us I could no doubt recover the credit of our forces; for at 
Wells when the alarm was, I know they would have fought like lion[s].’  Fitzharding 
was also unhappy with the way that the alleged failures of the militia were already 
being reported: ‘we are not beholding to the Gazet that trumpets the small acts of 
others and wholly omits what was of more consequence, our keeping Bath – they 
behaved themselves to a miracle.’71  The deputies in Bath were also unhappy with 
both the dispersed nature of the county forces and the absence of their leader from the 
field.  The other lord lieutenants in the southwest had held or ordered a rendezvous of 
their county forces, amassing their regiments and troops so as not to act in a 
piecemeal fashion.  The Somersetshire deputies exchanged increasingly acrimonious 
letters with Somerset requesting that he joined them or appointed somebody to take 
command, questioned his inactivity regarding destroying Keynsham Bridge, pressed 
him to allocate the county’s guns – which, apparently, he had not done – and likening 
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the situation to being tied by the leg.72  Churchill, however, possibly more wary of 
criticising a man of influence, lays the blame for the Somerset Militia’s failures at the 
door of the militiamen themselves and not at that of their commander. 
As soon as the danger of rebellion was passed, the king sent orders on 9 July 
to Somerset to dismiss his militias, both in Somerset and the East Riding of 
Yorkshire.73 By 15 July the duke was in correspondence with the county treasurer, 
John Stylman, with an application to use the money raised for the militia for other 
purposes.74  Perhaps it was Somerset’s frequent mismanagement and lack of personal 
and military discipline that exposed the Somerset Militia in particular, and the whole 
militia in general, to such criticism both in the late 1680s and in subsequent histories.  
Equally, Somerset’s letters, which exaggerated the peril of the situation and criticised 
his own men, may have contributed to James II’s decision to replace the militia with 
an enlarged royal army. 
Apart from the Duke of Somerset, the most senior leadership of the militia was 
effective as proven by Beaufort at Bristol, Albemarle at Axminster, Strangways at 
Bridport and Pembroke at Frome and Sedgemoor.  Napoleon may have argued, ‘There 
are no bad Regiments, there are only bad colonels’ but those militia colonels whose 
names are known were effective.75  Colonels Wyndham and Helyar were particularly 
good officers and despite his inexperience Francis Lutterell proved capable post 
Axminster.  Although Somerset’s mismanaged decisions were not overridden by his 
colonels they were certainly recognised and instigated protests. Junior officers too did 
their jobs.  Major Talbot commanded his troop with discipline at Keynsham and 
whilst Lieutenant Noys of the Wiltshire Militia may have been sick with fear at 
Lavington he still marched to war at the head of his company.76  Overall the militia 
officers performed as well as second line officers could be expected to perform, if not 
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better.  There is no reason to believe that despite a lack of military experience the 
leadership of the militia was significantly different from that of the royal army. 
 
5.3. CONCLUSION. 
Throughout the early 1680s in England and Wales, the militia attended regular 
musters and underwent training in order that they could march and carry out weapon 
drills effectively according to one of the drill manuals shared with the royal army.  
They drilled reasonably regularly and were practiced in the handling of their weapons. 
At various inspections both foot and horse showed a satisfactory level of military 
effectiveness in terms of drill and military manoeurvres and at times achieved 
excellence. In the field they showed themselves to be capable as support troops and 
maintained their military discipline apart from two serious breakdowns in 
extraordinary situations.   
The military effectiveness of those militiamen who had been trained and had 
seen several years of service albeit part time, seems not to have been in doubt in the 
eyes of their commanding officers. However, Colonel Edward Berkeley, Lord 
Fitzharding, remained wary of the newly raised men in his command when he wrote 
to his lord lieutenant:  ‘I find there is little trust in these new men’, singling out those 
who had just come in as replacements or recruits to his regiment then based at 
Bruton.77  Apprehension concerning the future behaviour of untrained, untried and 
unknown new men is not limited to James II’s Militia.   
The Duke of Somerset may have been an exception to the rule but the militia’s 
commanders were also effective with good decision making and incisive action.  
Similarly their senior officers usually acted promptly and displayed a degree of 
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military understanding and skill in most situations. As will be seen later, even in 
action they proved effective.    
The militia of 1685 were not troops in full time training, regularly undertaking 
drill and being subject to continual imposed discipline but, within the time constraints 
under which they operated they reached a level of proficiency acceptable to the 
authorities of the day. The militia was fit for service and available to undertake 
operations whenever called upon to do so.  Its training in marching, manoeuvring, and 
handling weapons may not have been up to the standard of those who trained on a 
daily basis, but it was effective and, ignoring the obvious failings of one lord 
lieutenant, so too was the men’s ability to obey orders in a disciplined fashion. 
Being fit for service in its abilities, its appearance and bearing must also be 
examined to see if it conformed to the period’s understanding of what soldiers looked 
like.    
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Chapter Six 
APPEARANCE AND BEARING 
‘… it was, and still is, heresy to hold that a man can 
be capable of doing a soldier’s work unless he is 
dressed like a cockatoo.’1     
 
The previous chapter indicated that the militia was a drilled body and able to perform 
on parade in a manner that was acceptable to men accustomed to reviewing troops, 
with several units showing themselves worthy of great praise.  Yet in order to be 
thought of as a proper military body by the people who saw them, the militia also 
needed to look like soldiers.  That the militia looked like a military force is evidenced 
by their being used as an example when Members of Parliament assembled on 23 
December 1680 to discuss The Petition against sitting at Oxford. Their appearance in 
arms and unifying field signs caused them to be likened to the militia: 
Those for the City of London came with a numerous Body of 
well arm'd Horse, having Ribbands in their Hats, with these 
Words woven in them, No Popery, No Slavery! And many 
others of the Members were attended in the like Manner, ... 
the Manner of their Assembling (says Mr. Echard) look'd 
more like the Rendezvous of a Country-Militia, than the 
regular Meeting of a Parliament.2 
 
Yet to evoke the gravitas of a military unit the militia not only had to be 
dressed in much the same way as the regulars, but also carry the same weapons, be 
furnished with the same equipment and display similar symbols including flags and 
drums.  The impact of appearance was more powerful in an age of limited travel and 
media both to local populations and to foreign invaders.  The visual image of royal 
troops during the reign of James II is well documented, so whether the militias of the 
southwest counties had a military appearance and bearing in order to appear 
equivalent to the royal army needs to be investigated.3 
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As we have seen the cost of furnishing the militia with arms, clothing and the 
accoutrements fell mostly upon the local communities so ordering of clothing and 
equipment was the task of the local constables under the direction of the high 
constable and deputy lieutenants.4 Contributors could provide their own coats as they 
could their equipment but more likely they paid to have them made up. Officers did 
acquire their own uniforms, Colonel Francis Lutterel’s whole apparel being ordered 
through his London tailor.5 Although there is no evidence of snapsacks actually being 
issued to militiamen, few men in the ranks would march without them for personal 
belongings and food.6 They were essential kit and being everyday items it is 
reasonable to suggest men brought their own.   
 
 
6.1. UNIFORM. 
 
To understand the methods of clothing issues to the militia in the 1680s requires an 
appreciation of earlier Elizabethan practice. In some counties, when coat money was 
extracted from militia contributors, the question of uniformity and its implementation 
was the responsibility of the lord lieutenants, commanding officers or whoever 
sponsored a regiment, be it nobility, clergy or corporation.  In 1543 the London 
Militia was issued with white smocks or shirts emblazoned front and back with a red 
cross and in 1545 the Privy Council allocated 4s each for coats to militia men 
mustered in Gloucestershire.7 The Gloucestershire magnate, Richard Whitgift, chose 
to uniform his troop of horse in tawny or blue, while the Duke of Suffolk dressed his 
men in red and yellow coats, caps and hose.8  This poorly-regulated situation 
continued into the immediate post-Restoration militia with the wearing of uniform 
still not nationally implemented. Clothing the militia was seen by the contributors as 
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an additional expense and no legislation or official promulgation of orders regarding 
its dress was issued.  
By 1666, however, the militia was becoming uniformed. Coleby remarks that 
there is mention of the Royal White Trained Bands of Hampshire in the Verney 
Memoirs, its name being derived from its coats which were made from undyed wool, 
whilst those in charge of the Andover Regiment purchased yellow coats for their 
militiamen.9  In 1668 when Charles Stewart, Duke of Richmond and of Lennox, 
temporarily acting as lord lieutenant of Kent, ordered that county’s militia to cease 
wearing armour and adopt knee-length coats, ‘as is the custom of soldiers’, he 
expected the cost, administration and implementation of the change to be borne by the 
contributors who were already providing the men, their pay and equipment. Indeed, 
Richmond instructed all captains to report any who failed to provide their men with 
the new red coats lined in black.10  ‘In 1685 we read of ‘red and yellow liveries’ and 
these seem to have been widely popular coat colours, perhaps because they were 
cheap dyes derived from madder and onion skins, although a full range of colours 
seems to have appeared, including purples and greens.11 Red or scarlet coats were 
popular with the militia across the country but were by no means universally 
adopted.12  There was sometimes a common county coat colour but it seems likely 
that regiments from different divisions of a county wore different colour coats despite 
the inherent difficulties and costs involved as seen earlier in Table 3.1.3.  Although 
there are references to various distinguishing coloured uniform coats there is no 
mention of shirts or breeches.  The cut of the coat and style of hat worn echoed that of 
civilian clothing of the period as did that of the royal army but there would have been 
savings in cloth by judicious cutting, minimal hemming, and skimping on buttons, 
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button-hole ribboning, or lacing. The militiaman’s other clothes followed the fashion 
for breeches, stockings and shoes. 
Illustration 6.1.1:  An officer, musketeer and pikeman of militia circa 1685.   
  
 
 
Source: Drawing by Neil Wright from evidence from James II’s Colour Book. 13 
 
To equip battalions several hundred strong some sort of group purchasing is 
likely to have taken place but the only evidence discovered suggests that ordering was 
undertaken on a small scale at parish constable level.  The constable was the civil 
officer who collected the militia money from his parish and spent it on those 
militiamen raised by his parish. For example from an unrecorded parish in 
Gloucestershire, Constable Aylbertsons (Albertson?) noted in his accounts for 1683, 
‘Paid Robert Punter for four blue cotes £3 5s. 0d’. 14 These were presumably finished 
articles whereas another entry states, ‘Paid James Arlyef for making four blue cotes 
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12s. 0d.’ As the tailor Arlyef (or perhaps Arless?) charged three shillings to make up 
each coat but unlike Punter he must have been supplied with the raw materials.  Other 
entries also record their costs. 
Table 6.1.1:  Entries from a list of Constable Aylbertsons’ of accounts, 1683. 
            Paid William Lysons gent for 9 yards of blue cloth £2.  11s.0d. 
4½ yards of blue clote     £1.  17s. 0d. 
12 doz of buttons              5s. 0d. 
12 yards of ribin               3s. 6d. 
 
Source: GRO. P354 CO 1/1.  Constable Joseph Aylbertsons’ Disbursements for the Armes, including 
lists of  persons providing arms, lists of cloth delivered to make soldiers’ coats and accounts for their  
manufacture, pay accounts for militia soldiers and 1684-86. 
 
No commercial tradesman would fail to make a profit out of his transactions 
so if the cost of a ready-made garment was 16s 3d and the usual rate for manufacture 
was 3s each, then the materials must have cost substantially less than 13s per coat.  
Unfortunately there is nothing to indicate the quality of the coats Constable 
Aylbertsons bought from Punter or if they were new or second hand, nor is there any 
note as to how many coats were made out of Lyson’s materials so further comparison 
becomes almost impossible.  
The naming of regiments by colours such as ‘the Blew Regiment’ is 
ambiguous; it could allude to either the coats the men wore or the flags they carried; 
or even both.  For example, during the civil wars the established pattern amongst the 
London Trained Bands was for regiments to assume names after the colour of their 
flags, as in the Red Regiment of the City Trained Bands or The White Regiment of 
the City of London Auxiliaries.  When there was no initial issue of uniform coats the 
troops wore their own clothing.  When reissues were necessary from a central 
purchasing source a colonel may have wished for the same coat colour but did not 
always receive it.  In December 1643 the Earl of Manchester received ‘Coates ready 
made 106...Scarlet coloured’ and ‘Coates providing for foote soldiers 200 Green and 
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100 Red in all 300’.15  However, civil war regiments did sometimes adopt names from 
their coats such as Samuel Jones’ Greencoats or Sir John Meyrick’s Greycoats.16  
Other coat colour combinations were more esoteric. 
Illustration 6.1.2:  A well-equipped and well-dressed militiaman.   
   
 
Drawing by Bob Marrion, based upon evidence drawn from James II’s Colour Book (See Chapter 9, 
p.347) and records of coat colours listed in the Egerton MSS. BL. Eg. 1626.Army. List of the Militia 
and of Lords Lieutenants in England and Wales 1697. 
 
With the post-Restoration militia, the situation becomes even more confusing 
as although regiments received issues of coats of the same colour, regimental titles 
were derived from its colonel’s name, its regimental muster point, its distinguishing 
colour, or sometimes a mixture of all three.17 For example, one Wiltshire militia 
regiment was known variously as Colonel Wyndham’s Regiment, the Salisbury 
Regiment and the Red Regiment, and despite having three titles the actual colour of 
flags or coats remains unrecorded.   
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Various constables’ accounts from Gloucestershire refer to blue coats being 
purchased or ordered to be made up but their ordering is not as specific as the 
commissioning documents that survive:  
 Appointment of Richard Hill as Lieutenant in the Red 
Regiment of Militia in the Forest Division of Gloucestershire. 
1694. 
Appointment of an ensign in a Company of the Green 
Regiment of Militia for service in Kingsgate Hundred. 1702. 
 Commission of Giles Nash as lieutenant in the White 
Regiment of Militia. 1715. 18 
 
Although these commissions are post 1685 William III improved and restored 
the militia, countering James II’s neglect, yet without radically changing its basic 
organisation. According to Brewer, ‘Britain’s military activity after the Glorious 
Revolution retained much of the pattern it had assumed before 1688… England 
continued to rely on the militia as a means of national defence’ and the use of colours 
as a means of projecting unit identity continued.19  During the Monmouth Rebellion, 
lacking the aristocratic colonels whose names they would otherwise have taken, the 
rebel regiments were identified by different colours.  They may have emulated the 
naming system of the local militia regiments which the ordinary recruits would have 
known, but it cannot be proved.  However, when these names were first adopted 
Monmouth’s four regiments had neither uniforms nor flags. A fifth regiment raised in 
Taunton and named the Blue Regiment were given the red-lined-purple coats which 
had been brought over from Holland, so the name probably referred to their flag.20   
Frustratingly, although whilst in that town all of the rebel regiments were presented 
with silk and taffeta flags there are no known descriptions of their general design or 
colour.21  Regrettably evidence to resolve the puzzle of names relating to coat, flag or 
both has been elusive despite the reference to the Royal White Trained Bands of 
Hampshire’s undyed wool coats.  
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The uniform for the militia may well have extended to issues of small clothes. 
During Monmouth’s 1680 visit to Exeter 1,000 men in linen waistcoats and breeches 
escorted him into the city.22  There is no evidence that they were militia but finding 
1,000 men to dress and act as body without recourse to the militia would have been 
very difficult.  This may have been so important an occasion that men were all 
volunteers and these items were manufactured by special order, but no record of their 
commissioning or delivery has survived.  However, as unarmed militiamen not 
wearing coats their presence could have been interpreted by contemporary political 
commentators as the county authorities’ attempt to show due deference to the king’s 
son without the least suspicion of promising him armed support. Indeed, ST, the 
otherwise unidentified author of a contemporary Monmouth biography of 1683, was 
at pains to point out that these men were harmless.23 
 In addition to coats, militiamen also needed other items of apparel.  As stated 
above no references to militiamen’s breeches appear in any accounts, and as all men 
needed to wear them it is supposed that the militia followed the established civil war 
practice of wearing their own.  This would have kept down costs.  The same may be 
said of their footwear and there were no regulations forbidding or dictating styles, 
‘boots and shoes being worn indiscriminately’.24 As he was discussing foot soldiers 
the writer does not mean riding boots but start-ups - half-shin, lace-up country boots, 
commonly worn in agricultural communities.  Hats would have been personal 
possessions too, usually wide-brimmed and made of a wool/felt blend, with an 
external hatband to adjust size.  These bands may have been issued in a regimental 
colour as became practice in the royal army of James II and alluded to for the militia 
in reference to the assembly on members of parliament on page 206.25   
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The militiamen of the Welsh counties were drawn by Thomas Dinely as he 
observed them during his master Beaufort’s 1685 inspection tour of Wales.26  His 
drawings are very small and must be to a degree representational, but nevertheless 
many of the men are depicted wearing breeches and short coats rather than the 
fashionable knee length coats of the royal army. His drawing of the Radnorshire 
Militia at Presteigne Church is in this vein. 27  Whilst depicting an officer in a 
Brandenburg (riding cassock) it also shows in the foreground several pikemen who 
appear to be wearing long coats, broad-brimmed hats and back & breast plates, 
together with waist scarves (sashes) and even decorative or distinguishing shoulder 
knots.  One figure sports a helmet with a flounce or plume at the back.28  
Unfortunately Dinely only states the county of origin of the militia units 
reviewed by Beaufort and does not specifically name them.  Perhaps this is because 
being sparsely populated each county only boasted one regiment of foot, but he does, 
upon occasion, note details of their clothing.29   
Table 6.1.2: The clothing of the county militia foot regiments in Wales in 1684. 
County  Foot Regiments            Horse Troops 
   Coats Lining    Stockings   Belts     Scarves     Coats  Lining 
Flintshire  Red Red        Red        Buff      White      not noted  
Brecknockshire Blue     not noted    Red        Buff      White        Buff 
Glamorganshire Purple  Red         Red        Buff      not noted   Purple  Red  
  
Source: Dinely, op.cit., pp. 92, 201,297. 
 
The 1684 manual advising county officials and militia officers on how to 
conform to the militia laws unfortunately contains no references to soldiers’ 
clothing.30  However, Aylbertsons’ meticulously noted disbursements alongside 
references to other clothing orders illustrate that the militia was indeed uniformed to a 
certain degree with coats of the same colour.31   Regimental uniformity of coat colour 
may not have been universal, but it was widespread.  If regularised uniforms appeared 
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in remote parts of Wales the likelihood is that uniformity was at least, if not more 
common in central and southern England.   
A reference to the Lancashire Militia in 1689, and a letter from the Earl of 
Macclesfield to his deputies in Herefordshire in 1691 informing them that other 
counties were clothing their militia and hoping they were doing the same, leads 
Western to surmise that uniformity was not really accomplished until the reign of 
William III.32  If the county militias were not universally uniformed then those 
counties clothing their militias for the first time in 1691 did so perhaps as part of a 
new reign initiative. However, neither the Lancashire clothing order nor the 
Herefordshire letter indicates if these were initial issues or replacements for worn and 
faded uniforms.  Although infrequently worn, it is reasonable to suggest that militia 
re-issues would have been necessary in William’s reign to replace militia coats 
distributed in the early years of the Restoration, some thirty years earlier. Royal 
troops received annual reissues. 
One suit of clothes shall be taken every year out of the off-
reckonings in the infantry, the first year one coat, 1 pr. 
Breeches, one cap or hat, two shirts, two Cravats, two pairs of 
stockings and two pairs of shoes, the second year one surtoute, 
one pair of breeches, one shirt, one Cravat, one pair of 
stockings, and one pair of shoes.33  
  
As militiamen did not wear their uniforms on a daily basis it is reasonable to 
suggest there were expectations that theirs would last a lot longer than those of royal 
soldiers.  Various writers hold that as the royal troops’ coats were replaced regimental 
tailors turned the old items into waistcoats.34 However, given the pecuniary system 
whereby near-proprietor colonels would with government blessing, ‘buy them where 
they like’ and the close social contact maintained by officers in both branches of the 
service and local government, it is possible that old coats were also sometimes sold to 
216 
 
the local militias.35  If this was the case the near-universal adoption of the red coat 
becomes easy to understand.   
Albeit piecemeal the introduction of uniform for the militia did not go 
unchallenged.  In Kent in 1668, deputy lieutenant Sir Roger Twysden’s refusal to 
promulgate the Earl of Richmond and Lennox’s instruction to adopt red coats cost 
him his office: he argued that legislation ‘provides for conduct money but no whit for 
coating the soldier’.  In his defence he cited that ‘coat and conduct money to have 
been of the first things layd hold on to make the late good Prince odious.’36  
It was not just the foot for whom central purchasing was undertaken.  Again 
Aylbertsons’ disbursements list payment to Guy Bellamy for ‘two boof coats’ at a 
cost of £2 10s 0d and a further £2 0s 0d to Widow Feddman, for a ‘buft cote’37  Made 
popular during the civil wars, by the 1680’s buff coats were old fashioned, stout, 
double-thickness leather coats worn by the cavalry. These expensive items could turn 
a sword cut if kept supple and were worn either under or over the regular woollen 
coats.38 During the 1640s Sir Samuel Luke paid £58 15s to equip his troop with buff 
coats. 39 Captain John Bird's troop was issued fifty three buff coats & fifty two pairs 
of gloves for £100 9s.40  Three troopers of Lt. Col. Thorpe’s troop each received buff 
coats costing 30s and this apparently remained the average price 40 years later.41 The 
constable appears to have secured a bargain from Bellamy whose name appears 
elsewhere in the lists as a supplier of various other items.  He may have been a 
general contractor who dealt in military equipment, whereas the widow’s coat might 
have been a better quality leftover from her late husband’s service in the civil wars 
and offered for purchase to the parish.  Being of hide they may have been branded as 
parish property as another entry appears to pay James Frost 10s 0d for additional work 
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in ‘marking to cotes’42 It is not known how many he marked, what system or emblem 
he employed nor what tool he employed to mark them, possibly a branding iron. 
 The only discovered extant examples of militia clothing are three cavalry 
buffcoats exhibited in the Rochester City Museum.43  They are of good quality buffalo 
hide, cut in the style of late seventeenth century civilian coats but with full 
overlapping skirts to protect the thighs when mounted and typical of cavalry issue.  
They have added and turned-back dark green velvet cuffs. Donated to the museum by 
Rochester Cathedral they are believed to have come from the troop of horse paid for 
by the clergy during 1684.  Armour believed to have belonged to the local militia foot 
is displayed on a manikin of a seated pikeman who is dressed in reproduction 
clothing.44  This pikeman, along with a central manikin representing a seated officer 
and another representing a musketeer with a musket and rest, form part of a curious 
tableau said to depict soldiers at the time of the Dutch Raid on Rochester in 1667. 
Illustration 6.1.3:  The pikeman and officer manikins in Rochester Museum. 
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The label for the display states that ‘The Dean and Chapter of Rochester 
Cathedral were required to supply a troop of six soldiers; the buff leather coats... 
swords and sword belt displayed here are the only surviving relics of their dress and 
equipment.’  It further states, that ‘although some of the equipment dates from the 
middle of the seventeenth century, the Cathedral’s archives reveal that the buff leather 
coats were renewed in 1684 at a cost of £15 2s 6d for six.’ 45 Regrettably the officer is 
in shoes rather than the more appropriate cavalry boots and the musketeer is fanciful 
as the coat is for a trooper not a foot soldier.  He also carries a late seventeenth 
century fowling piece and a reproduction rest, the use of which was discontinued 
during the early 1640s.  
Illustration 6.1.4:   The musketeer manikin in Rochester Museum. 
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Not all militia troopers could have afforded buffcoats and many would have 
turned out in the standard long coat of the period.  Whether the horse in general was 
uniformed remains uncertain but it is likely. If the foot acquired uniform coats then it 
is more than probable that the horse did likewise.  As the horse was often recruited 
from those who thought themselves socially superior, the desire to demonstrate 
collective identity through a common uniform must have been strong.  Both they and 
their contributors could often afford better equipment, including ‘lobster-tail’ helmets 
and back and breast plates which were manufactured in considerable numbers during 
the Interregnum and continued in production under Charles II.  Like the foot, troopers 
would have provided their own breeches and footwear although in their case this 
meant riding boots.  
Illustration 6.1.5.   A militia cavalryman.  
 
Source: Drawing by C.Famer based upon descriptions and drawings in James II’s Colour Book. 
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As noted previously militia officers provided their own uniforms.  Like their 
regular counterparts they were not bound by conventions, although fashion had a 
great influence upon what was worn and the style in which it was cut, made up and 
adapted.  Militia officers appear to have favoured as much gold or silver lacing as 
their rank, status and purse could warrant. In August 1681 the following bill was sent 
from William Franklyn, a tailor in Covent Garden to Francis Lutterell shortly after 
Lutterell’s appointment as a colonel in the Somerset Militia. 
Table 6.1.3: Taylor’s bill for clothing Colonel Francis Lutterell, 1681. 
Making a rich laced cloath suite 1l 18s. silk and galloone 5s. 
A pair of scarlet silk stockings with gold 1l 15s 
Buckles to the britches 3s 6d 
Silk to line the britches 10s 
Pockets and staying ape 3s 6d 
A sett of rich gold buttons  2l 14s 6d 
Rich gold brest buttons 4s 6d 
Fine drawing the suite  3s 6d 
2 ½ yards of superfine gray cloath 2l 12s 6d 
Buckram and canvas 1s 3d 
5 ½ yards of rich Florence satin to line the coate 4l 14s 
Scarlett plain ribbon 1l 5s 
4 yards rich gold and scarlet ribbon  6l 5s 
18 yards rich gold orar lace for coate and britches 18l 
Gold chaine to the suite  14s 9d 
Rich gold needle for the gloves  10l 5s 
A pair of gloves, making and facing 9s 
A scarlet fether 1l 8s 
Rich gold needle gold fring for a scarffe 35l 5S 
Silk for a scarffe and making it 18s. 
 
Source: Maxwell-Lyte, Sir H.C., A History of Dunster (London, St Catherine Press, 1909), p.204 -210. 
 
This was a very expensive uniform totalling £74 3s 0d. To this he would 
undoubtedly have added a silk shirt and lace-trimmed stock, a laced beaver hat, a 
breastplate, a quality sword with a decorated baldric and scabbard and a pair of tall 
leather riding boots and spurs; together with a new wig at £6 0s 0d, producing a bill of 
some £200.   
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Illustration 6.1.6:  A senior officer of militia. 
 
Source: Drawing by Bob Marrion from evidence in The history of the coronation of the most high, most 
mighty, and most excellent monarch, James II. by the grace of God, King of England... Their Majesties 
most splendid processions... ; the whole work illustrated with sculptures ; by His Majesties especial 
command by Francis Sandford Esq; Lancaster herald of arms. St John's College: Upper Library, 
Classmark: A.5.6. 
 
Officers below the rank of colonel would not have worn such expensive 
uniforms but they certainly would have reflected the wearer’s standing in the 
community and looked impressive to both the general population and their men.  They 
would have emulated royal officers, in particular copying the military style of having 
contrasting colours to the coat’s large cuffs, wearing a dramatic waist scarf, lacing the 
hat in a distinctive metal braid and sporting the ubiquitous plume, sometimes 
accompanied by a military field sign.46  The wealth of the country gentry could also 
ensure that among the junior ranks at least, the quality of dress surpassed that worn by 
their royal army counterparts.  
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Illustration 6.1.7:  A militia cavalry officer.   
 
Source: Drawing by Bob Marrion based upon records of coat colours in the Egerton MSS. BL. Eg.  
1626. Extract: LISTS of the Militia, with names of officers, in the several counties of. England and 
Wales, 1697; and of Lord Lieutenants of counties.. Paper; XVIIth  cent. Folio. From the Farnborough  
Fund. 
 
 
 
6.2. EQUIPMENT. 
Military accoutrements and weapons distinguished the soldier from the 
civilian and enabled him to wage war.  They included bandoliers or cartridge pouches, 
baldrics (sword belts worn over the shoulder) and various pieces of armour, together 
with horses-tack, holsters and slings.  The militia had need of them all if they were 
called out, as well as ammunition and provisions.  At the time of the Dutch incursion 
at Chatham, Pepys, safe in London, wrote:    
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[I had] a great deal of serious talk with my wife about the sad 
state we are in, and especially from the beating of drums this 
night for the train-bands upon pain of death, to appear in arms 
tomorrow morning, with bullet and powder and money to 
supply themselves with victuals for the fortnight... 47 
 
The most expensive piece of equipment, if it can be so termed, was the 
trooper’s horse.  If an assessed property-holder appeared in person and he owned one 
he would naturally ride his own beast and fulfil his obligation at no additional cost.  
However, if did not own one or he was loath to risk his own animal he would have to 
fund a horse by purchase or hire for himself or any man who substituted for him, even 
if the mount belonged to the man taking his place. If he knew of nowhere to secure a 
horse he could ask the parish constable to hire one at his expense and thus devolve the 
responsibility.  The average purchase price of a horse had returned to pre-civil wars 
rates of between £7 and £10.48  Finding and supplying a horse was not always easy as 
a tenant wrote to his landlord and local captain of militia:  
Sir, I am concerned my mans horse should meet with 
(illegible) mischief – whereby to be disabled performing every 
days duty in your troop, I have ordered him to procure as good 
a horse as he can … (illegible) the other be recovered I being 
uncapable of supplying him at present out of my owne stables, 
our Wiltshire Troops being likewise upon four … (illegible) 49  
 
Sick horses were the responsibility of their riders and blood-letting was a 
frequent cure-all.  At times it would appear that horses for the militia could have been 
acquired by other means: ‘Order to Henry Dawley, George Bridge and Richard Cobb  
esqs. and JPs and all bailiffs, constables and tithingmen to seize any horses above the 
value of £5 belonging to Anthony Brown and any other popish dissenters.’50  Dawley 
had been promoted to lieutenant colonel of the Fawley and Andover Regiment eight 
months previously.51  Whether seizure would be compensated is unclear. 
Additionally all troopers also required tack, the costs of which were similar if 
not slightly higher to those of 1643 as seen in Table 6.2.1 below. Stirrup leathers were 
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8d a pair, stirrups 6d a pair, cruppers 8d, breastplates 1s. 3d and a great bridle and bit 
3s.52  The New Model Contract Books indicate that saddles were not cheap, but 
having been mass-produced in the 1640s and 50s they sold at 16s 6d. Yet buyers still 
required a woollen under-blanket. Cheaper saddles were available in the form of those 
made for dragoon use during the civil wars, and these sold for 7s 10d.53  
Cavalrymen also had devices for keeping their firearms with them while 
riding.  Pistols were encased in pairs of leather holders slung and strapped across the 
horses’ necks while carbines were suspended by a dogclip and ring from a single wide 
crossbelt known as a sling and worn across one shoulder.   
Troopers were also furnished with protective armour.  This usually included 
an English tri-bar, lobster-tail helmet and a back and breast.54  Quality varied but they 
were both usually heavy, able to stop sword thrusts or cuts and even resistant to pistol 
shot. They were fairly common items as they had been mass produced during the civil 
wars and the Interregnum.  Militia cavalry officers may have worn bridle arms, steel 
vanbraces to enclose the lower left wrist and forearm which was otherwise often the 
target for enemy sword cuts.  
The defensive accoutrements for the pikemen of the foot included a helmet, a 
throat-protecting gorget, back and breast plates, and thigh and groin guards known as 
tassets, but it is unlikely that the militia had more than a helmet and breastplate: even 
among the royal troops wearing the full panoply was a thing of the past.  The Earl of 
Richmond and Lennox may have permitted his militiamen to cease wearing armour, 
but in practice it was still in use in 1699 by men who ‘still had confidence in “coats of 
armour”, flexible and otherwise, the fashion in head pieces being a skull cap or basin 
form.’55 These skull caps, sometimes called secrets, were worn under felt hats, 
affording the wearer undisclosed head protection. They were popular with those 
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cavalry troopers who had not been issued with the usual cavalry helmet or whose 
former old-fashioned helmets had been withdrawn.  Some musketeers wore them as 
their only defensive accoutrement. Royal infantrymen are known to have still been 
wearing secrets under their hats during the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745/6.56 
Furnishing a militiaman’s equipment was not cheap although prices were 
relatively stable. 
Table 6.2.1: Cost of items of equipment supplied to soldiers.  
 
Item   Cost   Date 
Pair of Holsters 2s  6d    1640s 
Horse        £7 10s 0d              1640s  & 1696 
Sword Girdle              1s 9d   1660 
1 lb musket powder  1s   1675 
1 lb powder   1s  4d   1684 
1 lbs bullet       £1   5s              1684 57 
 
 Source:  Firth, C.H., Cromwell’s Army (London: Methuen, 1902, 2nd Ed. London, 1912), p.73; Walton,  
C., History of the British Standing Army, 1660 – 1700 (London, Harrison & Sons, 1894), pp. 357, 808;  
GRO. P354 CO 1/1.; and Turton, A. ‘Collected Research concerning Military Matters of the 17th  
Century’ (unpublished), Basing House, Jan. 2008. W&SHC: G23/1/41 Item 8 An account concerning 
Thomas Naish and the supply of powder to the Militia; Item 9 An account for powder for  John Joyce 
Mayor of Sarum. 
 
 By the 1680s more controlled purchasing systems had all but eradicated early 
abuses in the supply of horses and tack.  The first cavalry militias of the Restoration 
had to suffer riding broken-down mounts furnished with old and rotting leatherwork.  
Henry Coker, an officer in the Warminster Troop of Militia during the mid 1660s, 
complained to the local deputy that ‘both horses and furniture are so extreme bad that 
an officer that ever saw anything of war or discipline may be ashamed to muster 
them; many of the horses have not come in.’58  However, this might be exaggeration, 
as from further reading of his reports, Coker sounds very much the retired regular 
officer for whom nothing was quite as good as when he was young.         
Excluding consumables, such as powder, once the capital outlay had been 
made there was little to find annually except funding for minor repairs and occasional 
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equipment replacement.  Apart from the muskets, which as we have seen were 
forbidden in general private ownership and were thus kept in parish stores, the 
equipment remained the property of the contributor or the parish, which was an asset, 
especially in the case of a horse.  
As with the coats there may have been a trade in army cast-offs or surplus 
equipment.  Ample supplies were available as indicated in a 1678 warrant for a 
regular regiment which relates, ‘…give the whole regiment every three years what 
they call the small armament Vizt. One Sword, one Bayonet, one Belt, one Cartridge 
Box with furniture and slings.’59  Weapons, metalwork and leatherwork may have 
become worn but they would certainly have remained serviceable after three years.  
The Robert Punter with whom Aylbertsons dealt may well have been a go-between 
for the constable and a regular colonel’s agent.60   
This expensive militia equipment whether publicly or privately owned was 
counted and recorded, continuing the practice of completing muster returns as in 
previous reigns.  Some equipment was deliberately marked to show ownership by 
parish or person, or to prevent the same item being recorded on different muster days 
as belonging to different people. Due to the geographic spread of muster locations and 
the need for a muster master to be at each of them they were often called on different 
days making borrowing of equipment feasible.  Such abuse, noted in the New Model 
Army and legislated against by the Articles of War, was taken just as seriously by the 
militia muster masters of James II.61  Public parish stores did much to eradicate the 
practice of borrowing to hide shortfalls in equipment.  Before the creation of parish 
stores there was no way of knowing whether men who appeared for musters had their 
own equipment or had borrowed it for the occasion.  The same accoutrement or 
weapon might have been listed three or four times as the property of different men.  
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Marking items by painting or branding made identification easier but locking them 
away in unit-specific stores under the supervision of the authorities was far more 
effective.62    
Turning to items furnished by Trophy Money, the militia seem to have been 
well supplied with drums, halberds and flags.  The Wiltshire Red Regiment had 
eleven drums for the eleven drummers, being two per company plus an additional 
musician in the colonel’s company who probably acted as the drum major although 
this rank is not stated.  Drummers were special, for their drums and their coats, (most 
probably heavily decorated with braided tape), were paid for out of Trophy Money.  
Three drum coats cost 10s and seven drum heads [skins] for the Salisbury City 
Company in 1674 cost 11s 8d.  Another entry states that Drummer Mallard’s hanger 
and his drum cost 2s 6.63   
The Wiltshire Red Regiment had ten sergeants, two per company, all of whom 
would have carried a halberd as their sign of rank.64  There is a curious entry in the 
Salisbury City financial records which lists a halberd being redeemed for two shillings 
– whether it was in pawn or had to be bought from a previous owner is unknown.65  
Each Wiltshire Red Regiment company also had an ensign whose duty it was to carry 
the company colour, which meant that trophy money had to buy five flags and staffs 
and finials, and supposedly five sets of decorative cords and tassels. 
 Military drums were large and were carried by men who held titular non-
commissioned officer rank not by boys, and the halberds were most probably the 
standard axe-headed pole arm of the civil wars. Very few descriptions of militia flags 
remain although what evidence there is suggests a colour-coded system similar to that 
established by the London Trained Bands before the civil wars as discussed 
previously.66  Accounts such as Wheeler’s and Wyndham’s, and descriptions of the 
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militia in the Egerton Manuscripts show that this was the case in the West; 
Gloucestershire had White, Green, Blue and Red Regiments, Hampshire had Yellow, 
Green, Blue, Grey, White and one other, whilst Wiltshire had a Red, a Blue, a Green 
and a Yellow Regiment.  Again whether this was due to their flag, coat colour or both 
is not certain.  
  Military vexillologist Lesley Prince has suggested that the ‘mystery flag’ in 
the National Army Museum, that has the appearance of a civil war colour and is blue  
with white piles wavy, belonged to one of the Militia companies of the 1680s.67 
Illustration 6.2.1:  The National Army Museum ‘mystery flag’. 
   
 
Source: Drawing by Dr. L Prince from the original in the National Army Museum, Chelsea, London..  
NAM. 1959-12-76- 1 Dept: UBM. Colour of an unidentified Infantry Regiment, nd. 
Associated with the English Civil War (1642-1649) and the Monmouth Rebellion (1685). 
 
The tradition of distinctive militia colours can be traced to Elizabethan units 
when elements of the militia were raised by the upper echelons of the clergy. In 1599 
Archbishop Richard Whitgift had his ‘Standards …crafted of silk, taffeta and damask.  
His arms had to be emblazoned with sufficient accuracy and style so these flags 
would not be confused with the standards of a private gentlemen’s they were to be 
wrought in oyle upon the silke to endure the weather…’68 
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Descriptions also exist for flags carried by the Oxford University Volunteers 
raised and maintained during the 1685 crisis to defend Oxford, particularly the 
colleges, should an army of dissenting rebels, bent upon the destruction of symbols of 
the Anglican establishment, descend upon the city.69 
Dinely notes several colours for both Foot and Horse, illustrated by several 
drawings with accompanying notes. 
Table 6.2.2:   Flags carried by the county militia regiments in Wales in 1684. 
County  Foot Colours  Horse Cornet  Fringes & Tassels 
Montgomeryshire  White   White with a scroll        Gold & Silver 
PRO REGE surmounted  
by a right arm in natural  
colours holding a red heart 
Merionethshire  St George in   Crimson with a scroll        Gold & silk 
canton upon      NEC TEMERE NEC 
1 Co. Red &      TIMIDE surmounted by 
3 Cos. Blue.    coronet from which emerges  
a bull’s head facing left 
Brecknockshire  Green       
Carmarthenshire St George in  Black          Gold & Silver 
   canton with fields 
   divided gyronny 
Cardiganshire  St George in  Colour unspecified but 
   canton, field  bearing crowned CR  
colour unspecified  royal cipher 
Pembrokeshire    Colour unspecified but      Gold & silk 
   bearing a scroll FOR 
   GOD AND THE KING 
Glamorganshire    Colour unspecified but 
      bearing a scroll ALTERA 
      SECURITAS surmounted 
      by a portcullis 
 
Source: Thomas Dinely, The Account of the Progress of Henry, the First Duke of Beaufort Through  
Wales in 1684 (London, Blades, East & Blades, 1888). 
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Illustration 6.2.2: Flags of the Militia Cavalry Regiments in Wales in 1684. 
                   
                        Merionethshire, Glamorganshire and Cardiganshire 
 
Source: Thomas Dinely, The Account of the Progress of Henry, the First Duke of Beaufort Through  
Wales in 1684 (London, Blades, East & Blades, 1888). 
 
Food supplies for the militia were the responsibility of the force commander 
who frequently devolved the problem to the householders upon whom the men were 
compulsorily billeted. As well as dispensing with the need to issue tents the practice 
also meant the county was not obliged to supply and transport cooking utensils and 
firewood. The militia horse was expected to find forage where it could. Senior militia 
officers had personal carriages for their campaign kit and regiments also had 
ammunition carts, but other equipment, especially for the rank and file, was minimal 
and personal including, perhaps, blankets.70  Some items might be loaded into the few 
ammunition carts or into a shared battalion wagon of the sort in which royal units 
carried their tents and medical kit, otherwise anything the men wanted, such as 
additional food, spare shirts, socks or horseshoes, had to be carried in their snapsacks.  
It is impossible to tell whether the militia was issued with axes, billhooks, spades or 
other tools. 
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6.3. WEAPONS. 
Weapons are the tools of the soldiers’ trade, and although the cavalry also carried 
pistols and carbines the three basic personal weapons of the militia were the musket, 
the pike and the sword.  Whilst the musket and the pike were the specific arms of two 
elements of the foot, the sword was a universal soldiers’ weapon. 
By 1662 each militia musketeer was required to carry a musket with a barrel 
measuring no less than three feet in length.71 The smooth-bore, muzzle-loading, 
blackpowder musket remained the same throughout the reigns of Charles II and James 
II although the technology of the firing mechanism began to change.  During the latter 
years of Charles II’s reign royal army regiments began converting from matchlock to 
flintlock or snaphaunce muskets.72  There are no records concerning militia units 
receiving snaphaunces and, given the rarity of these weapons in the royal army (newly 
raised units were equipping at a ratio of five to one) and the cost, it seems reasonable 
to suggest the militia was armed with matchlocks.73  The matchlock musket was the 
main weapon of the civil wars, and during the mid 1680s the matchlock was still the 
foot’s main missile weapon.  Most existing examples have no royal or militia 
provenance but are all about four feet long and weigh about twelve pounds.  Calibres, 
or barrel widths, vary from half to three-quarters of an inch and the weight of the 
musket balls fired varied from ten to sixteen to the pound.  Earlier muskets fired balls 
of about two ounces - eight bore, but on average those of the mid seventeenth century 
were between one and a quarter to one and a half ounces.  The muskets manufactured 
in England under the influence of the Dutch military system tended to be twelve 
bore.74  
Although reimbursement was available in some cases, ammunition for both 
muskets and pistols had to be supplied initially by the individual contributors.   
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And it is hereby further provided and enacted That at every 
Muster Training and Exercise every Musquetier shall bring 
with him halfe a pound of Powder and halfe a pound of 
Bullets, and every Musquetier that serves with a Match locke 
shall bring with him three yards of Match both which are to be 
found accordingly at the charge of such person or persons as 
provide the said Foote Soldier and Armes nd every Horseman 
is to bring with him a quarter of a pound of Powder and a 
quarter of a pound of Bullets at the charge of such person or 
persons as provide the said Horseman and Armes  who are 
hereby required to finde and beare the same upon paine of 
forfeiting Five shillings for every omission thereof…75 
 
Whether bullet moulds were issued or also provided by the contributors 
remains uncertain but consistency of ammunition would need to be addressed once 
the individual’s half or quarter pound of bullet had been expended.  Powder and ball 
could be provided from central or county depots after the initial self-supplied stocks 
were exhausted. The law and frequent arms searches had made the keeping of private 
arms a hazardous business consequently the need for individuals to keep bullet 
moulds in their homes would also have been be dramatically decreased.   In any event 
individuals intending to use their guns for shooting game would have little use for 12-
bore solid shot, multiple ‘birding shot’ was far more common.   
Some city authorities bought their own ammunition, introducing central 
purchasing so as to maintain standard bullet size and powder quality.  In the 1670s the 
Salisbury City Company had powder supplied by Thomas Naish and paid for by the 
mayor, John Joyce out of the Trophy Money. 
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Table 6.3.1: An account for powder from the Mayor of Salisbury’s office. 
  
 A note of Trophy Money paid by Mr Mayor / old debts  July 24: 71 
       l     s    d 
   39l powder at 11d     1 – 12 - 9  
38l powder at  9d     1 –   8 - 6  
August 13:74  16l powder at 11d     0 – 14 - 8  
Sept 12:  32l powder at 11d     1 –   9 - 4  
          3:  32l powder      1 –   9 - 4  
   More ½l powder  0 –   0 – 5½  
   Pd the porter   0 –   0 – 8 
       6 – 19 – 0½  
Source: W&SHC: G23/1/41. Item 7. 
 
Naish presented invoices for powder and ball between 1674 and 1685.  The 
men were obviously firing and so in all probability, militia musketeers, like their 
counterparts in the royal army, wore collars of powder bottles or cartridge bags, 
powder horns and an accompanying bullet bags.  This is also corroborated by 
purchases of these items by various parish constables for their militiamen.76  
 A militia pikeman was required to present himself at musters armed with an ash 
pike of some sixteen feet in length.  Tipped with a sharp, steel, leaf-shaped or needle 
point the pike was used to thrust into the body of an opponent.  It was principally an 
anti-cavalry weapon although it could still be used en masse to fight infantry. When 
pikes in a body are held in a threatening posture, the enemy sees a mass of sharp, 
steel, stabbing spikes pointed directly at him. It was usually enough to cause horses, 
already distressed by the sounds of gunfire and the smell of blood to veer away 
despite the urging of their riders.  In the militia the likelihood of a horse being trained 
well enough to charge home against pike would have been slim, the bright hedge of 
steel being sufficient to deter most cavalry attacks, especially if the muskets had 
caused casualties as the cavalry rode in. 
 What Shakespeare had called ‘the puissant pike’ may have required more 
physical robustness to handle but it was hardly demanding of great skill.  During the 
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Restoration its cheap cost and its relatively easier handling meant the weapon 
remained popular in the militia throughout the seventeenth century.   
Militia cavalrymen had to muster with a sword and a pair of pistols with 
barrels of no less than fourteen inches.77 New swords could be commissioned for five 
shillings each during the Restoration period. The militia trooper’s mortuary sword had 
the advantage of being slightly longer than the infantry’s tuck and was useful for both 
cutting and thrusting, and its guard gave better protection to the user’s hand. Officers 
and mounted gentlemen of higher social standing among the cavalry probably used 
their own swords or even heirlooms such as the longer, much more efficiently 
balanced and more expensive Pappenheimer – a German design of rapier carried by 
many of those who had seen service on the continent. Cheap swords were notoriously 
weighty, blade-heavy, clumsy and difficult to use.  The swords used by the horse 
could cut but their design did not approach the quality of the extremely effective light 
cavalry sabre of later eras, and they were not well suited for slicing down fleeing 
infantry. 
  Ideally batches of new weapons would have been purchased by the county 
lieutenancy or a senior militia officer but there is no evidence of this happening.  
Instead it would appear that county authorities generally followed the usual system of 
devolving the finding of appropriate arms to local parish constables with costs 
charged to the contributors.  A document from the constable of St. Briavels, by virtue 
of Warrant from deputy lieutenants Sir Duncombe Colchester, William Cooke and 
Robert Cotherington, to raise the Militia in the Forest of Dean in 1677 requires an un-
named parish constable ‘to collect together the horse, horsemen & armes, in like 
manner foote soldiers and armes to serve in his Majesties militia…as paid for by the 
assessment and levied among the inhabitants, and to bring them to the forementioned 
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lieutenants at the sign of the Bell in Gloucester’.78  Sent on 20 October 1677, this 
order gave the parish constables eleven days until 1 November to complete the task.  
In certain instances arms would have been easy to source from former serving 
militiamen: one civil officer mentions ‘as belonging to each person are: his musket 
sord belt and bandoleer (bondyliers) or his pike, sord belt and buufe coate’.79  
Elsewhere, an entry in the accounts of an unspecified Gloucestershire parish 
constable, states that Thomas Wintle was paid £1 10s 0d for a ‘musket and sord belt 
and bondylire’, which points to a possible second hand trade in equipment.80 
In most parishes the availability of new weapons and the money to pay for 
them would have been limited, and older weapons from ex-royal army sources would 
have made up the numbers.  It is to be wondered if a comment by John Martin, 
directed at the Lavington men of the Wiltshire Militia’s Devizes Regiment that ‘the 
[musket] locks being almost eat to pieces with rust’, was not a universal 
condemnation of militia weapons but rather evidence of one parish constable’s 
financially prudent, if unwise, purchases. 81  Alternatively some local contributors, 
many being militiamen themselves, might well have taken good care of their personal 
weapons held in the parish store, but neglected those allocated for general use.  
In major cities and towns such as Bath with its well-run public finances, the 
militia’s weapons were often well stored and cared for.   Bath Guildhall had been 
equipped as an armoury in the 1570s and in 1621 it was fitted with ‘racks to put the 
pikes on and pins to hang the armour on’.82  In 1638 John Gray was the Guildhall 
armourer in receipt of payments to maintain it which included ‘scouring the armour’ 
and ‘mending the faults in the armoury’.83 After the restoration, the Ditcher family 
inherited the role of resident keeper of the arms. In 1662, the armoury restocked its 
equipment with the purchase of 27 swords and scabbards, 12 pikes, 16 muskets, 16 
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sets of bandoliers, 27 belts and 37 pounds of powder. Then, just prior to the 
Monmouth Rebellion, another refurbishment was undertaken with the following 
expenditure: 
Table 6.3.2: Items drawn from the Bath Corporation payment accounts. 
  Paid Samuel Ditcher for mending a sword & Pyke                   1s  0d 
   Paid John Doulton for two Pikes heads which he pd for at the p.ton.    4s  0d 
   Paid Geo. Newman which he laid out for a Pykes head at Wells      1s  6d 
   Paid to a soldier Richard Short for mending his musket                        6d 
 
Source: BRO. The Chamberlain’s Rolls, Accounts rendered to the Corporation of the City of Bath. 
General Payments 1685-86 
 
John Ditcher was supervisor of leather on 27 September 1686 and he was still 
in post, possibly with increased duties, in 1690 when he was paid 5s for ‘cleansing 8 
swords and keeping them in repair for two years.’84   
Small parishes did not have this degree of civic support and those weapons 
recorded by Martin at Lavington may also have been brought out of the parish store at 
the time of the crisis to arm newly raised men and subsequently found to be in a sorry 
condition due to neglect. However, Martin does not say that these muskets were 
discarded because of their rusted firing mechanisms. Even damaged muskets could 
still be employed. Without a serpentine to grip the match or indeed a lock of any sort, 
a matchlock could still be used effectively by manual touch-firing – holding the lit 
match between finger and thumb and jabbing it into the primed pan. Despite Martin’s 
derisory comments there is no evidence that the condition of these particular weapons 
prevented the militiamen of Lavington from going on campaign or that anybody 
marched unarmed.  It may be that those whose muskets were unusable were re-
equipped with pikes but there is no record of such action.    
  Before the civil wars many corporations and parishes had owned weapons, but 
most of these were requisitioned by royal or parliamentarian forces during the 1640s.  
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However, there were stocks of guns remaining in private hands through the 1660s and 
1670s.  Such items were available for purchase by constables in small quantities from 
individuals anxious not to fall foul of the Game Act, and in larger numbers as part of 
the seizures of arms conducted by the militia themselves.85  Many privately owned 
guns would have been fowling pieces designed to fire birdshot rather than ball but 
were nevertheless seized before 1683.  However, there were sufficient numbers of 
military style muskets collected to help arm or re-arm those who seized them.   
His Majesty having received an account concerning the arms 
seized from dangerous and disaffected persons in Cornwall , 
would have you give order to your Deputy Lieutenants that 
such of them as are useful for arming the militia be deposited 
for that purpose in such place as you shall think most 
convenient and that the rest be sent to Pendennis and delivered 
to the Kepper of the Magazine there. 86 
 
 Similar letters went to other lord lieutenants. The frequent arms searches 
undertaken by the militia upon orders from the Secretary of State gave the opportunity 
for several lord lieutenants through the assizes to gather reports from their deputies 
and militia officers about the arms held in their counties.  Forbidden by Secretary 
Jenkins’ letter of 10 July 1683 from confiscating dress swords and fowling pieces, 
Gainsborough, lord lieutenant of Hampshire wrote reports which stated that many of 
the arms found were those purchased by contributors for arming the militia and stored 
by their owners for issue to the men when they were called to muster.87  Any 
repercussions from this flouting of the law by those connected with the militia is not 
recorded, however Gainsborough’s reports brought about another Council edict that 
these weapons too were to be collected along with any others suitable for the militia 
and stored somewhere centrally.  On 28 May 1683 Sunderland wrote to the Earl of 
Bridgwater, lord lieutenant of Buckinghamshire & Hertfordshire:    
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I have acquainted the king with your letter of the 23rd, desiring 
directions whether you may return to those who are assessed 
for the militia such arms as they are appointed to send.  His 
intention is that such arms as were seized and belonged to the 
militia should be kept for the use of the militia and should not 
be returned to the persons they were taken from, but be 
employed for arming the persons who appear on the trainings 
without arms by reason those who send them had their arms 
taken from them.88   
 
Similar letters were sent to other lord lieutenants.    
The locations of these stores and their security were local decisions: some 
weapons went to town or guild halls, as in Bath and Devizes, while others went to 
church towers where pikes could be accommodated.  In Hampshire those that did not 
go into local authority stores were sent to the Great Magazine at Portsmouth.89      
There was no problem of supply among the militia officers who purchased 
their own weaponry; Francis Lutterell laying out 1l 2s for a leading pike with a gold 
head, 1l 8s for a partisan, and 3l 7s for a gold sword.90 Militia foot officers might have 
carried a pistol of their own as, under the Game Act, gentlemen were permitted the 
possession of more discreet firearms for personal protection, but in military use 
pistols were essentially cavalry weapons for delivering close-range fire upon targets 
in order to weaken them before a melee, for fighting at close quarters, and for alarm 
signalling on patrol.  The flintlock pistol was adopted to make loading on horseback 
easier than its wheel-lock predecessor.  Pistols with lock inscriptions denoting they 
were issued during the reign of James II are very rare and most royal troopers carried 
the weapons of the previous reign, although the possibility exists that some older 
militia troopers might have retained a wheel-lock out of personal choice.91 Pistols 
varied in length according to the beliefs and styles of the gunsmith. By a royal order 
of 1630 pistol dimensions were set at eighteen inch barrels and twenty six inches 
overall but shorter versions evolved later in the century. 92 Pistols were issued in pairs 
239 
 
with holsters which were strapped over the pommel of the saddle.  Pistol bores varied 
too, with examples ranging up to 36 balls per pound weight, although the 24 bore was 
common.93  No references discovered indicate the militia cavalry had pistols issued 
centrally, although they do appear to have carried them along with carbines, all 
supposedly supplied by contributors. In March 1689 one contributor, keen to excuse 
his substitute for appearing without a helmet lists the accoutrements he provided in 
1685 thus: 
I have sent my man & horse to wait upon you with pistols, 
Carabin, sword and buff coat onely he hath never a pot nor 
doe I know where to have one of present till I have sent to 
London.  If after the discontinuance of the Militia for five 
yeares we have not everything in readiness at the first muster 
of horse you will do me the favour to excuse me that the next 
meeting every thing shall be compleat.  If I had known that a 
pot had been required I would have had one as well as other 
armes, but as I remember there was no such thing demanded 
in the Duke of Monmouth’s invasion wch was the last time I 
think of raysing the horse.94   
 
 Despite the advance in technology the pike was still regarded as the nobler 
weapon of the foot.  It cost substantially less than a musket so it is feasible that the 
number of pikemen in a company of militia would have been higher than that found in 
the royal army.  During the civil wars the ratio of musketeers to pikemen had 
gradually diminished.  Beginning at one musketeer to two pikemen it gradually 
evolved into two musketeers to one pikeman.95  Chandler maintains that by 1685 the 
ratio was generally five musketeers for each pikeman, and yet the numbers deduced 
from examining various sources relative to the royal battalions at Sedgemoor convey 
a different picture. 96 
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Table 6.3.3:  The strengths of the royal foot at the Battle of Sedgemoor, 1685. 
                      Companies   Musketeers     Pikemen    Grenadiers  Total 
The First Regiment of Foot Guards, 1st. Battalion    7 240           120 50 410 
The First Regiment of Foot Guards, 2nd. Battalion    6 240           120   0 360 
The Second Regiment of Foot Guards (Coldstreams)    6 200                  100 50 350 
The Royal Regiment of Foot (Dumbarton’s)                   5   86             68 50 204 
The Queen Dowager's Regiment (Kirke’s)                      5 136             64 50 250 
The Queen Consort's Regiment (Trelawney’s)                5 136             64 50 250 
Totals                     34       1,038           536           250       1,824 
 
Source: Scott, C.L., The Armies and Uniforms of the Monmouth Rebellion (Leigh-on-Sea, Partizan, 
(2008), p. 34.  
 
Table 6.3.3: above shows an average of just over two musketeers for every 
pikeman in the Guards and three to one in the line regiments.  It is unlikely that the 
numbers of musket-armed men in the militia would have varied much from this ratio.  
The document ‘A list of Trayned Band Soldiers within the City of New Sarum under 
the command of Captaine Richard David’ lists, ‘35 muskets 30 corseletts 37 
muskets’97 This statement also sounds like the tactical layout of the company with 
pikemen in the centre with sleeves of shot on either flank. As the New Sarum 
Company contained many of the wealthier urban tradesmen it is likely that their ratio 
of approximately seven musketeers to three pikeman might be higher than the rural 
parish-based units.   
As stated above, each cavalryman carried a sword as his primary weapon but 
the sword was also the symbol of the soldier.  During the civil wars Parliament 
commissioned vast numbers of cheap, unbalanced hacking broad or short swords, or 
tucks, with a rudimentary guard at a basic cost of 4s 6d. 98 Cavalry swords were more 
expensive at 7s 6d.99  It is likely that many of these weapons went into private hands 
after the wars and resurfaced as contributions to arming the militia.  Local constables 
were thus probably quite able to meet the militia demand for second-hand swords. 
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Table 6.3.4: The cost of weapons and equipment supplied to soldiers. 
 Item   Cost  Date 
Back, breast & pot   14s  6d  1640s 
Foot Sword      4s  6d  1640s  
Horse Sword      7s  6d  1640s 
Pike       3s  4d  1657 
Horse Sword      8s  1660 
Sword & belt    10s  1683 
Pistols & sword         £1 14s  1696 
Foot sword     5s  1696 
 
Source:  Firth, C.H., Cromwell’s Army (London: Methuen, 1902, 2nd Ed. London, 1912), p.73; Walton,  
C., History of the British Standing Army, 1660 – 1700 (London, Harrison & Sons, 1894), pp. 357, 808;  
GRO. P354 CO 1/1; and Turton, Collected Research. 
 
 
6.4. CONCLUSION. 
There is ample evidence to show that most militia units had a military 
appearance and bearing. Although probably having to wear their own civilian 
breeches and shirts the majority of the militia foot regiments, and probably most 
cavalry troops, had uniform regimental coats and whilst the style and cut may have 
varied there was an intention that the colour should not.  However, results from period 
dyes may have caused a problem and a somewhat varied appearance.  Many militia 
units also had uniformly coloured stockings, notably in Wales.  Although unable to 
compare with the Guards, as neither the county, the contributors nor the militia 
officers could afford or wished to incur comparable expenditure on their men’s 
clothing or equipment, militiamen dressed as soldiers and their senior officers would 
have been largely indistinguishable from those of the royal army.   
They carried similar weapons to those of the royal troops, including that 
universal symbol of the soldier, the sword, and although they likely lacked their share 
of flintlocks, the populations of the towns through which they paraded would 
probably not have noticed the difference.  The fact that they carried firearms and 
pikes would have underlined their special military status, and the crowds would also 
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have seen military style flags, ammunition carts and officers’ carriages akin to those 
of the royal army.   
The militias sounded military too.  There are no records of militia bands, and 
the introduction of the military fife was still some time in the future, but people would 
have heard the steady cadence of the drums and their distinctive calls which could 
summon, dismiss or cause the men to perform manoeuvres.  They would also hear the 
rhythmic rattle of the bottles on the bandoliers typical of any passing body of 
soldiers.100 The militia marched like most troops of the period with drums beating and 
colours flying.  
The Duke of Beaufort was impressed by militia displays in 1685 at which 
large numbers of men performed disciplined drills. During these martial 
demonstrations a slight lack of synchronisation of movements might have betrayed 
the fact that these were not full-time troops, but their overall appearance did not.  To 
those who saw them the militias conformed to the visually powerful image of soldiers 
with a military appearance and bearing which led people to regard them as an 
effective military body, encouraging an associated mystique and sense of awe. 
Having established that the militia was effective in appearing like soldiers and 
were armed like them too, the next chapter investigates if they could perform like 
them especially in a time of emergency.     
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Chapter Seven 
PERFORMANCE 
 
 ‘It is clear from the letters written by the commanders at the front to 
Sunderland that though they wished to attack they feared to move without 
direct orders from the King.’1 
 
Having established that the militia was fit for service it remains to see if it was   
effective in being able to perform its duties when required to do so.  It should be able 
to demonstrate mobility, the ability to engage in combat and the ability to reorganise.  
This involves being able to be at the right place within expected time limits and, once 
there, to achieve the objectives determined by the high command.  Having completed 
a task an effective military body should be able to react quickly to alternative orders, 
including returning to action if it had been fighting. This chapter examines evidence 
relating to the West Country militias’ performances – their ability to meet these 
requirements.   
 
7.1. MARCHING. 
 Seventeenth-century soldiers, whether mounted or not, marched everywhere, 
carrying most of their equipment. For the infantry moving meant walking. Cavalry 
troopers rode but it was no less a strenuous and demanding exercise, especially when 
feeding, watering and generally caring for their horses preceded any attention to 
personal comfort at the beginning and end of each day.  Troops were often 
accompanied by wagons carrying ammunition, barrels of powder and in the royal 
army some larger equipment such as tents or split-hazel hurdles for shelters. When 
units marched a train of carriages travelled with it.  The militia were never issued with 
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tents or shelters but its marches included the movement of wagons requisitioned by 
the lord lieutenants for the transport of supplies.   
 The accepted day’s march distance for a seventeenth-century army was 
approximately twelve miles per day.  Table 7.1.1 is an analysis of the marches made 
by the two forces prior to the battle of Naseby in 1645, some fifteen years before the 
Restoration. 
Table 7.1.1:  The marches of the armies before Naseby in 1645  
DATE  FACTION      DEPART       DESTINATION      MILES 
5 June  Royalist      Leicester       Market Harborough        15 
5 June  Parliamentarian    Oxford area      Marsh Gibeon          10 
6 June  Parliamentarian    Marsh Gibeon      Great Brickill    12 or 17* 
6/7 June Royalist      Market Harborough     Daventry             20 
7 June  Parliamentarian    Great Brickell          Sherington           10 
9 June  Parliamentarian    Sherington        Stony Stratford                8 
11 June Parliamentarian    Stony Stratford       Wootton           12 
12 June Parliamentarian    Wootton        Kislingbury            5 
11/12 June Royalist      Daventry        Market Harborough       20 
13 June Parliamentarian    Kislingbury       Guilsborough          10 
14 June Royalist      Market Harborough      Naseby                            4 
14 June Parliamentarian    Guilsborough        Naseby                            4 
 
Source:  Marix-Evans, M. et al. Naseby (Barnsley, Pen & Sword, 2002),pp. (Drawn from The Ogilvy 
Britannia 1666, and Sprigge).  
*The army marched by two different routes. 
 
 The average daily rate for these marches was thirteen and half miles per day.  
In a forced march when time was short, the foot, unencumbered by large wheeled 
transports, could achieve double this rate and horse even more.  However, senior 
officers had to ensure they did not exhaust their men and that their provisions could 
keep pace with them.2  The demands of campaign marching, the time of year, the 
condition of the roads and the loads to be carried had not changed in the forty years 
between the Naseby and Sedgemoor campaigns and the march record of the Salisbury 
Regiment of the Wiltshire Militia records the following daily distances during 1685. 
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Table 7.1.2:  The marches of Wyndham’s Regiment in 1685.   
 
DATE  DEPART  DESTINATION   MILES 
         Map Measured 
17 June Salisbury  Wilton              3 
18-20 June  Presumably provisioning & training at Wilton 
21 June Wilton   Market Lavington   18 
22 June Market Lavington  Chippenham    17 
23 June Chippenham  Bath     14 
24 June Bath   Bradford-on Avon     9  
25 June Bradford-on-Avon Trowbridge      4* 
26 June Trowbridge  Frome then Trowbridge  16  
27 June Trowbridge  Bath     13      
28 June Bath   Bradford-on-Avon then Bath     6 
29 June Bath   Frome     12 
30 June    Fighting at, then pacifying Frome & implementing the King’s Pardon 
  1 July Frome   Shepton Mallet   12 
  2 July Shepton Mallet Somerton, Sedgemoor then Charlton 23 
  3 July    There is no entry for 3 July, presumably resting with the army 
  4 July Charlton  Middlezoy    16 
  5 July    There is no entry for 5 July – some postings to Othery.  
  6 July  The regiment was involved in rounding up and guarding prisoners  
around Sedgemoor and Westonzoyland. 
  7 July Middlezoy  Glastonbury    12 
  8 July Glastonbury  Wells then Norton St Philip  25 
  9 July Norton St. Philip Devizes        15 
 
* A very hurried withdrawal. 
Italics indicate what the regiment did when it remained in one location  
Source: Drawn from Adam Wheeler’s ‘Iter Bellicosum: or a Perfect Relation of 
the…march…’(Camden Society, 1910), vol.18, pp.160-161. Reprinted Camden Miscellany Vol. 12.   
 
The table shows that during 22 days on campaign Wyndham’s Regiment of 
Militia covered approximately 212 miles at an average rate of nine and two thirds 
miles per day or, approximately, thirteen and a third miles per day in sixteen days 
marching. There were only two so-called rest days and their rate of march would have 
been slightly faster if the four-mile hasty retreat to Trowbridge is discounted.  The 
non-march days were spent undergoing training and rounding up rebels, not resting.  
Wheeler records some long marches for the period, notably 21 June and 22 June, as 
well as 2 July and 7 July.  They well exceed the expected daily distance. 
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Wadham Wyndham’s Journal gives different mileages which are slightly less 
and his dates and locations can also vary.  He notes the taking of Frome as 25 June 
whereas Wheeler’s realigned schedule puts it 30 June. Wyndham had no scale map, 
his distances were estimates, and it would appear that he either marched with a 
different regiment or undertook slightly different marches.  For example although 
Wheeler states that John Wyndham’s Red Regiment marched from Glastonbury to 
Sedgemoor and then back to Charlton, Wadham Wyndham notes a move directly 
from Glastonbury to Charlton.3  He estimates the march from Charlton to Middlezoy 
the next day as eight miles but on a scale map the distance is double that. Waylen 
notes the source for Wyndham as ‘Communicated by Wadham Wyndham Esq. to the 
late Mr. Hatcher the historian of Salisbury’ which makes the account third hand.4  
Wheeler’s account is a contemporary primary source for march details, and modern 
scale maps are more accurate than contemporary estimates of mileages. 
To compare these march distances with those of royal troops, Colonel Piercy 
Kirke’s Regiment of veteran royal soldiers, which had served for several years in 
Tangiers, left Hounslow Camp on 15 June and arrived in Chard on 21 June; a distance 
of about 130 miles in 6 days at an average speed of 20 miles per day.5 Given that 
Kirke’s was a march in extremis, then Wyndham’s militia average of 13, and on some 
days covering 23 or 25 miles, was a good effort for men unaccustomed to prolonged 
marching.  Albermarle’s Devon Militia managed the 18 miles from Exeter to Honiton 
in a day whilst Lutterell’s Somerset Militia undertook 17 miles from Crewkerne to 
Axminster in one day.  None of these militia marches are recorded as forced, and were 
accepted by Wheeler as normal campaign marches. 
An examination of Wyndham’s march to Sedgemoor and Marlborough’s 
famous march to the Danube provides a near- contemporary comparison between a 
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royal army and a militia campaign march.  Both Wyndham’s militiamen and 
Marlborough’s royal troops covered over 200 miles accompanied by ammunition 
carts and officers’ baggage vehicles, and both forces used major roads.  Wyndham’s, 
however did not march alongside a substantial river which considerably eased 
transport burdens.  Although the condition of the roads cannot be accurately assessed 
it should be borne in mind that Wyndham’s men spent the last four days of their 
march in torrential rain which must have slowed progress and sapped the men’s 
strength.  Although generally accepted as a prodigious achievement, Marlborough’s 
battalions did not undertake a forced march.  The March to the Danube took place 
only nineteen years after the Monmouth Rebellion and there is plenty of primary 
source evidence. Captain Robert Parker of the Royal Irish Regiment recalled: ‘We 
frequently marched three sometimes four days successively then halted a day… four 
leagues or four and a half each day’.6  A British league is approximately three miles, 
and with a daily march of four leagues it meant they covered twelve miles per day. 
Parker’s rate of three marching and one resting days, indicates coverage of 
approximately 36 miles every four days or an average of 9 miles per day overall 7  
 This march was regarded as a considerable feat, yet its average of nine miles per 
day is less than Wyndham’s Regiment’s nine and a half.   Nor did Marlborough’s men 
find it easy. Kit Davies, the so-called female dragoon because of military service 
disguised as a man, recalled ‘…long, tiresome marches which greatly harassed our 
Foot…’8 If Parker maintains the average daily march was four leagues, (twelve miles) 
Wyndham’s Regiment exceeded this nine times, equalled it twice, and doubled it on 
two occasions.  Marlborough’s Army departed Bedburg 19 May 1704 and arrived 
near Ulm 28 June 1704 having covered 250 miles in 40 days, an average of just over 
six miles per day, whereas Wyndham’s Regiment covered 212 miles in 22 days 
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averaging just over nine and a half miles per day.  A lot of Marlborough’s regiments 
had their kit in barges on the Danube but when Wyndham’s was encumbered by a 
train, as it was between 6 and 8 July when ordered to escort the Royal guns, it 
marched from Weston Zoyland to Devizes, some 54 miles, averaging fourteen miles a 
day.9  Examining the marches of the various militia units during 1685 makes it clear 
that the West Country militia could march effectively when called upon to do so. 
 
7.2.  TAKING PART IN A CAMPAIGN. 
The operational role of the militia was to take part in a defensive campaign against 
‘any Foreiner or Strangers with force to invade this Realme’10 This meant having to 
contain a hostile invasion force near to its landing point until the arrival of royal 
forces and, thereafter, to co-operate with them by securing strategic objectives or 
supporting field operations as a reserve.   The conduct of such a campaign was left to 
the judgment of the lord lieutenants and their individual interpretation of their 
instructions from the Secretary of the Privy Council, as influenced by local 
circumstances.  However the achievement of militia objectives to thwart rebellion or 
invasion can be identified according to specific campaign tasks, namely: resisting 
landings; containment by securing towns, ports, roads and bridges; securing lines of 
communications; preventing reinforcements reaching invaders or rebels; and 
suppressing sympathetic uprisings in potentially disaffected locations.   
 In the popular imagination guarding against invasion meant resisting a landing 
by hostile forces, conjuring up images of fighting on beaches.  For the militia to be 
successful in this task it was dependent upon the receipt of timely intelligence of such 
attacks being received in order to permit them to assemble and march to the specified 
invasion site in advance of any landing.  This had been possible at Falmouth in 1666 
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as de Ruyter made no secret of his intentions, and his progress down the Channel was 
well observed and alarms raised.11  Similarly, the Cornwall Militia’s rapid assembly 
and appearance at the quayside in Padstow was sufficient to deter a landing by pirates 
in 1692.12 Although rumour was rife in 1685 the Council did not despatch instructions 
to summon the militia to muster until 13 June, two days after Monmouth had landed 
and even then it failed to specify that they should assemble at the ports or man the 
south coast sea defences.13  In Exeter, Albemarle was the first lord lieutenant to hear 
of Monmouth’s arrival.  Whether by sagacious, pre-emptive action or by coincidence 
he had mustered the Devon Militia at Exeter on 11 June but was not alerted to the 
landing until a message sent at midnight from deputy searcher of customs, Samuel 
Dassul, arrived during the early hours of 12 June.14  Lack of intelligence rendered the 
militias too late to resist the landing.  Had Albemarle or Strangways gained 
foreknowledge of the invasion, a show of force on the shore would probably have 
deterred the landing force of just 82 men.     
However, the militias were not too late to contain the rebels by denying them 
access to major roads into the hinterland of Lyme Regis.  This was an important 
campaign objective when resisting an invasion or port-based insurrection, especially 
where holding bridges across rivers.  After the Battle of Bridport, the Dorset Militia 
operating in the Yeovil area hovered on Monmouth’s south-eastern flank, protecting 
the line of the upper River Parrett and screening the major south coast road.  After the 
incident at Axminster the Devon Militia denied the rebels the road to the west by 
holding Honiton and the line of the River Otter. They then spent the remainder of the 
campaign closing down Monmouth’s westward options – firstly by securing Taunton 
and the River Tone and then blockading the western approaches to Bridgwater.  
Pembroke, with the Wiltshire Militia and several battalions of the Hampshire Militia, 
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prevented the rebels from taking the major road east via Warminster and Devizes.  
The Somerset Militia held Bath, a major crossing of the River Avon.  Conversely, the 
failure to destroy Keynsham Bridge allowed the rebels to cross into Gloucestershire 
but subsequent bad weather caused them to retire back over the bridge to seek shelter 
in the town.  News of the presence of the Gloucestershire Militia in Bristol and the 
supposed proximity of the royal army on the northern bank deterred them from re-
crossing.  The Gloucestershire Militia also denied Monmouth the roads to Bristol and 
northwards to Gloucester thereby preventing a crossing of the River Severn and so 
into the Welsh Marches where another rising was planned to take place.   
  In any campaign rivers pose considerable barriers to movement, bridges 
being vital to an army’s wheeled transport and guns. The importance of bridges 
during the western rising was evident in the number of letters sent to the Duke of 
Somerset insisting he destroyed Keynsham Bridge, and the alacrity with which 
Pembroke’s Wiltshire Militia took possession of the bridge at Frome.  At Bridport, 
Strangways with the Dorset Militia, made the mistake of entrusting the town’s west 
bridge to a small detachment which proved to be no match for the number of rebels 
sent against it. Nevertheless, the regiment proved themselves more than able to defend 
the east bridge which, had it fallen, would have opened the rebels’ way to Dorchester.  
Illustration 7.2.1 shows the effective surrounding of Monmouth’s army.   
As a popular figure, Monmouth enjoyed good intelligence of the whereabouts 
of the various royal forces and, as an experienced soldier, he knew the quality of his 
men.  For this and perhaps others reasons he was unlikely to risk assaults upon 
concentrated or well fortified militia troops, as at Bath.15  Despite there being no 
discovered evidence of planned co-ordination, by denying him the options of major 
roads and bridges, the West Country militias forced Monmouth to abandon his 
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campaign objectives of advancing first on Bristol and thence to London and, 
subsequently, obliged him to retreat into the West. There they implemented the 
second stage of a successful containment campaign, in conjunction with the royal 
army, by slowly tightening the net around him. 
Illustration 7.2.1: Strategic positions of the county militias in July 1685.  
 
  
Source: Adapted from Scott, C.L., The Armies and Uniforms of the Monmouth Rebellion (Leigh-on-
Sea, Partizan, 2008).  
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Containment also entails denying the enemy strategic positions, shelter and 
supplies which necessitates securing towns and especially ports which would facilitate 
provisioning by sea by a foreign power.  Monmouth’s men were made welcome and 
readily supplied in Chard, Taunton and Bridgwater, all of which the lord lieutenant of 
Somerset failed to defend in sufficient force but, thereafter, their reception was 
increasingly muted as towns realised that as quickly as the rebels departed Churchill, 
Albemarle or one of Somerset’s colonels re-entered and re-established royal control.  
Royal army commanders were more ruthless than militia officers in demonstrating 
royal power: Pembroke merely imprisoned Richard Smith, constable of Frome, for 
declaring the town for Monmouth and attempting to raise men for him.16  On the other 
hand, Edward Dummer recorded that during Churchill’s march towards Bristol, 
‘Jarvice the Feltmaker’ was hanged ‘about a mile from Pensford, who dyes 
obstinately’.17 Equally, Kirke showed no hesitation in hanging rebel prisoners along 
the Bridgwater Road after the Battle of Sedgemoor.18 Colonel Wyndham soon learnt 
the ways of the royal army when ‘His honors Regimt Marched from Glastonbury 
(where six men were left hanging on the Signe-Post) to Wells’.19 This is corroborated 
by Wadham Wyndham: ‘Glastonbury, where we hanged on the White Hart sign post 
six of the rebels, one of them a lieutenant in Monmouth's army; and immediately 
stripped naked, in which posture they hung there till about 9 o'clock the next 
morning.’20 
Sometimes the militia were effective in dissuading towns from provisioning 
the rebels despite their arrival being imminent.  At Frome the Wiltshire Militia arrived 
before the rebel vanguard, attacked the rebellious townspeople and seized the bridge.  
They then entered and secured the town where they read the offer of pardon, arrested 
the constable for proclaiming Monmouth, disarmed the rebel sympathisers and 
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promised punishment for any who did not submit.  This had the desired effect. At 
Bridgwater although Somerset’s three hundred men fell back before Monmouth’s 
reoccupation of the town, the lesson of inevitable retribution had been inculcated into 
the population.  The writer of the Anonymous Account related the change in the 
rebels’ reception: ‘We came well back again to Bridgwater, and were received with 
wonted love’.21 When Monmouth attempted to fortify the town, ‘the townsmen 
disapproving it’, he desisted.22     
Perhaps influenced by the threat of foreign intervention and ever suspicious of 
the Dutch, the royal commanders were keen to prevent the rebels taking a major port.  
One of Monmouth’s prime targets was Bristol where significant numbers of dissenters 
could aid his cause.  If Bristol, the third city and second port in England, fell to him 
along with its wealth, Dutch arms and even troops could be imported and such a 
success could encourage other major cities to declare for him.  Its ships would also 
enable communication with other coastal towns, including those in Scotland where 
Argyle’s Rebellion was supposedly in progress, as well as up the Severn to Gloucester 
and beyond where more support was promised. Moreover Bristol’s warehouses could 
supply vast amounts of food and other goods.  Bristol was quickly occupied by the 
Gloucestershire Militia, effectively bolstering that city’s own seven hundred strong 
militia regiment.  Between them they defended the gates and walls, placed eminent 
dissenters regarded as pro-Monmouth troublemakers under house arrest and locked up 
numerous potential rebel sympathisers in their chapels by moving against them on a 
Sunday.  Beaufort even threatened to fire the city at the first sign of any insurrection, 
a gesture that achieved instant compliance from the influential merchant classes.23  As 
a result, Bristol would not offer the rebels a welcome nor access to its ships, harbours 
and wharfs.   
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The West’s next biggest port, Exeter, was secured by the Cornwall Militia 
whilst Albemarle also installed garrisons at Minehead and Lyme which were both 
active commercial ports in 1685. Within a week of being summoned the Sussex 
Militia reinforced the town and city militias of Poole, Lymington, Southampton and 
Portsmouth.  Supported by the navy in the English and Bristol channels, the West 
Country militias had effectively closed the ports to any potential rebel support from 
the sea.       
Armies need lines of communication connecting them to their supply bases 
and, sometimes, to their decision-making headquarters.24  The interruption of enemy 
supplies, reinforcements and instructions to front-line units is an important campaign 
goal, as is keeping open one’s own lines of communication.  As these often stretch 
back beyond the theatre of operations, maintaining their security is frequently a role 
for second line troops such as the militia.  Generals always try to keep a substantial 
friendly force between their supply depots and the enemy but, at one point in his 
campaign, Feversham made a mistake.  As part of the royal army was south of the 
rebels at Chard with Churchill, by assembling the remainder at Bath Feversham 
opened a corridor eastwards across southern England running through Westbury, 
Devizes, Newbury and Reading. Monmouth had the option to cut the royal lines of 
communication and strike at London.  Fortunately for Feversham such a move was 
forestalled by the Wiltshire and Hampshire Militias who marched to Westbury, whilst 
the Berkshire Militia stationed themselves at Reading with the Oxfordshire Militia in 
support.  The royal army’s communications were in imminent danger but they were 
secured by the militia, a debt that was never acknowledged. 
The rebels may have received potential succour from towns where they had 
been warmly received but the speed of the militia’s reoccupation ensured it was not 
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forthcoming.  Monmouth’s army may not have had lines of communication in the 
strict sense of the term, but whilst Churchill harried the rebels’ rear with his royal 
troops, Albemarle put the militia into Lyme, Taunton and Bridgwater and kept the 
major sources of rebel succour from the west under constant threat. Meanwhile 
Beaufort, Pembroke and Strangways did likewise to the north, east and south.  All the 
lord lieutenants in the field also kept their own communications secure: Albemarle to 
Exeter, Strangways to Dorchester, Pembroke to Salisbury, Beaufort to Bristol and 
even Somerset to Bath.25 As a result of these deployments the militia succeeded in 
accomplishing another of the strategic functions assigned to them – protecting 
friendly lines of communication and harrassing or severing those of the enemy.      
The prevention of significant numbers of recruits from joining the rebel army 
had a profound effect on the campaign.  All armies need men, especially in a rebellion 
that seeks to demonstrate its popular appeal.  As he had landed with a mere 82 men 
and initially rallied only a couple of thousand to his cause, recruitment was the 
lifeblood of Monmouth’s rebellion.  Preventing reinforcements from joining the rebel 
army in the field was therefore a crucial campaign task.  Regrettably for the royal 
cause Somerset failed in this task and allowed Monmouth to march through his county 
raising significant numbers along the way.  A fifth regiment of foot and two troops of 
horse were added to the rebel army’s strength in Taunton with sufficient additional 
recruits to add companies of approximately two hundred scythesmen to each of his 
five regiments in Bridgwater.26  
Other militias were far more successful.  The Gloucestershire and Bristol 
Militias kept potential recruits under guard in Bristol whilst the Somerset Militia did 
likewise in Bath.  The Gloucestershire Militia even arbitrarily moved potential 
trouble-makers or recruits. ‘Dissenters were sent prisoners from Bristol to Gloucester 
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till the rebellion was over. Sixty were sent in a vessel from Rownham, without a 
mittimus or having been taken before a justice of the peace.’27 
Upon hearing of Monmouth’s landing Strangway’s Dorset Militia threw a ring 
of outposts around Bridport to prevent men going to Lyme, and then performed the 
same function around Yeovil and across north Dorset.  Albemarle’s rapid march 
towards Axminster was a show of force to the villages of East Devon.  Pembroke and 
the Wiltshire Militia were successful in preventing a considerable body of Horse from 
the Warminster and Westbury region from reaching Monmouth at Norton St Philip as 
had been promised by a Mr. Adlam.28  Simply showing a presence was often enough - 
Captain Talbot’s Troop of the Wiltshire Militia Horse rode through the Chew Valley 
with Oglethorpe’s cavalry patrol as a demonstration of royal power.  Both the general 
pardon and the rain were effective agencies in sapping Monmouth’s numbers but the 
presence of militia soldiers was an important factor in preventing their replacement.  
Those who deserted Monmouth were soon arrested and ‘ … upon the whole fared 
worse than those who stood by their leader, as they speedily found themselves in the 
hands of the militia, who were widely spread over the country.’ 29 
 Preventing the insurrection from spreading was a major campaign concern and 
the militia was effective in the suppression of potential rebellion in their own counties 
and elsewhere.  The Gloucestershire Militia’s occupation of Bristol and the Wiltshire 
Militia’s strike at Frome, ‘where he [Pembroke] forced the Rebels to lay down their 
armes’, neatly nipped local risings in the bud and militia marches across the rest of 
their counties appear to have dashed rebel hopes of sympathetic insurrections.30  
Monmouth had great expectation of gathering recruits from Frome but the Wiltshire 
Militia’s response to the town’s early declaration for his cause was reported to the 
king by Pembroke.  It was later published in the London Gazette.  
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 Being informed that the rabble at Frome, headed by the 
constable, had put up in the market-place the traitorous 
declaration of Monmouth, he marched thither on Thursday, 
25th June last, with 160 horse, and mounted behind some of 
them thirty-six musketeers. Being arrived near the town, he 
heard great shouting and beating of drums, and was informed 
that between 2000 and 3000, upon the notice they had of his 
coming, were assembled from Warminster and Westbury, 
some with muskets, some with pistols, some with pikes, and 
others with scythes. Notwithstanding the small number the 
Earl of Pembroke had with him, he marched into the town at 
the head of his muskets, followed by the horse. The assembled 
multitude seemed at first very resolute ; and as the Earl came 
in at the gate, one fired at him, bidding the rest to fire, when 
his Lordship came to a particular spot ; but in a moment they 
all threw down their arms, and fled out at the other end of the 
town. Lord Pembroke, having caused the Declaration to be 
pulled down, made the constable write, with his own hand, an 
abhorrence of the same, and a declaration that Monmouth was 
a traitor, and put it up in the same place, and then committed 
him to prison.31 
 
The Wiltshire Militia’s success in Frome was in fact rather more difficult to 
achieve as will be discussed later but the outcome was hailed as a militia success and 
commemorated on a set of contemporary playing cards.  There is no known criticism 
of this event being depicted as a triumph nor the truth of what occurred disputed.  The 
militia’s effective performance appears to have been accepted as a normal state of 
affairs.  They were expected to beat disorganised rebels and they did so.   
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Illustration 7.2.1:  The Wiltshire Militia dispersing potential rebels in Frome. 
 
Source: Illustrated playing cards produced in 1685 to commemorate the defeat of the Monmouth and 
Argylle Rebellions;  Somerset County Museum. 
 
 After the Devon Militia marched out of Exeter any potential rising there was 
quickly quashed by the arrival of the Cornwall Militia.  The Sussex Militia effectively 
foiled attempts by Christopher Battiscombe, Monmouth’s principal agent, to incite 
Colonel Dove to raise Lymington whilst the Hampshire Militia did likewise to Sir 
Francis Rolle’s attempt in the east of the county.32 By these actions the militia 
restricted the area of unrest and rebellion to Somersetshire, the one county where the 
lord lieutenant happened to be a fickle and incapable man who whilst not disloyal, 
failed to take his responsibilities seriously and when he did act often revealed 
incompetence.33  His senior officers may have been wiser to disobey and conduct the 
campaign as they saw fit rather than follow his instructions – when he bothered to 
send any.   
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 In order to perform all these essential second line duties it was important that the 
militia were not thrown away in actions which would hasten their destruction.  The 
government were well aware that in order to be effective in the roles expected of them 
they had to be kept intact and more importantly alive.  Sunderland’s instructions to the 
lord lieutenants make this abundantly clear.  They were told they were trusted to do 
what they could but to ‘forbear to attempt anything against him, except upon great 
advantages…’34  Beaufort was told to send out troops ‘but at such as distance as to be 
out of danger and yet so as to give them trouble...’35.  Whilst even on campaign a 
strategic warning went out to Albemarle: ‘It being possible that the Duke of 
Monmouth may go westward, the King would have you keep yourself upon your 
guard’.36 Rather than the militia commanders, perhaps it was the council which was 
overly cautious.   
 Although it can be shown that the militias of the south west achieved their 
campaign objectives there remains the overriding question of would they fight, and if 
they did, would they do so successfully. 
 
7.3.  FIGHTING. 
Although regarded as part-time soldiers and therefore thought not as proficient or 
steady as the royal army, the county militias did not have a reputation for running 
from a fight or being incapable of fighting before 1685. Throughout the civil wars the 
militias had formed the nuclei of many active regiments, and the Red and the Blue 
Regiments of the London Trained Bands had proved themselves more than capable of 
standing under fire and fighting for hours on end at the First Battle of Newbury.  
Cromwell had used militia regiments within his armies at Preston, Colchester, Dunbar 
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and Worcester and never once did they fail him.  An official letter to Berkshire stated 
that the militia troops who had charged did good service at the battle of Worcester.37   
 When reformed in 1660, the concept of the militia fighting as part of the 
country’s field army was firmly entrenched. Of the Restoration Militia the Duke of 
Beaufort wrote that he found: ‘...all the gentlemen well inclined to do the King’s 
service, and the Militia is in very good order for Militia’.38 During the Dutch Wars 
they had given good service at Landguard Fort and in Essex during the raid on 
Rochester where they repulsed a raiding force.  
      ...the Dutch landed some men on Canvey Island in Essex, 
where they burned down barns and housed and killed some 
sheep to take on board for provisions. The local militia 
however, eventually drove them off.  The pause in the Dutch 
operation gave the Englishmen time to move the merchantmen 
higher up the river, above Gravesend, where the Dutch, 
uncertain of the state of the shore defences, decided it was too 
risky to press the attack.39 
 
 Moreover it seems that Albemarle despatched some of them to defend Upnor Fort 
across the Medway from Chatham, putting up ‘a stout resistance in which our Men 
showed infinite courage, with considerable loss to the enemy.’40 
 Although the Somerset Militia have a reputation for cowardice and reluctance to 
fight during the 1685 crisis, Colonel William Helyar wrote of his regiment ‘… Here is 
fighting every day and horse and foot (anywhere else but where an enemy is) are 
useless…  The way to restore our peace is to beat those who disturb it, and not to be 
afraid of those that may do it…’41   His men were obviously disgruntled and their 
morale was poor but they still fought.42  Helyar, however, was optimistic and regarded 
their fighting spirit as the source of their redemption. 
 Although second line troops during 1685 most of the western militias came close 
to action in battlefield support roles.  A troop of Wiltshire Horse guarded 
Oglethorpe’s escape route at Keynsham whilst their foot was in the rear at Norton St 
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Philip and Sedgemoor. The Green Regiment of the Hampshire Militia secured the 
bridges over the Parrett during Sedgemoor and was also at Norton St Philip where too 
the Somerset, Dorsetshire and Oxfordshire Militias were ‘drawn up and posted to the 
best advantage…’43   More Wiltshire Militia Foot and Horse had been in action at 
Frome whilst mounted Dorset and Devon militiamen were involved in small cavalry 
skirmishes between Lyme and Bridport and in the Chard area. A party of the Somerset 
Militia Horse were at Ashill and were involved in smaller clashes when patrols or 
probes met the rebels elsewhere.44 The horse from the Gloucestershire Militia was 
supposedly engaged near Bridgwater but no evidence has been found to substantiate 
this.45  We do know, however, that they were sent out. 
... it would be very much for his service if you would send out 
some of your militia horse under good officers to hinder the 
country from sending in provisions to the rebel…46 
 
 There were two major engagements of the militia during the crisis.  The first took 
place at Frome as mentioned above.  However, Pembroke did not have the encounter 
all his own way as the London Gazette suggests.  Wadham Wyndham gives more 
information: 
... This afternoon, the Earl of Pembroke with three troops of 
horse, viz. Colonel Penruddoeke's, Captain Willoughby's, and 
Captain Maskelyn's, and some of our regiment of foot being 
mounted behind some troopers, and others of the foot on small 
single horses, marched to Frome, where were gathered 
together near 1500 rebels armed with muskets, fowling pieces, 
prongs, &c. They maintained for some time the bridge, but at 
last were routed.47 
     This passage indicates that three troops of Wiltshire Militia, with some foot 
mounted for the march, sustained an attack for some time against a substantial number 
of rebel defenders.  Wyndham does not say how 180 troopers and perhaps 200 foot 
managed to rout an estimated 1,500 rebels.  The enemy number is probably a wild 
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exaggeration but the only way to prevail in this situation was to inflict more casualties 
in the fighting, have better morale and show a more determined fighting spirit.     
 The second major engagement was the Dorset Militia’s street battle in Bridport 
on Sunday 14 June. It is worth examining this event in depth and the events that 
preceded it. The first blood of the Rebellion had been shed on 12 June at an unknown 
location between Lyme Regis and Bridport when Major Manley with fifteen rebel 
troopers intent upon recruiting in Bridport, met a party of the Dorset Militia Horse 
supported by the constable’s watch.48 Wade describes the rebels involved as ‘officers 
and gentlemen that came over with the D.’ who were probably more experienced in 
military affairs than their opponents, whom they duly charged.49  Wade does not 
record numbers but says that, on first contact with one of the militia troops, the rebels 
killed two men and routed them.  However, this flight did not communicate itself to 
the rest of the militia present, or even to the watch, as Manley, finding the initial 
militia unit supported by a greater force, turned and retired to Lyme.50 Whether the 
fifteen rebels had engaged a leading section of one troop and the ‘greater force’ was 
the rest, another troop or some of the foot who had occupied Bridport, or even the 
watch, is unknown. But, despite an element having being overwhelmed, the rest of the 
militia stood firm. The absence of the exact location is frustrating as an examination 
of ground would be useful in understanding events – especially if Manley’s men could 
not see the supporting troops when they first attacked.  If lines of sight were obscured 
the militia horse would also have had no idea of the size of force they were 
encountering.  Wade reports this action as described to him by rebels who took part.  
They might have reported a militia rout when in fact what they had witnessed was 
very different.  A basic cavalry manoeuvre of the age was to charge into contact, 
melee briefly then retire quickly and rally. The party that did not retire would claim to 
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have routed their foes when what they had achieved was to force their enemy to retire 
first. At Lutzen in 1632 the Imperialist Horse under Piccolomini charged the Swedes 
seven times.51  Routs conjure up pictures of fleeing men being cut down amidst 
wrecked and looted baggage and care must be taken not to confuse the two events. 
Manley’s cavalry skirmish was followed up, on 14 June, by part of the rebel 
army attacking militia forces in the town of Bridport. Forde, Lord Grey, second in 
command of the rebel forces led the operation but was enjoined to take advice from 
Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Venner, whom Chandler calls a military man citing his 
experience as Cromwellian captain.52  Grey took 300 of the Red Regiment under 
Major Wade, 100 of the White under Captain Francis Goodenough and 40 cavalry.   
On approaching Bridport the vanguard, consisting of Lieutenant Mitchell with 
40 of the most experienced musketeers and Captain Thompson with another 100 
muskets, pushed ahead.  Covered by a thick mist which obscured vision and deadened 
sound, they surprised the militia sentries before securing and crossing the west bridge.  
Critics say the militia had neglected to set pickets or vedettes. This view was based 
upon Wade’s statement that: ‘They had no outguards at all but what we mett with just 
at the Town’s end…’53 Wade was not a military man and the small force Mitchell met 
was the militia outguard, stationed at an obstacle within the drillbook-prescribed 
distance from the militia mainguard.  The practice of setting vedettes and pickets in 
front of the outguard was a mid-eighteenth century development, possibly perfected 
by Marshal Saxe’s light cavalry, and it is inappropriate to expect it in the 1680s.54 
Wade thought that a scout should have been set further out to give earlier warning but 
the militia commander Colonel Thomas Strangways, obviously did not.  The west 
bridge was the correct outguard position in relation to the location of his camp to the 
east of the town.  Another site for such an outpost would have been atop a rise on the 
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Lyme road, a further half a mile away.  Strangways may have deemed this too far 
from the camp to be advisable or practical for an outguard.  
Unaware of the size of the attacking force the Militia outguard of about twelve 
men withdrew upon its mainguard and together they stood to face whatever appeared, 
as advocated by the drill manual.55   The rebels advanced towards the mainguard at 
the crossroads in the town centre and the forces exchanged a volley.  The militia are 
criticised for ‘enduring only one volley’, but a mainguard was composed of a 
lieutenant, together with a sergeant, a corporal, a drummer and 32 private sentinels.56 
Many of those present would have been pikemen so the mainguard, perhaps having 
some 20 musketeers, did not engage in a fire-fight with 140 rebel musketeers but quite 
properly fell back along the High Street to their main camp at the eastern bridge, and 
en route alerted a party of officers and volunteers billeted in The Bull Inn.    
Illustration  7.3.1:   Map of the area of the Battle of Bridport.57   
Source:  Hollick, C., ‘The Battle of Bridport, 1685’ in Journal of the Pike and Shot Society. 
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Mitchell’s men easily captured the west of the town, but the Dorset Militia 
seemingly had no intention of offering serious resistance at that stage, although some 
dismounted militia troopers apparently got involved in desultory skirmishing among 
the buildings in West Street.   Strangways did not leave an account of his intentions, 
but it seems he had decided to hold the east bridge in strength.58  Losing the west of 
the town did not matter provided he held the east bridge and protected his camp - 
which Illustration 7.3.3 shows he did by choosing his ground, fortifying it and 
obliging his adversary to advance into a firetrap. 
 The rebels gradually prevailed in the street skirmish with the dismounted militia 
horse, driving them back, securing their untethered horses and advancing up the High 
Street. Rebel Lieutenants Lillingstone and Brinscombe took small detachments along 
the north and south roads either side of the main crossroads to provide flank cover 
while Venner pressed on to the east bridge beyond which were the meadows in which 
lay the militia camp and stores. 
Lieutenant Ascue and a small rearguard of a stand of pikes plus two or three 
files of musketeers, about 30 men, held the rebel exit route over the west bridge whilst 
Venner advanced in two parties: one to attack the east bridge frontally and the other to 
act as a second wave with Grey’s Horse in support.59  As the second body of rebels 
passed the main crossroads, several militia officers quartered in The Bull Inn and few 
troopers in adjoining houses opened fire with pistols and carbines from the windows 
of their billets.  They halted the rebel advance.  
Wade joined his commander and ordered the breaking in of the doors, 
following which the rebels overwhelmed and captured the occupants. Several 
defenders fled, one hid in the attic while another got out the back door and hid in a 
bean field.  However, another man, Edward Coker, came out from one of these 
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buildings and shot Venner in the waist but fell dead to Venner’s return of fire.60 Yet 
another man, Wadham Strangways, was shot by a rebel musketeer as he tried to pistol 
rebel Captain Goodenough and take his horse. Both dead men were deputy lieutenants 
of Dorset, and Strangways was related to Colonel Thomas Strangways, another 
deputy, who commanded the Dorset Militia in the absence of the lord lieutenant. 61 
 Thomas Strangways, although colonel of the Bridport Regiment, is not 
mentioned as taking a leading role in the fighting and it could be that as a newly 
appointed king’s emissary placed in temporary overall command of all the county’s 
forces and recently arrived from London, he may have had the sense to leave the 
action to a more experienced officer, Colonel Thomas Erle, who as well as being 
colonel of the Blandford Regiment of Dorset Militia was a major in the royal army. It 
appears that Erle, having earlier been in Blandford, arrived in time for the fight and 
may have brought some of his men with him.  
The militia force numbered around 1,200 and whilst the cavalry stood in their 
usual support role, the muskets manned the defences.  The east bridge was barricaded 
and well defended by muskets perhaps performing the eight or six rank firings 
advocated by contemporary drill books. Whoever set the deployment also placed men 
in the buildings lining the street as it approached the barricade. This was a skilfully 
managed plan of defence which obliged the attackers to advance into a constricted 
place where they would be subjected to close range crossfire.  This they duly did in 
some disorder, due in no small part to the way the road narrows as it approaches the 
bridge.62  Had the rebels been advancing down East Street in an ordered line they 
would have been gradually forced to edge left as the gap between the houses 
narrowed by about thirty percent, causing ranks to bunch and order to be lost. 
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Illustration 7.3.2: East Street as it approaches the bridge.   
The narrowing of the thoroughfare can be clearly seen. 
 
 
Source: Author’s collection 
If such bunching occurred then it is more than likely that the rebels would 
have arrived before the barricade in disorder with restricted room to perform their 
firings.  Illustration 7.3.3 shows how the Militia defenders were able to bring more 
fire to bear from the barricade, the riverbank and the surrounding houses than could 
the rebels at the entrance to the main street.   
Illustration 7.3.3: Diagram map of the fight at Bridport’s East Bridge.  
 
    Source: Author’s drawing after site visit. Not to scale. North is to the right. 
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Illustration 7.3.4: The East Bridge area at Bridport Today.  
Taken from the site of the militia line near the river. The bridge (far left)  is wide 
enough for ten files of musketeers while a further forty files had a line of sight 
within arc  
 
 
Source: Author’s collection 
With Venner wounded, Wade led the attack followed by Grey’s Horse. 
Mitchell’s musketeers gave the barricade a volley which shook the militia defenders, 
but their ‘officers had with much adoe prevailed upon theyre souldiers to stand’, 
maintain their line, and return fire.63 Grey pushed the rebel cavalry through its foot 
and tried to advance upon the barricade but another volley from the militiamen killed 
two of Mitchell’s infantry and caused them to shrink backwards.  Some fled, upon 
which the mounted force broke and bolted for Lyme.  The discouraged rebels wavered 
but Wade steadied them by bringing up his second body.  However, before the 
reinforcements could make any difference Venner ordered a retreat, then rode off to 
Lyme himself.  Wade extracted the force in good order, bringing in the two flank 
guards and performing a fighting retreat, first back up East Street and then down West 
Street.64  The militia left their barricade and firing sporadically advanced to retake the 
ground they had earlier abandoned, including the crossroads and the western part of 
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the town. Edward Dummer, who was not present but was with the Royal Trayne of 
Artillery, claims that the Dorset Militia, ‘charg’d the Rebells, kill’d 7 of them and 
took 23 prisoners; the rest retiring in disorder to Lyme’.65 The retreating rebels made a 
stand at the west bridge and set up ‘an ambuscade of musketeers … near the bridge to 
give them good entertainment’.  Wade states that the Dorset militiamen would not 
come on, preferring to shout abuse and take the odd random shot from the safety of 
the middle of the town.66  
Chandler says ‘the affair at Bridport petered out’. He also claims ‘a fair 
number of red-coated militiamen also deserted to join the cause’, but provides no 
evidence for either assertion. 67 Macaulay styles it, ‘A confused and indecisive action 
… such as was to be expected when two bands of ploughmen, officered by country 
gentlemen and barristers, were opposed to each other.’68 Clifton describes the 
engagement in a brief paragraph, relegating it to a minor skirmish.69 These 
descriptions are surprising given that Venner and Wade planned and executed a 
daring action and Strangways and Erle defended their position well.70  It is also 
curious that the performance of the Dorset Militia at Bridport is dismissed lightly 
particularly considering Erle’s later military career (see Appendix 3, page 365).   
The image of the Dorset Militia fighting adequately at Bridport did not sit 
comfortably with the pattern of universal denigration that was apparently already 
being organised in London. Six days after the engagement on 20 June, Sunderland 
told Lord Abingdon that Churchill had arrived at Bridport with nine companies of 
regular foot, thus implying that the town was now safe and reliance upon the militia 
was at an end.71  However, Churchill and his cavalry had reached Bridport on 17 June, 
three days after the engagement. The royal infantry en route were Kirke’s five 
companies which were no further than Chard on 21 June.  Belittling the militia’s 
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efforts, Sunderland implied that the engagement at Bridport would have been a very 
different affair had royal companies been present. Undoubtedly it would have been as 
in action second line troops cannot be compared to front line units.  However, no 
royal foot could have been at Bridport in time and there is certainly no mention of 
them being present in the letter Colonel Strangways sent to Colonel William Helyar 
on 17 June. 72   
 It is however not the success at Bridport but the failure at Axminster on 15 
June that features more prominently in accounts of the militia’s performance during 
the Monmouth Rebellion. Therefore, that too is worthy of closer examination.  On 
Monday 15 June 1685 three forces converged on the small town of Axminster.  To the 
modern tactician it would appear that the Devon and Somersetshire Militias had 
caught Monmouth’s Army in a two pronged manoeuvre and being of superior strength 
and possibly of better quality, should have successfully performed a pincer attack and 
won a victory. However, the two militia forces not only left the rebels unmolested but 
withdrew, leaving them in possession of both the town and the road to Taunton.   
Macaulay says that both militia forces refused to fight, ran away, and substantial 
numbers of them deserted or went over to the rebels.73  James II used this incident as 
an example of the militia’s inability to fight and to perform in the field and by 
extension it became a major fulcrum to decry the ineffectiveness and loyalty of the 
militia in general. The king’s attitude was echoed by his contemporary political 
supporters and also by subsequent historians, some of whom also accuse the Devon 
Militia of succumbing to a panic-stricken flight.74   
Albemarle, who commanded the Devon Militia at Axminster, was a courtier 
by disposition rather than a soldier, but as mentioned earlier he was from a West 
Country family and he was a high-ranking peer whose father had been Commander in 
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Chief of the Army and the author of a book on how to engage in war.75 Although 
Captain and Colonel of His Majesty’s Troop of Horse Guards which effectively made 
him Commander in Chief of the royal army, Albemarle was without military 
experience and held a titular, honorific appointment.  Rather than riding with his royal 
regiment Albemarle exercised his right to field command of the Devon Militia force 
and was respected and trusted by his men.  The Duke of Somerset, the lord lieutenant 
of Somerset, was not at Axminster but at Bath and had given command to local 
regiment commanders of the Somerset Militia rather than concentrating his force.  
The two local commanding officers were Colonel Francis Lutterell and 
Colonel Sir Edward Phelipps who had both held rank as militia officers for some time.  
Lutterell had been commissioned as a colonel in 1681 despite his having little military 
experience but like many of the gentry, he appears to have managed his peacetime 
role adequately.76 Phelipps had been an officer of the militia since his gaining his 
lieutenancy in 1661.  He became a lieutenant colonel in 1666 and colonel in 1679, 
acquiring a reputation for severity both with his men and in his conduct during house 
searches and the disruption of conventicles.77  There was no question of excusing the 
militia’s conduct at Axminster by claiming that the men were serving under lenient or 
unfamiliar local officers.  By proposing an Axminster rendezvous, Albemarle was 
trying to gather all available local forces to bar Monmouth’s way in a defensive 
position and to offer battle in advantageous circumstances according to his orders, but 
the decision had its implications.  By rendezvousing in Axminster the men of 
Lutterells’ and Phelipps’ Regiments would cross the county line, and had they joined 
forces Albemarle would assume overall command by virtue of holding senior rank 
and the king’s orders that:  
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In the case of two or more Lieutenants shall be together, the 
Lieutenant who is in his own county shall command, and next 
under him such others as shall be there according to their 
qualities.78 
 
 The Militia was not usually expected to operate out of its home county.  During 
the civil wars, a cry of the Southern and Western Association Armies had been ‘Six 
pence a day and no foreign service!’ - by which they had meant no service outside 
their county. Moreover, there was also inter-county rivalry and enmity between the 
men of Somerset and Devon.79  Should the Somerset troops rendezvous with those 
from Devon at Axminster there was no doubt that they would effectively be 
transferred to the command of an unfamiliar senior officer.  Even before reaching the 
environs of Axminster the Somerset Militia may have been uneasy about this situation 
but they would have certainly been worried by the understanding that they were 
heading into combat.  Yet they persevered in their march to intercept the rebels.   
  Roberts states that Monmouth’s route from Lyme brought him to a high point 
above Hunter’s Lodge, just south of Axminster, from where he could see the Devon 
Militia on Shute Hill, about four miles west of Axminster, and the Somerset Militia 
about two hours march away on the Chard Road.80 Wade quickened the pace and his 
rebel vanguard entered the town, driving out the Somerset Militia cavalry scouts who 
subsequently reported these events to Lutterell.  Wade marched through the town and 
secured both approach roads by deploying his musketeers into hedgerows in fields 
either side of the narrow lanes.  When the rest of Monmouth’s force came up artillery 
was positioned within the lanes themselves.81 
 With Axminster in enemy hands the militia had the option to attack, but their 
two forces had failed to unite and only one communication seems to have been sent 
by Albemarle. Effective cooperation seemed impossible and so two uncoordinated 
attacks were the only option.  Both the Devon and the Somerset Militias still advanced 
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upon Axminster.  Clifton states that ‘Albemarle’s Devonshire men approached to 
within a few hundred yards but then withdrew’, adding that they ‘retired in good 
order’.82 However, Macaulay states,  
 Albemarle, therefore, though he had a great superiority of 
force, thought it advisable to retreat. The retreat soon became 
a rout. The whole country was strewn with the arms and 
uniforms which the fugitives had thrown away; and, had 
Monmouth urged the pursuit with vigour, he would probably 
have taken Exeter without a blow.’83  
 
Consequently, Beckett claims, ‘the Devon Militia disintegrated before his 
[Monmouth’s] advance and some joined the rebels’84  Beckett offers no sources but a 
Macaulay footnote cites the Axe Papers, Oldmixon and Wade.  The Axe Papers, or 
The Axminster Ecclesiastica, were written by an unknown dissenting minister who 
dramatically recounted the flight of the militia, but did not distinguish between the 
Devon Militia to the west and the Somerset Militia to the northeast.85 According to 
Macaulay, Oldmixon lived nearby but in reality he lived in Bridgwater, some 30 
miles away, and he was twelve years old at the time. Wade who was present states, 
 …the horse of the Devonshire forces advanced within a 
quarter of a mile of our advanced post, But discovering that 
wee had lined the hedges they retreated.  Wee advanced upon 
them but the Duke came and commanded us back telling us 
that the Somersetshire forces were likewise retired on the 
other side …86 
 
 No contemporary evidence for Macaulay’s assertion that the Devon Militia 
routed has been discovered and yet tells of the men throwing away weapons and 
coats.’87 Wade’s reference to the discarded guns and coats was written about the 
Somersetshire Militia.   
 We marched early the next morning from thence [Axminster] 
to Chard…  There happened nothing very remarkable in this 
day’s march… Here [Chard] we learnt that the retreat of the 
Somersetheire [sic] forces was little better than a flight, many 
of the souldiers coats and arms being recovered and brought to 
us.’88  
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 Wade saw nothing dramatic in the incident and although described as many he 
did not deem the number of arms and coats brought in as remarkable.  He is clear that 
the Devonshire Militia fell back and the Somersetshire’s retreat was little better than 
flight, but he does not mention either force’s movement degenerating into a rout nor 
anything about the countryside being strewn with arms and coats. Nor do such 
exaggerated claims appear in the highly imaginative and propagandist Axminster 
Ecclesiastica.  Had Wade seen the Devon Militia disintegrate he would certainly have 
described it.  Instead he says their horse came, looked and withdrew.  There can be 
little doubt that upon their report Albemarle ordered the Devon Militia to withdraw.   
Macaulay may have based his thoughts on The Anonymous Account, although 
he does not cite it.  Attributed to the rebel officer Venner and written abroad some 
years after the event, it reiterates what Wade wrote, ‘he [Albemarle] wisely retired,’ 
then adds what he could not have witnessed, ‘his men being in great disorder and 
confusion, supposing we had pursued them.’89  This may well have been the case but 
there is no evidence.  The reason for the Devon Militia’s retirement may be deduced 
from the orders issued by the King’s Secretary. Sunderland to Albemarle,  
 As long as the Duke of Monmouth stays in Lyme you should 
forbear to attempt anything against him, except upon great 
advantages… in case he should march out of Lime towards 
Taunton or elsewhere, attend his motions and take any fitting 
occasion to attack him.90  
 
  Albemarle is firmly instructed to attempt little unless, in his personal 
judgment, it is a ‘fitting occasion’, that is to say one in which he has advantages if not 
‘great’ ones. The circumstances at Axminster were far from advantageous and Wade 
listed the defensive measures taken by Monmouth:  
The Duke possessed himself of the town and seized on the 
passes regarding each army, which he guarded with cannon & 
musqueteers, the places by reason of the thick hedges and 
straight wayes being very advantageous for that purpose.91   
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Both the Devon and the Somerset Militias would have had to assault up 
relatively straight country roads with constricting linear hedges and across adjoining 
open fields against musketeers and guns in prepared positions behind lateral 
hedgerows. The Devon Militia had the more hazardous approach. The land between 
Shute Hill and Axminster Hill is a valley with two major waterways running north to 
south, the River Axe and the River Yarty, as well as other narrower yet distinct 
watercourses. These disordering features lay directly across Albemarle’s intended line 
of advance. There is also an enclosed spur of land between the two rivers 
perpendicular to the road with its southern tip almost touching the thoroughfare.   
Had the Devon Militia succeeded in attacking across these rivers and ditches 
and successfully driven Wade’s men from the hedges, they would still have had to 
attack up a steep hill along the narrow roadways and alleys before storming occupied 
town houses and walled gardens.92  Assaults on prepared positions are notoriously 
difficult and costly. Albemarle may have had sufficient men to batter his way through 
Wade’s force which faced him, but he knew Monmouth’s other regiments were in the 
town and that he did not have enough men to complete the task.  He had no idea that 
Monmouth had landed with less than 100 men, and only one of them a Dutch 
professional, and he was probably conscious that militiamen would not be effective 
troops for an assault over such ground. When the royal army faced a similar tactical 
situation at Norton St Philip Feversham allocated the task to his elite – the Grenadier 
Companies of the Foot Guards supported by dismounted Horse Grenadiers of the 
Horse Guards – and entrusted the operation to the experienced Colonel of the First 
Battalion of the First Foot Guards, Henry Fitzroy, Duke of Grafton.93  They 
nevertheless failed in their attempt.  
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 Albemarle’s militia horse probed forward and as a result of their reconnaissance 
he was aware of the extremely hazardous nature of the undertaking.  Conscious that 
he had little experience Albemarle would have relied upon what he had read about 
military campaigning especially in his father’s book.94 Albemarle had a fortified town 
before him and his father recommends seven ways to take such a place but none 
suited the circumstances.  He advised ‘never to assault a town or place without great 
probability of obtaining that which he desireth’.95 He further advised ‘A General must 
be careful never to hazard a Battel with his Enemy when he findeth him embatteld in 
a good advantage although he do outnumber him much with men.’96 So Albemarle 
complied with his instructions from Sunderland regarding caution and trusting his 
own judgment he ordered a withdrawal.  His father had also written ‘...to make an 
honourable retreat is one of the two principal points of Military Art and worthiest the 
knowledge of a General, to be able upon occasion to make a safe and sure retreat.’97  
  There could also have been little doubt in Albemarle’s mind as to the authority 
of his decisions.  He was empowered by James II to do what he thought best.  A letter 
prior to the affair at Axminster stated,  
... the King commands me to let you know that he places 
entire confidence in your conduct and zeal for his service, and 
therefore leaves it to your discretion to march with the forces 
of your county and to proceed in all things as you shall see 
cause and judge best for his service… 98  
 
 It was soldierly good sense.  The subsequent events of Norton St. Philip 
underlined the wisdom of his decision for there, although the rebels had no guns in the 
line, Feversham’s carefully selected attacking force came to grief and sustained a 
casualty ratio of 18 rebels to 80 regulars killed.  Surprisingly, Macaulay ascribes 
Albemarle’s decision not to wisdom but to the likely disloyalty of the militia.  
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Albemarle, however, was less alarmed by the preparations of 
the enemy than by the spirit which appeared in his own ranks. 
Such was Monmouth's popularity among the common people 
of Devonshire that, if once the trainbands had caught sight of 
his well known face and figure, they would have probably 
gone over to him in a body.99  
 
 As well as seeming to know the minds of the militiamen Macaulay also claims to 
know what was in Albemarle’s mind and implies that he predicted total desertion 
resulting from seeing Monmouth’s face.  This assertion revolves around a notion that 
in an age of restricted visual imagery an ordinary militia soldier would recognise 
Monmouth’s face – possibly seen at a distance some six years earlier during the 
Duke’s Western Progress.   Macaulay also confuses the relative army strengths. He 
asserts ‘Albemarle … had a great superiority of force...’ whilst, at this stage in the 
Rebellion, the Devon Militia had about 4,000 and Monmouth about 3,000.100 
 Albemarle’s tactical understanding and strategic thinking were exemplary, both 
in keeping his force intact by refusing to make a difficult assault with inappropriate 
troops, and in obeying written orders to only attack in advantageous situations.  With 
royal troops on their way, to throw away the local force on a dangerous gamble would 
have been very foolish.  He also displayed shrewd judgment in drawing his men away 
from a situation in which they might have been called upon to confront local loyalties 
and ties.  In addition, having been blocked on the road eastwards at Axminster, they 
could still threaten Taunton from Honiton.  
 The Somerset Militia most certainly ran, but this too demands careful 
examination to determine why it occurred and if it was, indeed, a panic-stricken rout.  
Two regiments of Somerset Foot, one just four companies strong, and some horse 
advanced towards Axminster, ostensibly to join up with the Devonshire Militia. If the 
Somerset Militia’s numbers matched those of other county regiments they would have 
numbered about one thousand and consequently only in concert with the Devon 
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contingent could they hope to face the whole rebel army.  Even if the Duke of 
Somerset had not sent copies of Sunderland’s letters to his subordinates, the tenor of 
the campaign strategy – shadow, contain, engage only if risk was minimal – would 
have been abundantly clear.  Alone they could not expect anything but defeat, so 
Colonel Lutterell took the horse, his own foot and part of Phelipps’ regiments ahead 
in an attempt to seize Axminster.  Presumably Phelipps retained some companies to 
bring up the baggage.   
 The exact sequence of events is uncertain as there are problems with the major 
source, a letter from Phelipps to fellow militia officer Colonel Berkeley.101 Although 
this document is contemporary, Phelipps was not present at the action and his 
comments display a desire to avert blame.  He stated that the Somerset Militia’s 
morale had already been undermined ‘by busie Phanatiques that they were fighting 
against their Religion’.102 Morale in Phelipps’ Regiment may already have been 
strained following the over-zealous training methods referred to in chapter six. Whilst 
resting at Stockland, news spread throughout Luttrell’s force that Albemarle had met 
with Monmouth and shaken hands.103  Had the men been of a weak disposition and 
disinclined to fight, that news alone might have caused them to halt or even fall back.  
Had Albemarle joined Monmouth, Lutterell’s 1,000 would be marching to engage a 
rebel force some 7,000 strong. Yet they continued their march, sending mounted 
scouts into Axminster, which they reported to be empty. However, Albemarle’s 
promised men were not at the appointed rendezvous.   
This news did not halt their advance and the Somerset Militia continued to the 
outskirts of the town.  It was only when their scouts had been driven out by 
Monmouth’s advance guard and they had discovered that instead of friends the place 
was now occupied by the enemy that a connection was made with the earlier totally 
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untrue rumour of Albemarle’s defection.  Even then they did not break, although ‘they 
cried out they were betrayed, and would not march a foot further, and no persuasion 
could prevail.’104  It is tempting to believe that had they been left stationary, in order 
and been reassured, the outcome might have been different. Unfortunately, Phelipps 
intimates that further pressure was unwittingly applied by a Captain Hawley who had 
been sent by Albemarle to bring news that he was engaged and for them to hasten 
forward. Being near enough to hear any fighting it was clear none was in progress, 
and Albemarle’s wording, designed to hurry their march, actually gave the impression 
that he was lying.   
The men, and most of the officers too, must have been unsure of what was 
happening, and some were apparently convinced that it was a trap and that only death 
awaited those who ventured into the town.  Already suspicious of operating out of 
their county and of being technically under Albemarle’s command, and having left a 
portion of Phelipps’ regiment behind, the men were probably aware that they were 
being marched towards an enemy army of unknown size whose numbers would have 
been dramatically increased if Albemarle’s men had joined them.  It is not known 
what commands Lutterell issued but one officer, Captain Littleton, a royal officer 
seconded to the militia as a muster master, believed the rumours and proclaimed, 
‘they were drawn thither to have their throats cut, for begod they would be…’  As 
Phelipps was not present the evidence is weak but he claimed that Littleton ran, and 
‘Upon this some of both sorts ran as he had, which was most shamefully…’105 
Phelipps, however, did not mention a rout nor did he say the entire force ran – he 
wrote ‘some’.  Phelipps’ main complaint is that the men of his rear echelon would not 
march towards Honiton but wanted to retire to Chard, presumably to defend their 
homes and stay in their own county.  
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What happened next is unreported because Phelipps left them.  Receiving 
reports that Monmouth was bearing down upon him Phelipps deserted his command, 
albeit one in disarray and unlikely to mount any resistance. Sensible that he had ‘lost 
honour never to be gained’, his account could be regarded as a blame-shifting 
exercise, inasmuch that it implies the defeat was the fault of the men’s disaffection if 
not disloyalty and not that of the senior officers’ inability to appreciate the situation 
fully or to quell the fears of their subordinates.106   
However, even one of those who ran, John Coad, did not mention a total 
flight.  He recorded ‘fear gripped our ranks and most were driven off backward.’  Yet 
‘being driven off’ is different from the Independent Congregation writer who 
maintained that the Lord appeared and sent a hornet of fear amongst them, causing 
them to fight each other and run away with amazement, ‘bereft of their reason like 
distracted persons.  Others threw away their weapons of war…’107 Calls for direct 
intervention by the deity and a hyperbolic style were typical of zealous non-
conformist tracts and speeches in the seventeenth century.  The difference was that 
Coad took part in the retreat whereas the Congregationalist scribe did not.  Had the 
Somerset Militia been broken and fled in rout, Coad would have quit their ranks and 
joined Monmouth immediately giving his troubled conscience some ease, his 
commitment to the militia being terminated when his regiment ceased to exist. In fact 
he remained with his colours for the time being.  
 Over the next days Monmouth marched steadily to Taunton but there no evidence 
of his army having collecting abandoned wagons or for his cavalry having harried 
fugitives. There are no references to colours being taken, officers or baggage being 
captured, stores being abandoned or a slaughter in pursuit which are all the usual 
reported hallmarks of any rout. If it had been thus, Wade would have reported it as 
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such. Instead, Wade says of the day after the incident ‘nothing very remarkable 
happened’.108   
  Further evidence to substantiate that this was not the rout of legend can be found 
in Coad’s statement that ‘most were driven off backward’, inferring that they were 
driven in a body rather than running off, dispersing in all directions. Coad deserted at 
Chard, the next morning by wading through a river to escape the watch.109  Evidently 
the Somerset Militia was still together. Routed forces lose all discipline and disperse; 
they do not remain together and set watches.  
 The Axminster Ecclesiastica notes that, as Monmouth’s Army pushed forward, so 
‘companies of souldiers belonging to King James pursued after but durst not overtake 
them.’110 These companies could have been from the Dorset Militia, which, after 
Bridport, was active in the area.  Local Honiton historian Angela Dudley states that 
the militia followed them and as the Axminster incident had occurred on 15 June and 
Churchill reached Axminster on 18 June, these companies were not from the royal 
army.111   Dudley also mentions that over these crucial days, until after the skirmish at 
Ashill, deserters to Monmouth’s forces thought twice about quitting their militia units 
and rejoined.112 
 Turning to the motivation for fighting, the morale of many militiamen was 
influenced by the fact that many had not been paid.  Pay and its significance has been 
discussed earlier in chapter four and it is not surprising that a colonel of the Somerset 
Militia warned that, without their pay, his battalion would desert the colours.113  
Desertions over lack of pay began before 15 June, and the perceived betrayal at 
Axminster might have induced even more to return home.  The colonel also declares: 
‘One company here only received four days’ pay and that is the way to destroy an 
army without fighting.’114  If the men imagined they were being betrayed both in 
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terms of pay and disloyalty among their senior officers, they may have harboured a 
very real anxiety concerning the stability of the very establishment they were serving 
to uphold.  It is probably that there was a good deal more to the events at Axminster 
than a simple description of events can reveal.  
 Not an eyewitness as he was en route from London to Bridport at the time, 
Churchill reported the reverse at Axminster to both James II and the Duke of 
Beaufort.  He said of Phelipps’ and Lutterell’s men that ‘those two regiments run 
away a second time’, despite there being no report of when or where the first occasion 
took place.115  Churchill also stated that ‘half if not the greatest part, are gone to the 
rebels’, which neither Wade nor any other account confirmed.116 He expanded upon 
an already exaggerated tale.  As to the militia’s fighting ability he stated ‘there is not 
any relying on these regiments unless we had some of your Majesty’s standing 
forces’.117  Churchill evidently still thought the militia capable with some royal army 
stiffening.  
 Churchill also requested more men from the Duke of Beaufort’s command be 
sent to Chard and Crewkerne, where he was bound.118   He might have thought the 
militia unreliable in action, yet he sought to be reinforced by another 4,000 of them. 
There is no way of telling if his projected use for them included combat alongside 
standing forces or in guarding lines of communication and other second line duties, 
and yet he is often cited as the primary source that described them as unfit for 
purpose.  If they were so, it would appear to have been caused by the failing of the 
Somerset Militia’s morale.  Under pre-combat stress and concerned about going out of 
its county, lack of pay, rumoured betrayal of a superior officer, vastly outnumbered 
and being told they were going to have their throats cut, were powerful incentives to 
flight rather than fight. 
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 Undoubtedly Axminster was a blow for the militia forces, but it was not the 
unmitigated debacle of popular legend. Although withdrawn to Honiton, Albemarle’s 
force was intact and still in the field and, whilst the Duke of Somerset had lost a 
portion of his force, he still had concentrations at Bristol and Bath. Even the senior 
officers present at Axminster had managed to rally their men and regroup at Bruton.  
 The events of Axminster may not have had a permanent effect upon the western 
militia’s fighting capability, but adverse comments did. Albemarle smarted under 
criticism of his withdrawal. His pique was fanned by the king appointing the Earl of 
Feversham as commander-in-chief in the West, with command of both royal and 
militia forces.  Albemarle’s response was a refusal to engage without regular support.  
Nevertheless, rather than endorsing Churchill’s view of the militia, he announced that 
he would not have been averse to fighting if he had had the authority to act.   
 My Lord, - Nothing considerable has passed Since my last to 
yr Lordpt,  My Lord Churchill has not yet joyned me, and 
having noe order to attack the enemy without him would not 
attempt it; if it had been done when I first desired it, I believe 
the Rebels would have met with some defeat before this 
time.’119 
 
 In reply Sunderland sent him the king’s thanks and compliments on his action, 
not recriminations for his men’s misdeeds.  
  Feversham’s sending home of three regiments of the Hampshire Militia has 
been interpreted as illustrating the royal commander’s total dissatisfaction with the 
militia in general.120  Yet, he had commended them previously:  ‘la compagnie de Mr 
bartlee [Berkeley] est sans raillerie fort belle, et un regiment d’hamshier commende 
par un nomme Mr. fleming, que je laisse ici aujourdhui, ayant marche toute la nuict 
avec le canon que je fait marcher pour me joindre’.121  At Norton St. Philip 
Feversham’s own account tells how he continued to employ several units of militia in 
his army. ‘The rest of our foot together with the Somersetshire, Dorsetshire and 
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Oxfordshire Militia…as they came in were drawne up and posted to the best 
advantage…’122 Although on this occasion they were not called upon to fight there 
was a succession of incidents in which they were.  Perhaps they displayed no great 
military skill nor did they face a determined or proficient enemy, but they fought and 
did so successfully sometimes under difficult circumstances.  
 On 24 June a party of the Gloucester Militia Horse met with reverse at 
Keynsham. Tincey comments that: 
Monmouth’s Horse …proved more than a match for the 
supposedly trained and disciplined militia Horse, who fled 
before them in such disorder that a militia trooper and two 
horses fell into rebel hands,123   
 
The contemporary account by Wade stated: 
 
   At Capt. Tily’s coming to the Towne there was in it a troop of 
militia horse of Glaucestersheire [sic] who at his approach 
immediately retired and left behind them 2 horses and one of 
theyr party prisoner.124 
 
 The modern historian infers the militia fought poorly and fled, while the 
contemporary source calls it a retirement and mentions no disorder. Undoubtedly a 
militia trooper was captured but whether he was on the wrong side of the bridge or 
elsewhere in the town upon some other business is unrecorded. 
 Later that night a skirmish took place in the streets of Keynsham ‘where the 
enemy came upon us at unawares and assaulted three passages into the town but could 
not prevail. They retreated with the loss of about 20 men.’125  One of the Royal parties 
was Colonel Theopholis Oglethorpe’s patrol in strength returning from scouting and 
pacifying the Chew Valley.  As well as his royal horse, Oglethorpe had with him 
Talbot’s troop of Wiltshire Militia Horse which, according to Feversham’s account, 
was left ‘at the enterance of the towne to make good their retreat.’126  They were 
placed to cover a withdrawal, which Oglethorpe was in the event obliged to perform.  
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There is no record of them failing in their duty and there is no evidence to substantiate 
Tincey’s reading of Oglethorpe’s mind to suggest that ‘the militia troop of Captain 
Talbot having been left well out of harm’s way for fear that they would not stand in a 
fight.’127 Oglethorpe sensibly took the men he knew into action and left the militia in 
a second line troops’ role, which proved to be not just useful but necessary.    
 Similar interpretations of Feversham’s intentions concerning the Wiltshire Militia 
claim that they were stationed at Middlezoy about two miles to the rear of the royal 
camp in Westonzoyland, in order to keep them safely in the rear during the battle of 
Sedgemoor.  Chandler has a footnote declaring, ‘In fact Feversham and Churchill 
were careful to keep the unreliable militia regiments in reserve.’128  Clifton says, 
‘They were kept safely in the rear as a reserve,’ whilst Tincey does not include them 
in his numerical calculations for Sedgemoor and states they were ‘well placed to 
support Captain’s Coy’s Dragoons at Burrow Bridge’ which crossed the River Parrott 
a further two miles to the rear.129 
 As mentioned in chapter four (pages 159-160) the militia unlike the royal Foot 
were not issued with tents and were thus obliged to find billets or camp as best they 
could. The royal army had them, as Sunderland had informed Feversham on 29 June 
that the king ‘…has commanded me to let you know that there are tents for 3,ooo men 
with the artillery, which he hope you may soon have with you’.130 The general staff, 
senior officers and the royal cavalry had commandeered the buildings of 
Westonzoyland and, whilst Chedzoy was nearby, it was forward of the royal camp 
and occupied by Lieutenant Colonel Francis Compton as the centre for his scouting 
operations. Consequently, the Wiltshire Militia (possibly three regiments) went to 
Middlezoy as the nearest habitation capable of housing troops.  Their commander, the 
Earl of Pembroke, was probably asleep at the army headquarters in Weston Court in 
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Westonzoyland when the alarm was raised whereupon he apparently mounted and 
‘rode in haste’ to arouse his militia.  As to their performance, Drummer Adam 
Wheeler records that Lord Pembroke alerted Colonel Wyndham:  
 ...betweene Twelve and One of the Clock in the Morneing, 
calling out …‘Colonl Windham, Colonll Windham - The 
Enemy is Engadged,’ and asking for his Drums; the Colonll 
answer was that he was ready, and soe forwith prepared 
himself.’  Pembroke ‘immediately commanded him [Drummer 
Wheeler] to beate an Alarum [following which] … The 
Regimt marched through Weston into Weston Moore with as 
much expedicion as possible could be, where They were 
drawne up Three deep in order to engadge if Occasion 
required.131 
 
 Wheeler may be inaccurate with his timings, as Dummer says the general alarm 
came at 2.00 am, but there appears to have been neither delay nor reticence in 
assembling and marching the mile or so to the battlefield, arriving in time to deploy in 
line and to witness the end of the fighting.  Wheeler adds that he was posted on the 
right of the formation and actually asked permission to quit his post to join in the 
pillaging of the dead ‘after the Enemy began to run.’  Wyndham’s reply illustrates the 
discipline he maintained over his militiamen: ‘That upon Paine of Death not a Man of 
his Regmt should move from his Post.’ 132  
Monmouth’s night attack had come as great surprise to the royal army.   
Although one officer, Captain Macintosh of Dumbarton’s, had marked out emergency 
assembly points for his company the rest of the army had taken little if any 
precautions against an attack. 133  A major engagement was not expected so being 
placed in the rear for an unexpected battle seems to be a tenuous conclusion.  
However, when alarmed, the Wiltshire Militia rapidly turned out of quarters, marched 
to the field and deployed ready to fight, although it was not called upon to do so. 
Neither were Kirke’s or Trelawney’s royal regiments.134  
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After the fighting was over Wheeler recorded: ‘The Right Honorable the Earle 
of Feversham, Generall of his Maties Army came to the head of Colonlls Windhams 
Regimt and gave him many Thanks for his readynesse, Saying his Matie should not 
hear of it by Letter, but by Word of Mouth…’135  Wadham Wyndham said: ‘The 
General rode along the front of our regiment with his hat off and gave us thanks for 
our forwardness and readiness in being so early in the field’.136 Feversham cast no 
aspersions on the militia’s performance. 
 The diarist Evelyn indirectly shed light on the question of the militia and its sense 
of martial honour and prowess when he related an incident after the rebellion was put 
down:  
 ... some words first in jeast then in heate twixt Sherrington 
Talbot a worthy Gent. (son to Sir Jo: Talbot & who behaved 
himself very handsomely) and one Capt. Love, both 
commanders of the Militia of the Country, whose souldiers 
fought best; both drawing their Swords & passing at one 
another Sherrigton was wounded to death…’137   
 
 Adam Wheeler and Wadham Wyndham both corroborate the statement regarding 
the duel, saying that it took place at The White Hart in Glastonbury and it arose over 
comments made after a false alarm.  As the quarrel grew it apparently embraced the 
behaviour of the troops at Keynsham.138  Whatever the circumstances, at least two 
men thought the Wiltshire Militia’s reputation for fighting was worth risking death 
for. 
 
7.4.  POST-ACTION RECOVERY. 
An important test of a military unit’s performance effectiveness is its ability to reform 
and return to duty after involvement in a fight.  In Elizabethan times the Cornish 
Militia surprised Carlos Amezquita and his raiding Spaniards by running before them 
at Penzance on 3 August 1595, only to drive them from Marazion the next day. 
 291 
 
Admittedly they were accompanied by some royal troops on 4 August but the bulk of 
the force was men who had fled one day and returned to fight again the next.139  There 
is nothing in the accounts about the time taken to recover by the militia troopers who 
fought at Ashill, but those involved in the fight on the Lyme Road on 12 June were in 
action again on 14 June fighting dismounted in the streets of Bridport.   The most 
telling evidence available concerning the militia’s ability to retake the field derives 
from the events immediately after the Battle of Bridport.  Beckett sums up the 
currently popularly accepted picture when he says: ‘The Dorset Militia failed to 
prevent Monmouth’s landing and holed up in Bridport’.140 He contradicts the 
contemporary evidence from Colonel Strangways and Colonel Helyer who were 
involved in the campaign and whose Dorset and Somerset Militias both campaigned 
and fought shortly after they had been in action.    
Rather than being holed up in Bridport the Dorset Militia was very busy after 
its engagement.  The battle for the town took place on 14 June and Strangways wrote 
three days later:  
 … I shall only desire you immediately to send word to the 
chief officers of the militia of your county that tomorrow 
morning [we] shall march hence with all our militia, who are 
very courageous.  We shall quarter tomorrow night at 
Winsham in three miles of Chard, and thenceforward to follow 
the enemy… If your militia will shew themselves to be good 
subjects, now is their time, and take their measure according 
to what I have said, to meet as soon as may be.141 
 
There is no indication that the militia was in shock or needed time to recover from its 
efforts. In fact there is praise for the bravery it had shown.  It is likely that the 
militiamen at Bridport received reinforcements during 15 and 16 June as the 
remainder of Erle’s Regiment from Blandford arrived, and they would have known 
that the rest of the county’s forces were assembling and would be marching to join 
them.  Strangways may have indulged in bravado, but there is no evidence that the 
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Dorset Militia did anything but march out of Bridport on 18 June with the intention of 
shadowing the rebel force in accordance with orders from Sunderland.142 The high 
command was also aware that it was with Churchill and marching well: ‘la milice de 
dorcetshier non pas par la mesme raison par ce qu’ils ont este tout le temps avec 
milord churchill et que les marches et les tourment fort...’143  
 Equally, the Somerset Militia was still involved in small-scale fighting after the 
incident at Axminster.  Of the men involved at Axminster Phelipps wrote: ‘they soon 
came to their arms and so we retreated…and intend tomorrow to join with his Grace if 
he does not countermand us.’144  Several fights that occurred as Monmouth marched 
to and then rested in Taunton were not undertaken by any royal force, except a 
cavalry clash at Ashill between a rebel troop of horse and a patrol from Oxford’s 
Blues – although, even there, some authors state the Somerset Militia were 
involved.145 Colonel Helyar’s writes, ‘Here, [between Ilchester and Crewkerene] is 
fighting every day.’146 Churchill might exclaim: ‘.…unless speedy action be taken, we 
are likely to lose this county to the rebels,’ and ‘There is not any relying on these 
regiments left behind unless we had some of Your Majesty’s standing army to lead 
them on’, but Helyar’s appeal for reinforcements was not for royal troops who were 
still marching for Chard or Bath, but for men from ‘the whole force of the county’.147  
He had sufficient faith in the men under his command to commit them in various 
skirmishes and trust in other militia units from which he solicited aid.   
 The militia was not only skirmishing in front of the rebels’ advance during the 
first part of the campaign, but continued to do so later during their retreat.  On 2 July, 
the only available news was that the enemy had been defeated in another skirmish, 
and was said to be coming back to Taunton.148  The two units that had been involved 
in action, the Dorset and the Somerset Militias, were able to recover and return to 
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duty. In some instances, they were again skirmishing with the rebels within a very 
short space of time.    
 
7.5.  CONCLUSION.  
 Despite Clifton’s assertion that the Somerset and Devon men had run when 
confronted by the rebels, and that the Dorset troops had performed poorly at Bridport, 
close examination of the events and recorded material can be said to demonstrate that 
when called upon to fight the late seventeenth-century militia of the southwest were 
able to perform adequately for second line troops.149 
 Despite James II’s hope that, ‘every body will be convinced, that the Militia … is 
not sufficient for such Occasions [Rebellions]’ it would appear that the West County 
militias could sustain and at times surpass the rate of march expected of the royal 
army. The marching achievements of the Wiltshire Militia to Sedgemoor surpassed 
that achieved by Marlborough’s army in its famous march along the Danube.   
 They also proved effective on campaign and their officers could manoeuvre with 
them so as to thwart an enemy’s intentions. They were effective in denying strategic 
points to the rebels, securing the royal army’s lines of communication and their own, 
and in throwing a containment cordon around the theatre of operations preventing 
reinforcements from reaching Monmouth and surpassing any attempts to rise for him.  
Although moving judiciously they tightened this ring around the rebels and boxed 
them up in Bridgwater allowing the royal army to camp nearby ready to pounce and 
destroy them. 
 Moreover, despite the assertions of Macaulay and the accusations of modern 
historians such as Lane, who maintain categorically that the militia would not fight 
their fellow West Countrymen, the militiamen from Dorset, Somerset and Wiltshire 
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did fight and fought hard – within their limited training and expectation.  Inferences 
that they were deliberately kept ‘well back out of the battle of Sedgemoor’ due to lack 
of trust or fighting ability are unfounded and ignore the reason for their having been 
billeted in Middlezoy.150  Belief that the failure of the Somerset Militia at Axminster 
rendered them incapable of fighting thereafter was not justified by events: no records 
of mass desertions have been found, and they returned to action quickly.  
Furthermore, it is unwise to describe those units that did not engage at Sedgemoor as 
lacking in fighting spirit, for then the mantle of cowardice might also be cast over 
Piercy Kirke’s and Charles Trelawney’s royal regiments – the Tangier veterans.  The 
Wiltshire Militia may not have fired in anger during the battle, but neither did they 
engage in a fire-fight with their own side, as did Kirke’s and Trelawney’s who, in the 
early morning mist, fired upon the Life Guards having mistaken them for rebel 
cavalry.151 
 The assertion that the militia was cowardly and ineffective in time of crisis, and 
that ‘The country people are only valiant where there are none to oppose them’, is 
untrue.152 Although not front line soldiers the West Country militias behaved 
adequately and played a significant role in the response to the Monmouth Rebellion.  
They may have lacked the professionalism and expertise of the royal army but they 
marched, campaigned and indeed fought when called upon to do so. 
 The rebellion of the Duke of Monmouth, whom from the time 
of his unfortunate landing at Lyme… until his overthrow at 
Sedgemoor, was opposed by the Militia of all the south-
western counties…. The brunt of the fighting was borne by 
this Militia army, and the poor Duke was afterwards captured 
by them…’153 
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Chapter Eight 
EXPECTATIONS AND LOYALTY   
 
‘Our security is the militia; that will defend us and Never conquer us.’1 
 
 
 
For a military unit to both justify its existence and achieve the effect desired by those 
who raised and sustained it, it must be able and prepared to carry out the orders of its 
officers and political masters.  The previous chapter dealt with the practical 
expectations of mobility, combat and reorganisation so this chapter focuses upon 
whether or not the militia fulfilled the government and society’s tangible and more 
intangible expectations.  Firstly, it answers the question of whether the militia served 
its purpose and, secondly, if it proved loyal to the king and those who created and 
commanded it. 
 
8.1. PURPOSE AND EXPECTATIONS. 
The primary role of the militia was to be the means by which the king and parliament 
met the fundamental requirement of government – the protection of its citizens.2  The 
society they governed expected it to uphold law and order and provide security 
against foreign invasion or internal insurrection.  The Council’s Instructions to the 
lord lieutenants regarding the militia go into greater detail in that:  
‘they were to be regular exercised, their full numbers to be 
kept up, well effected officers chosen and numerous, 
disaffected persons watched and not allowed to assemble, and 
their arms seized; fortresses to be secured, all rising 
suppressed, vagrants apprehended and accounts of 
proceedings to be sent in to the Council.’3   
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The stability of Charles II’s restored throne depended upon its ability to fulfill 
these expectations and nullify the threat of physical harm to life and property posed 
by enemies bent upon using might to impose their will upon the nation.   
During the period addressed by this thesis, the perceived threats were seen as 
likely to come from two foreign and one domestic source.  In Europe both France and 
Holland had expansionist aspirations which would be aided greatly by an England 
gravely weakened whilst at home the government needed to ‘be very vigilant over 
those of the Republican party, there being too much reason to believe that there is a 
design among men of desperate fortunes to make some sudden insurrection.’4  A force 
of trained soldiers was therefore imperative to provide the nation with sufficient 
physical might to defend both itself and its subjects from external and internal threats. 
Social, economic and political circumstances dictated that this force was the militia.  
The Restoration Militia’s ability to react in time of foreign invasion has 
already been examined and although its performance during the Dutch Wars at 
Landguard Fort and Rochester was adequate if not inspiring, it was satisfactory for 
second line troops. It served its purpose in providing support for the royal troops in 
Essex and in repulsing further Dutch landings on Canvey Island and in Kent.5  As 
well as being able to deter, counter or contain an invasion, the militia’s other 
protection role was to quell internal disquiet by the subjugation of plots and attempted 
rebellions.  This required the militia to act as the government’s instrument for keeping 
dissenting factions in disarray and for restricting the activities of any leading figures 
capable of focusing and coordinating rebellious activities.6 Both these purposes were 
part of an undefined but understood three-way contract between the militia, the 
government and society.  
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The expectations of the relationship between government, society and those 
who serve in its armed forces are today still imprecise, encapsulated in an all-
embracing term, ‘the military covenant’.7 During the Restoration period this was an 
even more informal agreement, particularly for the militia.  Militiamen received pay 
for service but exactly what that service was to be was very flexible and although 
ostensibly military in nature, as described previously it embraced both military and 
civil aspects.   
The fact that the arrangement appears to have been loosely understood and 
was never committed to paper except in general terms gave rise to a range of vague 
expectations and ways in which they were to be met.  Legally the conditions of 
service were one-sided, with legislation covering time to be spent in mustering and 
those things to be supplied by the contributors – all underscored by fines for those 
who did not conform. The dates and frequency of musters were left to the discretion 
of the deputy lieutenants whilst the drill taught or instruction given was the choice of 
the muster masters.   In return the men expected payment for their time and free 
quarter when called away from their homes – although there is no evidence of a 
commissariat assigned to billeting the militia.  Sometimes ad hoc inducements were 
proffered, mostly in the form of alcohol.  The informal, but understood, covenant with 
the royal troops was better as it included billeted accommodation, and sometimes 
even barracks.  It also included food supplies and regular clothing and equipment 
reissues. Even so, these were all set against the men’s pay.   
The expectation of both government and society was that the militia would be 
their protection: ‘Our security is the militia’.8 As with the royal army, the militia was 
expected to do the sovereign’s bidding at a day’s notice but, unlike their royal 
colleagues they had to leave their occupations, families and homes to do so.  If called 
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upon, they too had to risk life and limb because, although not front line troops, they 
were expected to fight if the occasion arose.   
Brewer argues that the militia was a means whereby England obtained 
national land-based security at minimal cost whilst expenditure was diverted into the 
building of the Navy.9  This is might be the reason for whenever the militia’s services 
in the field were no longer needed they were stood down with the result that their 
service pay stopped – whether it came from county or royal army funds was 
immaterial.  This meant that pay ceased from the moment the force was dismissed.   
The Wiltshire Militia, having mustered at its home bases of Salisbury, Devizes, 
Warminster and Marlborough in June 1685 was disbanded at Devizes following 
which the men had to walk back to their parishes, wherever they were, at no cost to 
the authorities.10  The Wiltshire Militia present at Sedgemoor numbered some 1,500, 
and included the Red Regiment from Salisbury and the Blewe Regiment from 
Marlborough, but whether the Green Regiment from Devizes or the Yellow Regiment 
from Warminster or parts of both were also present is not known.  The average time 
for the majority of men to walk home to their respective parishes from Devizes was 
two days. This translates as a collective saving of 3,000 days’ payment.  Prior to that, 
Feversham dismissed two regiments of the Hampshire Militia at Bath, claiming that 
they were ill-disciplined but, as he had sufficient militiamen with his army relevant to 
the size of the rebel force, the cost reduction was an attractive option especially 
because being attached to the royal army his war-chest was paying them. The 
combined strength of the dismissed regiments of the Hampshire Militia is unknown 
but they faced several days march in returning to their homes: the financial saving 
would have been substantial.   
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Conversely, the men were expected to remain in service for as long as their 
lord lieutenant required.  In Devon, Albemarle’s own regiment was kept out when the 
county’s other regiments were discharged.11  The east of the county was not quiet and, 
consequently, both a higher level of policing and a show of strength were necessary at 
least until Monmouth was executed.  This appears to have been accepted without 
resentment which was perhaps, a consequence of Albemarle’s reputation for 
efficiency, including his management of the distribution of their pay.  
During the rebellion the militia was expected to prevent sympathetic risings at 
which it was particularly successful in both Bristol and Bath.  It denied access to the 
rebel army when it appeared before Bath by keeping the gates firmly closed, manning 
the walls and shooting dead Monmouth’s trumpeter thereby forestalling any 
negotiation.12  On 4 July, when a report was received that rebel scouts had reached 
Tiverton and Cullompton, it was conjectured that Monmouth intended to march on the 
northern ports of Devonshire.  Albemarle wrote to his inferior officers: 
I question not but you have already sett good and strict 
watches att all the ports and creakes in your parts, as 
Appledore, Barnstaple, Biddeford, Combe Martyn, 
Ilfracombe, Clovelly, and other adjacent places, to view, 
search, and take an account of all ships and vessels that shall 
come in and go out at those places.13  
 
As expected and desired the presence of the militia was a forceful deterrent to 
dissuade potential rebellious factions from becoming active.  In troubled times the 
militia cavalry was also expected to undertake scouting duties, to move as a body 
towards a location and then to spread out in small groups across the district to gather 
information.  The Gloucester Militia Horse from Bristol investigated Keynsham and, 
upon reporting the bridge still intact, was ordered to destroy it.14 It also supposedly 
performed reconnaissance probes towards Bridgwater whilst Captain Talbot’s Troop 
of the Wiltshire Militia helped search the Chew Valley.15 On 8 July, after Sedgemoor, 
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Albemarle ordered the sheriff ‘to send out scouts in your northern partes, to 
apprehend such as are scattered there.’16 They were successful in that:  
...about two hundred of them [rebels] went towards Ilfracombe 
and dispersed, some one way some another, neere that place, 
and one of the witnesses saith hee, with Ferguson and about 
thirty others, went off in a boate at sea at Ilfracombe, but were 
driven back, seeing the King's shipping making toward 
them.17  
 
 Most of the party were taken, although Ferguson eluded them. Whilst 
rounding up scattered rebels was primarily the duty of the horse, the foot was also 
frequently employed in mopping up operations and the militia, as second line troops, 
bore a large share of this work. The Wiltshire Militia was assigned to guarding 
prisoners in Westonzoyland church, and the drummer of Colonel Wyndham’s 
Company, Adam Wheeler, was tasked with keeping ‘An Account of the Prisoners’ 
which he wrote on his drumhead.  His record is full of harrowing detail.18 There is an 
unsubstantiated local legend that the Wiltshire Militia also erected a series of 
temporary gallows along the Bridgwater Road, although it was Kirke’s men who 
hanged the rebels on them.19   On 2 July, a quarter session witness also recounts that, 
‘the Posse men were ordered to convey the disaffected persons from Exeter to 
Plymouth.’20 
The militia was also expected to co-operate with the royal army.  How they 
did so in a campaign of manoeuvre has been discussed in chapter seven to which it 
might be added that after Sedgemoor Wyndham records that: ‘We continued in King's 
Sedgmoor till near six o'clock in the evening, our regiment being exercised there by 
some of the chief Commanders of the army, and had their applause...’21  Co-operation 
on more mundane levels was also expected.  Sometimes this did not go smoothly. 
Feversham requested Lord Fitzharding, the militia commander in Bath, to hand over 
to him the transport wagons and carts that had been requisitioned by the lord 
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lieutenant of Somerset.  Fitzharding complied as part of the expected co-operation but 
was subsequently soundly chastised by the Duke of Somerset for directly accepting 
orders from a royal officer, albeit a lieutenant general and the commander in chief, 
without going through what he deemed the proper chain of command.22   
When not responding to a national emergency, the expectation was for the 
militia to act as a policing force.  The constable and the watch dealt with petty crime 
but the militia was expected to deal with more serious matters – especially when 
greater numbers were required.  Following the Titus Oates affair, ‘several messengers 
and officers visited Poole in March 1679, for the discovery and apprehension of 
persons suspected of being involved in the conspiracy’ and the militia was turned out 
and put to work.23  Such policing continued under William III.  In July 1689 the Duke 
of Bolton, the new lord lieutenant of Hampshire, ordered the keepers of the New 
Forest, as well as the constable and tithingmen of the counties of Dorset, Hampshire 
and Wiltshire, to search for all ‘Gunnes, Grayhoundes, dogges, nettes or other 
Engines’ used to destroy game in the New Forest’ and to ensure that offenders were 
arraigned before a justice of the peace.24  No express commands were given 
concerning the militia but whilst inside the New Forest the Verderers and Adjisters as 
keepers of the forest’s law carried out the work, the town and village constables and 
tithingmen had no other efficient force beside the militia to call upon.25 
 There also appears to have been an additional expectation of the militia to 
provide a general emergency service.  On 4 September 1666, Charles II called out the 
Middlesex, Hertfordshire and Surrey Militia to assist in fighting the Great Fire of 
London.26  They were provided with food for 48 hours, carts loaded with pickaxes, 
ropes and buckets and, from accounts of the Fire, they served well in creating 
firebreaks and dousing burnt-out buildings. They were praised for their actions, and 
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there were no accusations claiming cowardice in the face of danger.  But there were 
other less heroic tasks given to them.  In 1685, Judge Jefferies instructed the sheriff of 
Somerset that: ‘you, yourself, together with a guard of forty able men at the least, to 
be present by eight o’clock of the morning to be aiding and assisting me or my deputy 
to see the said rebels executed’.27  The sheriff had no power to call upon royal troops 
for this unpleasant duty and there was no available alternative source from which to 
find forty ‘able’ men.  It was probably viewed as part of the informal covenant for the 
militia to form the guard at every execution and at the nailing up of quartered limbs in 
the towns and villages of the South West following the Bloody Assizes.    
The purpose of the militia thus covered a wide range of activities but 
expectations of a covenant or contract, especially if ill-defined, can be interpreted 
differently by either party.  Since local government was responsible for collecting 
money for the men’s pay from the contributors, it also had the duty to honour its side 
of the bargain in distributing it.  Unfortunately this was not always the case and the 
men were forced to take action to put pressure on the authorities to issue the wages to 
which they were entitled.  Such pressure involved not obeying the orders of their 
officers.  It is tempting to see this action in terms of a twentieth-century industrial 
strike and perhaps to couple it with a reluctance to fight. However such was their 
sense of duty that those units in such straits staged more of a work to rule than a 
strike.  This is evident in a letter from Colonel Helyer to Somerset regarding lack of 
pay.28 There appears to have been several small-scale actions in the Yeovil, Chard and 
Crewkerne area during which the militia fought willingly enough, but their hearts did 
not appear to be in the routine work of general soldiering without pay. 
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…horse and foot (anywhere else but where an enemy is) are 
useless, and we were as good as have none at all, as to have 
them anywhere else but where they are necessary.  The way to 
restore our peace is to beat those who disturb it, and not to be 
afraid of those that may do it; few I believe, will now join that 
party who are proclaimed rebels; and the principal rebels 
being suppressed the confederates will be able to do nothing.  
If your Grace will be pleased to order pay for this regiment to 
be sent them, it will do well; else they will leave their colours 
as divers of them have done already… .29    
 
As a result of the Duke of Somerset’s failure to properly organise the 
distribution of pay, the willingness of his militiamen to respond to orders was 
adversely affected.  Helyer’s men were fractious when not in action. The reason for 
their discontent had nothing to do with co-religionists, compatriots or cowardice but 
rather a failure to meet their expectations that in return for service the authorities 
would fulfil their side of the bargain and pay them. The military usually construes any 
action other than complete obedience as tantamount to mutiny and presumably reports 
like Helyer’s fanned the embers of perceived disloyalty, although Helyer does not 
mention mutiny or reluctance to fight, although he does warn about likely desertion.   
Whether it was because it met society’s expectations or not, the militia was 
possibly held in better general regard during the seventeenth than the eighteenth 
century.30  It had a certain honorific position in society and militia uniforms had some 
peculiar significance.  On 23 October 1689, evidence was given at the Somerset 
quarter sessions  alleging that David Ford of Lydeard St Lawrence, threatened ‘to cut 
John Cox’s and Christopher Sanders’ guts out, and to abscond with his militia 
uniforms.’31 The discarded coats found after Axminster, were ‘the ornament of 
Monmouth’s Army’.32  Similarly, militia affairs were at times deemed important. 
Although melodramatic in tone, an address wrapper for an item pertaining to militia 
affairs reads: 
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To my Lord of Norfolks Grace    
In post hast    
Post hast    
Hast for thy    
Lief and  
uppon payn of hanging  33  
 
 To summarise, the Restoration militia’s purpose was the protection of the state 
in war and peace, and through it the kingdom was protected against foreign invasion 
or internal rebellion.  It not only adequately fulfilled its part of the covenant with the 
government and society but was held in a degree of esteem for doing so.  Although 
expected to put up some sort of resistance if required it was not expected to perform 
as royal soldiers and its role was as second line troops.  It also honoured the 
expectation to co-operate with the royal army in both strategic and more immediate 
practical concerns.  It more than adequately fulfilled its policing role whilst 
undertaking duties which exceeded expectations regarding the more gruesome 
element of law enforcement.  The militias of the southwest ably fulfilled their purpose 
and yet, as seen in the Helyer letter above, there was fear among those in power 
concerning their loyalty. 
 
8.2.       LOYALTY. 
Charles II had initially been wary of both the militia and the standing army. The 
militia had been used by parliament in the early days of the civil wars as the nucleus 
of its own armed force, and although the army had under Monck’s guidance initiated 
the events that led to his restoration, it had been the instrument that had defeated his 
father and brought about his execution. Initially Charles II’s royal army was small, 
embracing many who had served the king in exile and even though he slowly 
expanded it, he was careful to entrust its command to officers of proven loyalty or 
vested interest in the preservation of his crown.  Legal reassurance of control of the 
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militia was given by the Militia Act of 1661: ‘according to the ancient known Laws, 
we have declared the sole Right of the Militia to be in your Majesty’, and throughout 
his reign Charles sought to secure the loyalty of the militia by the same means as he 
used for the royal army, namely putting it under men he could trust and had a personal 
interest in the preservation of the status quo.34   
For all his later faults and mismanagement James II’s accession was greeted 
with jubilant demonstrations and addresses of public support and loyalty. 
Contemporary Erasmus Warren commented that ‘the whole nation’ was caught up in 
‘a vice of loyalty’.35  There is no reason to believe that the militia as a body harboured 
any contrary sentiment.  The London Gazette reported that in the southwest the 
Corporation of Lyme Regis, known as a centre for dissention, had twenty four bottles 
of wine sent to the Town Hall for the drinking of a loyal toast following the 
proclamation and in various towns spontaneous celebratory bonfires were lit.  Harris 
states that on 23 April at the Coronation, the Gazette further reported ‘Expressions of 
an Universal Joy’.36 At Lyme a procession of three hundred virgins pledged ‘their 
Majesties healths’, there was a firework display, cannon were fired, bonfires lit and 
free wine was piped into the streets.37  Although Mayor George Alford may have been 
a staunch Tory and staged a good party, it is doubtful if religious principles could be 
bought for a few fireworks and a few draughts of cheap wine. However, there is no 
record of dissenters at Lyme not joining in the celebrations or of any public 
expression of objection to the new king.   
Similarly there are no discovered reports of civil disturbances greeting the 
news of James II’s coronation anywhere else in the kingdom. It seems to have been 
accompanied by revelry and general rejoicing. If the militia reflected the general 
mood of the country then this is important in measuring its attitude and consequently 
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loyalty.  There may have been a few dissenters in the ranks who may have been 
apprehensive of the Catholic king, but they did not take part in any riots or protests or 
give any indication that they were in favour of rebellion. 
Even in the so-called fractious southwest James II’s reign began with the 
approbation of the people.  Harris argues this may have been greatly influenced by 
both the position of power which the court faction with their pro-absolutist stance had 
established through the period of Charles II’ reign, known as the Tory Reaction, and a 
speech that James made to his Council upon the death of his brother in which he 
promised to ‘preserve this Government both in Church and State as it now by Law 
Establish’d.’38 This speech was printed, widely distributed and read from all Anglican 
pulpits and its promise to protect the Established Church and the rights of his subjects 
was repeated by James at the opening of parliament in May 1685. Once again it was 
followed by formal expressions of loyalty, public celebrations and people lighting 
bonfires.   
The militia mirrored the population – ‘the attachment to the people was the 
hallmark of the militia’ - and there seems to be little doubt of a widespread acceptance 
and approval of James II rather than seething disloyalty.39 James inherited the stability 
of his brother’s reign, of which Hutton says ‘the position of the monarchy was 
fundamentally so strong that, only providing he did not show consistent folly, James’ 
control of his realms was never in doubt’.40 Harris affirms that ‘The Restoration 
monarchy was – in theory at least – irresistible.’41  However, Hutton also states that if 
this position was to be threatened, it first had to be undermined from within by the 
actions of the king himself.  By the time of the Monmouth Rebellion in June 1685, 
James might have begun his series of follies that would lead to his overthrow but they 
had not had time between May and June to multiply, to be consistent or to come to 
 312 
 
public attention.  To the militiamen, indeed to the vast majority of the king’s subjects, 
including those of dissenting persuasion, the monarchy was secure and strong. 
However, for James II loyalty was a simpler and more personal affair. He was 
determined that any military force in the country, royal or militia, should be under his 
direct control and loyal to him personally.  It became an obsession as seen in his 
sending authorities to determine the state and loyalty of the militia - such as the Duke 
the Beaufort being dispatched into Wales in 1684 - and his readiness to risk proposing 
that the militia, the perceived mainstay of social control and national defence, was: 
‘not sufficient for such Occasions [as the recent rebellion]’.42  Moreover, having been 
so frequently attacked because of his Catholicism he began to favour Catholic royal 
officers who: ‘always approved the Loyalty’ and he thought them: ‘fit to be employed 
under me, and … that, after having had the Benefit of their Services in such time of 
need and danger, I will neither expose them to disgrace, nor my self to the want of 
them, if there should be another Rebellion to make them necessary to me’.43   
The criticisms of the militia which emanated from the king were founded on 
an assertion that: ‘...there is nothing but a good Force of well-disciplined Troops in 
constant Pay that can defend us...’44 Those under his influence, such as Feversham 
and Churchill, insisted that the militia was not only cowardly, unwilling to obey 
commands and to serve in general, but that it was also antagonistic to royal authority.  
This theme has been developed by later historians into accusations of disloyalty that 
are exaggerated and untrue.  Wolseley states that at Bridport: 
...had Grey behaved with even ordinary courage… there is 
little doubt that many of the militiamen would have openly 
joined him, and the moral effect of this would have been great 
in London as well as in the locality.45 
 
   There is considerable doubt that the militia would have joined Monmouth.  
Colonel Helyer was convinced his men of the Somerset Militia would not: ‘few I 
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believe, will now join that party who are proclaimed rebels...’46   Had men of the 
Dorset Militia harboured ardent feelings of disloyalty to the crown they would not 
have prevented volunteers to the rebel cause from leaving Bridport to join Monmouth 
in Lyme. Indeed, they would probably have encouraged it and they were capable of 
absconding to Monmouth themselves had they wished to do so.  When they were 
attacked they could easily have gone over to Grey as Wolseley suggests, refused to 
fight, or even run away. They did none of these things. 
If Macaulay is to be believed, after the Axminster incident some 90% of the 
Somerset Militia present and half the entire Devon Militia changed sides.  That would 
mean Monmouth’s army received an influx of some 3,000 men, doubling its strength.  
Such an influx of recruits directly after Axminster is not recorded by Wade, who 
noted all significant reinforcements to Monmouth’s army. Wigfield lists those who 
joined between Axminster and Taunton as ‘...80 men of Axminster...Chard Town 
provided 99 recruits; Chardland 58, Combe St. Nicholas 22 and Winsham 8 ... 
Ilminster recruits numbered 54 and a ‘company of ragged horse’... Shoreditch 2.’47  If 
other unrecorded villages also supplied men the number of recruits might reach 350.    
Nor can the inclusion of 3,000 more men be explained by the numbers who joined 
Bovett’s Blue Regiment in Taunton.  Indeed in forming a large body of 600 men so 
quickly, Wade accuses Bovett of bolstering his new regiment by requisitioning all the 
Taunton men from the already-established rebel regiments.  Monmouth and his 
supporters believed that far men more would flock to his banner, and indeed expected 
the majority of the militia to turn their coats.  They did not.  
The militia remained loyal to the king and their officers, and stood and fought. 
These were not professionals, dependant for their livelihood on the king and his 
magnates.  Earle’s work has proved that the majority of West Countrymen who did 
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join Monmouth were capable of making up their own minds and acting upon their 
own decisions, despite the awful retribution that would follow failure.48  The 
militiamen were of the same stock and independent nature.  Woodley states ‘It is 
important to note the republican and the Restoration militia was comprised, as far as 
possible, of men with politically correct views. They were, to this extent, not general, 
but select, politically oriented militia’.49  Moreover, many of those in the ranks would 
have heard of Ware Field or Saffron Waldon, or other great rendezvous of the army 
during the Interregnum, where the democratic voice of the soldiery had been heard.  It 
was the government and the elite who would use such emotive words as ‘disloyalty’ 
and ‘mutiny’. Had the militia been mutinous the men were all capable of acting upon 
their consciences as Somerset militiaman John Coad and perhaps one or two others 
did; but Coad was far from representative of the institution.   The vast majority 
assembled, marched or fought for the royal cause. 
That is not to say that all militiamen were unsympathetic to the rebellion.  
Some did indeed have doubts about continuing their service, especially those with 
dissenter leanings, such as Coad, who wrote:   
After the death of King Charles II and the advance of the 
Duke of York to the Crowne, Popery and arbitrary 
government did more visibly appear in continual and 
unwearied plotting and contriving to weaken the Protestant 
party. This gave us great cause for fear of the subversion of 
our Religion and Liberties, from which we had great hopes of 
deliverance by the Duke of Monmouth’s appearance, 
strengthened by his declaration for the protestant religion and 
liberty.50  
 
Coad, wrote several years after the rebellion and cannot be regarded as wholly 
reliable, but the sentiment of his opening sentence may well express the feelings of 
the more enthusiastic Protestant militiamen as well as growing suspicions in the 
nation at large.  Indeed, not all in the ranks of official bodies were trusted by those set 
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in authority over them.  Axe states that:  ‘The Sheriff of Dorset called out the 12th and 
13th June the Posse Comitatus; but discharged all but the militia, as many of the others 
were badly armed and not to be trusted.’51  Thomas Axe was a dissenting Axminster 
minister, a fanatical anti-Catholic and opposed to central government and its 
instrument the militia.  For him to state that the militia was trusted by the authorities 
carries weight.     
A major aspect of loyalty is a shared cause and an important element in the 
control of men is the sharing of goals and aspirations between leaders and those over 
whom they hold authority. In 1681 Colonel Wyndham of the militia presented an 
address from Salisbury to King Charles II.  It expressed their continuing loyalty and 
their detestation of ‘all popish and phanatical principles and practices, tending to 
sedition and rebellion’. This address was approved by 355 loyal citizens and by the 
companies of clothworkers and barber surgeons.52  He had the support of the people 
of Salisbury which included its militiamen. The city’s loyalty to James II was 
steadfast too.  
Militia officers and men had a shared interest in preventing the outbreak of 
widespread civil unrest and even war: the cry ‘[16]42 is come again’ had a chilling 
resonance.  Equally, they had the shared experience of seizing arms from Catholics 
and breaking up dissenter conventicles in the cause of maintaining the peace.  They 
were assured that their goals would be achieved by taking action against people they 
saw as religious fundamentalists, even though they were fellow West Countrymen.  
They shared a belief which Callow asserts was ‘firmly grounded in the English 
Protestant tradition which had flourished since the late sixteenth century.’53   
In the literature, a lack of animosity between neighbours plays an important 
role in justifying the idea of militia reluctance to fight. The argument is frequently 
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expressed that the men’s supposed disloyalty was attributable to their unwillingness to 
fight their own countrymen. There appears to be a consensus that, ‘the militia and the 
posse comitatus, composed of local men reluctant to fire upon their poor neighbours, 
were clearly unreliable.’54 Despite knowledge of the internecine struggles of the civil 
wars it is also repeated in popular lectures:  
West country militiamen would not fight brother West 
countrymen.  Men from Bridgwater would never raise their 
hands against men from Taunton – against Londoners perhaps 
but not fellow Somerset men.55   
 
A counter argument revolves around local community loyalties.  Reports of 
inter-community rivalry, fighting and public disorder have dominated the news for 
generations and they appear to harness a taste for fighting among the general 
population.  There are some who have voiced the opinion that violence is an English 
trait: ‘Beware the English - a nation with the potential for aggression and violence.’56 
Prior to the seventeenth century, Shakespeare, an astute social commentator, has his 
Henry IV describe his people as, ‘fickle changelings and poor discontents which gape 
and rub at the elbow of hurly-burly innovation… moody beggars, starving for a time 
of pellmell havoc and confusion.’57   
The manifestation of tribal hatred and regional animosity can be seen today at 
local football derbies, which evoke passionate if illogical hatred and engender 
instances of extreme aggression and violent clashes, including stabbings and 
occasional murders.58 These attacks involve the expression of loyalty to a local 
community and institution. For the men of the Restoration militia, the opportunity to 
seize upon an authority-endorsed excuse to attack the men of a nearby community 
may have been tempting.   
The popularity of the idea of the young men of a county militia being reluctant 
to fight is perhaps more of a pastoral idyll than a real reflection of the feelings and 
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attitudes of the 1680s.  During the rebellion two neighbouring towns in North 
Somerset took opposing stands; the men of Burnham supported Monmouth whilst 
those of Huntspill favoured James II.  On 23 May 1687 a victualler, Stephen Wride, 
who had been out for Monmouth, upbraided a man from Huntspill for riding with the 
king’s army. They both gathered supporters and a fight ensued.  Later, on 29 June, 
about a hundred Burnham men attacked the Huntspill Fair.  They carried a bloody 
handkerchief saying they were Monmouth’s colours and set about the Huntspill men 
whom they called ‘papist rogues’.59 There was no reluctance to fight one’s 
neighbours.   
The authorities’ concern for the militia’s loyalty was no greater than their 
worries about the loyalty of the population as a whole, but both were heightened when 
the 1685 crisis brought to a head all the old fears of Whig-fanned exclusionist 
arguments and the fears about the newly crowned Catholic king.  James II became 
obsessed with loyalty, a preoccupation to which he gave free rein when all seemed to 
be crumbling around him in 1688, as a letter to Feversham illustrates:     
... I am obliged to ... endeavour to secure myself the best I can, 
in hopes that it will please God, out of his infinite mercy to 
this unhappy passion, to touch their [my enemies’] hearts 
again with true loyalty and honour. If I could have relied on 
all my troops I might not have been put to this extremity .... 
But though I know there are amongst you very many loyal and 
brave men, both officers and soldiers, yet you know that both 
yourself and several of the general officers of the Army told 
me it was no ways advisable for me to venture myself at their 
head or to think to fight the Prince of Orange with them. And 
there remains only for me to thank you and all those, both 
officers and soldiers, who have stuck to me and been truly 
loyal, and hope you will still retain the same fidelity to me. 
And though I do not expect you should expose yourselves by 
resisting a foreign army and a poisoned nation, yet I hope your 
former principles are so rooted in you, that you will keep 
yourselves free from associations and such pernicious things. 
Time presses me so that I can say no more.         J.R.  
I must add this, that as I have always found you loyal, so you 
have found me a kind master as you shall still find me.   J.R. 60 
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Since the early years of Charles II’s reign it was mandatory for those who held 
civil and ecclesiastical office to swear the usual oaths of allegiance and supremacy, as 
well as additional oaths renouncing all armed resistance to the monarch or those 
acting under his commission.  It was one thing for those who had not sworn such 
oaths to enjoy liberty of conscience, but many of the officers and men in the militia 
would almost certainly have taken them.  Part of the conditions set to demonstrate 
loyalty involved militia officers taking an oath of affirmation that the men concerned 
had taken the holy sacrament in a Protestant ceremony.61  
For those who wished to renounce their sworn loyalty there would be the 
notional rationalisation that an oath sworn to Charles II was not binding under James 
II, or that an oath sworn before a Protestant altar did not extend to the service of a 
Catholic monarch.  However, there are no extant examples of such arguments being 
cited, except by the king himself who, when rebuking Albemarle, reminded him that 
his commission was the gift of his brother, not of himself as ruling monarch.62   
Turning to the events of 1685 it is interesting to note that, where strong local 
leadership associated with the stability of the state was provided, the men of the 
militia remained loyal; fighting under Strangways and Erle at Bridport, campaigning 
under Beaufort at Bristol and with Albemarle at Honiton and Taunton, and mounting 
supporting actions under Pembroke at Norton St. Philip and Sedgemoor. Only when a 
break in the contract over pay or life or death crisis could be coupled with a rumoured 
betrayal by those in authority did a small portion of the militiamen desert, many 
perhaps being motivated by self-preservation, peer pressure or panic rather than 
political disloyalty.63     
Criticism of the militia’s supposed fickle nature owes much to one of their 
officers, Lord Fitzharding, who wrote of his concern and about their ability to stand.  
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Although his worries were articulated, their cause was not.  It was not necessarily 
disloyalty.  In command of an isolated regiment of perhaps between 250 to 450 men, 
Fitzharding would have been understandably apprehensive of facing the rebels, 
known to be around 5,000 strong at that time.64  Perhaps he was also rightly 
suspicious of Somerset’s military ability and his strategy of dividing and dispersing 
the regiments of his militia rather than amassing them in one large county force as 
Albemarle and Pembroke had done with the Devon and Wiltshire Militia respectively. 
‘Tis my humble opinion that all the force of this county should be drawn together in 
Wells, and that orders be despatched accordingly to Colonel Horner’s regiment,’ he 
wrote.65  Colonel Helyer expressed the same concern that he, his inferior officers and 
Colonel Berkeley [Fitzharding] ‘are of the opinion that if the whole force of the 
county be not ordered to march towards us, that perhaps this county may be in 
danger’66  
Despite later romanticising, support for the rebel Duke and his cause in the 
southwest was poor. The country appeared content with the promises made by the 
king and his government to promote toleration and freedom from the extremist 
elements of both Catholicism and non-conformity. Disloyalty among the people may 
have existed: indeed, Deborah Hawkins of Holborn said that if there was a war she 
would ‘put on breeches… to fight for the Duke of Monmouth.’67 But most of country 
was quiet, including the dissenters of Taunton, although the mayor of Bridgwater, 
Robert Hoare, received letters expressing concern over the new king’s ‘too forward 
and ungovernable zeal for Catholicism.’68  Fountainhall, Luttrell, Hutton, Harris and 
Miller, all published authors of works on the reign of James II present no evidence of 
a disaffected militia.   
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Disloyalty may have been latent among some individual militiamen, but not 
within the larger institution.  The established church exerted significant authority in 
local matters and the direct contact between some clergymen and their high-ranking 
militia officer patrons had an influence upon the frequency and severity of the anti-
dissenter activities undertaken by their troops or companies.  For instance, the 
personal chaplain to Colonel Sir Edward Phelipps of Montacute, no friend of 
dissenters, was a strong supporter of the established Anglican Church.69  Most of 
Somerset’s clergy were under the firm control of the pro-royalist Peter Mews, Bishop 
of Winchester (erstwhile Bishop of Bath and Wells), whilst Dorset reflected the views 
of William Gulston, Bishop of Bristol, another arch Anglican Tory.   
There are no recorded incidents of opposition or reluctance to enforce the 
various acts passed to restrict religious dissent.  The militia rounded up and 
imprisoned 200 Quakers in 1662 and in December 1664 five of the nine Dorchester 
nonconformist ministers were in jail on suspicion of being involved in a rising where 
they were joined by another minister and a further 70 lay folk incarcerated for 
nonconformity.70  Throughout the reign of Charles II the militia had loyally done its 
duty and suppressed potential and actual outbreaks of disorder and under Sir Edward 
Phelipps they did so with harsh effectiveness.  There is no reason to suggest they 
would not continue to do so under James II.   
  The militia reflected the general views of the people but the argument that the 
militias of the southwest were inherently disloyal and prone to rebellion is ill-
founded.  Although certain parts of Somerset may have been dissenter strongholds, 
dissent was certainly not universal from Salisbury west to Bodmin. The map of rebel 
support in the West, based upon analysis of the Monmouth Roll, shows an almost 
equal balance in area between those parishes which furnished rebels and those which 
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did not.71 Parishes that did not produce rebels (shown as white irregular blocks) lay in 
swathes to the east and west of the immediate centre of rebellion and even within it 
they are spread across the region like archipelagos of loyalty.  
Illustration 8.2.1: Map of rebel support by parishes. 
 
 
Source:  Clifton. R., The Last Popular Rebellion, The Western Rising of 1685 (Hounslow, Martin 
Temple Smith, 1984), p.250.  
   
 All parishes were required to furnish militiamen and undoubtedly some men did 
not turn out, but there is no reliable evidence to suggest that the western militias were 
below expected strengths upon mustering.  The fact that the southwest was thought a 
region of dissent does not appear to have had a serious impact upon the turnout of the 
militia.  Some militiamen were undoubtedly greatly troubled by their consciences 
over religious concerns, and some as seen above did change sides, but their numbers 
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were few and did not approach those suggested by several contemporary accounts or 
by the reports written and published by the government.  
James II had little to fear if only the most extreme dissenting militiaman could 
find a home in the ranks of Monmouth’s rebels.  Dissenters were few in proportion to 
the total inhabitants of each county but remarks concerning the religious context of 
the militia need also to be seen in context of the religious census reports of the period.   
Table 8.2.1:  The calculated percentage of faiths in county populations in 1676.  
 
County   Catholics Nonconformists Conformists 
Cornwall & Devon  0.25%  1 - 3%   96.75 - 98.75% 
Dorset    0.25 - 0.5% 3 - 4%   95.5 - 96.75%  
Gloucestershire  0.25%  3 - 4%   95.75 - 96.75% 
Hampshire   0.5 - 1% 4 - 5%   94.5 - 95.5% 
Somerset   0.25%  3 - 4%   95.75 - 96.75% 
Wiltshire    0.5 - 1% 3 - 4%   95 - 96.5% 
Source: Browning, A., (ed.), English Historical Documents 1660 – 1714 (London, Eyre &  
Spottiswood, 1953), p.414.  Fractions converted to decimal.  
 
Table 8.2.2: The numbers of various faiths in diocesan areas, 1693. 
Diocese Inhabitants Catholics Nonconformists  Conformists 
Bath & Wells 151,496 176 (0.2%) 5,856 (3.8%)  145,464 (96%) 
Exeter  213,274 298 (0.2%)  5,406 (2.5%)  207,570 (97.3%) 
Gloucester 67,227  128 (0.2%) 2,363 (3.5%)      64,734 (96.3%) 
Salisbury 108,294 548 (0.6%) 4,075 (3.7%)  103,671 (95.7%)  
Winchester 159,809 968 (0.6%) 7,904 (4.9%)  150,937 (94.5%) 
TOTAL 699,098         2,118(0.3%)     24,604 (3.5%)  672,376 (96.2%) 
Source: CSPD.  Census of 1693. pp. 448-450. Calculations drawn from Browning, Ibid. The picture is  
very similar at parish level.  Bishop Burnham’s Census lists the parish of Swindon in Wiltshire as  
containing 578 Anglicans (99.87%), 8 Non-Conformists (0.13%) and no Catholics. 72 
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These figures may be higher than elsewhere in the country thus affording the 
West a greater dissenter population than elsewhere, but in terms of numbers to 
influence the character of the militia it is not significant.  The claim that the whole 
Devon Militia would probably have gone over to Monmouth because of its dissenting 
background can be dismissed as nonsense.  In extrapolating the figures, of 4,000 
militiamen with a top estimate of 3% dissenters the maximum number in the ranks 
would have been around 120.  If those dissenting voices were spread among the six 
regiments of foot and one of horse then each regiment may have contained 17 men, 
about one or two in a company, whose religious opinions may have induced them to 
be disloyal and desert.  Whether they would simply abscond or actually join the rebels 
would be more of a personal decision than a religious one. 
Nor is there any reason to suggest that the charismatic Monmouth’s popularity 
in the West influence matters. Told in Spring 1685 that Monmouth might lead an 
invasion, Phelipps’ Regiment turned out and performed its duty without protest. 
Ardent dissenting militiamen unhappy about resisting the Protestant Duke would, on 
that alarm, have also been struggling with their consciences especially if, like Coad, 
they had ‘great cause for fear of the subversion of our Religion and Liberties, from 
which we had great hopes of deliverance by the Duke of Monmouth’s appearance’.73  
Yet they duly mustered at this false alarm, and did so again in June when called out to 
counter the rebellion. 
Monmouth had been persuaded that he was universally popular in the 
southwest and that not only the people but the gentry and the militia would come over 
to him.  However, he must have been aware of the Tory leanings among many of the 
militia officers such as Phelipps and country gentry such as Winston Churchill, the 
MP for Lyme and father of John Churchill, an up-and-coming royal officer.  The 
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gentry were mostly Anglican, with a few exceptions such as the Thynnes, Speakes 
and Fords, as were the majority of the population from which the militia was drawn.  
There were pockets of dissenters in the population of Somerset, especially in the 
urban areas such as Chard, Frome, Lyme and Taunton and their surrounding villages, 
which had long been non-conformist and had supported of the parliamentarian cause 
in the civil wars.74  But did this cause the militia to waver in its loyalty to the crown? 
Earle suggests that:  
 …this particular area, with its heavy concentration of 
Nonconformity and industrial workers, had been ever since 
1660 the most factious and militant region in the country, with 
the possible exception of London’75.   
 
However, during the mid 1650s the same region was, for the same reason of 
fractious, militant discontent, the target of a cavalier rising.  In 1655 Colonel John 
Penruddock and his rebellion met with initial enthusiasm which soon dwindled away, 
and he himself was captured and executed.  Monmouth was doomed to the same fate. 
The majority of those upon whom both Penruddock and Monmouth relied for a 
massive turnout preferred to stay at home and obey the commands of those in power.  
The numbers of militiamen who turned out in 1685 are very difficult to calculate 
exactly but they far outnumbered Monmouth’s adherents - 7,000 being the most 
optimistic estimate of his strength at the height of his rebellion, he had an estimated 
3,500 at Sedgemoor.  As seen earlier the militias of the six active counties dwarfed 
this number.  
Broadly speaking the nation was royalist and was more disposed towards a 
monarchy than towards a republic.  Monmouth’s declaration and proclamation as king 
at Taunton was an attempt to improve recruitment, especially from among the gentry.  
The rebel army might cheer Monmouth’s claim to the throne but the militia, like the 
majority of the population, generally supported the legitimacy of James II’s claim.  
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The men of the militia were ordered by the king’s instruction to serve, were mustered 
by the king’s lieutenants, wore variations of the king’s uniform, carried the king’s 
colours, drew pay bearing the king’s likeness from taxes gathered by the king’s 
agents, operated according to the king’s laws and the king’s sanctioned military 
regulations and drill books, and, as such, they enacted the king’s will.   
Later in the reign, after James II had alienated many of his Protestant subjects, 
those in his service were still loath to be disloyal.  When William of Orange first 
landed the common council of Exeter published an address against the Dutch.  On 9 
November, even with William before their gates, the Exeter magistrates tried to 
prevent his entry and the city clergy refused to read his Declaration from their 
pulpits.76  During the 1688 campaign political opportunists such as John Churchill and 
William Portman may have deserted the king but very few ordinary soldiers turned 
their coats. Nor is there any evidence to indicate that the remnants of the southwest 
counties’ militia following James’ neglect of them were disloyal until William’s 
success appeared inevitable.  Only then did they change sides and then neither upon 
their own volition nor upon orders of their officers, but under the direction of their 
lord lieutenants.  The Gloucestershire Militia not only remained loyal but fought at 
Cirencester to secure a party of some seventy ‘well appointed men’ under Lord 
Lovelace who were trying to join William.  
On the landing of William of Orange, in 1688, the inhabitants 
[of Cirencester] influenced by the Duke of Beaufort, declared 
for James II; and Lord Lovelace, on his march through the 
town with a party to join the prince, was attacked by Captain 
Lorange of the county militia, made prisoner and sent to 
Gloucester gaol. In this encounter flowed the first blood that 
was shed in the Revolution.77   
 
After James II deserted his army at Salisbury and returned to London, the 
mood of the country and the militia seems to have changed.  The Duke of Norfolk had 
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already raised the militia in East Anglia for William and had occupied Norwich and 
Kings Lynn. 78  Only when Princess Anne the king’s daughter and Prince George of 
Denmark his son-in-law, Churchill, second in command of the army, Viscount 
Cornbury a senior officer, the Duke of Grafton his royal nephew and many other 
leading officers had gone over to William, was the monarch no longer in a position to 
fulfill his office.  Then everybody’s loyalty was dramatically affected not just that of 
militiamen.  At Nottingham, the gentry and commons assembled to justify their 
disloyalty by asserting that James II ‘was always accounted a tyrant that made his 
Will the Law; and to resist such an one [was] no rebellion but a necessary defence.’79 
Under similar terms of self-justification the Dorset Militia was mustered for William 
by the local nobility without any sign of trouble.80 
Despite the accusations of the king and his dependants in the royal army there 
is little evidence and even less poof that the militia harboured any feelings of 
disloyalty in 1685, and it changed sides in 1688 only after most of the leaders of the 
political nation had already done so.  
 
8.3. CONCLUSION.  
Bearing in mind the limitations of a part-time force the Restoration militia carried  
out its duty of providing security against invasion or insurrection effectively.  The 
people’s and the government’s perception of the militia’s purpose may have had a 
difference in emphasis as to which element of this duty was of primary importance 
but both saw them as a necessary body which could respond locally to threat. 
 The expectation that the militia was to deter, counter or contain an invasion 
was met by the West Country militia for years before and during the Monmouth 
crisis.  In 1685 they fulfilled the role of second line troops during the campaign well 
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despite there being friction between one county force and its lord lieutenant.  Perhaps 
coordinated by a royal officer the southwest militias acted in concert to effectively 
contain the rebellion and then gradually to bring about its demise by obliging 
Monmouth to take the desperate gamble of fighting at Sedgemoor.  They certainly 
met the expectation that could deal locally with an insurrection or an invasion albeit 
they were not up against foreign professional soldiers.  They also several undertook 
other duties required by the authorities despite several of them being unpleasant. 
 The militia also proved itself to be loyal to both its officers and its king despite 
ties of community and religion.  The notion that West Countryman would not fight 
West Countryman is a romantic nonsense and in extreme circumstances several 
militia regiments proved themselves more than willing to go into action against the 
rebels.  Similarly religion appears not to have been an influence upon militia loyalty 
or performance and the fear of widespread religious dissent in the ranks provoking the 
men to be disloyal was ill-founded.  Dissenters would normally not have sought 
service in the militia but even if and when they did the overall percentage of potential 
malcontents was insignificant.  Religious dissent meant much to people holding those 
views but seemingly little to the average militiaman; certainly not enough to influence 
the loyalty of the institution. 
The militia proved that they were able to fulfil expectations but as with all military 
units, they needed to be well officered to do so.  The abilities of the country gentry 
appear to have been adequate in this respect, especially at field-officer level.  Even in 
extremis and under fire ‘the officers had with much adoe prevailed with theyre 
souldiers to stand’ and to give volleys.81 At a higher level the lord lieutenants or their 
deputies whether they had military experience or not, conducted the campaign with 
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skill and at times judicious daring, with the notable exception of Charles Seymour, 
Duke of Somerset. 
The Earl of Ailesbury, a steadfast supporter of James II, ‘thought that the militia’s 
“hearts and inclinations were certainly good”,’ whilst Sir Henry Capel said in the 
House that ‘Our security is the militia; that will defend us and Never conquer us’.82  
Both statements illustrate the confidence that members of both houses had in the 
institution, not only to render the nation secure but also to remain loyal and not to 
pose a threat that it would use its might to overthrow the government  
The militia fulfilled its assigned role and carried out the will of its officers and its 
political masters.  There were incidents of individuals and units not performing as 
they should, but in general the militia fulfilled its purpose and maintained its loyalty 
to those who created and commanded it. 
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Chapter Nine 
CONCLUSION 
“…it is difficult to escape the conclusion they were at best paper tigers;    
unreliable, inefficient and certainly not a serious military force.”1 
 
The tradition of a part time military force for the protection of the community was 
established from the earliest times, especially in the role of support troops to the 
warrior elite. This part-time force which complemented the various royal armies also 
acquired civil policing duties to meet threats to law and order, and performed 
adequately in both roles for hundreds of years. Despite inter-unit rivalry the royal 
army and the militia co-existed and at times of national emergency united cohesively 
into a practicable field army, forming a mutually supportive relationship until the civil 
wars blurred the distinction.2  
Following the Restoration differentiation between the militia and royal troops 
was redrawn as political fears resulted in the militia being seen as a counter-balance to 
the royal army.  Despite this however, the roles were sufficiently well defined with 
expectations of service being force-specific and well understood.  That co-operation 
was evident throughout the reign of Charles II.   However, although the militia was an 
effective and necessary part of national defence the West Country militia regiments 
active during the Monmouth Rebellion have a reputation for ineffectiveness, a stain 
affixed to their character with royal sanction if not by royal instigation.  
James II saw a strong affinity between monarch and standing royal army as 
essential to both his and his government’s security. In early 1685, if not earlier the 
king realised that he could hasten the expansion of his royal army by rubbishing the 
militia, and that in order to succeed he had to break the symbiotic relationship that 
existed between them and society. 
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The militia’s ranks were filled by civilians who shared the sentiments, political 
affiliations and consciences of the country’s population but the government of king 
and council, as well as leading Tories in both houses, feared the creation of a Whig 
militia.  Yet the Whig politicians never attempted to undermine it or to turn it from its 
duty. Republican sentiment also existed but it too was not a popular cause in the 
militia.  Overall, the militia remained in favour of stability, which meant espousing 
the establishment stance and being monarchist, pro-Anglican and susceptible to Tory 
guidance.  Militiamen might not have been enthusiastic about some of the duties they 
were called upon to undertake but they were certainly not sufficiently hostile towards 
them to quit their loyalties or their colours.     
To achieve his military aims James II needed to create both an imperative 
requirement for a large standing army and a source of financial savings to fund it. The 
Monmouth Rebellion played into his hands and he used the laxity of the lord 
lieutenant of Somerset, and the failure of his militiamen at Axminster to spearhead a 
general attack upon the institution, to denigrate its effectiveness and perhaps to 
reallocate its funding.3  It is not possible to identify exactly the point at which James 
decided to sacrifice the militia but it seems to have been in May or June 1685, and for 
three years he so neglected it that when threatened by William of Orange’s invasion, 
his attempts to reconstitute and summon it were mostly futile. Much of the evidence 
for James’ criticism of the militia came from senior royal officers with their own nests 
to feather.4  The militia’s cause went unsupported by the very men who should have 
seen the nation’s defence as a priority.  
Being an obstacle to James’ plans to enlarge of his royal army was reason 
enough for the king to neglect the militia’s maintenance, malign its reputation and 
even seek to destroy it.  Although many of his contemporaries did not believe it, 
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James’s political spin created a picture of an ineffective militia and over three years 
changes in its administration and the withholding of its funding naturally changed the 
nature, efficiency and effectiveness of the militia as a body.  The militia of 1688, the 
product of James’s deliberate neglect may well have merited criticism, but it was not 
the militia of 1685 and it is unreasonable to build an argument of militia 
ineffectiveness from material relating to them. 
Part of the people’s preference for the militia over the royal army stemmed 
from the fact that it was under the command of the country nobility and gentry and as 
such it was also an instrument of local authority and an effective agent of social 
control.  Militia officers were intricately bound with ties of loyalty to both the crown 
and the county and were often men who held land and office who were dependent 
upon the established order and social structure for their continued financial well-being 
and position.  They had a vested interest in the preservation of the status quo and also 
belonged to a landowning class where family loyalty was of great concern and 
marriages for family alliance frequent.  Nepotism in the appointment to local offices 
was also widely prevalent amongst these families.5  When it came to the appointment 
of militia officers, social status, financial power and family influence held sway. The 
only concession to professionalism was the choice of muster master who was often a 
veteran soldier who had held rank in the royal forces.  Charles II and his government 
understood and manipulated this network to advantage.  James II did not.   
There is nothing to suggest that any major flaw in command and control 
existed as long as the lord lieutenants and their deputies were diligent in the execution 
of their duties.  The county muster master and the militia regimental colonels 
maintained effective discipline whilst the other militia officers exercised their 
authority within a command structure that mirrored that of the royal army. However, 
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it must be conceded that the willingness of the militiamen to follow the orders of their 
officers depended not only upon their commissions but also owed a great deal to the 
interwoven nature of the governance of the local community. Community-based 
orientation with innate respect for status and obedience to social superiors was an 
important factor in the command and control of the militia.   
Militia officers could not hold their men accountable under military law, 
unless attached to a regular command.  Militiamen were subject to civil jurisprudence 
and answerable to civil authorities even for military infractions but inherent localism 
often ensured that their military officers were the same men to whom, in their civil 
offices, they answered for militia-based misdemeanors.6 However there are few 
references in petty or quarter sessions records of militiamen appearing before justices 
to answer such accusations. 
Similarly although extant lists of names of militiamen and their units are 
plentiful little relating to their occupations survives. Yet there is sufficient evidence to 
show that the majority of men were craftsmen, stockmen and small-holders in the 
rural parishes and tradesmen, manufacturers and shopkeepers in the urban ones, with 
a substantial proportion of them also being contributors.  There is nothing to suggest 
that the ranks were full of unemployed men or known rogues.7   
From the beginning of the reign of Charles II the militia had both a strong 
administrative and military framework. Each county organised its forces in a similar 
manner mirroring the well-established, effective practices and systems of the royal 
army, local authority government and the church.8  Both infantry regiments and 
cavalry troops were raised from the various civil divisions of the counties and were 
based upon a county’s major towns, often being named after a distinguishing colour 
or their commanding officer.9 This system was effective and fit for purpose, and 
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indeed did not undergo major administrative or structural change during the reign of 
William III although unit sizes were increased. 
 Not only was the organisation of the militia effective but so too was its ability 
to turn out in substantial numbers. Finding men was the responsibility of the 
contributors and organising them in files and companies was done by parish and 
hundred constables with the civil authorities ensuring compliance. These methods 
worked with organisation reflecting local identities: a parish mustered alongside 
neighbouring parishes and hundreds formed regional companies and regiments. There 
were abuses of the system, such as absentees, missing weapons or accoutrements, but 
these were easily investigated and punished due to the localised nature of the relevant 
authorities.10  
Localism made administration and muster attendance easier, and it also 
encouraged unit trust which in turn assisted performance. Unit strengths varied 
according to the number of hundreds in each county division and their respective 
abilities to furnish men through the wealth of their inhabitants, but muster masters’ 
certificates show that musters were usually well attended and units achieved expected 
quotas.  In 1685 the militia in the southwest numbered some 20,000 foot and 2,000 
horse and was thus capable of turning out a considerable force when required.11  
None of this or the militia’s ability to function in its allotted role would have 
been possible without efficient funding, pay and supply or an effective means of 
bringing the men into action. The Restoration government shifted responsibility from 
itself to local authorities and contributors.  These contributors could serve unpaid in 
the militia themselves, find substitutes or pay assessed sums to the sheriff’s office as 
Militia Money from which the parish constables had to find men, equipment and their 
pay.12 Parliament empowered the king to raise Militia Money via a separate assessed 
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taxation over a set period and payable in annual tranches, and this was assessed and 
collected effectively.13  The lord lieutenants were also permitted to exact and collect 
an additional tax to fund other military necessities and supplies under the auspices of 
Trophy Money.14 This too was done effectively.  
Although there were attempts by parliament to take financial control by setting 
a national militia rate the local systems of collection and distribution remained 
constant and produced sufficient money to fund the county forces. Magistrates 
quashed any slight resistance that emerged but complaints regarding over-assessment 
were often heard impartially and resolved fairly.15  Legal seizure of transport vehicles 
and draught animals for militia use was the one area where pressure by the authorities 
could be intrusive despite arrangements to pay for such on a hire basis. Nevertheless, 
there was no widespread or organised protest in response to this or the imposition of 
Militia or Trophy Money taxation.  Indeed the militia appears to have been well 
regarded by the civil powers and the people, who showed no hesitation in turning to 
them in a crisis. 
The speed at which militia units were summoned and mustered was 
impressive given the communications and the transport infrastructure of the age.  The 
rallying points for each stage of mustering a county force were known and entire 
county contingents could be drawn together within three days.16  Naturally there 
would have been stragglers but the general speed of assembling was remarkably 
quick, especially when danger threatened.  Invasion threats were rare but more 
frequently there were calls for aid in resisting pirates, containing smugglers, or 
responding to summonses to search suspected properties for weapons. These seem to 
have all met with the same rapid response.   
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To be effective military units have to be fit for service and be available to 
undertake operations when ordered.  This thesis has shown that the militia was indeed 
available, whilst their training made them able to perform as required.  The men of the 
Restoration militia did not regard militarism as an anathema and attended training 
musters willing.  Although the specific drill books used by the muster masters cannot 
be proved they are very likely to have been the same as those employed in the royal 
army and inspection reports testify to their satisfactory employment.  Payment and the 
chance to socialise were of course inducements to attend but training was also a 
government requirement with the lord lieutenants charged with ensuring it took place 
and that it was effective.   
During the Monmouth emergency thanks to their rapid assembly and delays in 
receiving orders the men had time to drill and practice operating in larger formations 
before marching, and once joined with the royal army, Feversham ensured that they 
practiced working as part of the combined force.  Some inefficiency was noted but the 
more energetic lord lieutenants were quick to identify and rectify it, even in the face 
of ambiguous or even contradictory government instructions.17  Inspections and 
assessments of military proficiency repeatedly record satisfaction by those in 
authority and other observers.  They also indicate the level of drill and types of 
complex manoeuvres the men in both the foot and the horse were able to perform.18  
Discipline does not appear to have been a problem within the militia. No 
instances of formal complaints against militia officers have been found although it is 
known that one and possibly more martinets existed.19 Officers did not doubt the 
effectiveness of their trained militiamen although at times reservations were expressed 
regarding new recruits.20 Unlike royal troops the militia did not receive full time 
training but it succeeded in achieving a level of proficiency that was acceptable to 
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contemporary authorities, and evidence from William III’s reign indicates a strong 
desire to return the militia to the level of effectiveness that it had achieved prior to 
James II’s deliberate neglect.21   
The militiamen may have been proficient but in order to be thought of as a 
proper military body by the people they needed to resemble the royal soldiers that the 
public might have seen. When assembled the militia regiments paraded with drums, 
colours and all the impedimenta of a royal fighting force which was funded centrally 
by Trophy Money.  Whilst the wearing of uniform may not have followed a specific 
universal code it was widespread and generally emulated the royal army’s dress. This 
was especially true amongst officers whose position in society made it imperative that 
they were not outshone by their royal counterparts.22 An established tradition of 
wearing uniform coats was continued by the Restoration militia in increasing 
numbers, although it did not become universal until William III’s reign.  Many of the 
West Country militia regiments of 1685 had uniform coats and equipment and to 
those who saw them they would have provided a visually powerful image of soldiery 
whilst their military appearance and bearing suggested to bystanders that they were 
indeed an effective body.23  
During the Monmouth Rebellion the various militia forces covered the 
required march distances without major problems.  There were no recorded incidents 
of late arrivals or large numbers of stragglers, nor any disorderly or slovenly marches.  
The Wiltshire Red Regiment comfortably exceeded expected daily mileages even in 
comparison with royal troops and the same unit showed an ability to launch an 
unexpected lightning strike at an objective by mounting infantrymen behind 
troopers.24 The West Country militia could march effectively when called to do so.  
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  The campaign role of the militia was to contain an invading force close to its 
landing point, or a rebellion to its area of inception until the arrival of royal forces and 
subsequently to co-operate with them by securing strategic objectives or by 
supporting field operations as a second line reserve.  During the Dutch Wars the 
militia responded well to foreign threats and throughout the age to those of pirates.25  
Lack of intelligence prevented the militias from resisting Monmouth’s landing but 
they responded quickly and after an initial setback at Axminster were able to fulfil 
their role of seizing strategic objectives whilst containing the rebellion within 
Somerset.  The Duke of Somerset’s distribution of his force in penny packets 
permitted the rebels to march unchecked through Somerset but other militias were far 
better handled.  The militia forestalled potential risings in major towns and cities, 
undertook raids and scouting duties, denied Monmouth use of major roads and 
bridges, obliged him to abandon his attempt on Bristol and forced him to retire 
westward.  During the latter part of the campaign they manoeuvred to gradually hem 
in the rebel army, drawing the net around it ever tighter as it retreated.  They were 
effective in rapidly re-entering places vacated by the rebels thereby re-establishing 
royal control. They also severed Monmouth’s communications with his main areas of 
support and adroitly prevented reinforcements and aid reaching the rebels.   
Although not a primary requisite of second line troops, when required to do so 
the militia fought effectively. The actions in which militia troops were involved were 
by no means big battles and were not fought against professional troops but the men 
stood, did not run, and often gained the upper hand.  The accusation that the militia 
were unreliable and were kept in the rear during action is mainly based on ill-
informed opinion rather than fact. The Wiltshire Militia’s posting at Middlezoy, two 
miles east of Westonzoyland, was a billeting solution not the result of their being 
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deemed ineffective.26  They also assembled quickly and marched forward to take part 
in the action on Sedgemoor and their contribution as the reserve was praised by the 
commander-in-chief.27 Similarly several militia units that were involved in fighting, 
notably the Dorset Militia at Bridport and the Wiltshire Militia at Frome, were able to 
march the next or even the same day, thereby demonstrating a remarkably effective 
rate of post-action recovery.  Even that part of the Somerset Militia which fled at 
Axminster was able to rapidly regroup and return to active duty.28   
Prior to the events of 1685 the militia proved more than adequate when 
supporting royal troops to resist foreign threats and were effective in controlling 
dissenter opposition. As second-line troops, they provided the means whereby 
national land-based security could be had at minimal cost and during the Monmouth 
Rebellion not only did they co-operate in the royal campaign of containment but their 
very presence dissuaded potential rebellious factions from mobilising. All of this was 
conducted at the expense of local authorities and inhabitants, with minimal charge to 
government funds. The Restoration militia adequately fulfilled its purpose of being 
the protectors of the state in war and peacetime and was held in a degree of esteem for 
doing so, and yet those in power remained constantly concerned about their loyalty. 
Control of the militia and the maintenance of its loyalty were continuing 
political issues throughout the seventeenth century and crossed several of the fault-
lines of the age: the tensions between king, parliament and army; Tory and Whig; 
centralism and localism; country versus court factions; and between conformity and 
dissent.  The first Restoration Parliament tried to make a definitive statement by 
placing the militia directly under the king but circumstances soon revived the debate.  
Although there is no real evidence for it these debates helped foster an underlying 
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perception that the militia, although capable of doing what was required, did so 
unwillingly. 
Despite a popular misconception that the West Country with its high 
proportion of dissenting residents was ripe for resistance to the commands of a 
Catholic king, a study of religious affiliation reveals that the numbers of both 
Catholics and Non-Conformists in these counties and cities were relatively small and 
that corresponding numbers in the militia would have been inconsequential.29  The 
idea that religious convictions made the militia deliberately and wilfully obstructive to 
the orders and policies of James II has been shown to be false.  To ensure loyalty to 
the Anglican faith, as well as reliability of service to the established ecclesiastic order, 
the church maintained sufficient influence through the pulpit and the chaplains who 
attended the militia’s senior officers.  There was the occasional extremist who might 
have deserted the ranks of the militia on religious grounds but they were very few.  
The situation was further improved by changes in government policy which resulted 
in fewer calls upon the militia to enforce the Clarendon Code.   
The contemporary concept of loyalty was complex in that it embraced several 
constituent aspects, including national, local and family identities as well as political 
allegiance and religious persuasion.  Given James II’s dislike of anything other than 
immediate and complete compliance and his already strong preference for an enlarged 
royal army, he was quick to identify the militia with opposition factions. His 
dissatisfaction with the militia was fanned by senior royal officers who saw 
advancement in curtailing the militia and by politicians anxious to be seen supporting 
the king. 
No evidence has been found to show that the militia harboured any desire to 
go over to Monmouth. Apart from a very small but well-publicised number of 
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incidents of individual coat-turning, it remained loyal to the king and its officers 
whilst campaigning for the royal cause. Perhaps many militiamen retained silent 
sympathies for Monmouth’s Protestant/Whig affiliation and were wary of James’ 
popery, yet the overwhelming majority remained loyal, and three years later several 
militia units remained faithful to James even when his senior army commanders and 
many royal troops deserted him.30 There are no recorded incidents of mutiny amongst 
the militia, even when its members were treated badly by authorities who withheld 
pay: commanders reported only a quasi ‘work to rule’ rather than wanton 
disobedience. Accusations of fickle loyalty in the field stemmed from extraordinary 
circumstances rather than inherent disloyalty.  
However, two aspects associated with the nature and operation of the militia 
prevented it from being deemed equal to the royal army. Firstly, it mustered for very 
short periods of time after which the men returned to their civilian occupations.  It had 
no permanent billeting accommodation, no regimental home and places in the ranks 
could be substituted at will.  Although militiamen could establish a unit identity and a 
degree of cohesion unlike the royal troops they were never together long enough to 
hone it to a sharp cutting edge. For all their drill and training they remained ad hoc 
units.  Secondly by dint of parish call-up individuals must have known neighbours 
and others who stood in the ranks alongside them, but there was no large corps of 
trusted comrades. Travel in the 1600s was limited amongst the social classes that 
made up the ranks of the militia with only journeymen leaving their parishes on a 
regular basis.  There was little opportunity to create ‘mutual trust and inter-
dependency which forge the bonds of mateship’, an important factor amongst fighting 
men and regarded by many soldiers as the one factor that keeps men in action when 
reason and personal survival instincts tell them to run.31  Denied such core elements, it 
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would be unreasonable to expect militiamen to perform like royal units under fire.  
Although the fighting at Bridport proved their ability to stand their ground in action, 
this had been achieved in a very favourable position against a foe of limited ability, 
and at Frome the enemy did not possess even the rudimentary organisation and 
discipline of the rebel army.  
Returning to reputation, in 1685 many of the men called out may not have 
regarded Monmouth’s invasion as a national emergency. They faced a rabble of 
fellow English co-religionists led by a popular English figurehead, not an invasion by 
a French or Spanish army of Catholic foreigners.  It was regarded as a threat and as 
such merited hostile action, but it was not one which was likely to engender intense 
passions.  
However, no matter how ill founded fear of the potential for the militia to rise 
remained. Wariness bred resentment and the image of a steadfast and effective militia 
was contradicted by a few well-publicised if misrepresented events.  However few, 
these incidents were enough to warrant censure but the individuals who condemned 
them were either non-military men such as the Reverend Paschall, who failed to grasp 
the concept of comradeship born of regular service, or officers such as Feversham and 
Churchill, who had to consider their careers in the king’s royal army.32  
Contemporary comments denigrating the militia were heavily outnumbered by 
satisfactory reports, factual statements of achievements and thanks for service – even 
from the king.  Criticism of the militia was derived from a false expectation that they 
should behave like first-line  troops, fanned by both unwitting bias and outright 
partisanship, all bolstered by a prejudice born of self-interest.  
  The modern perception of the late seventeenth-century militia is a blend of 
cultural memories based on the limited research of Victorian historians, unhistorical 
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illustration work of political cartoonists and satirists in the eighteenth century.  The 
situation is compounded by writers uncritically repeating secondary sources when the 
subject matter it is not central to their research.    
Many elements have to be taken into consideration before a judgment 
regarding the effectiveness of the militia can be reached. When a body of hitherto 
unused evidence is examined, the holistic picture of the militia that emerges provides 
sufficient evidence for questioning established perceptions.  Deliberately obfuscated 
evidence has previously been taken at face value and the criteria by which the 
seventeenth-century militia has heretofore been judged have been inappropriately 
influenced by an evaluation made out of time and context. The contention of this 
thesis is therefore that on the basis of the evidence discovered the reputation of an 
ineffective militia is ill-founded.  
Certain aspects concerning the historiography and the contextualising of the 
militia merit further work.  A study of those other militias which also mustered during 
the 1685 emergency might be undertaken to determine if they too meet the criteria for 
effectiveness.  Further work might also encompass the militias of the rest of England, 
Scotland and Wales over a larger period so as to establish a nationwide picture rather 
than one centred upon Southwest England.   
Other aspects of this work which could be developed include: 
• An examination of the influence exerted upon historians by the 
behaviour and practices of the militia of their own age. For example, it 
would be interesting to discover the opinion Macaulay held of the 
militia of his day to determine if he was perhaps predisposed to 
associating the militia of the Monmouth Rebellion with any ineptitude 
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and poor morale he ascribed to his contemporaries.  Did he project his 
own values onto his interpretation of the source material?  
• A comparison of similarities and differences between the militia of the 
1680s and the modern Territorial Army seeking to complement the 
work of Schwoerer and Strachan.33  A study of the relationship 
between the modern regular and territorial armies could attempt to 
draw comparisons between the royal army and militia of the 
Restoration period.  The current debate concerning the role of second 
line troops in the field, and the extent to which part-time soldiers can 
take their place in the front line alongside regulars, is the source of 
investigative studies of modern practice.34 
• An investigation of the manufacture of armour for militia troops and 
where they may have been made.  This was deemed too tangential for 
the current work, especially given the inability of both the Royal 
Armouries and the Worshipful Guild of Armourers and Braziers to 
locate any records pertaining to militia armour for the period, and the 
lack of specific county order books.    
• A study of improvements introduced by William III to counter the 
neglect of James II, how these were implemented, what they achieved 
and their effect.    
Whilst undertaking this work amid collections of original source documents 
held in local county libraries and record offices, one major obstacle arose worthy of 
note. Frustratingly, the National Archives at Kew contested the very existence of the 
Restoration militia.  Their public service handout, Military Records Information 2, 
last updated on 28 June 2004, states that ‘after the Civil War, the militia was in 
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abeyance until 1757’. On 20 November 2008, the duty archivist dealing with 
enquiries reaffirmed the use of the word ‘abeyance’ as meaning ‘it did not exist’ and 
further asserted that the institution would hold no records pertaining to non-existent 
bodies.35 
Another obstacle, albeit of a minor nature, was encountered with the Royal 
Library at Windsor Castle.  The author was told that the illustrator Bob Marrion, 
whose work was used in chapter six, had in the past been granted access to a 
collection item known as James II’s Colour Book. The work depicts the regimental 
uniforms of that reign and from it he gathered his specialist information.  The author 
made several attempts to contact the library without success, but Professor Richard 
Holmes replied to an appeal for support by stating: ‘There is effectively nothing you 
can do.  Windsor had a policy of not helping doctoral students, and I suspect this has 
not changed.’36  Consequently references to that work do not include a call number.  
However, this investigation hinges upon the declared intention in chapter one 
of evaluating the 1685 militia against a set of specified criteria of effectiveness. If the 
militia was effective then evidence of it having fulfilled them has to be demonstrated.  
This thesis has examined the historical purpose and context of the militia during the 
period specified as well as its relationship with society and these criteria have been 
tested against collected evidence. The militia was found to have an undoubted 
existence, an adequate organisation, with satisfactory recruitment and turnout at 
musters.  It was able to come into operation efficiently thanks to a workable funding 
system ensuring the men were paid and reasonably supplied.  More than adequate 
systems of summoning existed and in times of emergency the men showed a 
commendable readiness by responding reasonably quickly to calls upon them for 
duty. The men were available for service, adequately trained and proficient in both 
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drill and discipline. With an adequate supply of uniform, equipment and weapons the 
militia maintained the appearance and bearing of soldiers and was impressive as a 
body.  More importantly, its men showed that they could march, achieve campaign 
objectives, even fight when required and indeed recover their order, morale and 
general state of readiness after action. The militia understood and complied with its 
terms of service and its contract with society, and, in obeying orders and remaining 
loyal to its officers and the king, the militia achieved the desired effect for which it 
was raised and fulfilled its purpose as required by legislation.  
Evidence proves that the militia not only met the criteria for military 
effectiveness but also took an active part in containing and suppressing the Monmouth 
Rebellion, and should, therefore, be deemed to have been effective.  It was an 
effective military body which did not deserve the reputation for gross inefficiency and 
disloyalty that its king heaped upon it in his machinations to increase his royal army. 
Equally the view of an ineffective West Country militia advanced by current literature 
should be revised. 
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APPENDIX 1. 
 
Wiltshire and Swindon History Centre, Chippenham, Wiltshire.  490/1410 
 
A handwritten manuscript comprising nine sheets of folded cartridge paper folded and 
stitched into a small 3x9 ins booklet of thirty six sides containing lists of names by 
company, hundred and parish plus a summary of totals. 
 
List of Reg.t at Monmouths rising 
J: Wyndham Colonell 
J: Young Lieut.t Colonell 
Wm Hearst Major 
3 blank sides 
 
Wilts 13th June 1685 
 
Coll.s  Company 
 
John Wyndham Esq.r Colonell 
Gyles Wastfield Gentl Lieut.t  
Peter Harvy Gentl Ensign 
 
Rob.t Godfry    } 
W.m Watts        }Serj.ts  
………………..   } 
 
Rob.t Wheeler   } 
Adam Wheeler  }  Drum.rs   
Rob.t  Hooke     } 
 
Alderbury Hundred
 
Alderbury. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
John Bungy 
Rich.d Bungy 
Wm Tubb 
Tho.s Pilgrim 
Tho.s White 
 
Idmiston. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
Tho.s Bath 
Nich.s Yates 
Tho.s London 
 
Laverstock & Ford. . . . . . . 5 
 Geo.e Welsh 
 Henry Grey 
 Tho.s Exford 
 Roger Croutch 
Tho.s Holloway 
Pitton & Farley. . . . . . . . . 4 
 David Baily 
 Edw.d Matthews 
 Steph.n Asher 
 Elisha Cooper 
 
Plaitford. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
Edm.d Coward 
 Henry Henbury 
 Rich.d Brice 
 John  Rose 
 
Porton & Gumbleton. . . . 2 
 Timothy Grace 
 Rich.d Lywood 
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West Dean and   
East Grimstead. . . . . . . . . . 4 
 W.m Hatfield 
Tho.s Futcher 
W.m Bell 
W.m Staples 
 
West Grimstead 
And Whadden. . . . . . . . . . .4 
 Rich.d Coborne 
Rich.d Harwood 
Edw.d Foot 
John Mullens 
 
Winterborne Dauntsey. . . . 2 
 Geo.e Stout 
 Rich.d Willis 
Winterborne Earles 
and Hurcott. . . . . . . . . . 2 
 Rich.d Hayter 
 Tho.s Dowse 
 
Winterborne Gunner 
and Sherborrow . . . . . . 5 
 John Martin 
 Nich.s Taylor 
 Rich.d Hillyer 
 W.m Bennett 
W.m Bower 
 
West Winterslow. . . . . . 2 
 W.m Rowe 
W.m Bailand 
 
 
Chalke Hundred
 
Alvedeston. . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
 Rob.t Adlum 
 Rob.t Toomer 
Tho.s Toomer 
 W.m Small 
 
Berwick St. John. . . . . . . . 4 
 Nich.s  Lucas 
 Peter Kendall 
 Rich.d Barrett 
 Tho.s Randoll 
 
Bower Chalke. . . . . . . . . .8 
 Christop.r Charles 
 Geo.e Hardman 
 James Lidford 
 John Viny 
 Rob.t Serjeant 
 Henry Golden 
 Tho.s Sanger  
W.m Shergoll 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Broad Chalke. . . . . . . . . 9 
 Barthol King 
 David Erwood 
Edw.d Osmund 
Tho.s Gilbert 
Rich.d Wagg 
Tho.s Fisher 
W.m Fox 
W.m Merchant 
Lawrence Harvy 
 
Ebbesborne Wake. . . . . . . 4 
 W.m Browne 
 Oliver Price 
 Tho.s Barrett 
 Tho.s Scamell 
 
Tilfield. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 
 John Ingam 
 
Tollard Royall. . . . . . . . . 6 
 Ambrose Purchase 
 James Thompson 
 Geo.e Barnes 
 John Skinner 
 W.m Card – Corporall 
 W.m Lucas 
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Semley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 
Geo.e Marsh 
John Grey Sen.r  
John Rivers 
W.m Haskell 
Rich.d Parsons 
John Lee 
Samuel West 
John Blandford 
James Britle 
W.m Grey Jun.r 
John Grey Jun.r 
Benj. Blandford 
W.m Merchant 
Sam.l Blandford 
John Skinner 
Joseph Turgis 
Tho.s Merchant 
Tho.s Jones 
Walker Merchant 
 
Stoake. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
 Cha.s Savage 
 Tho.s Johnson
 
 
Swanborrow Hundred 
 
Alton Barnard. . . . . . . . . . . 2 
 Rich.d Rogers 
 W.m More 
 
Beachinstoake. . . . . . . . . . . 3 
 Joseph Cox 
 W.m Deere 
 Henry Marsh 
 
Charleton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
 W.m Hendy 
 Roger Coleman 
 
Huish. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 
 Tho.s Chandler 
 
Manigford Abbotts. . . . . . .3 
 Barnaby Binnock 
 Peter Smith 
 Michael Pike 
 
Maningford Bohn. . . . . . . 3 
 Rich.d Blake 
 Ralph Palmer 
 Geo.e Waite 
 
Maningford Bruce. . . . . . 4 
 John King 
 John Stevens 
 Roger Lie 
 Dan.l Alexander 
 
 
 
Russell. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
 Edw.d  Wallen 
 Edw.d Abethell 
 Osmond Rickett 
 
Staunton Bernard. . . . . . 4 
 W.m Head 
 W.m Liddell 
 W.m Smith 
 Rob.t Townsend 
 
Wilcott, Ware 
and Draycott. . . . . . . . . 5 
 John Durnford 
 Soloman Durnford 
 Anthony Iles 
 Char.s Liddall 
Rich.d Russell 
 
Wilsford. . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
John Gilbert 
Walter Turner 
John Oram 
 
Woodborough. . . . . . . .5 
 John Stratton 
 John Smith 
 Rich.d Sellwood 
 W.m Macklan 
 John Bartlett 
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Uphaven. . . . . . . . . . . 7 
 Anthony Lany 
 Anthony Palmer 
 Edw.d Woodby 
 Jasper Jarvis 
 John Furnage 
 W.m Jones 
Geo.e Holmes 
 
North Newton 
and Hulcott. . . . . . . . 4 
 Ambrose Tucker 
 Sam.l Deere 
  W.m Snoswell 
 John Johnson 
     ___ 
     148 
 
John Young Esq.r Lieut.t Coll. 
Will.m Turner Gentl Lieut.t  
Hampton Jay Gentl Ensign 
 
John Barford    } 
W.m Parker    }  Serj.ts  
 
W.m Bishop   } 
Adam Wheeler  }  Drum.rs   
 
Amesbury Hundred 
 
Allington. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
 John Dyer 
 Rich.d Croomes 
 W.m Newby 
 James Bryant 
 
Brigmiston 
And Milton. . . . . . . . . . . . .3 
 Edw.d Biddlecome 
 Edw.d Peck 
 W.m Hilliar 
 
Bulford. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
 Tho.s Sturgis 
 W.m Sturgis 
 
Compton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
 Rob.t Fry 
 W.m Richards 
 
Kingston Deverill. . . . . . . 3 
 John Frampton 
 W.m Buston 
 W.m Scamell 
 
 
 
 
Durnford Magna. . . . . . . . 9 
 Andrew Waters 
 Anthony Waters 
 Edw.d Waters 
 Henry Rawlins 
 John Carter 
 John Dowling 
 Tho.s Vincent 
Tho.s Waters 
 W.m Waters 
 
Durrington. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
 Geo.e Ford 
 W.m Brunsdon 
 Rich.d Haydon 
 
Cholderton. . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 
 Tho.s Porter 
 Timothy Humphry 
 Rich.d Talbott 
 
East & West Boscombe. . . .2 
 Walter Hart 
 Alex: Miller 
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Fildean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
 John Marshman 
 John Holmes 
 John Newman 
 John Whitlock 
 Roger Weeks 
 Cha.s Wills 
 Wm Holmes 
 
Great & Little 
Amesbury. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
 Francis Edmonds 
 John Pitman 
 John Woodford 
 Tho.s Syer 
 John Croaker 
 Anthony Philpott 
 Rob.t  Syer 
 
Ludgershall & 
Burden’s Dean. . . . . . . . . . 4 
 John Newman 
 Tho.s Cook 
 Edw.d Flory 
 Jeffery Butler 
 
Newton Toney. . . . . . . . . . 4 
 John Cherke 
 W.m Hoggett 
 Tho.s Olden 
 Rich.d Scamell 
 
Oakingham, Hurst 
& Swallowfield. . . .  . . .15 
 Rich.d Ham 
 John Gifford 
John Tinham 
W.m Tinham 
Tho.s Wheeler 
James Backford 
Tho.s Elliott 
Henry Wheeler 
W.m West 
John Randy 
Rob.t Syer 
Tho.s Lie 
John Bradford 
W.m Bishop 
W.m Parker 
 
West Wellow. . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
 John Kent 
 James Palmer 
 Tho.s Munday 
 
East Winterslow. . . . . . . . . 2 
 Edw.d Windsor 
 W.m Parnell 
 
Marden. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
 John Tew 
 Tho.s Woodhams 
John Wilmott 
John Lacy 
 
 
Part of Elstubb & Everly Hundred 
 
Alton & Stowell. . . . . . . . . 3 
 W.m Head 
 Rob.t Lacy 
 Roger Lamborne 
 
Collingborne Ducis. . . . . .6 
 Henry Moore 
 John Dudman 
 Rob.t Carpenter 
 Rob.t Smith 
 W.m Newman 
W.m Lawrence 
 
 
 
Buston. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
 W.m Wheeler 
 Rich.d Phillips 
 Rob.t Hamond 
 
LittleHinton. . . . . . . . . . . 6 
 Henry Sheppard 
 W.m Swift 
 Rich.d Lacy 
 Anthony Tarvy 
 John Hinton 
 Rob.t Peircy 
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Overton & Hilfield. . . . . .5 
 Cha.s Coocke 
 Edm.d Pennycourt 
 Rob.t Green 
 Tho.s Bisley 
 Christop.r Lacy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wroughton. . . . . . . . . . . .7 
 Rich.d Gilmore 
 Jos: Beastly 
 Tho.s Cope 
 John Wilkes 
 John Snow 
 …………… 
 
Westwood & Ford. . . . . . 4 
 John Dagger 
 W.m  Dagger 
 John Smith 
John Harman 
 
William Hearst Esq.r Major 
Daniel Hunt Gentl Lieut.t  
Peter Burgoine Gentl Ensign 
 
Edw.d  Phillips   } 
Tho.s Stevens     }Serj.ts  
 
John Keele        } 
Rob.t  Parker     }  Drum.rs   
 
Cawden & Cadworth Hundred 
 
Barford S. Martin. . . . . . . . 8 
 Edw.d Vaughan 
 John Atkins 
 John Rowden 
 Henry Jeffery 
 Geo.e Norris 
 Rich.d Goodfellow 
 Rob.t  Hartford 
 James Carpenter 
 
Baberstock. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
 Leonard Bony 
 
Bramshire. . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 
 John Pointer 
 John Chaper 
 John Turner 
 Antho: Willsnow 
 John Pointer Jun.r 
 Edw.d Lucas 
 
 
 
 
Britford. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 
 Stephen Bancks 
 Guy Waterman 
 John Baily 
 John Grumbleton 
 Edw.d Grant 
 Rich.d Russell 
 John Eaton 
 John Oliver 
 
Comb Bissett. . . . . . . . . .7 
 W.m Hibbert 
 Rich.d Palmer 
 Tho.s Luxon 
 W.m Lipps 
 John Barber 
 Andrew Brine 
 Andrew Russell 
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Eastharnham. . . . . . . . 3 
 Matthew Burgess 
 Moses Blake 
 John Vincent 
 
Foffant. . . . . . . . . . . . .10 
 John Petty 
 Edw.d Barker 
 Henry Turner 
 Christop.r Coretnance 
 John Feltham 
 John Lambert 
 Christop.r Sheppard 
 Rich.d Barter 
 W.m Barter 
 Edw.d Gasper 
 
Hummington. . . . . . . . . . 4 
 Tho.s Bodenham 
 John Harris 
 W.m Davis 
 W.m Swift 
 
Netherhampton. . . . . . . . 4 
 W.mPorter 
 Stephen Batten 
 John Bacon 
 Jocab Pasmore 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Odstock. . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
 John Lacy 
 Tho.s Clarke 
 Geo.e Chubb 
 Rich.d Monday 
 
South Burcombe. . . . . . 3 
 Rob.t Tew 
 John Moore 
 Sam.l Waterlane 
  
Stratford Toney. . . . . . .3 
 John Driest 
 John Street 
 John Broome 
  
Sutton Mandiville. . . . . . . .7 
 W.m Leslead 
 Geo.e Barrow 
 Edw.d Sheppard 
 Nich.s Hawkins 
 Tho.s Jay 
 W.m Marshman 
 
Westharnham. . . . . . . . . . 4 
 Rob.t Ward 
 Weeks Marke 
 Christop.r Randoll 
 W.m Jeffery 
 
Whitsbury. . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
 John Card 
 John Clerke 
 Silvester Scott 
 John Stephens 
 Henry Hatchett 
 
 
Underditch Hundred 
 
Great Woodford. . . . . . . .4 
 John Jipley 
 Nich.s Piercy 
 John Down 
 Tho.s Monday 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Little Woodford. . . . . . . .4 
 W.m Burrow 
 Isaac Detre 
 Tho.s Macksell 
 W.m Underhill 
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Milford. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
 Francis Watts 
 Lawrence Mitehell 
 Marke Silence 
 Stephen Brownjohn 
 W.m Misson 
 
 
 
Startford, Dean & Comon. 3 
 Arthur Culley 
 John Piercy 
 Rich.d Dowling 
 
Wilsford & Lake. . . . . . . . .1 
 John Smith 
      ___ 
       94 
 
Gabriel Ashby Esq.r Capt.n  
Thomas Stevens Gentl Lieut.t  
Edw.d Naish Gentl Ensign 
 
John Bacon     } 
John Meggs       }  Serj.ts  
 
And.w Littlefield } 
John Bevois       }  Drum.rs   
 
 
Downton Hundred 
 
Bishopston. . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gyles King 
Rob.t  
Hibbert 
Tho.s Holmes 
Tho.s Annett 
Nich.s Hall 
John Morris 
Matth.w Butt 
Francis Lodge 
Rich.d Ragland 
John Wheeler 
Tho.s Lanham 
Rich.d Talbott 
 
Bottenham & Nunton . . . . 6 
 Tho.s Elkins 
 Rob.t Daniel 
 Rich.d Blake 
 W.m Perrier 
 W.m Tivitoe 
 Edw.d Lively 
 
 
 
 
Charleton. . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 
 Roger Elkins 
 Tho.s Adams 
 James Ford 
 George Hobb 
 John Horse 
 Rich.d Crofts 
 Rowl.d Crofts 
 John Wiltshire 
 
Downton Burrough . . . . . .2 
 John Meggs 
 John Coock 
 
Church Tything. . . . . . . . .5 
 David Dove 
 W.m Littlecott 
 Tho.s Webb 
 W.m Gyles 
 John Newman 
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East Downton. . . . . . . . . .8 
 Henry Welstead 
 W.m Newman 
 John Smth 
 Rich.d Dove 
 James Symmons 
 James Thring 
 W.m Flaskett 
 John Bacon 
 
Fonthill Bishop. . . . . . . . 3 
 Joseph Stone 
 Tho.s Bendall 
 John Edwards 
 
 
Week & Newcourt. . . . .6 
 John Lamb 
 Patrick Worly 
 W.m Fulford 
 Ambrose Figg 
 Ellis Noise 
 James Fry 
 
 
 
 
 
Thustfield Hundred 
 
Abbotslong & Alderston. . . 2 
 And.w Littlefield 
 W.m Rowell 
 
Cowsfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
 W.m Hawker 
 Tho.s Atwell 
 
 
 
 
Landford. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 
Henry Batchelor 
 Roger Martin 
 Tho.s Andrews 
 
Whelply. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 
 John  Abbott 
 John Hill 
 John Loach 
 W.m Elcock 
 Tho.s Andrews 
 
Part of Elstubb & Everly Hundred 
 
Coome, Littlecott 
and Longstreet. . . . . . . . . . 3 
 Benj. Diaper 
 Owen Furmage 
 John Down 
 
Entford. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 
 Rich.d Barlow 
Tho.s Ranger 
Tho.s Hiscock 
John Palmer 
W.m Tarrant 
 
Everly. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .5 
 Rich.d Potter 
 Moses Green 
W.m Deere 
W.m Smith 
W.m Ward 
 
Fiddleton and 
Hackleston. . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
 Henry Reeves 
 Tho.s Diaper 
 John Sopp 
 John Bevois 
 
Netherhaven. . . . . . . . . . . .7 
 John Sutton 
W.m Spratt 
Francis Filmore 
Nathan.l Silverhouse 
David Morris 
Rich.d Blackmore 
Edw.d Hatchman 
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Patney. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
 Edw.d Harris 
 Gilbert Drewett 
 John Deere 
 Tho.s Palmer 
Will.m Gittins 
 
Stockton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
Tho.s Stevens 
Mich.l Beckett 
James Hopkins 
 
Chisonbury de la Folly. . . .4 
 B…….. Fleman 
 W.m Bungy 
W.m Coleman 
 
Chisonbury Priory. . . . . . . 2 
 John Chork 
 W.m Bradford 
 
   ___ 
   100 
 
 
John Davenant Esq.r Capt.n  
Edward Hearst Gentl Lieut.t  
W.m Wastfield Gentl Ensign 
 
Stephen Gibb     } 
Isaac Wilson      }  Serj.ts  
 
John Porter       } 
Henry Hatchett }  Drum.rs   
 
Branch & Dole Hundred 
 
Barwick St. James. . . . . . . .3 
 B………. Fleman 
 W.m Bungy 
W.m Coleman 
 
Bemerton & Ditchampton. 4 
 John Blake 
 Ambrose Chance 
 Tho.s Harnham 
 Walter Tarrant 
 
Fisherton Angel. . . . . . . . .4 
 Christopher Lacy 
 Rich.d Brewer 
 W.m Lilly 
W.m King 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ditchampton, Ugford 
and North Burcombe. . . . .7 
 Walter Tanner 
 John Merchant 
 Benj. Blake 
 Joachim Lee 
 Rich.d Hayter 
Geo.e Marshall 
Tho.s Stevens 
 
Thuggleston & Burdensball. 3 
 Oliver Adlum 
 Lawrence Martin 
 Will.m Parker 
 
Great Wishford. . . . . . . . . . . 5 
 James Smith 
 Leonard Petty 
 Tho.s Davy 
Tho.s Blanchett 
Alex: Blake 
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Elston. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 
 W.m Coles 
 
Little Wishford  
And Avon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
 John Merrevill 
 John Ranger 
 
Madington. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
 Francis George 
 Ambrose Hiscock 
 Henry Samsborough 
 Henry Strong 
 John Sopp 
W.m Baily 
 
Sherrington. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
W.m White 
John Farly 
Edm.d Collins 
 
Shrewton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 
 Barthol Selwood 
 Henry Sopp 
 John Alexander 
 John Monday 
W.m Cox 
Tho.s Sellwood 
John Sellwood 
Rob.t Monday 
 
Steeple Langford. . . . . . . . . . . 3 
 John Lilly 
 John Baker 
 John Clifford 
 
Tilshead. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 
 Roger Ager 
 Edw.d Wise 
 W.m Weeks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hanging & Little 
Langford. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
 Francis Randall 
 John Fricker 
 John Rowden 
 W.m Christopher 
 
Wilton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 
 Alex Waite 
 Henry Sympson 
 John Bacon 
 John Good 
 W.m Amos 
W.m Dawkins 
 
Wyle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
 Henry Smith 
 Edw.d Green 
 John Everly 
 Henry Laver 
 W.m Barnes 
 
Winterborne Stoke. . . . . . . . 4 
 Austin Waters 
 Geo.e Downton 
 James Millidge 
 W.m Fleming 
 
South Newton. . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
 Ragnell Watts 
 Roger Blake 
 John Cosens 
 Philip Nicholson 
 W.m Knight 
Rob.t Stone 
 ……………. 
 
Stapleford. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
 W.m Baker 
 Geo.e Richardson 
 Andrew Lake 
 John Baker  
 Miles Northover 
Nich.s Street 
Simon Voules 
  ____ 
   86 
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Coll Wyndham’s Co  148 
Lieut.t Coll Young’s Co 112 
Major Hearst’s Co    94 
Capt. Ashby’s Co  100 
Capt. Davenant’s Co    86 
   ___ 
Total   540 
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APPENDIX 2. 
 
 
Hampshire County Record Office, Winchester, Hampshire. HRO: 39M85/PC/E14 
 
A handwritten muster roll containing lists of names of riders and the owners of the 
horses they rode for a troop of horse in the Eastern Division of the county in 1685. 
 
The Troop of Horse in the East Division of the County of Southton under the 
command of Thomas Brocas Esqr. 
 
Thomas Brocas  Captaine 
Henry Boborly Lieutenant 
Will. Blundon  Cornet 
 
Riders     Horses   Owners 
Thomas Hinxman  Quartermaster 1  Sir William Gardiner 
Edward Morton  Corporall 1  John Hook Esq. 
James Davis   Corporall 1  Richard Holt Esq. 
Peter Simpson  Corporall 2}  Sir Hugh Stukely and   
John Kinch      }  Mr Young of Exton 
Thomas Elliott   1  Tho. Earl of Carlisle 
Henry Newman   1  Tho. Earl of Storling 
Lewis Garret    1  Sir Henry Tythborne 
Richard Lawner   1  Sir Andrew Henley 
Thomas Harrision   2}  Sir Robert Henly 
Gabrill Poulton     } 
James Bulvill    1  Sir James Stephens and 
       Lady Thompkins 
William Heverly   1  Lady Eurle 
John Soward  }  2  Richard Norton Eq. 
Edward Sheffoard } 
Thomas Soward }  2  Georg Pitt Esq. 
William Hooker } 
Thomas Rivers   1  Thomas Jervoyse Esq. 
James Bignall    1  Henry Wallop Esq 
James Roth    1  James Louth Esq. 
John Havil  }  2  Frederick Tilney Esq. 
James Buy  } 
John Crorkford }  2  Richard Cotton Esq. 
Edward Carington }    
John Stary  }  2  Sam Gawdon of Froyle Esq. 
William Gunner } 
Robert Wake  }  2  Jemy Hunt of Popham Esq., 
Edward Thumwood } 
John Webb    1  John Lukenor Esq., 
William Biggs    1  Challoner Chute Esq. 
Richard Wash    1  James Rudyard Esq. 
Thomas White    1  Mrs Wither 
Richard Ayliffe   1  Thomas Creswell Esq. 
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Thomas Libfrome   1  Mr Plowden and 
       Mr Ayliffe 
Jonathan Maglebarks   1  Richard Stanley Esq. 
Georg Yates    1  Mr Soper 
Thomas Feilder   1  Mr Marriott of Rapley 
Richard Sherrier   1  Doctor Barber and 
       Mr Hanberry 
William Cammer   1 { Doctor Woodford 
      { Mr Gilbert White 
      { Mr Wakeford of Blarkmore 
Georg Draper    1  Mr Bathurst 
John Evans    1  Mr Bathurst and 
       Mr Tutt 
John Fall    1  Mr Mathews 
John Horton    1  Mr Pownes 
Georg Knight    1  William Laroy Esq. 
Thomas Scrivener   1  Mr Palmer and  
       Mr Wakeford 
Henry Cleare    1           Bramshott and Headly Parsonages 
John Stanley    1  Mr. Venables 
John Bonnam    1           Farrington farme and parsonage 
Will Kerry    1  Wentworth Parsonage and 
Colsmor farm 
Nicholas Smith   1   Alfford and Byton Parsonages 
Nicholas Goodyeare   1          West Meon and Hinton Parsonages 
Jos. Browne    1        Cheriton Parsonage and Mr Mathew 
Richard Croft    1  Mr Blundon the elder 
Robert Twyford   1  Mr Cole of Lisse 
?     1  Mr Bruneing 
Andrew Pinke    1  Mr Morley and others for  
Waltham Parsonages 
 
The names of such persons and places as stand charged in the old list to find horse 
and armes in the aforesaid Troop but did not send in any in this last expedition. 
 
The Lord Stowell    1 Horse 
Sir Nicholas Stoward    1 
Mr Dalmore and Mrs Hide   1 
Mr Cooper and Mr Elton   1 
Sir Kingsmill Luroy    1 
Mr Elmore     1 
Mr Bety his estate    1 
Mr Sherwood and ?oe farme   1 
Neaton Farme and Newton valenre  1 
Alton and Brimstead  Parsonages  1 
Chaton Parsonages Bouler his estate  1 
Alverstoke and Marblington Parsonages  1 
The Lady Pleyden    1 
Droxford Farms and Parsionages  1 
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APPENDIX 3. 
 
Below is a list of those with major roles in the story of the West Country County 
Militias during the Monmouth Rebellion.  The information supplies general personal 
background and significant facts relating to their contribution to themes covered in 
this work.  
 
C 
     
 
John Churchill, (1650 – 1722), was a brigadier general and second in command of 
the royal army. He was the son of a cavalier officer and MP Sir Winston Churchill, 
and brother of the Duke of York’s mistress Arabella Churchill.  A page to the future 
James II he was commissioned into the army and served under Monmouth in 
Flanders, where he distinguished himself at Nimegan and Maastrict.  He then acted as 
an ambassador to Holland.  Appointed Gentleman of the Bedchamber and ennobled in 
1685 as Baron Churchill of Sandridge, he commanded the first royal army force into 
the West during Monmouth’s rebellion and performed well.  Changing sides in 1688 
Churchill rose steadily if slowly under William.  His wife Sarah’s friendship with 
Queen Anne gained him further promotion and he commanded the Allied army during 
the War of Spanish Succession and established a reputation as one of the great 
statesmen and generals of Europe.  For his services he was created Duke of 
Marlborough and awarded money to build Blenheim Palace. 
 
John Coad was a Somerset militiaman who, changing sides after Axminster, served 
as a pikeman in the rebel army and was the author of a contemporary account.   
 
D 
 
Edward Dummer was a captain and quartermaster of the ordnance, who marched 
into the West with the London Train of Artillery from the Tower.  He was the author 
of a contemporary account of the campaign and Battle of Sedgemoor and left a series 
of explicit maps of the conflict. 
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Louis Duras de Dufort, Earl of Feversham, (1640? – 1709), was the lieutenant 
general and commander of the royal army in the West. A Huguenot and nephew of the 
Great Turenne, he came to England as part of the Duke of York’s suite in 1665.  He 
became a court favourite and a protégé of the Duke of York, being employed as an 
ambassador to France and Holland. He commanded the 3rd then 2nd Troop of Horse 
Guards and was Lord Chamberlain to the Queen, then Lord of the Bedchamber to 
Charles II.  He joined the Privy Council on the accession of James II and was 
entrusted with suppressing Monmouth’s rebellion.  Given command of the entire 
army as a reward for his service in 1685, he also had command of the 1st Troop of 
Horse Guards.  He skilfully survived William of Orange’s arrival remaining in the 
service of the Dowager Queen and was a pall bearer at Pepys’s funeral. 
 
E 
 
Thomas Erle, (1650-1720), was a major in the royal army, MP for Wareham, a 
county deputy lieutenant and a militia colonel of the Dorset Militia based in 
Blandford.  He was present and probably did much to engineer the rebel’s defeat at 
the Battle of Bridport.  He fought for William III as a colonel at the Boyne, Limerick 
and Aughrim where he distinguished himself.  Rising to brigadier general at Steinkirk 
and Landen, he later commanded the covering army at Namur.  Promoted to major 
general in 1696 he commanded in Ireland in 1702 and became a lieutenant general in 
1703, commanding the centre at Almanza in 1707. Erle had an independent command 
of a Mediterranean invasion force but was thwarted by a lack of naval co-operation.  
However he successfully transferred his force to the Siege of Lille where he did well.  
He retired as Commander in Chief of South Britain.  
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F 
 
 
Henry Fitzroy, Duke of Grafton, (1662-1630), was a natural son of Charles II and  
rose to become Colonel of His Majesty’s First Foot Guards.  The son of Barbara 
Villiers, Countess of Castlemaine, he was created Earl of Southampton, then Baron of 
Newbury.  He was an able soldier during the Monmouth Rebellion leading the 
Grenadier Companies of the Guards in their ill-fated assault at Norton St. Philip. He 
commanded the Guards at Sedgemoor and may have commanded the attack of the 
combined grenadiers across the Bussex Rhine in the latter stages of the action.  He too 
changed sides in 1688 but took little or no part in politics although he sat as the Duke 
of Cleveland in the House of Lords. 
 
G 
 
Granville, John, Earl of Bath, was lord lieutenant of Cornwall and commander in  
chief of the Cornish Militia, and although he also held a colonelcy in the royal army it 
was only a titular appointment. Despite being a king’s man he was a dedicated friend 
to Albemarle. He fought in the civil war for Charles I in his father’s regiment and was 
knighted for bravery and appointed a Lord of the Bedchamber to the Prince of Wales, 
with whom went into exile.  In 1660, Granville took part in negotiations with George 
Monck which resulted in the restoration of the king. He was created Earl of Bath, 
Viscount Granville, and Baron Granville, and joined the Privy Council in 1663. In 
1665, he was the titular Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, but never visited the island.  Bath 
was appointed colonel of the 10th Regiment of Foot, first in 1685 then again in 1688 
after siding with William of Orange. He died in London. 
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Forde Grey, Lord of Warke, (d.1701), was the only aristocrat to join Monmouth’s 
cause and was appointed second in command of the rebel army.  An MP and hero of 
the Whig party, he was arrested for involvement in the Rye House Plot, but he 
escaped and fled to Holland where he joined Monmouth. Captured after the battle of 
Sedgemoor, he turned king’s evidence and was pardoned after paying Sunderland 
40,000l.  After a brief exile he returned to take an active role in Whig politics and 
under William III joined the Privy Council being created Earl of Tankerville and 
having numerous other offices heaped upon him. 
 
H 
 
                                              
 
Thomas Herbert, Earl of Pembroke, (1656-1733), was lord lieutenant of Wiltshire 
and commander in chief of the Wiltshire Militia as well as the City Militia of 
Salisbury. He succeeded to the earldom in 1683 after the deaths of two elder brothers 
and reshaped the county militia after a period of neglect.  In 1685 he campaigned with 
his militia and was present at Sedgemoor.  He became a noted politician under 
William III and then Anne, being appointed First Lord of the Admiralty and later 
Lord Privy Seal.  In 1697 he was employed as the first plenipotentiary of Great 
Britain at the congress of Ryswick.  
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J 
     
 
George Jeffreys, Baron Wem, as Lord Chief Justice he conducted the Bloody 
Assizes to punish the West Country for its rebellion.  His father had fought for 
Charles I during the civil war and he emulated his grandfather and studied law at the 
Inner Temple in 1663. His legal career prospered, becoming a Common Serjeant of 
London in 1671 and then Solicitor General to the Duke of York with whom, despite 
his Protestant upbringing, he found favour.  Knighted in 1677, he was Chief Justice of 
Chester, Counsel for the Crown at Ludlow and Justice of the Peace for Flintshire by 
1680. Charles II created him a baronet in 1681, and two years later, he was Chief 
Justice of the King's Bench and joined the Privy Council.  Jeffreys became Lord Chief 
Justice in 1683 and presided at the trial of Algernon Sidney, who had been implicated 
in the Rye House Plot. On James II’s accession to the throne in 1685, he named 
Jeffreys as Lord Chancellor.  He presided over the Bloody Assizes and handed out 
harsh sentences to Monmouth’s followers having over 300 people executed, and more 
than 800 transported to the colonies as indentured labourers. He remained loyal to 
James in 1688 trying to run the government after the king fled.  He was taken, 
imprisoned in the Tower and died in custody. 
 
K 
 
Piercy Kirke, (1646?-1691) of Whitehaigh in Derbyshire.  He was the son of a court 
official and was commissioned into the Duke of York’s maritime regiment and later 
served under both Monmouth and Turenne in Flanders before raising a regiment to 
garrison Tangiers in 1682.  He proved an energetic and capable officer, if somewhat 
brutal.  In 1684 he returned to England and refitted his regiment which he took down 
to the West Country in 1685 to support Churchill.  He was promoted to brigadier 
general just before Sedgemoor and after the battle ordered mass executions of rebels 
and extracted bribes for the pardoning of others.  His cruelty to the population of the 
West Country earned a sardonic interpretation of his regiment’s nickname of ‘Kirke’s 
Lambs’.  He was arrested during William of Orange’s invasion but promoted to major 
general by the new king. He commanded the Derry relief force and served at the 
Boyne and Limerick.  Whilst campaigning in Flanders he died in Brussels ‘of a 
loathsome disease’. 
 
 
 
 369 
 
L 
        
 
Francis Lutterell was colonel of the Taunton Regiment of the Somerset Militia.  He 
was Lord of Dunster Castle and wealthy from interests in the wool and dyeing trade.  
He was elected Member of Parliament for Minehead aged 20, and married into the 
Tregonwell family to enjoy a large private income. He does not appear to have had 
any military experience before his appointment as colonel in the militia in 1681 
although he served throughout the Monmouth Rebellion.  He opposed James II in 
1687 and went over to William of Orange in 1688. He transferred to the royal army 
under William for whom he raised his own regiment, the 19th of Foot.     
 
M 
                                    
 
Christopher Monck, Duke of Albermarle, (1653-1688), was lord lieutenant of 
Devon and Essex and commander in chief of both county militias. He was the son of 
Captain General George Monck who engineered the Restoration and he was a great 
favourite at court, rivalling Monmouth.  He became a colonel of a regiment of foot in 
1673 and was promoted to command the 1st Troop of Horse Guards, the titular 
commander of the army. He took an active role in containing the rebels but fell out 
with James II over the king’s attempt to denigrate the militia. He retired to the country 
but returned to become Governor of Jamaica where he died early in his tenancy.  
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P    
       
 
Sir Edward Phellips of Montacute, (1638 – 1699) was the issue of his father’s 
second marriage and lived at the family home.  He inherited not only the house but 
also the office of MP for Ilchester and entered militia service as a young man rising to 
become a captain with his own troop of horse. He was infamous for his persecution of 
his political enemies and those who appeared against him elections had ‘ever since 
had but little quiet, where it has been in his power to trouble them’. Active in the 
harassment of dissenters he assisted Col. Richard Stawell to suppress the ‘fanatics of 
Bridgwater’ and burnt the furnishings of their chapel.  He drove his men hard and had 
a reputation for being a martinet.  In 1685 he was also acting colonel of Stawell’s 
Regiment of foot in the Somerset Militia but failed as a military field officer and was 
absent when a number of his men made their ‘rapid withdrawal’ from Axminster.  In 
1687 he was so incensed during an argument with a Whig opponent that he exhibited 
such ‘outrageous fury that he foamed at the mouth’.  He appears to have been very 
unpopular with fellow members of parliament and there was considerable opposition 
to him regaining his militia commission under William III.   
 
Sir William Portman, sixth baronet of Orchard Portman, (1641?-1690), was a 
county MP, a deputy lord lieutenant and a colonel in the Somerset Militia.  In May 
1685 whilst visiting parliament he was mysteriously warned of Monmouth's landing 
and rising in the West Country and organised searches of correspondence in and out 
of Taunton looking for evidence of treason.  He also took an active part in 
investigating the causes of disaffection, and in organising the militia.  He was 
appointed to oversee the operations of the Sussex Militia in the New Forest.  There he 
was involved in the capture of Monmouth.  Like many influential Tories he changed 
sides in 1688, rallying to William of Orange at Exeter, but died before he could be 
rewarded. 
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S 
  
 
Charles Sackville, Earl of Dorset, (1638-1706), was lord lieutenant of Sussex, and 
commander in chief of the Sussex Militia.  He inherited the earldom of Middlesex in 
1674 and succeeded to his father's estates and title of Earl of Dorset in August 1677.  
He was MP for East Grinstead but showed little interest in politics. However, he had a 
reputation as a witty courtier as well as a rake and hellraiser.  In 1665 he served under 
the Duke of York in the war against the Dutch and was present at the victory off 
Harwich. One of original lovers of Nell Gwyn he stepped aside for his king but his 
scurrilous verses got him into trouble with James II and he retired from court.  He 
supported William III’s invasion and was promoted to the Privy Council and then 
Lord Chamberlain and a Lord Chief Justices of the Realm. He died at Bath. 
 
                                       
   
Charles Seymour, Duke of Somerset, (1662-1748), was lord lieutenant of Somerset 
and the East Riding of Yorkshire, and commander in chief of both county militias.  
Sometimes referred to as ‘The Proud Duke’, he was extremely wealthy having 
inherited a fortune and married the Earl of Northumberland’s daughter.  A post in the 
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king’s household, was followed by a colonelcy of dragoons in 1685.  He supported 
William of Orange in 1688, and was a favourite of Queen Anne becoming her Master 
of Horse in 1702. Fond of ceremony and pageantry he was a poor administrator and 
did not do well as a military commander and it was due to his incompetency that 
Somerset fell so easily to the rebels.  Neither was he tactful and during Anne’s reign 
he incurred the displeasure of the Marlboroughs.  Although he kept his place at court 
under George I, he was dismissed in 1716 and retired to Petworth where he died. 
 
 
 
                                       
 
James Scott, Duke of Monmouth, (1649-1685), was a pretender to the throne and 
captain general of the rebel army. Born in Rotterdam, the eldest illegitimate son of 
Charles II and his mistress, Lucy Walter, who had followed him into continental exile 
after the execution of Charles I. He took his wife's name upon marriage to Anne Scott, 
Duchess of Buccleuch. However, he claimed his parents were married if initially only 
in private, and was the darling of Charles II’s court.  He was feted and rose steadily to 
command the army but fell from favour due to his involvement with Whig politicians 
and their schemes to exclude his uncle, the Duke of York, from the succession.  
Briefly exiled to Holland he was there when his father died.  After leading an 
unsuccessful invasion and attempt to overthrow his uncle and seize the throne 
Monmouth was executed in 1685.  
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Henry Somerset, Duke of Beaufort, (1629-1699), was lord lieutenant of 
Gloucestershire, Hertfordshire and Monmouthshire and commander in chief of all 
three county militias as well as the City of Bristol Militia.  He was also Lord President 
of Wales and lord lieutenant of north and south Wales from 1672 to 1689.  He joined 
the Privy Council and became a Knight of the Garter in 1672 and sat on 
the committee of the East India Company between 1684 and 1690. He was a favourite 
of James II who appointed him as a Gentleman of the Bedchamber and gave him 
the lord lieutenancy of the Isle of Purbeck to add to his many responsibilities.  An 
able administrator who took the work of his offices seriously, he also proved himself 
an able military commander during the rebellion and secured Bristol and north 
Somerset for the royal cause. 
 
 
 
   
Robert Spencer, Earl of Sunderland, (1641-1702), was Secretary of the Council of 
State. Born in Paris he inherited his earldom at the age of three. In the Army, he 
reached the rank of captain in Prince Rupert's Regiment of Horse and proceeded to 
serve successively as ambassador to Madrid (1671–1672), Paris (1672–1673), and the 
United Provinces (1673). He served as a Gentleman of the Bedchamber from 1673 to 
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1679, was then made a Privy Councillor and appointed Secretary of State for the 
northern department in 1679, being sent briefly to Paris as Ambassador Extraordinary. 
In 1687 he embraced the Roman Catholic faith to please the king. That year, he was 
also made a Knight of the Garter but was summarily dismissed in October 1688, 
fleeing to Holland. William III was cautious about appointing him but eventually he 
became Lord Chamberlain of the Household in April 1697, and was a Lord Justice for 
a short period, but retired from public life in December of that year.  
 
Thomas Strangways was a deputy lord lieutenant of Dorset along with his brother 
Wadham.  He was the colonel of the Red (Western) Regiment of the Dorset Militia 
and was appointed by the king to command the whole Dorset Militia at the time of the 
Monmouth crisis.  He was a noted local dignitary and landowner, and became MP for 
Shaftesbury in 1701. 
 
 
 
  
Charles Stuart, King of England, (1630-1685). A teenage Prince of Wales during 
the civil wars he returned from exile to lead a rising against Cromwell in 1651 but 
was defeated at Worcester and fled abroad again.  After Cromwell died various 
political crises resulted in his restoration in May 1660.  Charles favoured religious 
tolerance but his leaning towards Catholic France embroiled England in the Second 
Dutch War. In 1670, Charles entered into a secret treaty with his first patron Louis 
XIV, whereby for aid in a third Dutch war France paid him a pension.  He also 
secretly agreed to convert to Catholicism and attempted unsuccessfully to introduce 
religious freedom for Catholics and Protestant dissenters with his 1672 Royal 
Declaration of Indulgence. In 1679 Titus Oates's accusations of a ‘Popish Plot’ 
fermented the Exclusion Crisis - an attempt to debar Charles' Catholic brother and 
heir James, from the throne. Charles abandoned Parliament in 1681 and ruled alone. 
The discovery of the Rye House Plot to assassinate both him and James in 1683 
resulted in several Whig leaders being executed or exiled.  Charles converted to 
Catholicism on his deathbed. His wife Catherine of Braganza bore no children, but he 
acknowledged at least 12 illegitimate children by several mistresses, the eldest of 
which was the Duke of Monmouth. 
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James Stuart, King of England (1633-1701) was Charles’ younger brother. 
Formerly known as the Duke of York he was in exile abroad until the Restoration.  He 
was appointed Admiral of England and was the hero of the naval battle off Harwich.  
Surviving the Exclusion Crisis he was crowned in 1685 he was initially a popular 
monarch but his intolerant nature and suspicion of disloyalty lead him to make great 
mistakes in government which gradually alienated many of his subjects who finally 
entreated Protestant William of Orange his son-in-law to come over and take control.  
James fled the country after William’s invasion in 1688.  He later led a Jacobite 
Rising in Ireland which failed and he remained in exile in France until he died.  
 
V  
  
Samuel Venner was a lieutenant colonel and third in command of the rebel army.  
One of the original landing party, he was part of Monmouth’s inner circle and was 
valued for his military experience.  He had been a captain in Cromwell’s army and, 
initially, had the role, if not the title, of Sergeant-Major General of the rebel army.  
Wounded at Bridport he stayed with the army until Norton St. Phillip when he was 
sent to Holland.  Later he wrote what is known as The Anonymous Account. 
 
W 
 
Nathaniel Wade was a Bristol lawyer, who became adjutant general and fourth in 
command of the rebel army.  Although a major he commanded the Red Regiment. 
Captured after the battle of Sedgemoor, he turned king’s evidence and was pardoned.  
In his testimony - a major source for study of the rebellion - he gave only the names 
of the dead and convicted to his interrogators.  After being pardoned he took James II 
on a battlefield tour of Sedgemoor and was made Town Clerk of Bristol. 
 
John Wyndham was the colonel of the Red (Salisbury) Regiment of the Wiltshire 
Militia during the rebellion and proved himself to be a steady and reliable field 
officer.  He became a Tory MP alongside four other family members, and sat for New 
Sarum in James II’s first parliament in 1685.  He also became High Sheriff of the 
county and being from a family of established lawyers, was called to the bar at 
Lincolns Inn in 1688.  
376 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Primary Manuscript. 
 
Bath Record Office 
Bath Chamberlain Accounts, 1603 – 1734 passim. 
Bath Council Minute Books, Nos. 1, 2, and 3. (1613 -1715). 
 
Bodleian Library  
Tanner MSS., vol. 158, fo. 79. Book of letters received by Archbishop Bancroft.  
 
British Library 
Add. 32, 79, 98, 125, 324. 
Add. 15551   Extract: The Severall Debates of the House of Commons, pro et contra, relating to the establishment 
of the Militia, disbanding the new raised forces and raiseing a present supply for his Majestie, 9 
Nov.20. Nov. 1685, f. 1.  
Add. 19,399, fo.138.Albemarle to Sunderland, 21 June 1685 BL.  
Add. 21048  Extract: COPIES of correspondence and instructions of James Howard,. Earl of Suffolk, as Lord-
Lieutenant of co. Suffolk, to Lord Cornwallis,. as Lieutenant, and the Deputy Lieutenants, relative to 
the militia,. and the payment of the subsidy to the Crown; 19 Aug. 1661-. 15 Jan. 1664. Paper. Folio. 
Add. 28050. Lord Dunblane’s letter to his father, the Earl of Danby,  
Add. 28082   Extract: ESTABLISMENT, muster-rolls, accounts and other papers, relating to the army; 1640 -
1702. 
Add. 31956          A Journal of the Proceedings of the Duke of Monmouth in his Invading England ; with the Progress  
                             and issew of the Rebellion attending it.  Kept by Mr. Edward Dummer then serving in the Train of  
Artillery employ’d by His Majesty for the suppression of the same, (London, 1672), copy of original  
held in Pepysian Library, Magdalene College, Cambridge. 
Add. 34516.  MACKINTOSH COLLECTIONS. Vol. XXX. (ff. 64). Copies and extracts relating to English 
history, temp. James II. and William III., including:- 1. Correspondence of Colonel Kirke and Chief-
Justice Jeffreys with the Earl of Sunderland ; 1685. With other papers relating to the suppression of 
Monmouth's rebellion. f. 10. 2. Papers relating to the state of the army in 1685-6. ff. 34-37, 46-49. 
Add. 41804.  MIDDLETON PAPERS. Vol. II (ff. 318). Papers rel. mainly to the suppression of Monmouth's 
rebellion, the apprehension of, and information against rebels, and reports on English conspirators in 
Holland, including intercepted letters, July 1685-Dec. 1687. 
Add. 62453.  MONMOUTH REBELLION: papers chiefly relating to the Monmouth rebellion and the 
prosecutions which followed. Partly printed. Stamped 'Clayton MSS', and originally dispersed with 
other parts of the archive of Sir Robert Clayton, the London scrivener, at Sotheby's, 29 March 1929, 
lot 401. For the whole collection, see F. T. Melton, 'The Clayton Papers', Bulletin of the Institute of 
Historical Research, LII (1979), pp. 91-99. Purchased at Christie's, 5 May 1982, lot 48.  
Paper; ff. i+135. British Library arrangement. The principal contents are: 
1. ff. 1-4v. Information relating to James, Duke of York, particularly of James Holloway, 
Bristol merchant, concerning the Rye House Plot, a longer and somewhat differing text of 
which is printed as The Free and Voluntary Confession and Narrative of James Holloway 
(1684); 1680-1684.  
2. ff. 5-8. Passes for apprehending suspected rebels, the first to Robert Gargrave, Sergeant-
General of the King's Carriages; 1685. 
3. ff. 9-34. Bonds taken by Gargrave from suspected rebels for their appearance at the 
assizes at Frome, co. Som., with brief notes about the strength of the evidence against them; 
1685.  
4. ff. 37-42. List of peers at the trial of Lord Delamere for his rising in Cheshire, with drafts 
of two speeches of Lord Jeffreys as Lord Steward at the trial on 9 Jan. 1686, apparently in 
the hand of the Solicitor-General, Heneage Finch, 1st Earl of Aylesford; 1686. The 
speeches are printed with somewhat differing texts in Howell, State Trials, XI, cols. 515-
516, 526-528.  
5. ff. 43-78. Informations of Thomas Dare, George Rickman, Malachy Mallack, Samuel 
Key, Joseph Standerwick, Joseph Holmes and Joseph Strong, concerning the involvement 
in the rebellion of Edmund Prideaux of Forde Abbey; 1685, 1686. For related material, see 
Lansdowne 1152, ff. 227-311, and Add. 41804, ff. 131-135. For this episode, see Commons 
Journals, X, pp. 113-116.  
6. ff. 79-84v. Letter from Sir Roger L'Estrange to Lord Middleton as Secretary of State, 
enclosing informations of Thomas Babington, Joseph Harvey and Richard Raw concerning 
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the Monmouth rebellion; 1686. Partly copies. For related material, see Add. 41804, ff. 139, 
195, 202-206.  
7. 85-94v. Answers by attorneys Richard Cridland, Andrew Loder and Giles Clarke to 
charges of taking money to procure pardons for suspected rebels; 1686.  
8. ff. 97-98v. Royal proclamation concerning the invasion of William of Orange; 1688. 
Draft.  
9. ff. 99-111v. Pamphlets, broadsides and proclamations concerning Monmouth and the 
rebellion; 1680-1685, Printed (Wing A335, C3440, C4456, 2509, J327, M2428, R820, 
S151, S151A, T2436A). 10. ff. 112-135. Transcripts of several of the above documents; 
1948. One (f.112) signed P.G.' (Sir Peter Greenwell, erstwhile owner?). Mostly typewritten. 
Add. 72866.  PETTY PAPERS. VOL. XVII (ff. 179). Papers concerning England and public affairs in general in 
the reign of James II; 1685-1687.ff. 5-6v. 'About the Militia & Elections'; 1685. Autograph. E74. 
Egmont 1626  Extract: LISTS of the Militia, with names of officers, in the several counties of. England and Wales, 
1697; and of Lords Lieutenants of counties.  Paper, XVIIth cent. Folio. From the Farnborough Fund. 
BL. 1626. 
Egmont. 3344.     LEEDS PAPERS. Vol XXI (ff. 55).  
Musters and muster rolls (partly on vellum) of military units in the North of England, mostly during 
the Revolution of 1688 as follows:  
1. Garrison of Scarborough Castle, under Sir Jordan Crosland, Governor; 1662. f. 1.  
2. Col. Sir Henry Cornwall's Regiment and other forces at Chester; 1688. ff. 3-31.  
3. Infantry and cavalry units at Manchester; 1688. ff. 32-37b.  
4. Forces under the command of Henry, 2nd Duke of Newcastle; 1688. Viz.:-(a) Capt. Ralph 
Hansbie's company of Foot. f. 38;-(b) Cavalry of the Yorkshire Militia, whose command was taken 
over by Lord Danby (see Browning, op. cit., i, p. 403). ff. 40-55 b. 
Egmont. 3381.     LEEDS PAPERS. Vol. LVIII (ff. i+88). Tracts, etc.; 1674-1695:-  
‘The Severall Debates of the House of Commons Pro et Contra Relating to the Establishment of the 
Militia'; 9-20 Nov. 1685. Other copies  are in Harley MS. 6801, ff. 266-279b, Lansdowne MS. 253, 
ff. 26-61, and  Add. MS. 15551, ff. 1-42. First printed as Debates in the House of Commons in the 
late King James's Reign relating to the Militia, 1697. ff. 8-42b.  
Lansdowne 1152 Interrogation of rebel prisoners.  
Phellips                The engagement at Axminster, letter and bill from Dr. Joseph Winter for treating the wounded. in  
Ilchester Gaol., 
Harleian 4689. Proceedings against the rebels.  
Harleian 6845 James II’s Account. 
Harleian 6845. Wade,N., Narrative. 
Harleian 6845. Wade,N., Further Narrative.  
Harleian 6845.  The Axminster Ecclesiastica. 
Harleian 7006      Monmouth’s proclamations., also includes letters between James II, the Duke of Albemarle and the  
Earl of Sunderland. 
Sloane  1487  A pocket book containing prayers, poems, shorthand notes and mathematical equations plus a  
handwritten copy of The Abridgement. 
 
Bristol University Library 
Nathaniel Pinney’s Account Book, Pinney Papers. 
 
National Archives 
 State Papers, Domestic 
ASS. 1/23/3. The Gaol Delivery Book for the Western Circuit, 1685. 
NA.W047/14 Re-equipping of Trelawney’s Regt. On their return from Tangiers. Sept. 1684.  
NA.W047/15 Equipment issues to the Holland Regt. Oct.1684. 
NA.WO55/1656 f.60. Letter Col. Sir E. Phellips to Col. Edward Berkeley.  
NA.WO55/1734 f.19 Order issued by the Duke of Monmouth  concerning the collection of scythes. 
 S.P. 31/3, fol. 69. Trelawny Papers.   
 S.P. 413.57, AR’s letter to Jenkins 1680. 
 S.P. 424.57   Bath Aldermen’s’ letter to Jenkins 1683. 
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National Army Museum 
NAM. 1960-07-218 - 1 Dept: APFS  Letter from Gen Kirke to Constable of Chedsey regarding Monmouth’s  
        Rebellion, 13 Jul 1685. And  Letter from Gen Kirke to Mr Blathwayt, Secretary at War, regarding Cunningham  
        and Richard’s Regiments, 1 Apr 1689. Associated with the Monmouth Rebellion (1685). 
NAM. 1982-11-163 - 1 &, 2, 3 ,4, & 5: Dept: APFS  Certificates relating to Officers of the Hampshire Trained Bands,    
       1683/84. Eight sacrament certificates recording that militia army officers had  received Holy Communion  
       according to the rites of the Church of England in the parish church at Alverstoke, Hampshire, June 1683-  
       November 1779. 
NAM. 1982-11-163 – 6 & 7, & 8. Dept: APFS  Certificates relating to the Regular Army 1684 , sacrament certificates  
        recording that army officers had received Holy Communion according to the rites of the Church of England in the  
        parish church at Alverstoke, Hampshire, June 1683- November 1779. 
NAM. 1988-06-27 - 5 Dept: APFS   The King's Letter to the General of his Army: With the General's  Letter to the  
         Prince of Orange. Broadside, 1688. Copy of the letter from the King to the General of his Army, Whitehall, 11  
         Dec 1688. With the General’s letter to Prince William of Orange, later William III, Uxbridge, 11 Dec 1688.  
         Associated with divided loyalty of the British Army. 
NAM. 1988-06-27 - 1 Dept: APFS  Certificate declaring that the signatory would not take up arms against James II,  
        February 1685-1686. From a collection of 11 documents relating to the Glorious Revolution (1688). 
NAM. 1988-06-27 - 2 Dept: APFS   Letter from Lord Robert Spencer 2nd Earl of Sunderland, (Secretary of State for  
        the Northern Department) to Lord Walter Aston, Lord Lieutenant of Staffordshire, 1688, telling him that 'in case  
        of any exigency you should call together such of the Horse Militia... as you think may be trusted, for the  
        preservation of peace'.  Associated with London and the Staffordshire Horse Militia. 
NAM. 1992-06-18 - 1 Dept: APFS  Notebook of memoirs by ? Denby who served (in the 1st Foot Guards?) during the  
        Monmouth Rebellion of 1685 and throughout the Nine Years War in Flanders 1689-1697. 
NAM. 2000-07-88 - 62 Dept: APFS  Sedgemoor, 1685. One of sixty-five reports prepared by Mr D K S Smurthwaite  
        and Dr A W Massie, National Army Museum staff, for the English Heritage Battlefield Register, with associated  
        research material. 
 
Cornwall Records Office 
BLIS/321a     Constables' valuation of Liskeard parish, 1661. Valuation 'for setling of the Militia' in Liskeard Parish. 
CA/B44/47  Appointment of Jonathan Rashleigh as Lieutenant Colonel of Cornwall Militia, 10 Mar. 1689. 
RD/1578   Commission granted by George, Duke of Albemarle, to James Rodd, esquire of Stoke Canon, Devon, 1660.  
       Commission granted by George, Duke of Albemarle, to James Rodd, esquire, of Stoke Canon, appointing him  
       captain of a company in Sir Copleston Bampfyld's regiment of militia foot. 
RP/2/14  Commission, John Rogers, ensign in infantry regiment and captain in Cornish militia, 2 June, 1685. 
       Appointment by John, earl of Bath, lord lieutenant etc of John Rogers as ensign of a company of foot in the  
       regiment of which Sir William Godolphin, baronet is colonel and captain in the militia of the County of Cornwall. 
RP/2/19  Commission, John Rogers, gentleman, lieutenant in infantry regiment and captain in part of militia, 10 May 
1690.  Appointment by the Lord Lieutenant John, earl of Bath, of John Rogers as lieutenant of a company of foot 
in the regiment of which Sir John St Aubyn was colonel and captain, part of the militia. 
RP/2/21 Commission, John Rogers, gentleman, lieutenant and captain, 9 May 1692. Commission by the Earl of Bath  
       and his son Charles Lord Granville of John Rogers as lieutenant of regiment under command of Charles Lord  
       Granville as colonel and captain being the western regiment and part of the militia in Cornwall.  
RP/2/22 Commission, John Rogers esquire, positions in regiment and militia, 6 Sep 1697. Commission by Charles  
       Bodville, Earl of Radnor, Viscount Bodmin, Lord Robartes and Baron of Truro, of Lanhydrock, of John Rogers as  
       captain and lieutenant of a company of foot commanded by the Honourable Francis Godolphin, esquire, captain  
       and colonel, part of the militia of Cornwall. 
 
Devonshire County Record Office 
1049M/P4-5 A list of donors of financial contributions for the establishment of foot-soldiers in the Parish of 
Shobrook. 1677. 
Papers, Seymour of Berry Pomeroy. 
 
Dorset County Record Office - Dorchester 
D/BLX/Z4  Nomina Villaum of the County of Dorset by order of the Easter Sessions: listing the divisions... 1775. 
D/FSI, Box 238, bundle 22, Dean of Sarum to Sir Stephen Fox ‘about his addresse’, 12 Aug. 1685.  
DC/BTB/PQ45  Notes on Dorset History, Monmouth Rebellion, condition of Dorset Labourers, epitaphs etc.– file ND. 
DC/LR/A/3/1      Misdemeanour Book, Counsels, Loyal Addresses etc. 1685-1751. 
PE/POW/MI 14  Nettlecombe November 1740; a short story relating to the Monmouth Rebellion of 1689 (sic).   
Uncatalogued & untraceable but listed in 1938. Two Commissions: William Bragg to be Captain in the Dorset Militia  
1660/61 – Sgt.Maj. 1670 & Capt. 1670.  
John Gold of Upway (Dorchester) to be Lieut. Col. of Thomas Stangways’ Regiment 16 Jan 1679/80. 
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Dorset County Record Office - Poole 
TDW 79.5 &TDW 4.5  Transcription of the Book of the Staple 1589-1727 Poole Borough Archive, 1997. 
          Borough and County of the Town of Poole, Calendar of Local Archives. 
16.     22 January 1578 ‘A Direction for the Commissioners for the musters in the Towne of Poole  howe they shall  
          procede in the execution of said commission. 
21.     8 December 1688 Grant of Charter of 8/12/1688. 
124 (81) 21 May 1587.  Letter from Sir Harry Asheley to the Mayor of Poole to James Reade, Captain of the Trained  
          Band concerning the setting up if a target.  
 166(A5) 28 August 1655? Town Accounts including reference to beer for the watchmen at the Insurrection.  
 
Gloucestershire County Record Office 
GRO. D1637/Z1  Commission of Giles Nash as lieutenant in the White Regiment of Militia. 1715. 
GRO. D2026 X23  Document from the Constable of St. Briavels to raise the militia in the Forest of Dean, 1677.   
          Account of parish monies of St. Briavels by constable George Bond, including a report on repairs to roads &  
          bridges and the militia. 1681.   
GRO. D2079/111/30  Appointment of an ensign in a Company of the Green Regiment of Militia for service in  
          Kingsgate Hundred. 1702. 
GRO. D9125/923   Appointment of Richard Hill as Lieutenant in the Red Regiment of Militia in the Forest Division of  
          Gloucestershire. 1694. 
GRO. P244 CO 1/1  The Book of the Constables of Painswick: Reciepts and disbursements. 1684 to 1714. 
GRO. P265 CW 4/1 Pre-printed Receipt for the collection the armed forces. 
GRO. P354 CO 1/1  Various Constables’ accounts, including lists of persons providing arms, lists of cloth delivered to  
           make soldiers’ coats and accounts for their manufacture, pay accounts for militia soldiers and accounts for the  
           purchase of arms etc., 1684-86 and a return of persons contributing towards the Horse and Foot 1715. 
GRO.TRS.93  The supply of militiamen in Gloucestershire. 1688. 
 
Hampshire County Record Office 
HRO: 9M7/672/11 Papers of Thomas Stringer, Wiltshire, secretary, steward and friend of  Anthony Ashley  
          Cooper, 1st Earl of Shaftesbury. Letter to Jan, wife of Thomas Stringer, from Katherine, wife of Benjamin  
          Mildmay, Lord Fitz-Walter, 14 Oct 1685. 
HRO: 11M49/F/05 Volume containing memoranda relating to Charles, 1st Duke of Bolton as Lord Lieutenant  
           of Hampshire, Lord Warden of the New Forest, lord of various manors in Cornwall, Devon, Dorset, Hampshire  
           and Wiltshire, and Colonel of a Regiment of foot in the Hampshire Volunteer Force.  1672-1699. 
2 Copy of letters patent appointing Charles, Marquis of Winchester a colonel of a Regiment of Foot 8 
Mar 1699. 
4 Copy appointment of Henry Dawley, esq. as a Lieutenant Colonel of a Regiment of Foot raised 
within the Division of Fawley and Andover, 23 April 1689.  
10  Copy Order to the keepers of the New Forest and all constables and tithingmen in the counties of 
Dorset, Hampshire and Wiltshire to search for all ‘Gunnes, Grayhoundes, dogges, nettes or other 
Engines’ used to destroy game in the New Forest and to ensure that offenders are brought before a 
Justice of the Peace. 22 July 1689. 
11 Copy order to Henry Dawley, George Bridge and Richard Cobb esqs and JPs and all bailiffs, 
constables and tithingmen to seize any horses above the value of £5 belonging to Anthony Brown 
and any other popish dissenters. 20 December 1689. 
12 Copy order for the Deputy Lieutenants and Richard Cobb Treasurer to the militia to meet at 
Winchester and issue warrants for the lewing of Trophy Money so the Militia may be mustered as 
the earliest opportunity, nd. 
35 List of Officers of various Regiments of Militia and numbers of men mustered Nov 1699 for Alton 
Division, Portsdown Division, Fawley Andover Division, New Forest Division, Basingstoke 
Division, two troops of Horse, Independent Companies in Southampton and Winchester. 
HRO: 12M55 Portsmouth Sacrament certificates. 
HRO: 21M57/C30/43 Letter concerning militiamen swearing an oath.   
HRO: 32M94/93 The Ringwood Story – part 1: Ringwood, the Monmouth Rebellion and the Bloody Assize,  
          compiled by Capt. Hon. Rupert Keppel, (Ringwood Community Association, 1960). 
HRO: 39M85/PC/E14   Muster Roll for a troop of horse in the Eastern Division of the county under the command of  
          Thomas Brocas. 1685. 
HRO: 44M69/F6/8/1 Letters to Thomas Jervoise, sorted alphabetically by name of correspondent1679 – 1698.  
2 Letter from the Duke of Bolton 1690/91 militia matters Blackwood 16 March 1690. 
 4 Letter from Richard Chandler re horses and the militia, 1690. 
10 Letter from Thomas Higgens re militia matters, 1689/90.   
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HRO: 44M69/F6/9/26 Letters to TJ from Mr R Calthorpe re elections and provision ...for the militia 2 Nov. 16 97. 
HRO: 44M69/F6/10/3 Miscellaneous letters to Thomas Jervoise re militia matters 1689-172. 
HRO: 44M69/G5      Military Papers, mainly muster books, rolls and correspondence re Hampshire, 1587 – 1640s. 
HRO: 44M69/G5/23/4     Muster Book of the Ringwood or New Forest Militia 1622.  
HRO: 44M69/G5/30/07   Muster Book of the Ringwood or New Forest Militia 1629. 
HRO: 44M69/G5/50/57 Bundle of military papers, possibly original. 
3 Copy letter from the deputy lieutenants to Lord Conway 26 February 1630, re his letter about the 
settling of the Muster Master’s entertainment and expenses.   
4 Letter from William Withers at Manydown to Sir Thomas Jervoise 20 September 1631 re the 
charges for setting up the trained bands.   
HRO: 44M69/G5/50/86 Order to Captain Jervoise from the deputy lieutenants of the county re militia horse raised  
         throughout the last month which is to continue together and to exercise/train. 
HRO: 44M69/G5/50/112      A list of the names of all persons who furnished horse in the Militia Troop commanded  
         by Captain Jervoise. Undated but ascribed to the 1680s. 
HRO: 44M69/G5/50/119 Note of defects and defaults from musters, and the reasons why the musters are defective.   
HRO: 44M69/G6      Militia Papers mainly correspondence and other papers re organisation and  management of the  
         North Hants Militia 1702 – 1840s. 
HRO: 44M69/G6/3/1/34 Commission from the Council of State appointing Thomas Jervoise Captain of a militia troop  
         of Horse for Hampshire. 1660. 
HRO: PER98/1   Hampshire Militia Rolls no 1: New Forest Division. Christchurch Borough Hundred with the Liberty  
        of Lymington. New Forest Regiment. East Part of Christchuch Company.  1626-1637. 
HRO: PER98/2   Hampshire Militia Rolls no 2: City of Winchester. Winchester Company. 1622-1638. 
HRO: PER98/3   Hampshire Militia Rolls no 3: Andover Division. Kings Somborne Hundred.  Andover Regiment.  
         Romsey Company. 1626-1637. 
HRO: PER98/4   Hampshire Militia Rolls no 4: Alton Division. Alton Infra and Extra Hundreds.  Kingsclere  
         Regiment. Alton Infra Company 1626-1638 and Alton Extra Company.  1626-1640. 
HRO: PER98/5   Hampshire Militia Rolls no 5: Fawley Division. South Part of Buddlesgate Hundred.  Andover  
        Regiment. Hursley Company. (1) 1626-1638. 
HRO: PER98/6   Hampshire Militia Rolls no 6: Andover and Fawley Division. Barton Stacey and North Part of  
        Buddlesgate Hundred.  Andover Regiment. Barton Stacey Company.  1626-1638.  
HRO: PER98/7   Hampshire Militia Rolls no 7: Southampton. Southampton Companies. Holyrood and St. Laurence  
        1626-1638, St. Mary and All Saints 1622-1638, St Michael’s and St John’s 1622-1638. 
HRO: PER98/8   Hampshire Militia Rolls no 8: Andover Division. Thorngate Hundred. Andover Regiment. Wallops  
        Company. 
HRO: PER98/9   Hampshire Militia Rolls no 9: Andover Division. Wherwell Hundred. Andover Regiment. Wherwell  
        Company 1626-1638. 
HRO: PER98/10   Hampshire Militia Rolls no 10: Andover Division. Thorngate Hundred. Andover Regiment.  
        Broughton Company. 
HRO: PER98/11   Hampshire Militia Rolls no 11: Alton Division. Alton Infra and Extra Hundreds. Alton Regiment.  
        Alton Infra Company 1624-1638 and Alton Extra Company.  1624-1638. 
HRO: PER98/12   Hampshire Militia Rolls no 12: Portsdown Division. Fareham and Havant Liberty. Portsdown  
        Regiment. Fareham and Havant Company.  1626-1638. 
HRO: PER98/13   Hampshire Militia Rolls no 13: Basingstoke Division. Crondall (inner hundred) and Bently Liberty.   
        Basingstoke Regiment. Crondall and Bentley Company.  1624-1642. 
HRO: PER98/14   Hampshire Militia Rolls no 14: Basingstoke Division. Odiham Hundred).  Basingstoke Regiment.  
        Odiham Company.  1626-1642. 
HRO: PER98/15   Hampshire Militia Rolls no 13: Basingstoke Division. (part of) Crondall and Odiham Hundreds.   
        Basingstoke Regiment. Hartley Wintney Company.  1624-1642. 
HRO: PER98/16   Hampshire Militia Rolls no 16: Portsdown Division. Portsdown and Titchfield Hundreds.  
        Portsdown Regiment. Porchester (sic) and Titchfield Company.  1626-1642. 
HRO: PER98/17   Hampshire Militia Rolls no 17: Andover Division. Kings Somborne Hundred. Andover Regiment.  
        Stockbridge Company 1626-1642. 
HRO: PER98/18   Hampshire Militia Rolls no 18: New Forest Division. Redbridge Hundred. New Forest Regiment.  
        Eling Company.  1626-1642. 
HRO: Q21/6/1 Roll of qualifications of Deputy Lieutenants and officers of the militia 
HRO: Q25/2/2/4  Sacrament certificate for John Serle, Ensign to Sir Richard Worseley’s Company of the Militia of  
        Foote belonging to the West Medina regiment, taken and issued at the parish of  Northwood on the Isle of Wight. 
HRO: Q25/2/2/4, 5, 15, 16 & 17.  Four Sacrament certificates undertaken in 1683 for officers of various companies in  
         the Isle of Wight Militia.   
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Oxfordshire County Record Office 
ORO: 26/A9/44  Family tree of the 43rd/52nd Militia, Volunteers.  Photocopy of article Sheppard, S.T., The First  
        Volunteers in Blackwoods Magazine No 1516. 
ORO: BOR4/3/2/C1/1 Letter to the Lord Lieutenant from the Earl of Sunderland and King James  authorising him to  
        raise the militia, 19 October 1688.  
ORO: PAR36/9/MS1  Memoranda re the church and parish, begun by Dr.John Mill rector, 1681-1949… tax  
        assessment for militia 1684 (p.iii) parish poor rate evaluation 1684 (pp. 1-73.)   
ORO: PAR209/5  Oxford St. Mary the Virgin, Overseers’ Papers 1636-1888. 
ORO: PAR213/5/F1/3  Overseers’ Accounts 1683-1692. 
 
Somerset County Record Office:  
D\PC\brush 6/7 Bastardy, settlement, apprenticeship and militia papers, 1671-1826. 
DD\CM/64 Scrap notebook containing appointment of Thomas Collins as Lieutenant of a foot company of 
        militia in the regiment of Col. John Pyne, 26 Mar. 1650.  
DD\DR 53/1 Order re Militia (David Yea), 1662.  
DD\DR 53/1 Certificate re Militia (David Yea), 1662. 
DD\GB 148/69 Petition to the Hon. Lieutenant [of Monmouthshire?] of Mr [William ?] Gore respecting the      
        provision of a horse for the Militia by Mr Kemys and the disagreements relating thereto. Reference to a horse  
        being unobtainable at the time of the Monmouth rebellion, c.1700 . 
DD\LV 10/1 Lord Lieutenant's Commission to Alexander Popham in a company of the Bridgwater Regiment of  
         the Militia, 1691. 
DD\PH 219/52 Duke of Ormonde to Lord Pawlet and the rest of the Deputy Lieutenants. He is going to Ireland on  
         the King's service there; asks them to meet him at the next assizes to settle the affairs of the militia, 4 Jul 1662. 
DD\PH 222/64 Answer of John Buckland of West Harptree. To a charge that he had neglected to provide a horse for  
         militia service at Nether Stowey, 1664. 
DD\SAS/C795/FA/137 Militia (Sir Francis Warre). Letter from the Duke of Ormonde to Sir Francis Warre sending  
         a commission to be colonel of a regiment of militia foot, 9 May 1691. 
DD\SAS/C795/FA/139 Militia. Letter from the Duke of Ormonde to Sir Francis Warre, mentioning that he has  
         been appointed Lord Lieutenant of Somerset, and that he will dispatch a commission for the command of the  
         regiment which Sir Francis has, if he wishes to continue, 18 Apr 1691.  
DD\SAS/C795/FA/140 Militia. Letter (Order) from the Duke of Ormonde to the deputy lieutenants ordering the  
         exercising of companies of militia, 9 Apr 1694. 
DD\SAS/C795/FA/145-148  Sir Francis Warre. Letters from Lord Rochester enclosing letters from the Privy Council  
         to the Lord Lieutenant, the Duke of Ormonde (absent overseas) mainly concerning militia matters to be  
         communicated by Sir Francis Warre to the other deputy lieutenants, 1692.  
DD\SAS/C795/FA/156 Militia (Sir Francis Warre). Appointment as Colonel of regiment of foot in militia whereof  
         Francis Lutterell is colonel commonly called the Taunton Regiment, by Charles, Duke of Somerset, HM  
         Lieutenant for Somerset and the East Riding of York. 6 Mar 1684/5.  
DD\SAS/C795/FA/157 Militia (Sir John Warre). Appointment as captain of a militia troop of horse in the regiment  
        whereof Sir Maurice Berkeley, kt, is colonel, by James, Duke of Ormonde, Lord Lieutenant of Somerset, 1663. 
DD\SAS/H342/1 Appointment. By James, Duke of Ormond, Lord Lieutenant, of John Burland, Esq., to be captain of  
        the militia company of Foot in the Regiment of which Ralph Stawell, Esq., is Colonel, 1669. 
DD\SAS/H342/4 Appointment. By James, Duke of Ormond, their Majesties Lieutenant of Somerset, of John Burland,  
         Esq., to be captain of a company in the Regiment of Foot in the Militia called Bridgewater Regiment, 1691. 
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